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PREFACE
A doctoral dissertation on Spain and Western European economic 
cooperation during the period from 1945 to 1955 might cause initial 
surprise. During the entirety of Franco’s reign Spain was excluded from 
European initiatives as a consequence of its lack of democratic process. 
The political cartoon on the facing page caricatures the clash existing at 
the time between Spain and democratic Europe. It shows the British, 
French and Belgian foreign secretaries Ernest Bevin, George Bidault and 
Paul-Henri Spaak, representing the nations of Western Europe, initiating 
the construction of a United Europe in the name of democracy, under the 
protection of the United States with the fervour of a new generation of 
handsome Europeans. Over in a comer, the Caudillo heads a sinister 
gang united only by their common feelings of anti-Communism. The 
cartoon provides us with an excellent black and white image of Franco 
Spain’s relations with Western Europe.
It is unquestionable that Spain’s isolation from international politics in the 
postwar period is accounted for by the origins and nature of the Franco 
regime. However, isolation does not, by itself, describe the country’s 
historical reality of that time. The origins and nature of the Franco regime 
tell us little, if anything, about how the Spanish Administration perceived 
the various initiatives for European economic cooperation, articulated a 
response to them and elaborated a policy to manage the negative 
implications which initially resulted from them. This Thesis focuses its 
attention on answering a whole host of questions which stem from this 
area of inquiry. The conventional explanations provided by textbooks and 
traditional wisdom prove to be inadequate for our purpose. This set of 
answers were derived automatically from prejudgment, where emotion 
played in detriment of clear thinking
If Franco and the Falange are replaced by, for example, export 
commodities, if political diplomacy is checked and complemented by an 
economic diplomacy, and if we concentrate our investigation on the gap 
which exists between economic interests and official political 
declarations, a complex and interesting story emerges: the economic 
interests of Spain in Western Europe and vice v e rsa  and the mutual 
employment of economic tools for political purposes.
It is not only the paucity of prior research in the field that justifies this 
study, but the insights derived from it will help to provide answers to the 
broader question of how and why the Franco regime successfully sailed 
in the ocean of political antipathy after World War n.
'«
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Note on Tables
It is known that the official Spanish trade statistics, Estadistica(s) Espafiola(s) de 
Comercio Exterior, are not a reliable data source for the 1940s and 1950s.1 The then existing 
strict exchange c cm trois gave stimulus to all kinds of illicit foreign currency operations with 
undeclared holdings by Spanish importers and exporters. An OEEC study estimated that between 
1952 and 1957 Spanish exports suffered from an average 22 per cent undervaluation while it was 
of 25 per cent for imports.2 More recently, the existing discrepancy between official Spanish 
trade figures and the official statistics of Spain’s main trading partners has been recalled.3 Since 
no alternative source to the official trade statistics has been yet produced for the 1940s and 
1950s. the following official British, French and German trade figures were used whenever was 
possible:
- Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kinprinm with the Commonwealth countries and 
Foreign Countries;
- Tableau général du commerce extérieure, vols. Commerce de la France avec la France d’Outre- 
Mer et les pays étrangers: and
- Per AuBenhanrifrl der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
The United Nations’ Y earbooks of International Trade Statistics will provide broader 
comparative data.
For the sake of simplicity, the expression "Spanish monetary area" means the area covered by 
the statistics compiled by the central customs office. i.e., the area formed by metropolitan Spain, 
the Balearic and Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla, although it actually included Spanish 
Morocco, the territory of Ifni, Rio de Oro and Spanish Guinea also.
A first call of attention for the post-1945 p«riod was made by Ram6n Tamamas: 
Estructura Económica de España, 3 vols., Madrid [Guadiana] 1960, vol. 2, p. 545*
2. Report quoted by Angel Viñas, Julio Viñuela, Femando Egruidazu, Carlos 
Fernández Pulgar and Senén Florensa: Política comercial exterior en España (1931- 
1975), 2 vols., Madrid [Banco Exterior de España] 1979, 2nd vol., pp. 926 ff.
*. i.e., Juergen B. Donges: La industrialización en España. Políticas, logros, 
perspectivas, Barcelona [Oikos-Tau] 1976, p. 52, footnote no. 13, and Alan S. 
Milward: "Una comparación del comercio de exportación español, italiano y
portugués, 1950-1959", in Leandro Prados de la Escosura and Vera Zamagni (eds.): 
El desarrollo económico de la Europa del sur. España e Italia en perspectiva 
histórica, Madrid [Alianza] 1992. Donges estimated (for 1955) 16 per cent
undervaluation for Spanish export values and 8 per cent for imports values. Most 
recently, Antonio Tena Junquito: "Fiabilidad y "comparabilidad” de las
estadísticas del comercio internacional 1890-1967**, Doctoral Diss., Universidad 
de Alcalá de Henares, 1990, pp. 11, 54-58, and 98-99, has confirmed this
phenomenon and showed that during the period 1947 to 1959, Spanish export trade 
figures to the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom suffered from 
the largest undervaluation since part of the traffic was registered as directed 
to the Netherlands and Switzerland.
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"Pensez à l'Espagne, un grand pays qui vit 
dans un autre monde, à une autre époque. 
L’Europe ne doit pas devenir l’Espagne 
du monde."
Jean Monnet
"L’Espagne fait partie de l’Europe occidentale. 
C’est une vérité dont vous devez et nous devons 
convaincre de plus en plus."
Nicolás Franco
1. Declarations to France-Soir’s correspondent 
in Luxembourg on 22 October 1952, MAE, Leg. 
3368, exp. 15: Despatch No. 2024 from the 
Embassy in Paris, "Declaraciones de M. Jean 
Monnet", 23 October 1952.
2. AD, Z/EE voL 94: Jacques Dumaine, French 
Ambassador to Portugal, to Quai d’Orsay, 
"Nicolas Franco et les relations d’Espagne 
avec la France", Lisbon, 11 August 1951.
Introduction
The object of this doctoral Thesis is to demonstrate the response of the Spanish 
Administration, however confused or divided in its objectives, to the various forms in 
which Western European economic cooperation appeared during the first post-Second 
World War decade. These responses should be seen as an effort to control the 
unfavourable and discriminatory economic and political consequences experienced by 
Spain as a result of the new Western European economic initiatives. This Thesis will 
present the ongoing interplay of domestic and external forces in the definition of this 
response and it will further assess the degree of success achieved in establishing a certain 
measure of basic compatibility between the domestic and international policy strategies.1
The period discussed herein is considered to have been transitional between 
autarchy and development. During the first post World War n  decade, remnants of the 
autarchic philosophy were being progressively expelled from the Spanish administrative 
bodies dealing with foreign economic policy, but the new philosophy of development had 
not yet fully replaced autarchic thinking. The general hypothesis of this dissertation is that 
the problems imposed upon the Spanish economy by European economic cooperation 
served as a catalyst of this transitional phenomenon. Departing from the simplest concept 
of interdependence, it was supposed that the Western European States, in moving 
toward closer economic cooperation, imposed costs on the Spanish economy and that the 
Spanish Administration, within its limited capacity as an outsider, articulated a policy
x. This «pacific approach is owed to the following publications: Peter J. 
Katzenstein (ed.): Between Power and Plenty. Foreign Economic Policies of 
Advanced Industrial States, Madison [The University of Wisconsin Press] 
1978; Angel Viñas, Julio Viñuela, Fernando Eguidazu, Carlos Fernández Pulgar 
and Senén Florensa: Politics comercial exterior en España (1931-1975), 2
vols., Madrid [Banco Exterior de España] 1979; Alan S. Milward: 
Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945—51, London [Methuen] 1984 [all 
throughout the Thesis this book will be always called to its University 
Paperback ed. 1987); and, Richard T- Griffiths (ed,): The Netherlands and 
the Integration of Europe 194 5—1957, Amsterdam [NEHA] 1990. All of them make 
emphasis on the interaction between domestic strategy for economic 
development and the State's foreign action. In a more direct way the author 
owes this approach to the EUI Research Project "Challenge and Response in 
Western Europe: The History of European Integration". For Viñas et al., the 
only of the above mentioned titles which deals with Spain, to share approach 
does not mean at all to share their conclusions. This Thesis will be, at 
crucial points, their contradiction.
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response in an attempt to avoid having the burdens of adjustment forced upon it.2
Foreign economic policy is interpreted here as the interaction between the 
domestic strategy for economic development and the State's instruments for foreign action 
(foreign and commercial policies). In this line, this doctoral dissertation stays on the edge 
of the international connections of an inward-looking economy. Spain’s exports assured 
the supply of a very limited range of products which turn to be strategic from all points 
of view: economically since otherwise the economy does not run; politically since the 
economic effects produce malcontent and therefore a nice bed for political turmoil; and 
militarily because without economic development and political stability there is no 
possible defence policy. The desire of the Spanish Administration for economic 
nationalism was based on the idea that Spain could stand alone but their emphasis on 
industrialisation effectively increased, rather than diminished, Spain’s reliance on imports. 
In these circumstances, Western Europe was a main concern for the Spanish 
Administration since it represented the country’s main trading area.
That trade with OEEC countries constituted a high proportion of total Spanish 
trade (see bold figures in tables 1 and 2) constitutes the first of several commercial 
features important to retain for understanding future arguments in this work. A second 
feature is the growth of trade between 1947 and 1955: imports grew by 15.2 per cent 
while exports grew by 105.7 per cent A third important element is the stability of the 
Anglo-Saxon countries as Spain’s main single trade partners: the United Kingdom and the 
United States accounted for 23 per cent of Spain’s overall imports on average between 
1947 and 1955 (against 27.65 per cent in 1935, just before the outbreak of civil war) and 
for 29 per cent of its exports during the same period (against 32 per cent in 1935). A final 
feature is that the post-World War n  years brought important disruption of the pre-Civil 
War pattern, which was finally recovered during the fifties.
2. Interpretation of interdependence from Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. 
Nye, Jr.: "Power and Interdependence revisited", International Organization, 
vol. 41, no. 4, Autumn 1967, pp. 723-53, p. 730. This article is a 
reassessment of their Power and Interdependence, Boston (Little Brown] 1977.
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TABLE 1
SPAIN'S IMPORT TRAD* BT PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES OF PRODUCTION 
IN PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL IMPORTS, 1935-1955
Year 1935 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
TOTAL(♦) 876.1 1214.5 1483.0 1399.4 1195.1 1307.5 1752.6 1837.9 1882.1 1399.4
Austria * * 0.50 0.55 0.43 1.26
Belg-Lux. 3.61 2.64 2.49 2.73 2.60 3.88 2.71 2.36 2.87 4.49
Denmark * 0.54 0.89 1.81 1.30 2.IB 2.03 1.45 1.19 2.14
France 5.79 0.08 0.63 6.33 7.86 9.57 9.24 10.27 8.70 14.66
Germany M 14.02 0.17 0.02 0.88 4.13 4.54 9.12 11.60 11.27 13.70
Ireland * 0.04 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.44 0.59 0.19 0.36 0.44
Italy 3.33 1.47 1.53 1.82 1.08 0.96 2.10 2.35 1.80 3.25
Netherlands 3.63 2.30 2.61 3.06 2.39 2.71 2.93 2.20 3.03 4.42
Norway * 0.58 1.29 1.74 1.74 1.73 1.98 1.63 1.82 2.31
Portugal 0.44 0.77 0.55 0.44 0.59 0.78 0.14 0.21 0.53 0.35
Sweden 2.86 2.08 2.70 2.29 2.23 2.17 2.80 4.62 2.72 3.54
Switzerland 2.25 2.40 2.55 2.94 1.78 2.55 1.95 2.70 3.12 4.51
Turkey * 0.38 0.20 0.08 0.12 0.22 0.12 2.01 2.88 0.69
U.K. 10.87 6.34 11.95 8.35 7.10 8.55 10.09 10.33 10.35 13.74
O.E.E.C. 46.6 19.79 27.56 32.66 33.11 40.88 46.30 52.47 51.07 69.50
Arabia * * 3.65 * * * 8.37 7.91 7.63 11.43
Argentina 2.51 21.31 26.84 13.43 2.68 2.46 1.19 1.52 0.61 0.21
Brazil 0.42 8.32 8.00 8.62 3.27 0.95 0.85 1.68 2.15 6.29
U.S.A. 16.78 8.84 6.99 8.97 13.19 15.98 16.64 5.84 18.36 25.07
Source: United Nation*; Yearbook(s) of International Trade Statistics. Each year has been 
listed from the yearbook which incorporated the last updating, i.e. years 1935 and 1953 from TITS 1956, 1947 from YITS 1950, 1948 from YITS 1957r 1949 from YITS 1951, 1950 YITS 
1952, 1951 from YITS 1953, 1952 ¿rod YITS 1955, 1^4 ¿rom YITS 1958, and 1955 from YITS 
195$. Data for 1945 and 1946 is not available. (#) Value in millions of gold-pesetas. It 
includes gold and excludes trade with Canary Islands, Ceuta, Melilla, Spanish Morocco and 
Spanish Guinea. 4M) Listed as Federal Republic of Germany since 1950 (*) Figure not
available. (-) Category not applicable.
On import trade, the 1935 status was altered between 1946 and 1949 by massive 
imports from Argentina and Brazil, which were entirely unrequited by Spanish exports to 
both countries. The deficit with Argentina was caused by import of cereals, something 
directly ascribable to domestic policies responsible for the decline in agricultural 
production. After 1950, the South American in te rreg n u m  ended and the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France and Germany returned to be main suppliers of the Spanish 
economy, amounting to (on average) 45 per cent of total Spanish imports between 1950 
and 1955 as compared to 47.5 per cent in 1935. Leaving aside the steep rise of
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agricultural imports on credit from Argentina, there was a greater shift in Spanish imports 
than in experts, reflecting and affecting the changes in internal economy.
In terms of volume, imports had decreased after 1948 and only started to increase 
after 1952 maintaining altogether a level lower than 1935 until the 1960s. Regarding 
import commodity composition, foodstuffs finally reduced, after 1949, their high 
percentage to a level lower than pre-Civil War, going from 30 per cent on average in 
1946-1949 to 12 per cent in 1950-1955. The diminution of imports of foodstuffs freed 
important financial resources to purchase other categories of goods. Manufactured goods 
and raw materials maintained during 1950-1955 an average percentage of 46 and 40 per 
cent, respectively (while they had been 36 and 35, respectively, in 1946-48). Investment 
goods. i.e., metals and their manufacture, machinery, pieces of equipment and vehicles 
(class IV and V of the Spanish Tariff), increased their share in total imports (from 16 per 
cent in 1946-48 to 27 per cent in 1949-1955). The per capita value of these imports, at 
constant {»ices, maintained at the level of 6.2 Ptas during the 1940s, passed to be 18.3 
Ptas in 1950-55.3 This important investment effort -frequently referred to as strcrtegic- 
should attract more attention than the little quantitative importance of the country's trade 
in terms of GDP.4
The recovery of the pre-Civil War export trade pattern, in terms of destination, 
could only be completed in 1952 due to the late incorporation of Germany. However, 
excluding the latter and the year 1947, when trade across the Franco-Spanish border was 
still interrupted, the United Kingdom, the United States and France reappeared as main 
markets for Spanish export commodities in 1948. Even after the disappearance of the 
German market, which during the period between 1941 and 1945 received 30 per cent of 
Spain's total exports, a full 57 per cent of Spain's exports were directed towards markets
Manuel de Torre* (director): "EX Comercio Exterior y «1 desarrollo
económico español", Información Comercial Española, no* 328, December 1960, 
pp. 18-56, p. 34.
4. i.e. Banco Urquijo: La economía española en 1952-53, Madrid, 1954, p. 13. 
For a concise exposition of the long debate previous to and during the first 
years of the Franco era, see Enrique Fuentes Quintana: "¿Es aplicable a
España la teoría keynesiana?", in Román Perpiñá Grau: De estructura
económica y Economía hispana, Madrid [Rialp] 1952 [1935], pp. 417-4 9, in 
particular pp. 432-33.
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in Western Europe in the years between 1947 and 1950. From 1951 to 1955, the OEEC 
countries (especially Germany) received 55.7 per cent of Spain’s total exports, against
65.4 per cent in 1935. Following the pre-Civil War pattern, Spanish foreign trade 
maintained a strong concentration on the European front and OEEC countries provided 
Spain with its major trading surplus with any area. With no other means to finance 
imports than exports, Spanish exports to Western Europe provided sufficient financial fuel 
to prevent a collapse of the Spanish economy.
TABLE 2
SBXIX' S EXPORT TRADE BT PRINCIPAL COONTRHS OF LAST CONSIGNMENT 
IB PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL EXPORTS, 1935-1955
Year 1935 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
TOTAL(♦) 569.7 664 821.7 886 947 1524.5 1402.5 1478.9 1421.6 1366.0
Belg-Lux. 5.14 6.61 4.44 3.97 4.13 4.93 3.35 2.99 2.76 3.19
Denmark * 1.90 1.35 3.23 3.75 1.65 1. 68 1.80 1.65 1.66
France 12.11 0.0 6. 96 14.10 8.34 7.91 10.49 7.84 6.77 8.05
Germany M 13.13 0.59 1.01 3.23 2.89 5.54 9.00 13.00 11.06 14.53
Italy 3.44 6.23 3.46 2.70 1.67 1.65 2.25 1.30 1.48 2.05
Netherlands 5.28 7.41 4.58 5.02 3.54 5.15 3.85 3.61 3.51 4.65
Norway * 1.45 2.24 2.96 2.21 1.60 2.04 2.28 1.85 2.09
Sweden 1.51 3.06 5.04 4.37 3.42 2.77 3.74 3.08 2.71 2.53
Switzerland 2.32 4.31 6.84 4.42 2.59 3.27 3.36 3.91 4.04 3.58
U.K. 22.47 19.50 22.86 20.77 16.61 19. 99 17.59 15.65 16.64 16.30
O.E.E.C. €5.40 51.06 58.78 64.77 51.15 54.46 57.35 55.46 52.47 58.63
Argentina 5.56 6.90 3.57 3.02 3.90 0.75 0.33 0.06 0.36 0.23
Brazil 0.63 1.61 1.81 1.99 1.85 1.01 0.41 1.78 2.57 5.50
U.S.A. 9.50 8.23 9.36 5.74 15.27 13.28 10.59 10.66 10.45 10.50
Source: ••• table 1.
The questions raised by this Thesis could not be satisfactory answered from a 
purely political point of view, which hardly considers the economic reality of foreign 
relations. By taking a broader look at these areas of inquiry, this Thesis attempts to 
provide a new direction for research in post-1945 Franco Spain’s international relations.5
5. Because documentary records were not accessible, research into Franco 
Spain's international relations started only recently in a sort of revival, 
warmly welcome as "the end of lethargy” by E. Fuentès: **L' histoire des
relations internationales en Espagne: la fin de la léthargie”, Relations 
internationales, no. 42, Summer 1985, pp. 183-86. Other authors deal with 
this revival of the Spanish diplomatic history: 1/ Victor Morales Lezca— no:
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The scarce historiography on Spain’s foreign policy, foreign economic policy and 
international relations, leads us to believe that Franco’s Spain paid little attention to or 
was incapable of formalising a response to the integrative initiatives taking place in 
Western Europe during the late 1940s and the first half of the 1950s. There are two 
possible explanations accounting for the historical gap in research on this period. First, 
the traditional historiographical procedure bad been to jump from the end of the Second 
World War to the 1953 Spanish-American military bases agreement, quickly arriving at 
the most obvious feature of Spam’s return to international affairs, i.e., the sbategic 
factor. Second, the non-existence of a European dimension in Spain's foreign action is 
a strongly adhered-to belief.
Researchers examining Spain’s foreign policy have only minimally questioned 
traditional accounts given by Alberto Martin Aitajo, Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs 
at the time, and Franco himself in many of their public statements.6 That is to say, it was 
customarily suggested that Spain’s foreign policy activities of the time centered around 
five principal areas. 1) The Spanish question before the United Nations: between 1946 
and 1950 the United Nations entered into a debate as to which measures might best be
a) "Las relacionas internacionales de España con sus vecinos mediterráneos. 
(Üna revista de libros)", Revista Estudios Internacionales, vol. 4, no. 3, 
1983, pp. 543-51; b) "Les relations d'Espagne avec ses voisins", Relations 
internationales, no. 37, 1984, pp. 141—47; c) "La rehabilitación de un campo 
de estudios", Revista de Estudios Internaciona- les, vol. 6, no. 3, 1985, 
pp. 665—70; and, d) "Historia de las relaciones internacionales: España 
contemporánea. (Notas de Lecturas)", Revista de Estudios Internacionales, 
vol. 7, no. 2, 1986, pp. 575-82. 2/ Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares : a)
"Reflexiones sobre la histo- ria de las relaciones internacionales y la 
política exterior española", Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea, 
no. 8, 1987, pp. 269-89; b) "Franquismo y Democracia: el desconocimiento de 
dos historiografias contemporáneas", in Españoles e Italianos en el Mundo 
Contemporáneo, Madrid, 1990, pp. 309-18; and, c) with Angel Cervantes 
Conejo: "La política exterior del franquismo: un reto para la historiografía 
española", Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, no. 12, 1990, pp. 175-82. 
3/ Marco Mugnaini: "Recenti studi sulla política estera della Spagna
contemporánea", Storla delle Rela2ioni Internazionali, 1989, no. 2, pp. 371- 
85. Actually there are more articles published in the 1980s pointing out a 
revival in the field than publications to prove it!
4. Franco to Cortes on 17 May 1952, cit. in Juan Pablo Fusi: Franco.
Autoritarismo y po- der personal, Madrid [El Pais] 1985, p. 110. 
Compilations of Franco's public statements to be found in chapter 1, 
footnote no. 5. For Alberto Martin Arta jo see the articles written after his 
dismissal: a) "Las constantes de nuestra política exterior", Arbor, nos. 
151-52, July/August 1958, pp. 336-46; b) "Política Exterior de España (1898- 
1960)", text of a speech pronounced by Artajo on 24 March 1960 in the 
University of Georgetown, Washington D.C., and c) "L'Espagne et ses 
Relations internationales", Synthèse, no. 199, December 1962, pp. 159—67.
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adopted in order to secure a change in the Spanish regime, then regarded as the last 
vestige of Fascism. 2) In an attempt to break out of diplomatic isolation, the Franco 
regime cultivated close foreign relations wherever it could. Relations with the Arab and 
Latin American nations had the main purpose of giving a world-wide dimension to 
Spain’s foreign policy. 3) Relations with Portugal materialised in form of the Iberian Pact. 
Although the efficiency of the Pact is still questionable, it did serve to counter-balance - 
in domestic public opinion terms- the rest of the Western European pacts. 4) The signing 
of the Concordat with the Vatican in August 1953 provided an important ideological 
backing to Spain in its isolation. Finally, 5) Spain’s preparations for the bilateral military- 
economic agreements with the United States, which took place in September of 1953, 
remained the pillar of Spain’s foreign policy, representing considerable propaganda and 
material success for the Spanish government of the time. According to previous research 
efforts, Spain's foreign action of the period in question seems to have been limited to 
these areas.7
\  These are the main issues before and after the opening of the Spanish 
records during the 1980s: José Mario Armero: La Politica Exterior de Franco, 
Barcelona [Planeta] 1978; Charles R. Halstead: "Spanish Foreign Policy,
1936-1978” and the rest of the contributions in James W. Cortada (ed. ) : 
Spain in the Twentieth-Century World. Essays on Spanish Diplomacy, 18 98-
1978, London [Aldwych Press] 1980, pp. 41-94; Angel Viñas: a) Los pactos 
secretos de Franco con los Estados Unidos. Bases, ayuda económica, recortes 
de soberanía, Barcelona [Grijalbo] 1981, and b) "La politica exterior dei 
franquismo", in Juan Bautista Vilar (ed.): Las relaciones internacionales 
en la España Contemporánea, Murcia [Servicio de Publicaciones de la 
Universidad de Murcia] 1989, pp. 115—24; Pereira: Introducción al estudio 
de la politica exterior de España (Siglos XIX y XX), Madrid [Akal] 1983; 
Francisco Aldecoa Luzárraga: a) "La politica exterior de España en
perspectiva histórica, 1945—1984. De la autocracia al Estado de Derecho", 
Sistema. Revista de Ciencias Sociales, no. 63, 1984, pp. 111-31, and b) "Las 
relaciones bilaterales hispano-portuguesas en perspectiva histórica, 1945- 
1978” in Guy Clausse and M» . do Céu Esteves (eds.): As relacoes luso-
espanhoas no contexto da adesso à C.E.E., Lisbon [Instituto de Estudios para 
o Desenvolvimiento] 1987, pp. 75—100; Paola Brundu Olla: a) Ostracismo e 
Realpolitik. Gli Alleati e la Spagna franchista negli anni del dopoguerra, 
Cagliari (Celt Editrice] 1984, and b) L'Anello Mancante. Il problema della 
Spagna franchista e l'organizzazione della difesa occidentale (1947—1950), 
Sassari [Università degli Studi di Sassari] 1990; Victor Morales Lezcano: 
a) "Les relations de l'Espagne avec ses voisins", Relations internationales, 
no. 37, 1984, pp. 141-47, b) "L'Espagne, de 1'isolationnisme à l'integration 
Internationale", Relations Internationales, no. 50, Summer 1987, pp. 14 7-55, 
and, c) "L'Espagne des années de la guerre et son isolement d'après-guerre 
(1939-1953)" in La Moyenne Puissance su Xxème Siede, Paris, 1988; 
Florentino Portero: a) "Politica exterior española, 1945-1953", Proserpina, 
no. 1, 1984, pp. 161-74, and b) Franco Aislado. La cuestión española (194 5- 
1950), Madrid, 1989; Antonio Marguina Barrio: España en la politica de 
seguridad occidental (1939-1986), Madrid (Servicio de Publicaciones del 
Estado Mayor del Ejército] 1986; Benny Pollack: The Paradox of the Spanish 
Foreign Policy. Spain's International Relations from Franco to Democracy, 
London [Pinter Publisher] 1987; Manuel Espadas Burgos: Franguismo v politica 
exterior, Madrid [Rialp] 1988; and, finally, the edited Ph.D.Diss. of 
Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla: Diplomacia franguista v politica cultural
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Given Spain’s strong economic dependence on European markets, it is clear that 
its foreign policy had a European dimension. This doctoral dissertation intends to 
demonstrate that Western European post-war institutional economic reorganisation was at 
the forefront of the Spanish Administration’s economic and political concerns. Although 
this was an important aspect of Spain’s foreign policy, it was less colourful and certainly 
not as suitable for use in statements to the press, parliamentary Cortes, or popular 
gatherings. Obviously, Franco’s Administration was not about to place Western Europe 
at the top of its list of priorities while the Western European governments were not 
cordial in political terms. However, Western European economic reorganisation constituted 
the essential point of departure for Spain’s post-1945 foreign policy and, most especially, 
foreign economic action.
This research addresses the previously described area of inquiry from two 
perspectives: challenge and response. From the first perspective, it attempts to reconstruct 
the Spanish Administration’s perception of the various institutional arrangements, 
considered in this Thesis, in which European integration manifested itself. Implications 
for the development of Spanish strategies for domestic economic and foreign action will 
be also explored. From this point of view we can see how the concept of an objective 
national interest is altered when the various perceptions of national interest are challenged 
through interaction with the outside world. From the second perspective, this research 
examines the policies which the Spanish Administration formulated in an effort to adjust 
to newly created circumstances. Included in this analysis are: an in-depth examination of 
the set of policy options available at the time, the State’s room for action and the policy­
makers and the policy-making process. Information is presented and examined from these 
two perspectives, although overlap is inevitable and a clear line of distinction could hardly 
be drawn.
The actions of the central Spanish Administration of the time period in question
hacia Ibaroamérica. 1939-1953, Madrid [Centro Superior da Xnveatigacionea 
Cientificas] 1988» This perspective is common also to books covering the 
entire Franco period: José Antonio Biescas and Manuel Tuftôn de Lara: Espafta 
baio la dictadura fascists (1939-1975), Barcelona [Labor] 1980; Stanley C. 
Payne: The Franco Regime, 1936—1975, Madison [University of Wisconsin Press] 
1987; andr Javier Tuseli: La dictadura de Franco, Madrid [Alianza] 1988.
8
is the principal focus of this research. The domestic players responsible for shaping the 
foreign economic options of Spain were necessarily limited to include the inner circles of 
the State Administration dealing with foreign matters: top civil servants, ministers and 
Cabinet members. The effect that pressure and interest groups or that any other actors of 
possible influence had on swaying official Spanish positions has proven either to be 
insignificant or too difficult to determine given the state of public records.* The 
hypothesis underlying this line of approach is that the Spanish Administration was far 
from a monolithic entity.
The first chapter introduces the main Spanish actors of the story and explains the 
mechanics of foreign economic policy as it stood in 1947. The objective of this chapter 
is to show how the principle of unity in foreign action was elaborated over time. 
Given that further examples of administrative conflict will be encountered in later events 
covered herein, this chapter provides an indispensable tool for subsequent analysis. The 
purpose of the second chapter is to describe early post-Second World War reconstruction 
efforts and Spain’s role in them. A thorough understanding of the immediate post-war 
experience with Spain’s attending economic contribution to European relief and 
reconstruction efforts, is essential to appreciate the Spanish Administration's response to 
later events of European economic cooperation. The third chapter will explain the 
circumstances and consequences of Spain’s exclusion from the European Recovery 
Program. The relative importance of Spain’s subsequent American connection will 
be presented in chapter four.
The following chapter examines large frameworks of cooperation such as the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union. 
Three case-studies will be presented for the purpose of determining how the early forms 
of European multilateral economic cooperation affected Spain's trade performance: the 
United Kingdom, France and Germany, Spain’s foremost commercial partners in Europe.
*. The experience with the Socialist Party in exile and agricultural 
organised groups, leads to this conclusion. See my "The Spanish Socialists 
and the European Question in the Decade of the 1950s", EDI Colloquium Paper 
no. 312/B8 (Col 73), November 19B6, and "Spain and the Green Pool: Challenge 
and Response, 1950-1955", EUI Colloquium Paper no. 312/90 (Col 46), November 
1990. For the state of public records see Archivalia section.
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Chapter six deals with the impact on the Spanish economy of the first of the European 
Communities, that is, the European Coal and Steel Community. Moreover, in chapter 
seven, we will look at attempts that were made to extend integration to other economic 
sectors that failed to set up some form of multilateral institutional structure, such as 
agriculture and transport. The questions this research aims to answer are thus new and 
relevant in Spanish historical terms.9
This research claims to have also roam within the general literature on European 
cooperation and integration, in which Spain is rarely mentioned. In the past, research 
priority in the field was rightly focused on countries directly involved in establishing 
institutional arrangements designed for purposes of European economic cooperation or 
integration. The main concern of this research is the effects of these institutional 
arrangements on the most peripheral country in Western Europe with regard to European 
cooperation. Because Spain did not belong to any institution of a European scope until 
the late 1950s, it has been excluded from preceding analyses. However, a country's lack 
of participation in institutional arrangements does not prevent these very institutions from 
affecting its economic structure and political circumstances. Even though Spain did not 
participate in European economic agreements, it was affected by them because of its role 
in the European pattern of trade. A minor part, perhaps, but nevertheless a role. This 
research suggests that more explicit attention should be paid to the experience of those 
countries not directly involved in the institutional arrangements of regional integration and
*. Two titl.s con*titut® th. »pacific lit.ratur. on thi* Th.aia' topic. Juan 
Ortega Galán: "Proceso de aislamiento e incorporación de España a la
organización internacional (1944-1959)• Factores que ejercieron mayor 
influencia. Consideración especifica de la incorporación a la OECE", 
Doctoral Diss., Universidad de Barcelona Law School, May 1976, written 
without the benefits of public records. Luis Antonio Buñuel Salcedo: "España 
y la idea de Europa (La Política Europea de España 1945-1958)", 2 vols., 
January 1986, a never published Report for the European Studies Programme 
of the Joan March Foundation and accessible exclusively at the Foundation's 
Library, used a much limited range of sources than the present Thesis. The 
literature written contemporarily to the events described here is limited 
to Estudios sobre la unidad económica de Europa, 9 vola., Madrid [Estudios 
Económicos Españoles y Europeos S.A.] 1951—1961. These Estudios, edited
during the period 1951—1961, consist of a compilation of studies of economic 
sectors from the perspective of their integration in a perfect European 
economic union. They were directed by José Larraz, former Minister of the 
Treasury in Franco's second Government (August 1939/May 1941), a convinced 
phalangist who turned out later on to be an equally convinced supporter of 
a Federal Europe. Other published works with an exclusive ideological 
standpoint are not considered here.
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international interdependence. This is an additional historiographical justification for the 
present research.
It is important to note that this Thesis will not deal with defence agreements and 
their economic effects. Relevant forms of European cooperation, such as the Western 
European Union (Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948), the North Atlantic Treaty (signed 
in Washington on 4 April 1949) and the European Defence Community (launched in May 
1952 and put an end to in August 1954 by the French National Assembly), are out of its 
scope. This Thesis also excludes from its consideration the military considerations 
involved in the bilateral agreement for military bases with the United States which was 
signed in September 1953. Without access to records of the Spanish Ministry of Defence, 
only direct access to official records of the United States could have provided a clear 
understanding of the particular set of circumstances in which Spain's incorporation into 
the Western European defence strategy was conceived and finally emerged. Another 
element conscientiously omitted from consideration by this Thesis was the Council of 
Europe (whose Statute was signed in London on May 5th, 1949) because of its minimal 
influence in the modification of Spain’s course of foreign action.10
10. Emilio Muftoz Alemany : El proceso de integración de España en el Consejo 
de Europa, Granada [Universidad de Granada] 1989. For a contemporary 
ideological perception of the Council of Europe by the semiofficial Spain's 
observer to the inaugural session of its Assembly in August 1949, see 
Ernesto Giménez Caballero: a) L'Europe de Strasbourg. Vision espagnole du 
problème européen, Strasbourg [Heintz] 1950, translated as La Europa de 
Estrasburgo (Visión española del problema europeo), Madrid [Instituto de 
Estudios PoliticosVGráficas González] 1950, and b) Informe sobre el Consejo 
de Europa en Estrasburgo (Durante su segunda reunión, 7 al 28 de Agosto de 
1950), Madrid [Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores) 1950, both to be found in 
Spain's National Library, Madrid.
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Chapter 1:
POLITICS OR ECONOMICS?
THE ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 
AS ESTABLISHED BY 1947
1.1. Introduction p. 15
1.2. The Higher Level of Policy-Making p. 16
1.3. Ministerial Struggle for Control of Foreign Economic Policy p. 21
1.4. The Concept of Unity in Foreign Action p. 31
1.5. The Under-Secretariat for Foreign Economy and Commerce p. 43
1.6. Conclusions p. 50
"The State's attitude in the economic field 
developing in contact with the foreign 
world is one and, as such, unity must be 
conducted and administered." July 19461
1.1. Introduction
The present chapter has the purpose of showing how foreign economic policy was 
administered by 1947 when European economic cooperation on a multilateral scale began 
with the launching of the European Recovery Program. A clear image of the machinery 
of foreign economic policy-making constitutes a necessary tool when analysing the issues 
with which the following chapters will be concerned. This chapter intends to provide a 
picture of who the policy-makers were and their general perceptions on the best way to 
run the nation's foreign economic policy. It will show how the Spanish Administration 
was far from constituting a monolithic entity to execute the guidelines imposed from the 
higher political spheres of the regime. This chapter will reveal the struggle existing among 
the different Ministries to gain control over the nation's foreign economic policy. Finally, 
this chapter will also describe the national and international factors that constrained and 
shaped the evolution of the various administrative re-organisations that attempted to 
handle the foreign economic relations of the nation more effectively. The way this
1. MAE, Leg. 4618, «ip. 22: "Nota relativa a loa problemas qua a* plantean 
an la Subsecretaría llamada da Comercio, Política Arancelaria y Monada", 
Saint Sabaatian, 29 July 1946, n/a, probably draftad by tha Diractor Gane ral 
of Economic Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for his Minister.
machinery, at different stages, influenced the issues concerning Spain's relationship to the 
various forms of formalised European interdependence anri how the positions adopted by 
the various policy-makers had to accommodate to specific domestic and international 
affairs will be shown throughout the Thesis.
This chapter has not followed any of the multiple theoretical approaches to the 
study of policy-making in foreign policy. The bureaucratic politics approach was of little 
use for this chapter since the study of all its requirements was completely impossible to 
fulfil. The lack of research in many aspects of this field, the lack of documentary 
information and, most especially, the aim to determine the administrative machinery 
involved and not the policy outcomes, made its use here of little effect. Most of the 
theoretical approaches to policy-making concentrate on single processes limited in time. 
This thesis covers quite a long range of items in a decade, making it therefore impossible 
to go into such detail as required in the different theoretical models. This is an ad-hoc 
case-study with difficult extendibility to other studies. There will certainly be other 
systems in which an element qualifying this case may appear but not the others and 
always with a different intensity. This chapter is based simply on the basic idea that the 
Spanish Administration could not be an unified and single actor but a complex and 
compartmentalised machine. The administrative definition regarding foreign economic 
policy could not be the result of one man's efforts but instead of internal bargaining 
within the entire Administration.2
1.2. The Higher Level of Policy-Making
Foreign policy, as a set of actions and decisions, is the instrument chosen by the 
Government to deal with the outside world. During the early period of the Franco regime
2. Recant criticism* of policy-making theories from historians are Marlis 
G. Steinert! "La décision en matière de politique étrangère: un essai sur 
l'utilisation de théories pour l'étude des relations internationales”, in 
Enjeux et Puissances. Pour une histoire des relations internationales au XXe 
siècle. Mélanges en l'honneur de Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Paris 
[Publications de la Sorbonne] 1966, pp. 69-82; and J. Garry Clifford: 
"Bureaucratic Politics", The Journal of American History, vol. 77, no. 1, 
June 1990, pp. 161-66.
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this field was dominated exclusively by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where political 
elements constituted its main input. Commercial policy constituted a rather limited 
concept for the Spanish Administration, referring to the administrative aspect of foreign 
economic relations. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce was the instrument selected 
to deal with this second field. The combination of both spheres, foreign policy and foreign 
economic relations, constitutes the State’s foreign action. The interaction between 
domestic strategy for economic development and the State’s foreign action constitutes the 
State’s foreign economic policy.3
J. What studies dealing with the formulation of policy-making in the Franco 
period have to offer i» of very little help when dealing with foreign 
economic policy for the period 1945 to 1955. The literature is mainly 
concerned with the post—1957 period when the major economic turning point 
in the Franco period occurred: Charlea W. Anderson: The Political Economy 
of Modern Spain. Policy Making in an Authoritarian System/ Madison [The 
University of Wisconsin Press] 1970; Kenneth N. Medhurst: Government in 
Spain. The Executive at Work, Oxford [Pergamon Press) 1973; Manuel Jesús 
González González: a) "Los economistas en el preludio de la planificación 
indicativa", Investigaciones económicas, no. 6, May-August 1978, pp. 121-56; 
and b) La economía política del franguismo, 1940-1970. Dirigismo, mercado 
y planificación, Madrid [Tecnos] 1979; Richard Gunther: Public Policy in a 
No-Partv State: Spanish Planning and Budgeting in the Twilight of the
Franguast Era, Berkely [University of California Press] 1980; and Jayier 
Tusell: La dictadura de Franco, Madrid [Alianza Editorial) 1988, pp. 214 ff. 
For the political personnel of Franco's administration, Equipo Mundo: Los 
90 Ministros de Franco, Barcelona [Dopesa] 2nd ed., 1970; Caries Viver Pi- 
Sunyer: El personal politico de Franco (1936-1945), Barcelona [Vicens Vives] 
1978; and Miguel Jerez Mir: Elites politicas y centros de extracción en 
España, 1938-1957, Madrid [Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas] 1982, 
pointing to the búreaucracy as an important element in the regime1 s 
political elite, although unfortunately not as disaggregated as might be 
desired. All the above-mentioned works are scarcely based on archival 
sources. Angel Viñas is the only scholar who has paid attention to foreign 
economic policy-making for the period of our concern. His works constitute 
an important secondary source in the matter. A. Viñas, Julio Viñuela, 
Fernando Equidazu, Carlos Fernández Pulgar, and Senén Florensa: Política 
comercial exterior en España, 1931-1975, 2 vols., Madrid [Servicio de
Estudios Económicos del Banco Exterior de España] 1979, constitutes an 
excellent result of limited access to the public archives and a still valid 
reference to the Franco regime's commercial policy. The bureaucratic 
phenomenon of infighting was later developed by Viñas: a) "La conexión entre 
autarquía y política exterior en el primer franquismo (1939-1959)", Revista 
de Estudios Internacionales, vol. I, no. 1, January-March 1980, to be found 
in Viñas: Guerra, dinero, dictadura. Ayuda fascista y autargüía en la España 
de Franco, Barcelona [Critica] 1984, pp. 205-37; b) "La administración de 
la política económica exterior en España, 1936-1979", Cuadernos Económicos 
de ICE, no. 13, 1980, pp. 157-272; c) Los pactos secretos de Franco con los 
Estados Unidos. Bases, ayuda económica, recortes de soberanía, Barcelona 
[Grijalbo] 1981; and d) "La política exterior española durante el franquismo 
y el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores", Cuenta y Razón, no. 6, 1982, to be 
found in Guerra, dinero, dictadura, cit., pp. 265—87. Spain's diplomatic 
historians seem to pay no attention at all to the subject, apart from its 
most obvious features. Most recently the Diplomatic School and the Under­
secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs financed an ambitious research 
project in this field, "La Administración Exterior del Estado: estructura, 
funcionamiento y análisis comparado", directed by Juan Carlos Pereira from 
the Department of Contemporary History, Universidad Complutense, Madrid. Its 
first phase ran from October to June 1991 without any apparent publication 
as yet.
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Although this research focusses on the Administration as the main actor, the fact 
that the literature has always stressed that political and economic guidelines were designed 
by the Chief of State himself could not be avoided. Generalissimo Francisco Franco 
Bahamonde, victor of the civil war by the Grace of God, was Head of the State, Prime 
Minister, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Chief of the Phalange Party.4 
He ruled the nation without being himself subject to rules. He had to answer for his 
actions only to the Almighty. The degree of power held by Franco was therefore 
immense.
The problem is to determine how this power was translated into the daily bread 
and butter of policy-making. When be intended to determine the policy guidelines for the 
Spanish Administration, he remained imprecise and vague, if not contradictory'. Franco’s 
numerous public statements widely quoted in the literature cannot be interpreted by any
*. See Medhurst, op. cit., pp. 55 ff. for the most revealing items of 
legislation in relation to the legal basis of Franco's political system and 
personal power. For the text of the Decree 138/1936 of 29 September, and of 
Laws of 30 January 1938 and 8 August 193 9 conferring on Franco full powers 
and in force during the entire Franco period, as it was stated by the First 
Transitory Disposition II of the Organic Law of the State, 1 January 1967, 
see Jorge de Esteban (ed.): Las Constituciones de España, Madrid [Taurus] 
1981, pp. 221-29, and 264. For a concise and brilliant biography of Franco, 
Juan Pablo Fusi: Franco. Autoritarismo y poder personal, Madrid [El Pais] 
1985, published in English as Franco. A Biography, London [Unwin Hyman] 
1987. The Prime Minister in Spain is called the President of the Government, 
and Council of Ministers and Government are synonym expressions in the 
Spanish Law, Aurelio Guaita: El Conscio de Ministros, Madrid [Publicaciones 
de la Secretarla General Tècnica de la Presidencia del Gobierno] 1959. 
Article 3 of the Law of 8 August 1939 suppressed the figure of Vice- 
President of the Government. Franco remained his Prime Minister until 1973 
when he handed the job over to Admiral Carrero Blanco. Luis Carrero Blanco 
(1903-1973), active Navy officer during the Spanish Civil War was appointed 
to the Under-Secretariat to the Presidency of the Government (Secretary of 
the Cabinet Council) in May 1940 as well as Phalange National Adviser. The 
Under-Secretary's tasks were to prepare the meeting of the Council of 
Ministers and the different standing or ad hoc Cabinet Committees 
(Comisiones Delegadas del Gobierno). Under Article 4 of the Decree-Law of 
19 July 1951, the Under-Secretariat was elevated to the category of 
Ministry, apart from the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, hereafter 
remained in power. In 1967 he was appointed Vice-President of the Government 
without resigning as Minister Under-Secretary. In 1973 became President of 
the Spanish Government; in December he was assassinated by the Basque 
terrorist group ETA. He had declared himself to be "a man totally identified 
with the political work of the Caudillo. My loyalty to his person and his 
work is complete, transparent, and pure, without any shadow of private 
reservation or blemish of mental reserve.** cit. in Jesus Ynfante: La
prodigiosa aventura del Opus Dei, Paris [Ruedo Ibèrico] 1970, p. 175. The 
political thinking of the so-called Franco's alter ego could be assessed 
reading through the pages of Luis Carrero Blanco: Discursos v escritos 1943— 
1973, Madrid [Instituto de Estudios Politicos] 1974.
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means as policy directives.5 This might be due to the state of the Spanish archives where 
the sources corresponding to the Chief of State in public record offices are veiy few.6 
The few traces which could be found in the archives do not bring further clarification on 
this point.7
The limited research carried out for this Thesis tends to point to the idea of a set 
of principles forming part of the regime’s mentality instead of clear-cut and defined policy 
options from the Chief of State.* In other words, the Spanish Administration followed
s. Some compilations of Franco's public statements are: Franco ha dicho. 
Discursos y declaraciones, Madrid, 4th ed., 1948; Textos de doctrina
politica. Palabras y escritos de 1945 a 1950, Madrid, 1951; Pensamiento 
econòmico de Franco, Madrid [Centros de Estudios Sindicales de la 
Organización Sindical de FET y de las JONS] 1958; Discursos y mensajes de
S.E. el Jefe del Estado en las Cortes Españolas. 1943-1961, Madrid, 1961; 
and, finally, Pensamiento político de Franco, 2 vols., Madrid [Ediciones del 
Movimiento] 1975. An interesting insight into Franco's perception of reality 
is provided by Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo: a) Mis conversaciones
privadas con Franco, Barcelona [Planeta] 1976, and b) Mi vida junto a 
Franco, Barcelona [Planeta] 1977. Araujo was Franco's first cousin and head 
of his military household 1954 to 1975. The book is full of flashbacks for 
the period of time covered by this Thesis•
*. The publication of 8 volumes on Franco's statecraft based on the private 
documents (sic) of the General, who supposedly kept copies of all important 
documents and entrusted them to his wife, proves that an important part of 
the public records escaped public control, Luis Suárez Fernández: Francisco 
Franco y su tiempo, Madrid [Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco] 1984.
7. One of the rare documents attributed to Franco in this field, 
"Fundamentos y directrices de un Plan de Saneamiento de nuestra economia, 
armónico con nuestra reconstrucción nacional", is of an early date: 9
October 1939. This document was brought to public attention from the 
darkness of the archives by Javier Tusell: "La autarquía cuartelaria. Las 
ideas económicas de Franco a partir de un documento inedito", Historia 16, 
no. 115, November 1985, pp. 41—49. Tusell only mentions in his article that 
this important document comes "from the private archive of one of the [14!] 
Ministers appointed in August 1939".
*. In using mentality and referring to the Franco regime as authoritarian, 
distinct from both democratic governments and totalitarian systems, see Juan 
J. Linz: "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain", in Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen 
(eds.): Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems. Contributions to
Comparative Political Sociology, Helsinki [The Westermarck Society] 1964, 
pp. 291-341; re-published in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (eds.): Mass 
Politics: Studies in Political Sociology, New York [Free Press] 1970, pp. 
251—83, p. 257. A reappraisal of the topic was done by Linz in "Totalitarian 
and Authoritarian Regimes", in Fred I. Greens te in and Nelson W. Polsby 
(eds.) : Macropolitical Theory Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3, Reading 
(MA) [Addison-ttfesley] 1975, pp. 175—411. An identical distinction between 
totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorships, the Franco regime among the 
latter, is Stephen J. Lee: The European Dictatorships 1918-1945, London 
[Methuen] 1987, pp. 299 ff. See Javier Tusell: La dictadura de Franco, 
Madrid (Alianza Editorial] 1988, pp. 86-106; and Eduardo Sevilla Guzmán and 
Manuel González de Molina: "Política Social Agraria del primer franquismo", 
in José Luis Garcia Delgado (éd.): El primer franguismo. España durante la 
segunda guerra mundial, Madrid [Siglo XXI] 1988, pp. 135-187, specially pp. 
136-46, for detailed references to the lively debate on the nature of the 
Franco regime that has gone on for now more than two decades. A most recent
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non-codified ways of reacting to situations. Franco very rarely played an active role in 
formulating policy, although he imposed the limits for the policy options for the 
Administration.9
The basic principle of the Franco regime’s foreign action consisted in the survival 
of the political regime.10 In this framework Ministers and top civil servants, i.e. at the 
National Institute of Industry (henceforth INI) and at the Spanish Institute of Foreign 
Currency (henceforth IEME), had great freedom to conduct policies." This was not 
necessarily because Franco greatly trusted his subordinates but because he bad no other 
option. A certain degree of autonomy for die various bodies within the Administration 
constituted the only possible option for carrying out policies in Franco’s authoritarian 
regime. Franco was concerned with main principles, leaving aside explicitly any technical 
matter dealing with the execution of these principles. The Council of Ministers, meeting 
once a week, could not but be a weak point of reference for daily policy. The Council of 
Ministers indicated guidelines at a lower level than those emanating from the Chief of 
State but their execution and their adaptation to specific circumstances required an 
administrative mechanism as homogenous as possible. Franco relied very much on his 
Ministers to define the executive measures to put into practice the main principles with 
the security that important decisions would be made in consultation with him. When 
difficulties arose among Ministers, Franco’s position was either to let them reach a
reassessment of the literature on European fascisms is António Costa Pinto: 
"The Salazar "New State" and European Fascism", EÜI Working Paper HEC no. 
91/12, Florence, August 1991.
*. This is a conclusion derived from the research undertaken for this 
Thesis. Joan Esteban: "The Economic Policy of Francoism: An Interpretation", 
in Paul Preston (ed.): Spain in Crisis. The Evolution and Decline of the 
Franco Regime, Hassocks [The Harvester Press] 1976, pp. 82-100, p. 83, made 
a strong plea to go on the contrary direction: "It is quite clear that the 
crucial decisions have always been personally taken by Franco himself", 
however adding, "how different interests made themselves known and how they 
were weighed before a decision was taken is something that is still 
unknown."
l0. The most recent reminder of this has been Florentino Portero: Franco 
aislado. La «cuestión» Española (1945-1950), Madrid [Aguilar] 1989,
11 - Some of them have attributed to Franco an active role in adopting 
policies as a way to avoid responsibility. An excellent example is Juan 
Antonio Suanzes Fernández: "Franco y la economía", in his Ocho discursos de 
Suanzes, Madrid [Centro de Estudios Ecónomicos y Sociales del Instituto 
Nacional de Industria] 1963, pp. 123—63, This lecture at the 25th 
Anniversary of the Caudillo as ¿Lief of the Spanish State (Burgos, 28 
November 1961) represents the official economic version of Francoism.
17
common position or to use his prerogatives during his weekly meetings with his ministers 
to reach an agreement or to impose a decision.12
Franco had a special interest in the field of foreign policy. He was quite aware 
that the main risk for his personal rule -at least until 1946- came from abroad. He was 
also aware of the potential danger in domestic terms that could be derived from his 
regime’s awful international image due to political dislike and isolation. Therefore foreign 
policy constituted for Franco, as it had done during World War Q, a policy area to be 
surveyed personally, at least until he was sure that die Western Allies would not intervene 
to remove him from power. Thus, Franco’s godlike rule over the field of foreign relations 
declined as his regime’s political isolation declined. Even in the years of the highest level 
of political isolation, 1945 to 1946, Franco could not give more precise guidelines for 
foreign action than to guarantee the survival of his political regime. Even in the period 
of greatest difficulties, it is highly doubtful that Franco was involved at any stage in 
drawing up guidelines for foreign economic policy. It constituted a rather technical issue 
beyond his concern. Therefore, in this sense, the various bodies within the Spanish 
Administration competent to deal with the different aspects involved in foreign economic' 
relations, had a wide discretion in managing foreign economic affairs.
1.3. Ministerial Struggle for Control of Foreign Economic Policy
Foreign economic policy, in our specific case, constituted a field with problems 
of interpretation. The departments concerned with foreign economic relations (mainly, the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Industry and Commerce) did not necessarily hold 
similar opinions. Until 1947 the procedure for foreign economic management consisted 
in creating administrative bureaucracies in different Ministries. These frequently held 
opposed views on the way foreign economic policy' should be dealt with. Furthermore, 
the struggle to impose a system for conducting foreign economic policy was not restricted
12. For a description of Franco's method* of gov«rnroent, Stanley Payne: The 
Franco Regime 1936-1975. Madison [The University of Wisconsin Press] 1987, 
pp. 397—412; Fusi: Franco, cit., pp. 67 ff.; and Salgado-Araujo, op. cit.
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to Departments but spread to categories of civil servants.
The Ministry of Industry and Commerce emerged from the civil war leading the 
foreign economic policy machinery. In August 1939, the powerful EEME was created as 
successor to the Committee of Foreign Currency («C om ité de Moneda Extranjera»), 
which from January 1938 had been subordinated to the Treasury'.13 A Decree of 24 
November placed this administrative body that controlled the State’s limited foreign 
currency holdings and the exchange rate mechanism within the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce. In other words, it imposed its dynamics on the nation's international economic 
relations. Furthermore, in November 1939, an ad hoc administrative body for foreign 
economic policy, the Under-Secretariat for Commerce, Tariff Policy and Currency was 
created in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. This new body was split from the one 
dealing with Industry. The IEME was subordinated to the above-mentioned Under- 
Secretariat. The outbreak of the Second World War promoted the importance of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (created in 1938), despite the pre-eminence the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce had reached in foreign commercial policy. During the world war 
years, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was intended to become the administrative 
instrument selected to determine and execute foreign economic policy within the general 
framework of foreign policy and subject to its political principles. This intention can be 
labelled as the principle of unity in foreign action.
Control over economic warfare, in the early phase of the war, was the main field 
of ministerial confrontation preventing any unity in foreign action.14 Inter-departmental 
differences also focussed on another line of confrontation, that of Pro-Axis versus Pro- 
Allies. Approximately between May to October 1940 the State’s action was a unified one 
of positive response to the approach adopted by the Allies to win Spain from Axis
n . BO of 27 August 1939. See a brief description in Juan Sardi: "El Banco 
de EspaAa (1931-1962)", in El Banco de Espafla. Pna historia econòmica. 
Madrid, 1970, pp. 421—79, p. 454.
14. An extraordinary account of these matters in relation to the Allied 
economic blockade during World War II, is W.N. Medlicott: The Economic
Blockade. 2 vola., London [His Majesty's Stationery Office], first published 
in 1952 with free access to official documents, then revised including 
confidential source references, in 1978; see most especially, vol. 1, 
chapter XV, and vol. 2, chaps. X and XIX. The following two paragraphs are 
based on this work.
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influence. The Allied policy of economic support, carried out to relieve Spain’s shortages 
and reduce dependency on German supplies, allowed the importation, within reasonable 
quotas, goods in short supply, such as wheat, oil, rubber, cotton, coal, sisal, phosphates 
and manganese, provided also with shipping. Controlled assistance was backed by sterling 
credits. The Anglo-Spanish Trade and Payments Agreement signed on 18 March 1940 
included a loan agreement under which Spain secured a sum of £2 millions for 
expenditure in the sterling area. The Anglo-Spanish Moroccan Agreement of 29 
November provided £350.000 to facilitate Spain in purchasing commodities from the 
French Zone of Morocco. Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colonel Juan Beigbeder 
y Atienza was determined to keep Spain out of the war and fully accepted the 
implications of British economic aid.15 Allied economic help constituted a means of 
strengthening Spanish neutrality.
This policy led to Cabinet confrontation, after Beigbeder’s resignation, in October 
1940. The new Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Commerce, Serrano Süâer and Carceller, 
respectively, did not hold the same view on how to handle the instruments of economic 
warfare.16 When Carceller came to office he looked for some relaxation in the economic 
blockade to enable him to bargain with the Germans and the pro-Axis members within 
the Cabinet. Although a Phalangist leader, Carceller was soon to show himself to be a 
keen, although hard-headed and unconventional, exploiter of help from both the Anglo- 
Saxons and the Germans. Süner was to offset this. He was determined to frustrate any 
policy of rapprochement to the Anglo-Saxons by emphasising that the interests of Spain 
were solidly with the Axis. Süner’s determination to prevent any clear co-operation with
15. Juan Beigbeder y Atienza (1888-1957), vetaran soldier of the Moroccan 
wars and pro-British Minister of Foreign Affairs from 9 August 1939 to 16 
October 1940.
ai. Ramón Serrano Súñer (b. 1901), State Solicitor, Franco's brother-in-law 
and Minister of the Interior since Franco's first government of February 
1936 and National Chief of the Phalange's Press and Propaganda. In October 
1940 he was appointed Foreign Minister. He travelled regularly to Italy and 
Germany. Master engineer of the unified party. Re had to resign on 3 
September 1942.
Demetrio Carceller Segura (1894-1968), Textile Engineer, appointed 
member of the Phalange's National Council a month before being appointed 
Minister for Industry and Commerce, a post which he held from October 1940 
to July 1945. Carceller was dismissed due to his free action without 
strictly adjusting to Franco's wishes; Ram6n Garriga: La España de Franco. 
Vol. II De la división azul al triunfo aliado, 1943-1945 , Madrid [G. del
Toro] 1976, pp. 387.
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the Allies was complete. When a further British credit of £2.5 millions for continued trade 
with the sterling area against the pressure of the Axis, was agreed upon in November 
1940, it was boycotted by Siiner. The opposition from Sufier delayed the signature of the 
Supplementary Loan Agreement for six months, although it had originally been asked for 
by the Spanish Government. The crop harvest 1940/41 had been one creating a serious 
problem of food shortage that risked general unrest Further privation during the winter 
could well touch off a revolt. Carceller went so far as to resign in protest against such 
political intrusion in economic matters, though he withdrew his resignation later, when the 
agreement was finally signed on 7 April 1941. The efforts made by Carceller to secure 
Allied economic aid were opposed by Sliner with dilatory manoeuvreing or avoidance of 
Franco’s involvement in the matter. It does not mean that had Franco intervened the 
situation could have been clarified. Franco had never been very helpful in this matter. He 
seemed to be decided upon neither abandoning nor helping his Axis friends.17
In September 1942 the Council of Ministers tried to end the danger of ministerial 
conflict over the State’s foreign economic action. The Cabinet agreed that any contact 
with foreign representatives in future negotiations in political, financial and commercial 
orders ought to be exercised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The principle of unity of 
action was explicitly stated:
"The principle of the unity of direction referring to Spain1s 
negotiation with other powers does not need to be reasoned, 
since it is self-evident. "1#
The chaotic situation produced by the intervention of all administrative bodies in
11. Vividly described in personal terms in the following memoirs: 1) Carlton 
J.H. Hayes (appointed U.S. Ambassador to Spain in September 1942) Wartime 
Mission in Spain, 1942—1945, New York [Macmillan] 1945; 2) Sir Samuel Hoare 
(later Lord Templewood, appointed British Ambassador to Spain in June 1940) 
Ambassador on Special Mission, London (Collins] 1946; and 3) Willard L. 
Beaulac (member of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Madrid as Counsellor of 
Embassy and -intermittently-* Charge d'Affaires, from June 1941 to May 1944) 
Franco. Silent Ally in World War II, Edwardsville [Southern Illinois 
University Press] 1986. In general the Allies believed that unless Spain 
starved, the country would not enter the war. The latter book together with 
Antonio Mar quin a Barrio: Espafta en la Politica de Seqruridad Occidental
(1939-1986), Madrid [Servicio de Publicaciones del Estado Mayor del 
Ejercito] 1986, chapter one, provide further references to illustrate 
Spain's role in World War II, a matter that this Thesis has consciously 
foregone.
l#. MAE, Leg. 6285, exp. 2, carp. 11: Order to Ministers, 18 September 1942.
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international affairs, mainly in foreign economic matters since the outbreak of the Second 
World War, made it
"essential to hold all international negotiations under one 
unified rule [.. • ] In this constant struggle of which 
international negotiations consist and frequently of great 
toughness, the Spanish State needs to present a unified front 
under a single command, which cannot be except that of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the direction of the Chief 
of State.9,29
Consequently, the order requested all Ministers to stop handling the nation's 
international interests individually and to limit themselves to submitting their points of 
views, opinions and suggestions, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter could unify 
them and present a single front at international negotiations without the fear of seeing its 
efforts side-tracked by interference from other administrative bodies who persued isolated 
agreements. Direct contact between foreign diplomatic staff and other Ministers would 
take place exclusively on specific technical matters, without reference to political matters 
and always under die aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All commissions, 
committees and parties travelling abroad were to keep a close contact with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. The reason behind this Cabinet decision could have been linked to the 
important change then taking place in Franco's Government, September 1942.
A close colleague and friend of Franco, who helped to organize the regime in its 
earliest stages, the Count of Jordana, came back to the Palacio de Santa Cruz, the 
headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.10 The departure of Serrano Sliner might 
be seen as linked to domestic affairs (Phalangist quarrels with the conservative 
monarchists).21 The important point is that Jordana’s presence in Franco's Government 
was interpreted by the United Kingdom and the United States as a guarantee of Spain’s
**. Ibid.
J0. Francisco Góme2—Jordana y Sousa, Count of Jordana (1876—1944), Soldier 
and veteran of the Cuban and Moroccan wars, had been already appointed 
Minister for Foreign Affairs (and Vice-President of the Government) in the 
first Franco Cabinet, February 1938 to August 1939.
11 • As Súfler himself relates in his memoirs, Entre Hendava v Gibraltar 
(Noticia v reflexión, frente a una leyenda sobre nuestra política de dos 
guerras), Madrid [Ediciones Publicaciones Europeas] 1947, p. 170.
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abandonment of the pro-Axis tendencies promoted by Serrano.22 The latest research in 
this field shows that in selecting Jordana, Franco had no intention to modify his foreign 
policy guidelines: Jordana was selected because there was a pressing need to appoint a 
new Minister for Foreign Affairs and nobody else seemed to have been available for the 
post.23 The research on the policy implications deriving from this ministerial substitution 
tends to point out that, in any case, Jordana was soon able to show his appreciation of the 
situation. The document commented on above was produced at the first meeting of the 
Council of Ministers in which Jordana took part, mid-September 1942. The special 
circumstances in which the replacement occurred allowed Franco to give Jordana some 
preference, in contradiction with Franco's traditional balance of power within the 
government, in order to avoid any interference in this important phase of the State’s 
foreign diplomatic action.24 It was impossible to ignore the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce, who controlled money, ships and export/import licenses, but it was up to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to decide on the general principles of the economic 
programmes.
The Minister for Industry and Commerce, Carceller, strongly disagreed with the 
above. Commercial procedure, he argued, had three stages. The first consisted in preparing 
the field for a commercial treaty by presenting the Spanish desiderata. The second dealt 
exclusively with negotiating the treaty. Finally, the third stage of the procedure dealt with 
the execution and fulfillment of the agreements. The Minister of Industry and Commerce, 
surprised by the principle of unity in foreign action, argued that his Ministry had 
always limited itself to claiming the direction of the first and third phases since it was
11 ♦ Javier Tusell: "On giro fundamental en la política española durante la 
segunda guerra mundial: la llegada de Jordana al Ministerio de Asuntos
Exteriores**, in Garcia Delgado: El primer franquismo, cit., pp. 281-93; p. 
291 for references to the British and American sources on this point. Also 
the Vatican adopted a more favourable attitude, see Tusell: Franco y los 
católicos. La política interior española entre 194 5 y 1957, Madrid [Alianza 
Editorial] 1984, p. 48.
23, Tusell, **ün giro...”. The argument is based on Jordana's Diary, although 
Tusell forgot to state where researchers could consult it.
24. Franco's "political chemistry balanced and neutralized [the so-called] 
•’families'* of the regime. None was permanently excluded from power; none 
allowed a monopoly of influence**, Raymond Carr: Modern Spain 1875-1980, 
Oxford [Oxford University Press] 1980, p. 166. For the policy of 
equilibrium, see Súñer, op. cit., pp. 38-39.
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best equipped to carry them out properly from the technical aspect, while it had always 
provided the necessary support for the second stage. All this, he argued, was in 
accordance with "a parallel principle of unity in the internal action of the Government".15 
Obviously, the Spanish Minister for Industry and Commerce did not feel inclined to give 
up a large slice of his Ministry’s competence to less skilled personnel from another
ministry
The intenninisterial struggle over control of foreign economic policy overlapped 
significantly with the struggle inside the Spanish Administration between those who were 
prepared to accept Allied economic assistance and those who remained sensitive to Axis 
pressure. It is this circumstance that explains better than anything else the position of the 
different personages involved in these quarrels. Carceller’s opposition to an extension of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ influence in foreign economic policy might be directly 
linked to his experience during the early phase of World War n  and the effects of the 
economic blockade imposed by the Allies to curtail supplies to Germany. It was not that 
he might have been more or less pro-Axis, something that is not within the scope of this 
chapter, but that he might have fully realised the powerful weapon that the Allies 
possessed in their control of Spanish imports and the importance of some Spanish export 
items. The great economic difficulties of the Spanish economy and population could be 
made more difficult throughout the war if there was a strict implementation of political 
considerations which forced foreign economic policy into decisions on other than 
economic grounds.
The financial adviser to the British embassy in Madrid described the situation as
follows:
•*{T]here was a keen rivalry b«twt«n the two Spanish ministries 
[Foreign Affaira and Industry and Commerce] for tha control of 
Spanish axtarnal trada and othar ministries which might have 
playad a part wara kept in tha background.
The so<alled w olfram  crisis during World War n  is just one example -the better known
**. MAE, Leg. 6285, exp. 3, carp. 1: Carceller to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, 3 November 1942.
,€. Quoted in Medlicott, op. cit., p. 548.
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one- of the strategic importance of handling Spain’s little economic bargaining power in 
foreign economic relations for achieving political aims. The point was to deprive Germany 
of a vital ferro-alloy required for modem warfare, wolfram, an exceptionally strong metal 
used in steel production to increase the hardness and strength of cast iron.27
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foreseeing the importance of gening a grip on 
foreign economic matters, re-structured its internal organisation in October 1942. The DG 
of Economic Policy, one of the three main newly introduced General Directorates in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was to negotiate commercial agreements as well as to conduct 
all matters relating to foreign trade. Despite everything, this section remained inefficient 
at least until the end of 1944 since it lacked the means for carrying out policies.2* 
Anyway, by the end of 1942 both Ministries (Foreign Affairs and Industry and 
Commerce) housed administrative bodies especially designed to deal with foreign 
economic matters without a clear distinction of their respective competences. By the end 
of the world war both departments were ready to claim control over the nation’s foreign 
economic policy.
In the ministerial infighting two groups of civil servants dealing with the foreign 
world developed in confrontation with one another. To the traditional diplomatic corps at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic representation abroad, was added a new 
corps of technicians from other departments. In September 1930 a service called 
commercial councillors and attachés («Servicio de Consejeros y Agregados 
Comerciales») was created. Although it was created in a department other than the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its members were to be recruited from the diplomatic corps 
and to be subordinated to the chiefs of mission in the respective posts. A month later, a 
new civil servant corps was created to perform technical auxiliary services for the above-
For a vivid account of the Spanish wolfram crisis with the Allies see:
Hayes, op. cit., pp. 165—200; and Beaulac, op. cit., pp. 186 ff. For the
wolfram story inserted into more general British and American economic 
warfare operations, Alfred E. Eckes, Jr.: The United States and the Global 
Struggle for Minerals, Austin and London [University of Texas] 1979, chapter 
4, pp. 89-119; and Medlicott: Economic Blockade, cit., vol. 2, pp. 582—610.
*•. Its budget only extended to paying its personnel, MAE, Leg. 4 618, exp.
2: Director General of Economic Policy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
7 October 1944.
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mentioned commercial councillors and attachés at the central Administration as well as 
in its offices abroad. This special technical corps of secretaries and commercial officials 
(«C uerpo Técnico de Secretarios y Oficiales Comerciales») was also created outside 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (within the Under-Secretariat for Commerce, Tariff Policy 
and Currency of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce). This corps benefitted from the 
expansion of State intervention in foreign trade during the 1930s and the 1940s by an 
enlargement of its staff and by their inclusion in the diplomatic lists.”  Actually, this did 
not represent the danger the diplomats wanted it to appear. The incorporation of the 
technical personnel to the diplomatic lists only took place when they were sent to an 
embassy, something which only happened exceptionally at the time.10 Notwithstanding 
this, the process of supplanting diplomatic personnel by technical personnel in the 
commercial field and in foreign economic bodies was repeatedly denounced by diplomats 
during the period we are dealing with.”
At this point one can draw a first conclusion: there was a clear problem of 
administrative efficiency and overlapping of competence. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
responsible for the diplomatic corps abroad, had a DG of Economic Policy aimed at 
conducting all matters relating to foreign trade, whereas the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce, responsible for the economic and commercial offices and services abroad.
**. Adopting in June 1940 the name of Technical Corps of Commerce (Cuerpo 
Técnico de Comercio) , also called Corps of State Commercial Technicians 
(Técnicos Comerciales del Estado)• In an public effort to obtain more 
professionals of the economy involved in the central Administration the 
first Political and Economic School was founded in Madrid in 1944, whose 
first promotion reached the market in 1947, see Mauro F. Guillen: "La
profesión de economista, cuarenta años después", Información Comercial 
Española, no. 652, December 1987, p. 93, and Juan Velarde Fuertes: "La base 
ideológica de la realidad económica española", in España Economia, Madrid 
[Espasa-Calpe] 1988, pp. 955-1000, where a complete reference to many of his 
articles on the matter can be found. A brief but vivid description of the 
influence of the School in the Spanish economic world during the 1950s in 
Velarde: "1875-1986: Historia de un proceso de apertura económica al
exterior", Política Exterior, vol. I, no. 2, Spring 1987, pp. 91-113, p. 
111.
10. In personal correspondence with Professor Manuel Varela Parache 
(Universidad Complutense, Madrid), then a civil servant who joined the 
Ministry of Commerce in 1951 when this department separated from the 
Ministry of Industry, promoted to Chief of its General Technical Secretariat 
in 1957. He is considered to be one of the leading personalities who 
promoted the Stabilisation Plan in 1957-59.
i.e. MAE, Leg. 4618, exp. 2: The Director General of Economic Policy to 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, n/d, probably about the end of 1944.
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housed an Under-Secretariat for Commerce, Tariff Policy and Currency, which contained 
a DG for Commercial Policy. Once the World War was about to end it became clear that 
the system was not only inefficient but also dangerous for the survival of the regime. 
Inefficiency was due to the "serious" lack of coordination between departments and their 
respective civil servants, the rivalry among officials subjected to the different disciplines 
of the departments and the duplication of expenses due to a duplication of functions.32 
The various interministerial bodies, all of them of a consultative nature, in which 
representatives from the different departments sat around a table, did not seem to work 
very efficiently in coordinating them.“  Coordination offices were far from being 
effective. The political coordination represented by the decisions of the Council of 
Ministers was not effective enough for the execution and administration of the issues in 
detail.34 Thus the rivalry between departments and their civil servant corps could no 
longer be avoided:
"Isolation is inconceivable today for any nation. It is 
precisely in the economic field and, particularly, in 
commercial relations where contact has to be closer, more 
frequent and more systematized.",5
*2. Openly admitted in the sources, i.e. MAE, Leg. 4 618, exp. 2: "Esquema de 
una ley orgánica de la Subsecretaría de Politica Econòmica Exterior", n/s, 
n/d.; and ibid, Note for the Minister, 8 November 1944, n/s, probably 
drafted at the DG of Economic Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
**. These interministerial bodies were: 1. The Interministerial Commission 
for Treaties (Comisión Interministerial de Tratados), created in April 1938 
and later on sheltered within the DG of Foreign Economy of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, consisting of representatives from Foreign Affairs, 
Industry and Commerce, Agriculture, Defence and Treasury; 2. Commission for 
Foreign Trade Regulation (Comisión Reguladora del Comercio Exterior), 
created in April 1938 and housed at the DG for Trade of the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce, with representatives from the latter, Foreign 
Affairs, Vice—Presidency of the Government, Agriculture, Transport and 
Treasury; and 3. the IEME Administrative Council, created in August 1939, 
presided over by the Minister of Industry and Commerce with representation 
from Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and Treasury, as described in MAE, Leg. 
4 618, exp. 2: "Nota relativa a los problemas que se plantean en la
Subsecretaría llamada de Comercio, Politica Arancelaria y Moneda”, Saint 
Sebastian, 29 July 1946.
u . MAE, Leg. 4 618, exp. 2: Note for the Minister, 8 November 1944, n/s.
,5. MAE, Leg. 4618, exp. 2: Informative note on the State's foreign action, 
n/s, n/d, probably from the end of 1944.
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1.4. The Concept of Unity in Foreign Action
In late 1944/early 1945 the debate on the responsibility for the management of the 
State's foreign economic relations and its connections with foreign policy became more 
acrimonious, as can be detected from the records. This is the period when José Félix de 
Lequerica was Minister of Foreign Affairs (August 1944-July 1945).* After 1948, when 
Lequerica was sent on special mission to the United States he, on several occasions, 
expressed strong complaints about the increasingly important role of economic elements 
in dealing with foreign matters.37 Being Minister of Foreign Affairs he showed a clear 
tendency to decide this debate in favour of a predominant role to be played by 
diplomats.3*
The civil servants within the Foreign Office (mainly the DG of Economic Policy) 
argued that although the Ministry of Industry and Commerce ran international economic 
relations in the field of commercial policy, these should always come under the aegis of 
foreign policy and be determined by the guidelines agreed on in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Foreign economic policy should always be framed within the more general 
foreign policy guidelines. It was characterised by a double nature, political and technical, 
both aspects being so "closely and indissolubly united [as] to be impossible to separate 
in practice".39 A coordination of both departments* activities appeared necessary. 
Presentation of the economic requirements, negotiation of trade and payments agreements, 
their signature, the execution and survey of the agreements, all aspects of the foreign
**. José Félix d* Lequerica y Erquiza (1890-1963), Lawyer, Franco's 
Ambassador to Vichy, the perfect incarnation of a Franco!at-Monarchist 
distant from the Phalange. He was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs 
after Jordana's death on 3 August 1944. In July 1945 he was replaced by a 
more convenient man, Martin Artajo, to face the post-war period. After a 
period of diplomatic inactivity he was appointed as special inspector of 
embassies in April 1947. Under this vest, travelled to the United States in 
April 194 8 initially for a two-months inspection and rested there untill 
1961. Maria Jesús Cava Mesa has recently published Lequerica'a biography, 
Los diplomáticos de Franco. J.F. de Lequerica, temple y tenacidad (1890- 
1963), Bilbao [Universidad de Deustoj 1989.
r . See chapter four, p. 291.
*#. Unfortunately the few interesting references that Cava gives to 
Lequerica's model about the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 
State's foreign economic action (op. cit., pp. 215 4 216) do not give an 
account of archival sources.
*f. MAE, Leg. 4 618, exp. 2: Note for the Minister, 8 November 1944, n/s.
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commitments of a nation, could no longer be dealt with separately, but as a unity of 
action and execution in strict subordination to the joint interest of public service. The 
conclusion was obvious. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should control the process, 
allowing the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and other departments a limited auxiliar}' 
role in the technical field.
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, effective interministerial 
coordination was to be achieved by promoting its DG of Economic Policy as a new body 
organically dependent on the Foreign Office though technically dependent on both.40 It 
would include all services of commercial policy and commercial attaches abroad 
depending upon the Under-Secretariat for Commerce, Tariff Policy and Currency 
(Ministry of Industry and Commerce), as well as all economic offices of the diplomatic 
missions in foreign countries. Furthermore, it would stop the historical process of the 
supplanting of diplomats by technicians. Recruitment would be partly from the diplomatic 
corps and partly from the corps of Sute commercial technicians («Técnicos Comerciales 
del E stado») in equal proportions. The new service would be made up of councillors and 
attachés for foreign economy («Consejeros y Agregados de Economía Exterior»), 
substituting the existing service of commercial councillors and attachés.41 The facilities 
belonging to both departments. Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Industry and Commerce, 
would be transferred to the reconstituted DG of Economic Policy. Their responsibility 
would be the negotiation of treaties, agreements and conventions of an economic 
character, the international representation, information and, finally, the running of the 
commercial offices abroad.
This proposal was a compromise between the moderates and the extreme position 
of the DG of Economic Policy that hoped to extend its control over all aspects involving 
foreign economic policy. A report by the General Director of Economic Policy, Emilio 
Navasqüés, for his Minister concerning the organisation of Spain's commercial services,
Ibid.
41. Article 8 of the Draft-Decree prepared, MAE, Leg. 4618, exp. 2, n/d.
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proves his strong feelings on the matter.42 One of the most important problems regarding 
the structure of his department was to determine its prerogatives regarding the recruitment 
and discipline of the service of commercial councillors and attachés. The proposal made 
to the Minister was that these functions were absorbed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
while the rest of the Departments would continue to contribute to the regulation of 
technical matters, such as specialist studies of commodities and currency questions.43 
Thus, it provided for the absorption by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the service of 
commercial councillors and attachés for making the services for Commercial Policy of the 
Ministry of Industry dependent on this department. Other less desirable options considered 
the convenience of further developing and shaping the existing interministerial bodies. If 
a monopoly could not be gained it was preferable to maintain the status quo with no 
modification in the basic legislation. To this was added that the mixed nature of the 
nation’s foreign relations was to be clearly recognised, allowing the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to draw up the guidelines for foreign economic policy within the framework of 
foreign policy leaving technical details to other departments. Finally, the proposal also 
suggested diplomats should predominate over commercial civil servants abroad in a 
proportion of two:one. Thus, the proposal presented by the DG of Economic Policy of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not foresee the creation of a new administrative body but 
the clarification of the matter by promoting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the only 
speaker in all foreign matters. Any interministerial body was perceived as constituting the 
best way to favour the supplanting of diplomats by technicians, thereby "sterilizing the 
State's action abroad."44 As was clearly stated, if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not 
totally absorb all competence and initiative in foreign economic policy "this Ministry
42. MAE, Leg. 4618, exp. 2: The Director General of Economic Policy to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, n/d, probably about the end of 1944.
Emilio Navasqüés y Ruiz de Velasco, Director General of Economic Policy
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed the diplomatic design to take
over foreign economic policy, leaving aside the rest of the ministries 
involved as simple technical advisers. He was himself a diplomatic member 
of the service of commercial councillors and attachés. He was honoured with 
the Grand Cross Isabel la Católica in July 1947.
41. Previous proposals in this sense seemed to have been put forward and 
rejected by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, MAE, Leg. 4616, exp. 2: 
"Guión para una conversación", n/d, n/s., probably drafted by the DG of 
Economic Policy at the end of 1944.
44• MAE, Leg. 4616, exp. 2: The Director General of Economic Policy to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, n/d.
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would in fact disappear".45 This is an exaggerated statement revealing that a struggle for 
bargaining power was involved.
The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was perfectly aware of the strategic 
importance of the commercial relations that Spain maintained with Western Europe. The 
increasing and public political dislike for the Franco regime pushed them to use this 
economic potential to pressure for the solution of political conflicts of a bilateral 
character.46 Independently of the solution proposed, it became clear that the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs saw that something had to be done in order not to lose control over 
foreign economic policy and, what is more, over foreign policy itself:
"If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs abandoned these problems, 
it would practically lose a large part of its competencies and 
it would totally disable itself from performing its functions 
as it should. If things were to continue as they have since 
1940 (enlargement and centralisation of attributions in the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce, civil servants exclusively 
dependent on that Department in larger numbers than those 
dependent on the economic—diplomatic services, etc) the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs will soon be facing a situation of 
inferiority and incapacity, as already pointed out.”47
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not reveal the whole truth. The important 
administrative bodies dealing with foreign economic policy housed outside its 
headquarters were controlled by diplomats.4*
**. MAE, Leg. 4616, exp. 2: "Guión para una conversación”, n/d, n/s,
probably drafted at the DG of Economic Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
at the end of 1944.
44. "Navasqüés avait jusqu'à present pris soin de laisser les accords 
commerciaux indépendants des facteurs d'ordre politique”, reported the 
Delegate in Spain of the French Provisional Government, Jacques Truelle, to 
his Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Bidault, on 9 January 1945, AD, 2/E, 
vol. 92. See Chapter Two for more detailed presentation on the matter.
41. MAE, Leg. 4618, exp. 2: "Guión para una conversación", n/d, n/s.
4#. In June 1945, the diplomat José Sebastián de Erice y O'Shea held the 
General Directorship of Commerce and Tariff Policy at the Under-Secretariat 
for Commerce, Tariff Policy and Currency, the ad hoc administrative body for 
foreign economic policy at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, replacing 
the State commercial technician Eduardo Junco y Martinez-Azcoitia. Did Erice 
reduce and stifle opposition within this body to the proposals from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or, on the contrary, did he help to transfer to 
the latter the opposition from the economic ministry and, therefore, to set 
aside the more radical proposals? Furthermore, in June 194 6 another 
diplomat, Mariano de Yturralde y Obregoso, replaced Erice after his 
resignation, and remained Director General until February 1947. Finally, 
when in the same month, a technician from the Commercial Technical Corps of 
the State, Luciano Albo Candina, held the General Directorship of Foreign 
Policy in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce he lasted only three months,
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Furthermore, the weakness of the entire foreign economy structure meant that, at 
that period, the technicians were not really in competition with the diplomats. Spain’s 
foreign economic staff at the end of World War II had hardly changed from the 1920s and 
consisted of 14 commercial technicians cooperating with 33 commercial councillors and 
attachés. Their budget was similar to the one in 1929. The geographical distribution of 
these men did not differ much from that of the pre-war period. Often a commercial office 
had to deal with different countries and usually there were no offices outside national 
capitals.49 The Spanish Administration did not have skilled staff to inform themselves 
on economic affairs or to deal properly with economic matters in the entire 
Commonwealth, in the Colombian states (Uruguay and Peru) and in any part of the 
Orient. The latter was the case in spite of the declared pro-Arab foreign policy of the 
Franco Administration. The weakness of the technical (or non-diploma tic) staff dealing 
with foreign economy is not reported to the reader only to indicate the scant importance 
of the official Spanish presence in world markets. It serves to further illustrate the 
important point that behind the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' concerns for the question of 
supplanting diplomats there was the clear intention of extending its control over the 
nation’s foreign economy. That is the very essence of the concept of un ify  in  foreign 
action.
The policy options for administrative coordination remained quite limited. It could 
not be otherwise with constant conflict of viewpoint between the departments involed and 
their civil serants. The promotion of either of the departments involved seemed out of the 
question although it was believed to constitute the most effective solution. The creation 
of a mixed bureaucracy seemed the best way to please both departments. It turned out to 
be the best way to perpetuate the struggle. When it became evident that some cohesive 
and monolithic governmental structure for foreign economic policy was necessary the
sines in June 1946 he was substituted by José Núñez Iglesias who stayed 
there until July 1950 when he was again transferred to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs as General Director of Economic Policy. Since then and until 
July 1951, José Miguel Ruiz Morales remained as a Director General of 
Foreign Economy in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Viñas has defined 
this process as the personnel policy by which the diplomatic corps attained 
control over the apparatus of foreign economic policy; "La administración 
de la politica econòmica exterior en España, 1936-1979”, cit., pp. 181 ff.
4#. MAE, Leg. 4618, exp. 2: Informative note on the State's foreign action, 
n/s, n/d.
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solution finally adopted was undoubtedly a compromise and, as the near future was to 
show, quite inefficient. In 1945 Franco, with the agreement of both Ministers involved 
and the Cabinet, created the so-called foreign economy division («Servicio de Economía 
Exterior» ) .50 This was a decision that, in spite of the fact that the essence of the unity 
principle in foreign economic action was explicitly assumed, remained limit é  to the level 
of civil servants. Part of the civil servants in foreign economic bureaucracies from both 
ministries were transferred to this body in equal proportions to take up their technical 
reponsibilities at the commercial offices abrod, as well as at the Directorates General of 
Economic Policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of Commercial Policy in the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce. The administrative decree did not attempt to unify 
the different categories of civil servants. In practical terms the decree only meant a 
recommendation to both ministries to keep close contact to make sure that "commercial 
and foreign economic activities follow the course of the convenient foreign policy”.51 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to continue to run the negotiation and signing of 
trade and commercial agreements while the Ministry of Industry and Commerce was to 
undertake the preparatory and executive aspects. Significantly enough the decree 
eliminated all reference to the "interministerial nature" stated in article 2 of the draft 
decree or to the "permanent" nature of the administrative arrangements as was also stated 
in the preface and article 1 of the draft decree.52
The solution adopted did not prove satisfactory since it did not end the ongoing 
departmental struggle. This confrontation was not going to do any good to a nation that 
could expect strong international retaliation after the end of the war due to the origins and 
nature of its political regime. The Yalta declaration, in February 1945, appeared to make
*°. "On« of the main problems Spain faces at the present and which will 
considerably increase in the future with the arrival of peace, is that of 
regulating our international economic relations. These, although essentially 
conducted by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, are always determined 
by the guidelines that have to be adopted, in relation to foreign policy, 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." MAE, Leg. 4618, exp. 2: Decree
establishing the Foreign Economy Service. I do not have the precise date, 
but in any case it was after November 1944 and in the first quarter of 1945.
91. Article 1 of the decree.
MAE, Leg. 4618, eacp. 2: Draft Decree-Law for the creation of the Foreign 
Economy Service, n/d.
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reconciliation with Spain while under Franco virtually impossible.53 The San Francisco 
Conference adopted a resolution according to which Article 4(2) of the United Nations 
Charter, adopted on 19 June 1945, could not apply to States whose regimes were 
established with military assistance from the countries that fought against the United 
Nations as long as such regimes were in power.54 The three big powers were certainly 
discussing the future of Spain at Postdam. The Spanish Administration had no other 
option, in July 1945, than quickly accommodating the political regime to the new 
international circumstances imposed by die victors.
Initial steps to provide the regime with some democratic institucional basis were 
taken. On the 13th the Cortes approved a sort of rights charter, the « F u e ro  de los 
Españoles» and the following day the « L e y  de Bases para el Régimen L o ca l»  
regulating county elections.55 On the 21st a new Cabinet was formed where the Phalange 
lost some of its traditional ministerial posts. The appointment of Alberto Martin Artajo 
as Minister of Foreign Affairs was intended to benefit the regime by its internatinal 
connections as eminent representative of Catholic organistions and his previous non- 
political commitment, easing a rapprochement to the Vatican and the Anglo-Saxons.56
51. "The Crimean (Yalta) Conference, February 4-11, 1945", in 81at Congress
1st Session Senate: A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents
1941-1949, prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations by the staff of the Committee and the Department of State, 
Washington [US Government Printing Office] 1950, republished by Arno Press, 
New York, 1971, pp. 27*34. Still then, Spain maintained diplomatic relations 
with Japan (until 14 April 1945) and Germany (until 15 May 1945).
54 • As recalled in the Resolution of UN General Assembly of 9 February 1946, 
in ibid, pp. 087—888.
55. Both, together with the Law of National Referendum promulgated on 22 
October 1945, were considered earlier Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom, of 
which the principles were defined as permanent an immutable. For these legal 
texts see Jorge de Esteban, op. cit., 235-40 and 271-78 and Leyes políticas 
españolas fundamentales (1808-1978), compilation by Enrique Tierno Galván, 
2nd ed., Madrid [Tecnos] 1979 [1968], pp. 216-24.
5*. Alberto Martin Artajo y Alvárez (b. 1905) Lawyer, active member of
Catholic Action, leader-writer of El Debate, newspaper of Christian- 
democratic tendency, who accepted the appointment as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs after its approval by the Primate Cardinal of the Spaniah Church, 
Mon sign or Pía y Deniel. Minister of Foreign Affairs from July 1945 to 
February 1957, his task was to get Franco Spain out of its international 
political isolation. He was called the "Chancellor of Resistance”. For the 
circumstances of Artajo's appointment see Tusell, Franco y los cat61icos, 
cit*, pp. 38, 4 9, and 51—69, based on Arta jo's private papers. For a
detailed description of the regime's reconciliatory efforts in the immediate 
months after the war see ibid., pp. 52 ff. and the classic Max Gallo: 
Historie de l'Bspaqne franquista, Paris [Robert Laffont] 1969, pp. 182 ff.
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Despite all the make-up efforts, the Potsdam Conference issued a note on 2 
August 1945 in which the three governments said that it was their duty to say clearly that 
they would not support the candidacy of Spain to the United Nations organisation under 
any Franco government.37 British Foreign Secretary Eden suggested the admission of all 
other neutral governments so the reference to Spain would be more pointed.”  It seems 
important to point out, however, three facts which are not always highlighted in the 
literature. First, the public announcement about the exclusion of Spain, while under the 
Franco regime, from the world organisation of the United Nations was agreed by the three 
major powers before Winston Churchill left Potsdam. No alteration of the terms of the 
declaration was made by the new British Labour Prime Minister or his Foreign Secretary. 
Second, none of the big powers favoured the use of force to expel Franco. Stalin himself 
denied that his proposal against Spain implied military intervention or any other meassure 
leading to civil strife. Finally, the high echelons of the regime were perfectly aware of 
this. Luis Carrero Blanco, at the time Head of the Political Chiefs of Staff, declared at the 
end of August 1945:
"Pondering carefully, it has to be recognised that at Potsdam 
we have been defended with energy by Truman and Churchill 
[...] The decision was adopted with Churchill as British 
premier and [ • . . ] Attlee [. . . ] in full Labour euphoria did not 
attempt to worsen what was already agreed upon [...] Now then: 
if [they] defended us against Stalin's claims, it was neither 
for affection, nor humanity, nor justice. They defended us for 
interest, [the Anglo-Saxons] are interested in an Iberian 
Peninsula in order and anticommunist, although they would 
rather prefer to obtain it with a regime different to the 
present one*"5*
57. "[H]aving been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not 
[the Spanish Government], in view of its origins, its nature, its record and 
its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications 
necessary to justify such membership [of the United Nations].” A Decade of 
American Foreign Policy, cit., doc. no. 17: "The Berlin (Potsdam)
Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945", (a) Protocol of the Proceedings, August 
1, 1945, pp. 34-48, p. 45.
Si. Herbert Feis (economic adviser to the US Department of State): Between 
War and Peace. The Potsdam Conference, Princeton [Princeton University 
Press] 1960, p. 202.
5f. Artajo's Private Archive: "Notas sobre la situación política", 29 August 
1945, as cit. in Portero, op, cit., pp. 104-106. Document also reproduced 
in Laureano López Rodó: La larga marcha hacia la Monarquía, Barcelona
[Noguer] 1977, p. 60. In this note Carrero provided important directives for 
Spain's foreign policy. The document has been reproduced from a secondary 
source because no access to Artajo's papers has been possible. Little 
historical debate can be developed when essential records, i.e. those of 
Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs from July 1945 to February 1957, are not 
open to all researchers in equal conditions.
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"The Anglo-Saxons do not want under any circumstances the 
Communist danger in Spain -Carrero explained Franco few days 
later-. Only if they are convinced, or afraid, that any 
attempt at change would lead to such a danger, will they let 
the present regime go its way in peace* The only formula
for us must be: order, unity and hang on for dear life.”'0
Churchill had stated at Potsdam the arguments that were to be used in many future 
occasions by his political opponents, the Labour Government: the United Kingdom was 
not ready to use the force but only diplomatic means to speed the departure of franco, it 
would do nothing that could risk starting another civil war in the Spanish soil, it was 
against interfering in the internal affairs of any country and it did not want to risk the loss 
of its trade with Spain.6’
Considering the text above the researcher has to question the real sense behind 
the so-called policy of siege (« c e rc o » ) ,  elaborated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
undoubtedly helped by the high echelons o' me Administration. It sered to favour the 
need for repression and reinforcement of tht dership. Already before the end of World 
War n, the so-called post-war programming -no more than a set of assumptions about 
the future behaviour of Western European nations of USA/URSS relations- had foreseen 
that Spain could be ostracised but that the Franco regime would not be removed from 
power by international action. The only element perfectly identifiable was the importance 
of economics. Thus, post-war economic reconstruction was to play a major role in the 
political designs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The link between the Spanish 
economy and the European economy established during the war were clearly stated by 
Artajo as an essential input in his post-war policy.*2 Therefore, to have an effective
14. L6pex Rod6, op. cit., p. 58. English version of this document from Qasim 
Ahmad: Britain. Franco Spain■ and the Cold War. 1945-1950. New York [Garland 
Publishing, Inc.] 1992, p. 10. The reader interested to measure the gap 
between "policy*' and public declarations should compare this text with the 
official Spanish response to the Potsdam note in Fernando Diaz—Plaja: La 
Eapafla franquista en sus documentos (La poscruerra espaftola en sus 
documentos). Barcelona [Plaza 4 Jan4s] 1976, p. 183.
**. Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 33 ff.
43. i.e., regarding the United Kingdom, Artajo argued that the British
interests in Spain and Spain's supply to the United Kingdom were the "things 
that really matter", making them forget other political incursions regarding 
the nature of the regime and its reforms; MAE, Leg. 1374, exp. 10: Artajo 
to Duke of Alba, Ambassador in London, 30 July 1945, and MAE, Leg. 1768, 
exp. 2: Report on the preparatory meeting, London, to the first General 
Assembly of the United Nations, 5 January 1946. Although the topic of post­
war progxmaad.ng has received much attention in the literature, there is not,
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foreign economic policy and to control it under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was essential for the new foreign policy for the post-war. A monolithic body 
executing foreign economic policy within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ guidelines 
became a matter of urgency.63 Although the survival of the regime was theoretically at 
stake it was far from clear how to carry out the idea of installing an effective 
interministerial coordination.
The nature of post-war politics imposed its logic on Franco’s Administration in 
regulating Spain’s intematinal economic relations. On the one hand, the political isolation 
suffered by the regime after the end of World War n  favoured the pre-eminence of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, the economic problems of Spanish 
reconstruction, its links with European economic reconstruction and the fact that, 
economically speaking, the Franco regime was suffering less from international 
punishment than from political dislike, at least during the period of relief following World 
War n , as will be shown in the following chapter, provided grounds for the economic 
department’s request to lead foreign economic policy.
A new proposal was launched, at the end of the summer of 1945, to set up "an 
administrative mechanism as homogeneous and tied to the same principles as possible.”64 
The preliminary remarks of the decree could not give a clearer indication of the failure 
of all measures adopted at coordinating both departments in the ñeld of foreign economic 
policy. In previous years, as we have seen, difficulties in foreign economy were faced by 
creating crd hoc administrative bureaucracies within the different departments concerned. 
The opposition to any ad hoc unified administrative bureaucracy to deal with the 
complexities of foreign economy was formidable. So it remained. The new decision to
to my knowledge, any monograph on the matter. In my understanding the so- 
called programming was not more than a set of assumptions and not a real 
post-war peace programme.
41. MAE, Leg. 4 618, exp. 2: Note sent to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
and Industry and Commerce on 29 August 1945.
*4. MAE, Leg. 4618, exp. 2s Draft Decree -as it was sent to the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs and of Industry and Commerce on 29 August 1945— promoting
the Under-Secretariat for Commerce, Tariff Policy and Currency, within the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce, to be technically dependent on both 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Industry an Commerce.
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achieve coordination between the Ministries to guarantee the desired unity of action 
and execution in foreign economic policy was limited to promoting the Under- 
Secretariat of Commerce, Tariff Policy and Currency. It was meant to be technically 
dependent on both departments though administratively dependent on the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce. It was to receive instructions from both on how to execute the 
nation's foreign economic policy in all its aspects. It was to include the DG of Economic 
Policy (existing in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and meant to remain there), the DG of 
Commerce and Tariff Policy and the IE ME. There was no change in competence or 
attributes in the field of foreign economy since the new measure was to be implemented 
"without diminishing the attributes belonging to the ministries concerned."45
The compromise solution thereby achieved remained as ineffective as the earlier 
attempts at coordination. The ineffectiveness of the new administrative formula in assuring 
permanent relations between both departments, as its main purpose was stated to be, is 
further illustrated by the launching of a new proposal less than a year later.46 It consisted 
in turning the Under-Secretariat of Commerce, Tariff Policy and Currency into the Under- 
Secretariat of Foreign Economy. The name Foreign Economy to be given to the 
proposed Under-Secretariat was to confront the traditional label of Commerce. The later 
had limited competencies in foreign economic and Commerce policies but many in 
domestic economic policy. By contrast, the concept of Foreign Economy (the report 
uses the term Doctrine of Foreign Economy) limited its implications in the domestic 
fields to a minimum and enlarged those in foreign economy to all matters that have an 
impact on the balance of payments. All commercial problems within the Spanish market 
were administered by the Commissariat General for Supply and Transports («Com isaría 
General de Abastecimientos y Transportes») charged with problems of supply.
**. MAE, Lag. 4618, exp. 2: Draft decree a* handed over to the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and Industry and Commerce, on 29 August 1945.
**. MAE, Lag. 4 616, exp. 22: "Nota ralativa a los problemas qua se plantean 
en la Subsecretaría llamada de Comercio, Política Arancelaria y Moneda", 
Saint Sebastian, 29 July, 194 6, n/s, probably drafted by the Director
General of Economic Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for his Minister.
The administrative implications of this document, qualified as a
'confidential report', were firstly pointed out in Viñas at al.x Política 
Comercial Exterior, cit., vol. 2, p. 522. In a later work, "La
administración de la política económica exterior...", cit., p. 161 ff., 
Viñas attributed its drafting to the Director General of Economic Policy, 
Emilio Navasqüés y Ruiz de Velasco*
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merchandise distribution and consumer prices.67 The report proposed to change its name 
to Under-Secretariat of Interior Trade and Supply, that is the domestic equivalent of the 
proposed Under-Secretariat for Foreign Economy, accentuating thereby the specific nature 
of foreign economic policy. That is, while the concept of commerce was limited to the 
exchange of products and the administrative mechanics of foreign economic relations, the 
concept of foreign economy pointed to broader politico-economic implications including 
tariff, fiscal, transport matters, agriculture, tourism, migration, patents and royalties. In 
other words, the concept of foreign economy consisted in the implementation of the 
principle of unity in fo reign  action:
"From a strictly political or tactical viewpoint the 
convenience of submitting the administration of the entire 
foreign economy to the same discipline seems evident. 
Otherwise, it would not surprise us to see the limited 
commercial benefits to the obtained decreasing due to losses 
attributable to negotiation and politico-economic conduct in 
any of the above mentioned matters."f#
The proposed Under-Secretariat of Foreign Economy would include (in administrative 
terms) the DG of Economic Policy. The latter would control most of the Under- 
Secretariat’s functions. The DG of Foreign Trade and Tariff Policy of the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce would be limited to the traditional function of merchandise 
exchange and tariff matters, that is, to the administrative mechanics of foreign commercial 
policy. The IEME would continue to administer foreign currency and exchange rates. A 
general Secretariat would be dedicated to the internal administrative matters of personnel 
and statistical services. The DG of Economic Policy would deal in exclusive terms with 
the functions of negotiation, direct conduct and monopoly of the information channels for 
all economic matters having an effect on the State’s foreign economy. While the concept 
of commerce and commercial policy attributed competence in foreign and domestic trade 
to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the concept of foreign action implied a 
transfer of competence to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, traditional commercial
*\ By Decree of 10 March 1939 the Commissariat General for Supply and 
Transports was set up, see Antonio José Narváez Bueno: Agricultura y
desconcierto. La política de precios agrarios, Córdoba [Caja de Ahorros y 
Monte de Piedad] 1980, p. 105.
MAE, Leg. 4 618, exp. 2: "Nota relativa a los problemas que se plantean 
en la Subsecretaría llamada de Comercio, Política Arancelaria y Moneda", 
Saint Sebastian, 29 july 1946.
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policy would be linked more closely than ever before to the general framework of foreign 
policy. The immediate implication of tins perspective was that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, through the action of its DG of Economic Policy in the Under-Secretariat for 
Foreign Policy, would finally gain complete control over foreign economy. It would, thus, 
reduce the task of the competing departments to limited technical aspects to be undertaken 
within its general guidelines.
1.5 The Under-Secretariat for Foreign Economy and Commerce.
It repeatedly became evident that the existing structures of Government were 
inadequate for the tasks they confronted. The old system of a d  hoc bureaucracies 
sheltered in different departments proved an effective opposition to a monopoly of foreign 
economy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried again to reassert itself by appointing an 
interministerial body in which its administrative bureaucracy would bold a powerful 
position. A new attempt to shape the administrative structure for foreign economic policy 
was made in February 1947, when the Under-Secretariat for Foreign Economy and 
Commerce was created. As die preface to the establishing-decree stated, it was set up 
because
"coordination between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of 
Industry and Commerce, regarding the development of economic 
foreign relations, must be as close as possible to the 
advantage of the nation's higher interests".4*
It had taken six months for the higher political echelons of the regime to accept 
the idea of an Under-Secretariat and when they did, the project was executed with a slight 
difference. The original note from the DG for Economic Policy, as we have seen, had not 
considered extending the proposed Under-Secretariat to Commerce, Tariff Policy and 
Currency and included the same administrative bodies originally proposed by top civil 
servants at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the DG of Economic Policy, which was to be 
housed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the DG of Commerce and Tariff Policy
MAE, Leg. 4618, exp. 2 s Onder— Secretary for Foreign Economy, DC of 
Economic Policy, "Circular No« 2.115, Decreto—Ley de la Jefatura del 
Estado", 21 February 1947, BOE 27 February.
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(Ministry of Industry and Commerce), the IE ME and, after April 1947, the General 
Secretariat and the Office of Treaties and Commercial Policy. The Under-Secretariat was 
to be technically dependent on both departments. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce, while depending administratively on the latter. It was to 
receive all the necessary instructions for the execution of foreign economic policy from 
both departments according to their legal attributions and competencies. Although the 
decree did not explicitly state what were the tasks of the new State office, it was clear that 
by transferring to it all the administrative and executive attributions in the field of foreign 
economic relations existing within the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Industry' and 
Commerce, the newly created Under-Secretariat had the difficult task not only of 
executing and undertaking instructions in matters of foreign economic policy coining from 
other ministries but also of administering the nation’s international economic interests.
The task of unifying and coordinating the management of Spain’s foreign relations 
in its economic and political aspects was far from easy. The decree left it to the ministries 
to work out the necessary administrative dispositions required to flesh out the legal text. 
It seemed as if control over the new office would come indirectly from control over the 
corps of commercial civil servants employed. Thus, the struggle then passed to the 
recruitment system for the new public officials. A few weeks after the Under-Secretariat 
had been set up, the commercial councilors and attachés were renamed as councilors and 
attachés for foreign economy («Consejeros y Agregados de Economía Exterior»). The 
General Director of Commerce and Tariff Policy (at the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce) proposed to his Minister that the recruitment of the new service for foreign 
economy should come from the diplomatic services and the corps of State commercial 
technicians, though not in equal portions. There was to be a higher ratio of two thirds of 
technicians, who would, apart from other special treatment, enjoy the prerogatives and 
immunity of the diplomatic staff.70 The final decision reached was to recruit staff in
1#. MAE, Leg. 4618, exp. 2: Report on the creation of the Service for
Foreign Economy by the DG of Commerce end Tariff Policy, Madrid, 17 March 
1947.
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equal portions.71 The new body was bom from a consensus, but it constituted only a 
formal change of name, remaining as inefficient in coordinating the foreign economic 
policy of the nation as its predecesor. Its own double-headed nature and the mixture of 
officials of two powerful bureaucracies struggling for power, diminished the effectiveness 
of its actions.72 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not give up the idea of imposing its 
definition for foreign economic policy. In October 1948, a new official appeal to all 
Ministers was necessary to remind them that
"in the future, any issue examined by the different branches 
of the Public Administration, with either origin in or effect 
on an international dimension (...) has to be reported 
previously by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is up to the 
Presidency of the Government to resolve cases of 
disagreement".73
Important is to note that the role of intermediary was not given to the Council of 
Ministries or Cabinet where the ministers in dispute could try to obtain support from a 
majority within Government, but to the Presidency of the Government. In other words. 
Franco's inner circle remained in possession of the capacity to decide ultimately if there 
was a conflict between ministers.74
There are two further elements to consider briefly regarding this case-study on the 
administration of the foreign economic policy, before moving to the conclusions. First, 
the problem of historical continuity of administrative habits in Spain is posed. Secondly,
71. Deere* of 23 May 1947, see text in MAE, Leg. 4616, exp. 2: Dossier
"Gestión del Primer Titular de la Subsecretaría de Economía Exterior y 
Comercio", n/d, p. 16. See this same report for the measures adopted by the 
Under—Secretariat in the first years of action and other measures to adapt 
the existing interministerial committees to the new administrative 
situation.
79. The diplomatic corps gained control over the Under-Secretariat. The 
diplomat Navasqués, who until February 1947 had run the DG of Economic 
Policy, was promoted to Under-Secretary, which post the held until the end 
of 1948. Then he was replaced by another diplomat Súñer Ferrer who remained 
as Under-Secretary until July 1951, being replaced again by a diplomat, Alba 
Delibes. Another diplomat, Yturralde, held the General Directorship of 
Economic Policy from February 1947. When in March 1947, a cabinet was 
created within the Under-Secretariat, again a diplomat, Núñez Iglesias, was 
promoted to this post.
7*. MAE, Leg. 6285, exp. 2, folder 3: Order 5998 from the Presidency of the 
Government, 29 October 1948.
74. The research in the records of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and 
the papers of the Under-Secretaries for Foreign Economy at the Central 
Archive of the State's Civilian Administration, Alcalá de Henares, Madrid, 
has not allowed the author to more clearly define the terms of this matter.
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whether the Spanish experience was unique in Western Europe. In relation to the first 
point., this chapter cannot deal with how foreign economic policy was conducted before 
Franco, whether there was anything left of this method by 1947 and what principles of 
foreign economic policy were established by the Franco regime itself and how did they 
differ from those of the 1920s and first half of the 1930s. Just some hints are given.
It is well known that a significant part of the authoritarian regime’s leadership 
(both political and technical) had already participated actively in the Administration during 
Miguel Primo de Rivera’s dictatorial times (September 1923-Januaiy 1930) or had come 
from the right-wing personnel under the II Republic (April 1931-July 1936).75 
Coordination in foreign economic policy was a goal pursued during the 1920s and 1930s. 
The creation of the National Economic Council, by Royal Decree of 8 March 1924, 
attempted to concentrate the different attributes diffused among ministerial departments 
regarding commercial relations.76 Little is known about the reasons that caused General 
Primo de Rivera to instal in November 1928, at the end of his regime’s life, a Ministry 
of National Economy, although it could have been opposition to the protectionist tendency 
of the Council.77 The Intenninisterial Commission for Foreign Trade, set up in 
November 1931 after the installation of the D Republic attempted to coordinate the 
commercial services dependent upon the Ministries of Economy and of State (the 
predecessor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), for the defence of the State’s commercial 
interests.71 The clearest element showing the continuity of administrative habits since the 
1930s dates from the period after the November 1933 elections that gave way to a 
conservative government: an order issued in June 1934, reminding officials that any 
foreign contact ought to be channelled through the Ministry of State, constituted the first 
document of the first dossier containing the documentation upon which this chapter was
TS. Juan J. Linz: "Continuidad y discontinuidad en la élite política
española. De la Restauración al Régimen actual", in Estudios de Ciencia 
Política v Sociología. Homenaje al Profesor Carlos Ollero, Madrid, 1972, pp. 
361—423, especially pp. 410 ff.
Gaceta de Madrid, no. 71, 11 March 1924.
” . Gaceta de Madrid, no. 309, 4 November 1928.
7*. The Historical Archive of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
contains the minutes and documents of this Commission, which are of an 
extraordinary value.
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drawn, if it was to serve as a model for new instructions in the field.79 This latter 
element could prove that there was continuity from the pre-Civil War period on this 
matter.
The second element appears more challenging. It can be said that the question of 
administrative contestation of a monopoly in foreign economic policy is far from 
constituting a specific feature of the authoritarian regime. In many contemporary 1940s 
administrative experiences in Western Europe this phenomenon appeared. A comparative 
study with France proves significant in showing bow bogus were some arguments put 
forward to give the Ministry of Foreign Affairs an active role in defining foreign 
economic policies. For instance, that the Franco regime’s administrative organisation did 
not include anything like a Ministry of National Economy, which in close relation with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could have form the framework of the State’s action in 
international questions of an economic nature, does not constitute a good basis for 
explaining the situation described in tins chapter. In the French case, it was the Ministry 
of National Economy, created in September 1944 by the Provisional Government and 
placed under the direction of Pierre Mendès-France, who suffered from contestation by 
other ministries. This Ministry was given undefined powers over the economic ministries 
and soon demanded to be responsible for providing the general directives for conducting 
economic negotiations with foreign governments. To that much opposition was presented. 
President of the Provisional Government Charles De Gaulle, and, obviously. Minister of 
Foreign Affairs George Bidault, agreed that the Ministry on National Economy could help 
in the preparations of international negotiations, but argued that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs should conduct them. De Gaulle told Mendès-France: "La négotiation ne saurait 
etre menée que par le ministres des affaires étrangères" car "il importe de centraliser 
toutes les relations avec l’étranger entre les mains d ’une meme personne."*0 The 
Ministers of Finance and Agriculture also wanted some representation at international 
economic and financial negotiations. In spite of this, the solution adopted by decree in
'**. MAE, Leg. 6285, exp. 3, folder 11: Order dated on June 1934.
M . Meeting on 9 October 1944 of the Comité économique interministérielle, 
cit. in Pierre Gerbet et «1.: Le relèvement. 1944-1949. Pari* [Inprimerie 
Nationale] 1991, p. 240. For the problem of inter—departmental coordination 
and the losing of the diplomatic monopoly of external representation and 
initiative in the French case, see chap. VII.2, pp. 239 ff.
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November 1944 was that of securing a concentration of economic powers in the hands of 
the Ministry of National Economy. This was supposed to co-ordinate the actions of 
ministries dealing with economic matters and to propose to the French Government 
general directives for the conduct of economic negotiations with foreign countries. The 
resignation of Mendès-Frances in April 194S could partially be explained by the fact that 
he could not set up a powerful independent Ministry of National Economy and that all 
the ministries concerned managed to evade the intended check on their activities.*1 In 
the future, the compromise between the Ministry of Finance and the Quai d'Orsay will 
lead to the creation of the Interministerial Committee for European Economic Cooperation 
(the so-called "Comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique 
européenne") after June 1948 in order to coordinate foreign economic policy.
Italy presents another case of conflict between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the technical departments. In April 1947, Italy's Minister of Commerce asked his 
colleague in Foreign Affairs to face foreign economic relations, including commercial 
relations, "organically, as a whole, following pre-established plan and with criteria 
regarding the unavoidable economic needs".*2 In his letter, the Minister of Commerce 
insisted upon considering criteria of technical aptitudes and economic preparation for 
those sent as representatives of the State abroad and for selecting the heads of the 
commercial delegations following these criteria. The Minister insisted, again in October, 
that trade relations and commercial attachés were to be dependent on his ministry. A 
previous attempt to do this was undertaken when De Gasperi was Minister of Foreign
,l. See Frances M.B. Lynch: "Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet Plan:
National and International Planning in French Reconstruction", The Economic 
History Review, Second series, vol. 37, no. 2, May 1964, pp. 229—43, pp. 
233-34; Stephen S. Cohen: Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model,
Berkeley [University of California Press] 1977 (1969), pp. 36 ff.; and
Philippe Mioche: Le Plan Monnet. Genèse et élaboration 1941-1947, Paris 
[Publications de la Sorbonne] 1987, pp. 42 and 47. For a first-hand account, 
see Pierre Mendés-France: Oeuvres completes. Vol. II One politique de
l'économie 1943-1954, Paris [Gallimard] 1985, pp. 55-72, for his program for 
a Ministry of the National Economy, pp. 157—161 for the role played by this 
Ministry, pp. 115-128 and 148-152, for the causes of his resignation, 
specially highlighting the description given in p. 151 of the "décourageant 
désordre gui règne dans le Gouvernement en ce gui concerne son action 
économique."
ACS, records Segretaria De Gasperi, file (fascicolo) no. I l s  Letter to 
the President of the Government, De Gasperi, 30 Apri1 1947, cit. in
Mariuccia Salvati: "La dirigenza dei ministeri economici, 1945-51", Italia 
Contemporanea. voi. 153, December 1983, pp. 183—207.
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Affairs and then rejected. Sforza emphasised the "political" character of commercial 
relations and opposed technical direction of trade relations, which would probably be of 
a protectionist character. Carlo Sforza went as far as proposing the dissolution of the 
Ministry of Commerce!13 It is not difficult to imagine how closely the intentions of the 
Italian Ministers of Commerce and Foreign Affairs were to their Spanish counterparts.
The British Administration, under the Labour Government, could not avoid this 
common pattern of departamental confrontation over the nature of the nation's foreign 
economic policy. Recent research on British postwar policy towards Germany shows the 
opposed positions of the Foreign Office and the trade and technical departments headed 
by the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Supply. The Foreign Office was more 
concerned to create a common Allied position whereas the other two departments were 
concerned with the condition of the national economy. This situation produced deep 
antagonism within the Cabinet.*4
Other research in various aspects of international relations of different countries, 
presently carried out at the EU1 Research Project "Challenge and Response in Western 
Europe: The History of European Integration", provide more examples in which one could 
fmd many similarities with the Spanish case. Problems of administrative efficiency and 
overlapping of competence, the abandonment of economic criteria when dealing with 
foreign relations,appeared everywhere in the western world. Confrontation by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs with the other departments with some degree of interest in foreign 
matters is a natural phenomenon. It could not be otherwise for a department that benefits 
from such ambiguous institutional competence of representing the State abroad.
“ . Sforza to D« Gaaperi, 17 October 1947, in ibid. Salvati (p. 198) write» 
the following: ”(£' proprio nel] campo (togli scambi con l'estero (dalla 
radiazione dei piani dal 1945 alla tariffa doganali dal 1949*50) ...] che
ai segnalano i conflitti di più lunga durata. Essi investono problemi di 
coordinamento tra il ministero del Commercio Estero e il ministero degli 
Affari Esteri che vanno dalla composizione delle delegazioni incaricate di 
condurre la trattative commerciali (membri esterni da includere, 
designazione del presidente ecc. •••), alla direzione degli addetti 
commerciali, allo scioglimento stesso del ministero del Commercio Estero."
“ • Cari Glatt-Hackney: "Industrial Reconstruction, Reparations, Science and 
Industrial Technology: The United Kingdom and its Zone of Occupation in 
Germany (1944-1952)" Ph.D.Diss., EUI, Florence (forthcoming). He also shows 
how European economic cooperation was a feature in the dismantling of the 
German industry, although official Europeanism has forgotten about it.
46
Furthermore, confrontation between ministerial departments and civil servants is very 
much inherent to the very nature of bureaucracies themselves. Notwithstanding this, 
political and economic circumstances as well as institutional differences provide 
necessarily different administrative models. The very particular circumstances that 
characterized the Spanish regime and its Administration, as described before, gave way 
to an extreme way of dealing with foreign economic policy. Obviously, examples of 
countries, periods of time and historical episodes in which political factors had 
overwhelming importance and were imposed over all other considerations, could surely 
be found in Western Europe. What renders the Spanish model unique is the degree in 
which political considerations were designed to be predominant.
1.6 Conclusions
The principle of u n ity  in foreign action was fully operational when Spain 
faced the first steps towards European economic cooperation. Being an essential point for 
this Thesis and a good tool of analysis, I have given a lengthy and detailed account of the 
administration of die Spanish foreign economic policy. The scope of this was to present 
the way this principle was elaborated and the forces that opposed it. Based on this 
principle the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would claim to play a determining role in the 
Spanish State’s foreign economic policy.
The Spanish Administration’s reaction towards European integration was not to 
be an exception to the rule. Struggle between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the so- 
called technical departments involved in foreign economic policy at different stages was 
to be presented throughout the period examined in this Thesis. The post-1947 events will 
be part of the following specific chapters where the reader will find what is missing here, 
that is the policy-outcomes as adopted in each of the cases of study. The reader might go 
directly to the final section of chapter seven (7.5.) to find out how the administrative 
mechanics of foreign economic policy were influenced by Spain's experience with 
Western European economic cooperation and how a rationalisation of the experience took 
place, constituting the basis for better known future policy options.
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When World War n  was about to end the strategic importance of foreign 
economic policy was a foremost concern for policy-makers. Since departmental 
competencies were not clearly defined, a sharp struggle developed. It was realized that it 
was going to be practically impossible in the situation with the Allies to consider the 
political and economic aspects of the international problems of reconstruction separately. 
Thus, it appeared essential to establish an administrative system securing a unity of 
criterion and execution in the foreign economic relations of the nation in harmony with 
the political premises of the regime as carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
monopoly of foreign economic action by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as unity in 
foreign action had foreseen at the time, meant the extreme use of commercial policy 
as a diplomatic instrument, incorporating the nation's economic relations in the atrophy 
and stagnation distinguishing the diplomatic relations of the Spanish State. This implied 
the abandonment of economic criteria when dealing with foreign economic relations and 
its replacement by die politico-diplomatic guidelines of foreign policy.*5 As this Thesis 
will show, this principle represented the attempt by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to use 
the limited bargaining power represented by economic relations in its strategy to overcome 
the Franco regime’s international political isolation.
The principle of u n ify  in  foreign action was an immediate result of the 
Cruzada character adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding post-war 
international relations. The constant need was to prove that an external threat was 
necessary to justify continued and strict controls over the country’s political, social and 
economic life. The first post-world war governments were commonly recognized as 
governments of crisis facing foreign intervention. This type of justification was of 
necessity to be maintained because the strength of Franco’s power was his claim to defend 
Spain from foreign intervention. The principle of unity showed the validity of the idea 
that the foreign threat continued to be as strong as in 1939.
•*. Thi» was a parallel phenomenon to the domestic sphere, ••• González: La 
economía política del franquismo, cit., p. 310. Particularly for the first 
half of the 1940s, see Carlos Velasco Murviedro: "El «ingenierismo» como 
directriz básica de la política económica durante la autarquía (1936—1951)", 
lnformaci6n Comercial Española. February 1984, no. 606, pp. 97—106,
48
In this chapter only two departments have appeared on the stage; the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. When the unity principle 
does not apply, some form of coordination between the department competent in foreign 
affairs and that directly interested in foreign economy becomes essential. The chaotic 
situation that characterized the period before Jordana’s arrival was not going to facilitate 
such aims after the war. What emerges from this chapter is the extreme difficulty and 
limited success in obtaining an effective administrative coordination despite the existence 
of a strong political wing. The best proof of this are the many references, present in all 
the documents, to the lack of precision in administrative coordination and the undefined 
nature of the status of the personnel in the foreign economy. The struggle between 
Ministries and their respective civil servants gives a basis for explanation.*6 The Spanish 
Administration was not a monolithic entity in executing the political will deriving from 
the higher political spheres of the regime in foreign economic policy. This could be 
interpreted as a result of Franco's balancing act, which produced weak administrative 
structures.
One consequence of the struggle for control in foreign policy was the weak 
development of the technical staff dealing with foreign economic matters. When in 
1944/45 the service for Foreign Economy was proposed, the required staff amounted to 
sixty councilors and secretaries for Foreign Economy.*7 In October 1953, the active 
number of councilors and attachés for Foreign Economy amounted to fifty-seven, of 
which twenty five resided in Madrid.**
A further conclusion is of more far-reaching consequence. The policy makers at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who aimed to control foreign economic matters always 
admitted that the rest of the Ministries could have a limited intervention in techniocd
**. "In spit* of their best desires, they [ministries and civil servants] ran 
up against the obstacles that naturally derive from this administrative 
disparity•** MAE, Leg. 4 618, exp. 2: "Esquema de una Ley-Orgánica de la
Subsecretaría de Política Económica Exterior**, n/s, n/d.
a\ MAE, Leg. R. 4 618, exp. 2: Draft Project establishing the service for 
Foreign Economy, n/d, dated between November 1944 and summer 1945, most 
probably closer to the first date.
M . MAE, Leg. 5185, exp. 1: "Escalafón al 31 de octubre de 1953 del servicio 
de Consejeros y Agregados de Economía Exterior".
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aspects. What would happen when the other departments apart from the above two 
became involved in foreign economic matters? European interdependence speeded up this 
situation. The technical departments would try to obtain as much as they could by pulling 
matters into their limited field of action, that is in a technical direction. Later they were 
to show that product agreements, currency and tariff matters, and so on were not so 
limited and technical as their colleagues in Foreign Affairs believed. These matters had 
broad politico-economic implications. By acting in this way the rest of the departments 
could try to reduce the political element involved in foreign economic policy, and thus 
in turn the political interference of Franco and Franco’s inner circle. By doing this they 
tried to salvage foreign economic policy from the rule of foreign policy and the 
Monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce 
mostly contributed to this at an early stage and, as we will see in the following chapters, 
the three Ministries of Agriculture, Commerce and Transport played their part when their 
interests where involved. When the debate between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the technical ministries was established, the technical argument could only favor the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce, who pushed to have better prepared professionals to 
deal with foreign economy matters. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to press for a split 
between technical and political matters at this early stage would have involved the risk 
of losing power and competence in the foreign policy field in the 1940s, when foreign 
economic policy increasingly became the dominant aspect of the nation’s foreign policy. 
By contrast, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly objected to mixing political and 
technical issues when facing international patterns. In these cases, in the face of 
international political dislike for the Franco regime, it was useful to hide matters under 
the cover of technical issues. During the first half of the 19S0s the idea of unity in foreign 
action and, thus, control over foreign economic policy was revived. It occurred while 
dealing with die various failed attempts at looser European integration, agricultural and 
transport pools.
The situation described in this chapter cannot be explained in terms of 
independent personalities enjoying freedom of action from competing among themselves. 
The only feasible explanation comes from the fact that Spain, in the same pattern of the 
rest of Western European nations, used its limited economic bargaining power to achieve
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its diplomatic goals. Although this is a normal pattern of international behavior, which we 
could fmd elsewhere, Spain seems to have pushed it to extremes given its post-war 
stringent international political isolation. European integration is the perfect testing ground 
of this, as will be shown in the following chapters. The Spanish government opted for a 
single administrative centre of an interministerial character and the administrative rank of 
Under-Secretary to obey a single rule in foreign economic policy. The future 
developments with which we will be dealing with in the coming chapters will show how 
effective this double-headed politico-administrative option in foreign economic policy was. 
The hypothesis that could be advanced is that Franco Spain’s foreign economic policy was 
to face a new set of complex situations in multilateral frameworks with the instruments 
of antiquated statecraft The broad politico-economic implications of the various forms of 
European integration convulsed the traditional structures of foreign economic policy. 
Therefore there was to be an inevitable misunderstanding of facts and lack of mastery in 
policy definition.
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Chapter 2:
TRADE VERSUS POLITICAL DISCRIMINATION: 
SPAINrS ROLE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RELIEF
AND
[EARLY PHASE OF] RECONSTRUCTION, 1945-Spring o f 1947
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Spain's Contribution to European Economic Relief 
and Reconstruction
2.2.1. As Exporter of Essential Foodstuffs
2.2.2. As Exporter of Strategic Raw Materials
2.3. Exigencies of French and British Economic Reconstructions
2.3.1. The French Provisional Government of the IV Republic
2.3.2. The British Labour Government
2.4. Trade versus Politics: An Instructive Debate
2.5. Conclusions
"Les pyrites n'ont pas de parti." 
Charles de Gaulle, October 1945
"D n ’y a pas d ’oranges fascistes, 
il n’y a que des oranges."
George Bidault, September 1947:
2.1. Introduction
Spanish historiography has argued, after 1975, that the ostracism the Franco 
regime suffered after World War n  was not as tight as had been assumed by its 
propagandists.3 It has also assumed that trade relations were the narrow path of escape
1. Chari«» de Gaulle: Discours et Message* vol.I Pendant la guerre Juin 
1940-Janvier 1946, Paris (Plon] 1946, Press Conference of 12 October 1945, 
pp. 627-41, pp. 640—41.
2. Bidault, France's Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the National Assembly's 
Foreign Affairs Commission in September 1947, while discussing the 
consequences of having the Franco-Spanish border closed. Archives de 
l'Assemblée Nationale Française, minutes of the Foreign Affairs Commission,
12 September 1947.
*. Hypothesis first launched by Joan Esteban: "The Economic Policy of
Francois»: An Interpretation", in Paul Preston (ed.): Spain in Crisis. The 
Evolution and Decline of the Franco Régime, Hassocks [The Harvester Press] 
1976, pp. 62-100, p. 93: "isolation was a deliberate aim of Francoist
economic policy, (...) the blockade on the one hand was the consequence of
p. 52
p. 56 
p. 63 
p. 68 
p. 78 
p. 79 
p. 89 
p. 104 
p. 127
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that allowed the Spanish Administration to escape international political ostracism. 
Literature in the field, however, has not provided a clear explanation of how, when and 
why things happened as they did. The present chapter, as well as the following one, will 
try to concentrate on these aspects. From the perspective of Western European economic 
cooperation, this research will try to provide an account of the implementing mechanisms 
of international political, and supposedly economic, discrimination against Franco Spain, 
as well as the economic, political and institutional consequences of discrimination. This 
chapter will show the external aspects of discrimination as adopted by the western bloc, 
using the case-studies of France and the United Kingdom. The following chapter, with the 
help of a case-study on the European Recovery Program, commonly known as the 
Marshall Plan, will deal with the domestic sphere, that is the actual courses of action 
adopted by the Spanish Administration in its relations with Western Europe. In other 
words, this research will show that the relevant question, when approaching the economic 
implications of international post-war ostracism against the Franco regime, lies in 
determining what responsibility belongs to the Franco regime’s economic policy and what 
to the negative impact of international political dislike against it.
This chapter will show how the needs of relief and reconstruction during the 
period immediately after the war caused Western European powers to lay aside their 
distaste of the Franco regime. It will contrast the Spanish Administration's wide room of 
manoeuvre in trade relations with its international position during the first two years after
the political choices made by the regime and on the other it was not very 
tight". The argument was further developed by Angel Viñas et al.: Política 
comercial exterior en España (1931-1975), 2 vols., Madrid [Servicio de
Publicaciones, Banco Exterior de España] 1979, chapter 4. The Franco 
regime's representatives had argued that trade disruptions imposed by the 
Second World War and the international boycott until 1953 were the main 
responsible for the low post-Civil War economic recovery, i.e. Higinio Paris 
Eguilaz: El Desarrollo Económico Español, 1906-1964, Madrid, 1965, p. 192, 
and Juan Velarde Fuertes: "Política de desarrollo", in Enrique Fuentes
Quintana (ed.): El desarrollo económico de España« Juicio critico del
Informe del Banco Mundial, Madrid [Revista de Occidente] 1963, p. 20. The 
latter's views were strongly opposed by Luis Gamir: "El periodo 1939—1959, 
la autarquía y la política de estabilización", in Gamir (ed.): Politica 
económica de España, Madrid [Guadiana] 1972, pp. 11—25. For a representative 
explanation of Franco regime's economic performance by a top official of the 
Spanish Administration, see Juan Antonio Suanzes Fernández: "Franco y la 
economía", in Suanzes: Ocho discursos de Suanzes, Madrid [Instituto Nacional 
de Industria] 1963, pp. 123-63. Suanzes was Minister of Industry and 
Commerce between January 1938 and August 1939 and, again, between August
1944 and July 1951 and permanent President of the Institute of National 
Industry after its creation in 1941.
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the Second World War. The hypothesis of departure is that die political discrimination and 
ostracism that Spain suffered immediately after May 1945 due to the origins and nature 
of its political regime, were not accompanied by an equal rebuff in economic relations. 
This was mostly due to the contribution that the Spanish economy could and did offer to 
the relief and reconstruction of Western European economies in the period of 
demobilisation and abrupt conversion from war to peace-time production. Whether or not 
the Spanish economy had fully benefitted from the opportunities offered by economic 
relief and reconstruction is another question, left for the following chapter.
Relief relates here to the supply of goods in the form of alternatives to the decline 
in European production. On the contrary, reconstruction was not then limited to repairing 
war dislocations and damage and to the restoration of capital equipment but implied 
essentially transforming the European economies through a rationalisation and a 
modernisation of their structures on the basis of a specific "institutionalized pattern of 
economic interdependence", setting the departure of an exceptionally long economic 
boom.4 This chapter will refer to the early phase of reconstruction, that is when it took 
place as a result of separate -often conflicting- national reconstruction policies. From 
Summer 1945 to Spring 1947 relief and, most especially, reconstruction efforts were so 
vast that any contribution to ease its path was welcome, despite ideological considerations 
as the political regime ruling over countries of supply. This is the sense of the formula 
trade versus political discrimination that introduces the title and that de Gaulle and 
Bidault might have given to the declarations that open this chapter.
The present chapter was not conceived merely as a study of diplomatic relations, 
either bilaterally with any individual country or a juxtaposition of several bilateral 
accounts.5 This chapter is not conceived within the mono-subject syndrome, adopting a
4. For the extensive use of "reconstruction", see Alan S. Mil ward: The 
Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, London [Methuen] 1987, pp. xvi, 
chapter one "The Crisis of 1947" and "Conclusions". Quotation in text, in 
p. 470.
*. The United Kingdom and France are the only Western European countries 
whose post-1945 relations with Spain have been studied. Unfortunately 
nothing has been done for Germany, up to my knowledge. The most recent 
surveys of the German historiography on Franco Spain give none reference 
regarding post-194 5 international relations, see Walther L. Bernecker: 
"Historiografía alemana sobre la época franquista. Estado de las
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somewhat different perspective. It attends chiefly to those developments that turned out 
to be significant not so much for the immediate post-world war period as for Spain's 
attitude towards multilateral economic cooperation that was to follow it. The first step will 
be to determine Spain’s role in the earliest general efforts for European economic 
reconstruction. To face the so-called 'Spanish question’, that is the political ostracism 
against the Franco regime, without looking into Spain’s role in Western Europe’s main 
problem, its economic reconstruction, seems senseless. To understand Spam's position 
towards European multilateral cooperation without being conscious of the lessons learned 
from the reconstruction of normal trade patterns after the world war seems complete 
nonsense. Spain’s trade experience with its future most important economic partners in 
Western Europe during the years covered in this chapter accustomed the Spanish 
Administration to a way of dealing with international economic relations. This set of
investigaciones", Hispania, vol. 46, no. 162, 1986, pp. 197-217, and Von 
Walther L. Bemecker: "Spanien 1914—1975", in Wolfram Fisher, Jan A. Van 
Houtte, Hermann Kellenbenz, lija Mieck, Friedrich Vittinghoff: Handbuch der 
Europäischen Wirtschafts-und Sozialoeschichte, Stuttgart [Klett-Cotta] 1987, 
vol. 6, pp. 946—48. For the political aspect of British-Spanish bilateral 
relations see Florentino Portero'a edited Doctoral thesis Franco Aislado. 
La cuestión española (1945-1950), Madrid [Aguilar] 1989, which despite its 
title is mainly an account of British policy towards Spain, using secondary 
sources for the American and French perceptions. A more interesting study 
is Qasim Ahmad: Britain, Franco Spain, and the Cold War, 1945-1950, New York 
[Garland Publishing, Inc.] 1992, though the fact of not using any Spanish 
records and bibliography limits the validity of some of his conclusions. For 
the political aspect of Franco-Spanish bilateral relations see: Pedro
Martinez Lillo: a) "Una introducción al estudio de las relaciones hispano­
francesas (1945-1951)", brochure of the Juan March Foundation, Serie 
Universitaria no. 226, Madrid, 1985; b) "Una aproximación al estudio de las 
relaciones bilaterales hispano—francesas durante la posguerra. El "affaire" 
fronterizo en la perspectiva del Quai d'Orsay (1946-1948)", Revista de 
Estudios Internacionales, vol. 6, no. 3, July-September 1985, pp. 567—99; 
and c) "Francia y la cuestión española en el Tercer Periodo de Sesiones de 
la Asamblea General en las Naciones Unidas", in Alberto J. Lleonart Anselem: 
España y la ONU, vol. III (1948-49). La «cuestión española», Madrid [CSIC] 
1985. Both Portero and Martinez are considered part of the new "generation 
of young historians on foreign policy", J.C. Pereira: "Reflexiones sobre la 
historia de las relaciones internacionales y la política exterior española", 
Cuadernos de Historia Moderna v Contemporánea, no. 8, 1987, pp. 269-89. A 
more challenging approach to the Allies' policy towards Spain in the period 
from 1944 to 1947 uses a multi-national approach through British, French and 
American (but not Spanish) records, Paola Brundu Olla: Ostracismo e
Realpolitik. Gli Alleati e la Spaqna franchista neqli anni del dopoquerra, 
Cagliari [C.E.L.T. Editrice] 1984. An excellent summary of its French side 
is "L'Espagne franquiste et la politique étrangère de la France au lendemain 
de la deuxième guerre mondiale", Relations internationales, no. 50, 1987, 
pp. 165—81. This article reveals for the first time the strong contradiction 
between political ideology and commercial requirements. In my understanding 
she gives most importance to political factors and the responsibility of 
opposition forces to Franco. The subsequent publication of Anne Dulphy: "La 
politique de la France à l'égard de l'Espagne franquiste, 1945—1949", Revue 
d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, vol. 35, January-March 1988, pp. 123—
40, does not provide any additional information.
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assumptions was subsequently to prove inadequate because attempts to formalise European 
cooperation modified the pattern of European economic relations, as the following chapter 
will show. In any case, Spain’s commercial experience during the immediate post-world 
war period was to condition the Government's approach to the first attempt at European 
multilateral economic cooperation.
2.2. Spain’s Contribution to European Economic Relief and Reconstruction
When on the 7 th of May 1945, die Third Reich capitulated. Franco was not in an 
easy situation. The Franco regime was among die problems to be solved in the new post­
war international order and Spain’s political position in the international arena after the 
Second World War could be labelled as that of a pariah with no possible initiative.6 The 
internal démocratisation of die regime, taking place immediately after the end of the 
war in Europe, with the intention of finding accommodation in the changing pattern of 
the international situation, failed to convince international public opinion. Western Europe 
was in a very delicate position regarding Spain; in particular France and Great Britain. 
Opposition to the Franco regime received sanctuary in both countries and looked to these 
Governments for ideological guidance and material assistance. The strategy common to 
all opponents of Franco was based on the call for the overthrow of Franco as a just 
corollary of the war and their efforts. The number of Spaniards who fell in combat against 
the Axis forces was their testimony. Some 6,000 Spaniards died fighting in the ranks of 
the French army, 14,000 were taken prisoner and 8,000 refugees died in concentration 
camps on French territory or were deported to Spain.7 The Spanish opposition leaders
*. Peter Lane: Europe since 1945. An Introduction, London [Batsford Academic 
and Educational] 1985, p. 216. Contemporary publications provide perfectly 
this perception* A most useful guide to these for the entire period covered 
in this Thesis is Norman S. Field: League of Nations and Pnited Nations 
Monthly List of Selected Articles. Cumulative 1920-1970, New York [Oceana 
Publications] 1971, Vol. II. Political Questions 1929-1945» pp. 739-40, and 
Vol. Ill Political Questions 1946-1960, pp. 841-42 (for 1946-1950) and pp. 
983-86 (for 1951-1955).
7. Michel Legris: "Les espagnols, en deçà des Pyrénées. .. I«- La fin de
lfespoir", Le Monde, 8 January 1964, p. 6. Paul Preston put the number of 
Spaniards who fell in combat against the Axis forces at 20,000, "The Decline 
and Resurgence of the Spanish Socialist Party During the Franco Regime", 
European History Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 2, April 1988, p. 210.
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constantly remainded the Allies that they had a moral debt to a democratic Spain. In both 
France and the United Kingdom there existed a hard and vigorous core of Franco-haters, 
many of whom had fought with the International Brigade in Spain. In both, there was 
some strong political formation ready to cause difficulties if their respective governments 
decided not to follow a strict policy against Franco. In France, the Communist Parry was 
the most organised political force and in Britain the Labour Part}’ was committed to its 
previous position during the Spanish civil war when it had bitterly criticised the 
Conservative policy of non-intervention. On the international stage France and the United 
Kingdom had endorsed the various Allied resolutions on Spain. In particular, the Labour 
Government that took office on 26 July 1945, was strongly committed to the Potsdam 
Resolution on Franco Spain.*
The political nature of governments in Western Europe after the first post-war 
round of free elections was inauspicious for the Franco regime. In Belgium the immediate 
post-war period was dominated by the Socialist Party that formed various coalitions with 
the Liberals and Communists from 1945 until 1947, when it entered a two-year coalition 
with the Christian Socials. In the Netherlands, the Labour Party was in power in coalition 
with the Catholic People’s Party. Although in Denmark, after the elections of October
1945, Social Democrats were displaced by a coalition of liberals and radicals, with a shift 
to the right. Social Democrats and Communists formed a strong opposition. Finally, in 
Sweden and Norway majority Labour governments were in power and stayed in power 
until September 1948 and November 1951, respectively. Given this situation, no political 
compromise with the Franco regime was ever possible and Spain was to be excluded from 
all new institutions of a European, as well as world, scope created for the new post-war 
international order. Western Europe’s populations could not easily forget that Franco had 
received help from Hitler and Mussolini during the Spanish Civil War. Moreover, the 
nature of the N u ev o  Estado provided further arguments to maintain the rejection. 
Notwithstanding this, the important point here is that confronted with this picture most 
Western European countries rapidly restarted commercial trade with Spain.
*. See chapter on«, pp. 33 ff., for a more detailed account of the 
information compressed into the paragraph.
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Since 1945 Spain negotiated trade and payment agreements with a number of 
countries, mostly European that later were to be involved in the Marshall Plan.9 Denmark 
had after August 1941 renewed annually its commercial arrangement with Spain, while 
Portugal had an agreement with Spain presented for revision every six months by a Joint 
Committee. Portugal provided timber and colonial produce (mainly oils and foodstuffs) 
in exchange of potash, iron, steel and lead. Spanish-Swiss trade was greatly developed 
during the war, and Switzerland, already in July 1944 and then in May 1945, exchanged 
notes on financial questions with Spain providing for the exchange of Swiss machinery , 
electrical equipment and chemicals, in return for a wide variety of Spanish exports. In 
July 1945 the exchange of notes was transformed into an agreement on financial and 
merchandise traffic regimes, renewed in September 1946 and in December 1947.
In May 1945 the Spanish Cortes approved a Ptas 76 million credit to Italy (the 
same amount of Mussolini's aid during the Spanish civil war).10 Italy signed a trade and 
payments agreement in December 1945, and renewed it in August 1947. Italy was to 
export chiefly vehicles, chemicals and many types of machinery, and to receive in 
exchange iron ore, rosin, turpentine, lead, anchoives, tunny and cork. The Netherlands and 
Sweden exchanged notes with Spain establishing a commercial and payments m o d u s  
v iv en d i in January 1946. The Netherlands enlarged theirs in April and transformed it in 
a trade and payments agreement in October, valid for a year. The agreement established 
the "most favorable" trading clause for the two countries, but basically governed the 
exchange of Spanish agricultural goods, iron ore, woollen and rayon goods, and potash 
for much-needed Dutch petroleum products as well as rubber, copper and tin from the
A couplet* list of bilateral treaties can be obtained from Ministerio de 
Asuntos Exteriores, Secretaria General Técnica, Servicio de Información: 
Censo de Tratados Internacionales suscritos por España desde 16 de 
Septiembre de 1125 a 21 de Octubre de 1975, Vol. I Bilaterales, Hadrid 
[Imprenta de la Oficina de Información Diplomática] 1976* The following 
paragraphs are based on it. For subsequent information about Spain's 
bilateral trade activities see chapter three, p* 214 and chapter five, pp. 
358 ff.
10. AD, Z/E vol. 92: Jean Hugues, Comercial Counsellor, Chief of the
Economic Division at the French Delegation in Spain, to the Minister of the 
National Economy, 17 Hay 1945. For a study of the Italian aid to Franco 
during the Spanish Civil war and its subsequent payment see Angel Viñas: "Le 
financiación exterior de la guerra civil", in Hugh Thomas (ed.): La guerra 
civil española. Vol. VI, Madrid [Ed. Urbión] 1979, reproduced in Viñas: 
Guerra, dinero, dictadura. Ayuda fascista v autarquía en la España de 
Franco, Barcelona [Critica] 1984, pp. 168*204.
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Dutch East Indies, and seed potatoes, electrical, Diesel engines and breeding stock from 
Holland. It was renewed in December 1947 and complemented in March 1948.
Sweden, although the Social Democrats were in power after October 1946, 
renewed its commercial and payments modus vivendi with Spain in October 1946 and 
July 1947. Sweeden was to export timber and wood pulp, special steels, marine Diesel 
engines, roller bearings and electrical equipment, and to receive in exchange oranges, 
potash, cork, grapes, and cotton textiles. In practice bilateral trade was conducted on a 
compensation basis. A proper trade agreement between both countries was signed in July 
1948. In February 1946 a trade and payments agreement was signed with the Belgium- 
Luxembourg Economic Union, but it was never ratified. Maybe the arrival of a Socialist 
Prime Minister to power on 31 March 1946 in Belgium could explain it. Nevertheless, the 
agreement was largely carried into practice since the beginning of 1947. It provided for 
an exchange of Belgian sulphate of ammonia, copper sulphate, iron and steel products and 
a wide variety of machinery against oranges, potash and pyrites. Ireland also signed a 
trade and payments agreement with Spain in 1946 and renewed it in September 1947 
providing primarily for the exchange of seed potatoes from Eire for Spanish potash. 
Norway, with a Labour Government in power in November 1945 with an absolute 
majority, signed commercial agreements with compensation. So did Turkey. Even with 
the Allied Control Council in Germany an exchange of notes took place on 28 October 
1946, renewed in May 1947. When the Federal Government took office in September 
1949 a formal bilateral trade and payments agreement was finally signed with Spain.
Finally, despite the fact that both the United Kingdom and France were considered 
by official Spanish propaganda as the leaders of post-world war international political 
ostracism of Franco Spain, they also competed for a fair share of Spain’s products. France 
signed a very beneficial trade agreement with Spain on 15 September 1945 and, once the 
border problem was over, rushed to obtain a new trading agreement to recover lost trade, 
signed on 8 May 1948. The clearing of 18 March 1940 and its secret protocol of 
November 1940 (signed in April 1941) were still in force for the United Kingdom after 
the war, and bilateral trade with or without formal agreements was eagerly promoted.
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All Western European governments tried their best to avoid political questions 
complicating their economic relations with that country, given the dominant features of 
the post-war economic situation of Western Europe.11 The economic position of Western 
European countries after the war varied widely. Some of them had to undertake extensive 
repairs of war-damaged production capacities, while others emerged from the war with 
their resources of real capital virtually intact Most of them, however, faced certain 
common problems. All Western European governments aimed at quick relief for their 
populations, and in the shortest possible time the restoration of Europe’s capital equipment 
and pre-war standard of living either by domestic production, trade, interest-free loans or 
grants. The modernisation of economic structures appeared necessary to take full 
advantage of the new economic international order set for the post-world war era, as 
envisaged at Bretton Woods in July 1944 and eventually embodied in the International 
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This was 
a much more difficult target to reach and implied a long-term adjustment problem 
requiring all resources available. The restoration of a healthy peacetime economy involved 
heavy imports. Quick relief implied imports of foodstuffs, especially grain, as well as 
consumer goods, adding to the import pressures imposed by economic reconstruction. 
When an immediate increase in exports or gains from invisibles were impossible, large 
import programmes were designed for fuel and raw materials, industrial materials like 
timber, iron and steel and manufactured goods such as chemicals, machineiy and 
replacement parts necessary to the effective utilisation of existing production resources, 
vehicles and ships. Some of the countries suffering little or no physical damage during 
the war, with production near or above pre-war levels, revealed a ratio of exports to 
production in 1946/47 only about two-thirds or less of the 1938 relationship, whereas their 
imports were near or sometimes well above pre-war levels in both absolute and relative
11. The Department, of Economic Affairs of the Economic Commission for Europe 
of the UN (ECE) elaborated sinae March 1946 a series of studies of the 
economic conditions of Europe. The first, A Survey of the Economic Situation 
and Prospects of Europe. Geneva, 1948 (henceforth referred as ECE, A 
Survey), contains an overall analysis of the European economy for 1945-1947, 
extensively used here. Chapter one of Milward's op. cit., provides a general 
interpretation of the main politico—economic goals as well as of the 
international implications of most Western European post-war reconstruction 
programmes. A short account is Alec Cairncross: "Post—War Planning in
Europe, 1945-47", Okonomi eg polltik. vol. 60, no. 4, 19B7, pp. 213-23.
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terms.12 Id other words, strong balance-of-payments deficits were to finance recovery and 
modernisation of the European economies.
Any large programme of imports implied a burden on the balance of payments, 
most especially towards the dollar area, which contained the only large surpluses available 
for world trade. The decline of intra-European trade (Eastern flow towards Western 
Europe and between Western European countries) in foodstuffs and raw materials 
aggravated Europe's dependence on overseas supplies, grains and coal in particular. To 
reduce the huge deficit in their overseas balance of payments the European economies had 
to increase their overseas exports and constrict their overseas imports, especially with the 
United States. European nations thus aimed ar raising their capacity to export while also 
developing those industries that provided substitutes for overseas imports. In manufactured 
goods, the emphasis rested on heavy industries (iron and steel, chemicals and engineering 
industries), whose products came almost entirely from the United States. To increase 
industrial production Europe raised its imports of raw materials and manufactured goods 
from overseas compared with pre-war levels. Therefore, agricultural output was to be 
pushed upwards to save some dollar impons, and in the short term, due to strong deficits 
in hard currencies, Europe had to force a reduction in food supply from overseas, limiting 
as much as possible purchases other than grains. It is in within these set of circumstances 
that the role to be played by the Spanish economy can be assessed.
The Spanish Administration’s collaboration with the general effort of European 
relief and reconstruction was offered by its Minister of Industry and Commerce, the textile 
engineer Demetrio Carceller, at the beginning of 1945.u Spain would supply some 
important items as well as the financial facilities required to pay for them. It provided 
foodstuffs -preserved fish, olive oil, vegetables, citrus fruits and other fruits- for direct 
relief of the population as well as some basic raw materials for reconstruction programmes 
-such as pyrites, potash and iron ore. It was to take part within the United Nations Relief
1J. ECE, A Survey, tables 17 and 24, pp. 21 ff. and 37 ff. Although it 
refers to July 1946 to June 1947, the pattern is applicable to the immediate 
post-war period.
x*. Carceller1 s declarations to Barcelona's newspaper La Vancruardia, as 
recorded by Jacques Truelle, Delegate in Spain of the French Provisional 
Government, AD, 2/E vol. €5, Telegram from Madrid, 24 February 1945.
6 1
and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), created in November 1943 to supervise 
plans of short-term relief in war-devastated areas throughout the world once fighting had 
ceased. Although some textiles were distributed through UNRRA in the first post-war 
months, Spain as exporter of manufactured goods -textiles, footwear and cork- could not 
offer a large supply to Western Europe. Cork manufactures and textiles amounted to 6 per 
cent and 2 per cent of total imports from Spain by France and the United Kingdom, 
respectively, in 1945.14 In return, the Spanish Administration expected to escape the 
pressure of blockade, especially concerning the supply of raw materials still controlled by 
the navicert system.11 Difficulties about price and the fear of political repercussions 
limited the working out of the deal on a large scale.16
Carceller was sensitive to lessons of the world war years, when Spain had a 
limited but in certain circumstances a key position in economic warfare. Why could it not 
be turned in a key position for post-war economic welfare? In 1945 there were few 
alternatives, since much of continental Europe was in ruins and the traditional pattern of 
international trade disrupted. Carceller’s offer was his last independent course of action 
in foreign economic policy before his dismissal. It could be interpreted as his personal 
reaction to the attempts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to place international 
economic relations under the aegis of foreign policy and to be determined by the guide­
lines agreed on in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Carceller might have been perfectly 
aware that in the post-war world it was safer for Spain to secure its participation in 
economic reconstruction as a technical affair far away from the political debate.
11. Direction General* des Douanes: Tableau Général du Commerce Extérieur.
Année 1945. Coran«rce de la France avec sta colonies et les pays étrangers, 
Paria, Imprimerie Nationale; Annual Statement of the Trade of the United
Kingdom with the Commonwealth Countries and Foreign Countries, Hereinafter
trade figures between Spain and both countries will refer to the above- 
mentioned official statistics, unless otherwise stated.
15. Navicert derives from a code word: navis + cert (ificate) . It was
originally a consular certificate granted to a neutral ship testifying that 
its cargo was correctly described in the manifest and not contraband 
destined for the enemy. It became one of the chief instruments in the 
prevention of enemy trade during World War II.
lé. W.N. Medlicott: The Economic Blockade, 2 vols., London [HMSO) 1978, vol.
2, p. 618. The Portuguese goverment (with the approval of Canadian, British, 
Soviet and OS governments) made a sole contribution to UNRRA in August 1946 
of $1 million for the purchase of fish, wolfram and cod-liver oil to be sent 
to Italy; George Woodbridge: UNRRA. The History of the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration, 3 vols., New York {Columbia University 
Press] 1950, an exhausting guide to UNRRA, pp. 130-31.
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Conversely, for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, if Spain had some economic advantages 
to offer, these should be used to bargain for the international political acceptance of the 
regime.17
Since the Spanish economy was the only source of supply for some goods and 
saved payments in hard currencies, most Western European countries secured their fair 
share of supply independently of the political circumstances tied to the question of the 
Franco regime. The fact that the latter was able to sign these trade agreements at all 
indicates that the "anti-Franco ardor of many Western European nations was to be gauged 
more on the verbiage extended in the United Nations than in the actual conduct of their 
foreign relations"1* A closer look to the way the United Kingdom and France acted 
commercially with Spain, will provide the necessary elements to assess Spain’s role in 
Western European economic recovery.
2.2.1. As Exporter of Essential Foodstuffs
Immediate post-war demand for foodstuff imports after almost six years of low 
levels of consumption was expected to return to pre-war levels. The level of liquidity in 
the countries that had not suffered from German occupation was high and long pent-up 
demands existed from the war years. This, together with the pressure for wage increases, 
where they were blocked during the war, was to result in an increasing private 
consumption. Those countries that suffered from German occupation, were prompt to relax 
the tight control and rationing system installed by the Germans. Finally, consumers in 
neutral countries had strongly suffered from the Allied blockade imposed against 
Germany. The collapse of Germany’s export potential would have negative effects. In 
general the population of Western Europe was less willing to postpone demands and to 
accept restraints once the war was over and thus the level of consumption could not easily 
be held down after years of difficulties. An upward trend in agricultural production in
11. See chapter one, pp. 28 ft.
l*. De Garmo, Peter Henry: Bevond the Pyrenees; Spain and Europe Since World 
War II. Doctoral thesis, University of California, 1971, p. 67.
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most future OEEC countries was programmed immediately after the war to feed an 
increasing and more demanding population and to reduce the import bill of foodstuffs, but 
a transitional period of several crops, with imports as the only source of supply, was 
necessary. Although imports were to be kept low by rationing, controls and restrictions 
to avoid a heavy burden on balance of payments, it was not desirable to keep imports of 
essential foodstuffs at or below war-time levels. This was the case in most Western 
Europe as a reaction to wartime restrictions.
After the first few months of direct economic relief, the first element of 
improvement was diet enrichment with the inclusion, among others, of tropical, citrus and 
dried fruits and nuts. With exports and invisible gains not instantaneously rising to the 
necessary level. Western Europe could not afford a large increase in imports if they were 
to be paid for in hard currency. In these circumstances the Spanish economy, a traditional 
foodstuffs exporter, had few foreign constraints to continue exporting foodstuffs in the 
immediate post-war period.19 For the United Kingdom and France, in 1945, foodstuffs 
amounted to 60 per cent and 57 per cent of total imports from Spain, respectively, with 
preserved fish, fruits and olive oil as main items. If the population of western Europe, on 
a daily material basis, was most concerned about food and most governments were forced 
to provide better livelihood to their people, why should they be deprived of Spanish food 
supply? Any restriction on consumption rates was to be made on the altars of the higher 
national interest whilst it seemed difficult to deprive the population of Europe of the 
Spanish supply on this basis.
Spain’s food supplies to France reduced the pressure of the foodstuffs shortage, 
which had become an obsession in France in the months after Liberation.20 Spanish
In 1945—46, 57 par cant of Spain's total axport trad* was mad* out of 
foodstuffs, Antonio Tens: "Comrcio txterior", in Albert Carreras (ed.) : 
Estadísticas Históricas de Espafla. Siglo» XIX y XX, Madrid [Fundación Banco 
Exterior] 1989, pp. 329-61, tabla 8*5, p. 350. This volume, hereinafter 
referred to as Estadísticas históricas, is the most complete compilation of 
Spain's historical economic statistics covering the period after 1880. It 
is a most useful research tool that will be widely operated in this thesis.
A lively account of the "obsession with food supplies" is Jean-Pierre 
Rioux: The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958# Cambridge/Paris [CUP/Editions de la 
Maison des Sciences de 1'Homme] 1987, pp. 23 ff., originally published in 
French as La France de la IV République, 2 vols«, Paris [Seuil] 1980 and 
1983. See also Pierre Gerbet et al.: Le relèvement, 1944-1949, Paris
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supplies of fruit bad little competition in Europe and were only limited by the recovery 
of agricultural output in Spain. At the end of 1944 a poll revealed that the French 
population wanted to see the reappearance of bananas, oranges and lemons, as well as 
other colonial products, such as chocolate, coffee and tea.21 The French Ministry of 
Health expressed with insistence the interest in the Spanish supply of citrus fruit and 
bananas for the feeding of its country’s population, especially children and sick people." 
On the other side, cuiTent transport difficulties had strongly reduced the possibility of 
traditional imports from North Africa into the metropolitan market. In France, as in the 
rest of Europe, Spanish foodstuff supplies offered diet variations and enrichment, while 
reserving hard currency reserves to cope with the bad grain harvest of 1945.
A sharp rise in consumption took place in the United Kingdom in the first two 
post-war years, particularly in food due to accumulated purchasing power. Wages were 
kept high during the war and income-earners had ample funds to spend afterwards.23 The 
United Kingdom, heavily dependent on food imports, relied on Spain for some of the 
easements and variations in diet to which the British housewife was looking forward, 
notably oranges, bananas and tomatoes. In Britain, the Ministry of Food confirmed the 
importance of Spanish foodstuffs exports to the national welfare.24 The British
[Imprimerie National«] 1991, chap. V, "La faiblasse économique", pp. 121—54. 
The relative importance of the Spanish supply to France comes from the 
following figures: it represented 10 per cent of total French imports of 
foodstuffs from continental Europe, it provided 76 per cent of foreign 
supply of olive oil imported from Europe, it ranked third in French European 
imports of preserved fish, after Portuguese and British supplies, and, 
finally, it provided 20 per cent of French imports of fruits from Europe.
21. Cited in Rioux, op. cit., footnote 23, chap. 2.
23. AD, 2/E vol. 92: The General Director of Economic Affairs Division at
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Note pour le Ministre", 23 November 
1945.
21. Alec Cairncross: Years of Recovery. British economic policy 194 5-51, 
London [University Paperback ed.] 1987 [Methuen, 1985] pp. 14 ff. and 30-31;
and Derek H. Aldcroft: The British Economy. Vol. 1 The Years of Turmoil 
1920-1951, Brighton [Wheatsheaf Books] 1986, p. 233.
a4. PRO, BOT 11/3068: Minute Sheet of the interdepartmental meeting at the 
FO on 28 February 1946 to consider how British interests were to be affected
if it became necessary to consider certain lines of action in regard to
Spain, dated on 1 May. Foreign Office, Treasury, Board of Trade, and the 
Ministries of Food, Supply and Fuel and Power attained. BOT 11/3067 contains
another minute sheet of the meeting. Health considerations also applied in 
Britain. "Spanish [foodstuffs] supplies (...) could not be foregone without 
adversely affecting the health of the British people." PRO, FO 371/67897: 
"British Imports from Spain", n/s, n/d, the note relates to the year ending
31 March 1947.
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Government was aiming most at returning to the pre-war situation but at the time the 
country scarcely imported a quarter of its pre-war volume of fresh fruit British pre-war 
consumption of citrus fruit was the highest in Europe and, from October to December, 
Spain provided the bulk of British winter orange supplies. Spanish tomatoes had 
traditionally filled the gap between the winter months before British supplies became 
available. Even though the Spanish prices were generally high, sweet oranges, bananas 
and tomatoes were considered essential hems and could not be replaced by other sources, 
as all possible supplies were not sufficient to meet the demand." Oranges alone -both 
the eatable and the marmalade (bitter) varieties- accounted for 37 per cent of Spain’s total 
exports to the United Kingdom in 1945 and even after the bad orange crop early in 1946, 
oranges plus bananas and tomatoes represented 38 per cent of British total imports from 
Spain in 1946. The only large producers of tropical fruits (bananas) were the American 
states within the dollar area. Therefore, if the British or anyone else in Western Europe 
were to eat any, it seemed sensible to obtain all possible non-dollar supplies before 
importing from the dollar zone. There were various other items, such as dried apricots, 
raisins, nuts and apricot pulp, in which the inability to import from Spain would cause the 
British Ministry of Food considerable concern.36 Other commodities included in the 
British food programme of purchase from Spain had to be sacrificed since they were 
irreplaceable (notably sheny) or could only be replaced from other sources with varying 
degrees of difficulty (such as Mediterranean sardines). Though the British did not yet take 
much canned fish from Spain, they were most interested to keep the market open as a 
bargaining power to prevent Portugal from becoming a monopoly and rasing their 
prices.27 To find alternative suppliers to Spain’s foodstuff exports was probably difficult
25. PRO, BOT 11/3066: Board of Trad« to Overseas General Division, Ministry 
of Information, 7 March 1946. Those Western European countries that before 
the war were large sources of supply showed records of agricultural output 
in the crop year of 1945/46 appreciably below pre-war levels. ECE, A Survey, 
table 8, p. 11.
2*. See explanations relating to the year ending 31 March 1947 in PRO, BOT 
11/3068: "British Imports from Spain'*, Annex to Intel no. 27 from Ernest 
Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Douglas F. Howard, 
British Chargt d'Affaires in Madrid, "Economic Relations with Spain", 21 
January 1947 (henceforth referred to as Intel no. 27) . This document 
compressed the economic arguments presented by the different departments 
involved in economic relations with Spain, since their first meeting in 
December 1945.
27. PRO, BOT 11/3067: "Minutes of a Meeting held at the FO on the 26th
February (1946) to consider the possible consequences of a rupture of 
relations with Spain"•
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at the time owing to the dollar situation and the long distances involved in shipments from 
other countries. Moreover the situation of food supply was not such as to forego any 
possible source, even more if offered products in strong scarcity and with little financial 
effort in terms of hard currency.28
The Spanish economy (and consequently the Franco regime in political terms) 
benefitted from the circumstances of world food shortage, the liberation of purchasing 
power kept low during the war years, strong aspirations for improved standards of living, 
and world-wide dollar scarcity. The most favourable agricultural plans for restoration of 
pre-war levels of output implied a delay of at least five years from the end of hostilities. 
Even a full restoration of pre-war output still meant a 6-8 per cent reduction in output per 
head compared with 1934-1938, owing to the increase in population.29 It implied that 
Western Europe had to support an important burden on its balance of payments with the 
dollar area. The gap was very difficult to reduce. European overseas imports of foodstuffs 
consisted partly of products not produced at all in Europe (i.e., coffee and tea), of 
products in which European indigenous production could not be easily expanded (i.e., 
grain), and finally of foodstuffs in which only a minimal contribution could be expected 
of European production. Opportunities for contraction in imports of these foodstuffs and 
some industrial materials -such as petroleum, cotton and wool- were to be extremely 
limited without a harmful reduction in consumption and production in Western Europe. 
In these circumstances, Spain’s exports constituted a non-dollar supply of foodstuffs, and 
although high priced, were presented as dollar-savings and a contribution to solving the 
balance-of-payments deficits while also contributing to an enrichment of the diet. This was 
the real position of Spain as an exporter of foodstuffs in a world that had declared the 
Franco regime as the last refuge of fascism.
11. The reader should bear in mind that by mid—December 1945 there still
were Parliamentary questions like the following one: "Whether it was
possible to raise the rations of agricultural workers and coal miners to the
ration level of the British soldier which has more than twice the caloric-
value of the civilian ration", Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol.
417 (henceforth, 417 HC DEB) London, HMSO, 1946, written answers of 19
December 1945, p. 1499.
2#. ECE, A Survey, p. 20.
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2.22. As Exporter of Strategic Raw Materials
Industrial recovery in Western Europe was based on two initially interconnected 
elements: overcoming the shortage of basic materials handicapping European industry and 
freeing maximum hard currency for the purchase of essentials. In the first aspect, the 
experience of the war and the post-war reconstruction gave way to a race for resources 
and a "global struggle" for minerals and fuels.10 It appears, therefore, that Spain was an 
important source of raw materials, especially critical minerals at the time, constituting its 
second main export category, amounting to 20 per cent of total exports in 1945-1946.31 
Pyrites, potash, tungsten, rosin, iron ore and cork, were important items of bilateral trade.
The attempt to free purchases made in hard currency, together with the war 
experience, involved a strong increase in agricultural production throughout Western 
Europe. In the previous section, the Spanish economy was presented as a supplier of 
foodstuffs to European relief. This section will deal with it as provider of those raw 
materials that constituted bottlenecks to the recovery of agricultural production, here 
considered as strategic. The recovery of European agricultural production to at least pre­
war levels was a precondition to reduce overseas food imports. An increase in agricultural 
production was not to be attained as quickly as in industrial production. The estimates of 
the ECE for 23 European countries accounting for 90 per cent of the total net value of 
agricultural production of Europe before the war, showed that in the crop year 1945/46 
output was only 63 per cent of the pre-war level, whilst the 1938 level of industrial output 
was restored by the last quarter of 1946.32 In Britain, agricultural production received 
special attention in the later stages of war owing to increasing anxiety as to the viability 
of overseas supplies and the ability to finance imports in the transitional period. In France, 
where reconstruction was translated into some fonn of long-term plan, agricultural 
production was considered as an important element. Among the basic economic sectors
**. Taken from Alfred E. Eckes, Jr.: The Pnited States and the Global
Struggle for Minerals, Austin and London [University of Texas Press] 1979.
11. Ten*, op. cit., p. 350. Percentages of raw materials in total French and 
British import bills from Spain were 30 and 27 per cent, respectively, in 
1945.
” . ECE, A Survey, table 8, p. 11.
6 8
of the Plan de Modernisation et de l'équipement de la France, the so-called Monnet Plan, 
drafted in April 1946 but initiated in the autumn of 1945, were agricultural machinery and 
chemical fertilisers. An increase in agricultural output was seen as necessary not only to 
feed the population of metropolitan France and its North African territories but also to 
ease the country’s trade balance to accomplish the modernisation of its economy. The 
Monnet Plan was to provide the French economy with a spring-board to substantially 
increase productivity in the interests of French economic competition in the open 
international economy. Eliminating or at least strongly reducing imports of agricultural 
commodities was necessary to free foreign currency resources to be devoted to the 
purchase of necessary raw materials for industry. As a member of the Plan Commissariat 
put it: "La réalisation rapide de notre plan industriel commande, plus encore que les 
importations, celle de plan agricole."35 In sum, food production was an essential element 
of British and French reconstruction policies, as well as in the rest of Western Europe.
Fertiliser programmes were drawn in most Western European countries as an 
integral part of a strategy to increase productivity in agriculture. It was necessitated by 
labour shortages, the need to divert manpower from agriculture to industry, the cumulative 
effect of insufficient capital investment and use of fertilisers with the consequent 
impoverishment of the soil, and, finally, the deterioration of agricultural equipment and 
loss of livestock. The latter element had reduced the organic materials used to fertilise 
land, imposing a larger dependency upon inorganic or chemical fertilisers, mainly 
nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium. In 1945/46 world production of nitrogen was still 69 
per cent of that of 1938/39, whereas Western Europe only reached 55 per cent34 
Regarding phosphorus fertilisers -calcium phosphate from phosphate rock and 
superphosphate obtained by treatment of calcium phosphate with sulphuric acid- the 
situation was critical from 1944 to the end of 1946. French North African production of 
phosphate was well below pre-war levels. The United Kingdom, owing to a shortage of 
labour and the decline of Belgium’s exports, was sending phosphate rock to Spain for
AN, 80AJ/15: R. Dumont, "Lea Conditions de Réalisation du Plan Agricole 
rédigé pour la réunion du 7 Juin 1956 de la Commission de Modernisation de 
la Production végétale. Annexe 2 du procès-verbal de la réunion." For 
references on the Monnet Plan see the following chapter.
>4. UN, Statistical Yearbook 1948 (SY 1946), New York, 1949, p. 216.
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processing there into superphosphates The supplies coming forward under this 
arrangement contributed to about 5 per cent of British supplies for the season 1945/46. 
Even with this contribution the Ministry of Agriculture’s target programme for 
superphosphates was about 10 percent short16 With the production of nitrogen, to be 
used as nitrates or ammonium salts, reduced and with limited supplies of phosphorus 
fertilisers, other chemical compounds for the fertiliser campaigns reached a greater 
importance, such as potash and pyrites.
Spain constituted the cheapest source far potash, and produced approximately 5 
per cent of the world’s potash output in 1944/45.37 Spain provided approximately two- 
thirds of total British requirements in 1945/46 and it was maintained to 50 per cent for 
the following year.3* No other source of supply appeared possible since French and 
German production was still far below pre-war levels, and the total output from Palestine 
had already been imported. Dollar considerations overrode the only other source of 
supply, the United States, which had doubled potash output between 1940 and 1945. Even 
after securing Spanish supplies the British Ministry of Agriculture’s target programme for 
the season envisaged a short fall of 33 per cent.3*
Another important component of the fertiliser programmes was pyrite, as source 
of sulphur in the manufacture of sulphuric acid. Only after the extraction of sulphur were
,s. PRO, BT 11/3068: "Raw Materials from Spain”, note by the Raw Materials 
Department, 2 March 1946. Superphosphate used as fertiliser is a compound 
produced by treating rock phosphate with either sulfuric or phosphoric 
acids, or a mixture of the two. As soon as Belgium was in a position to 
export superphosphates at the end of 1946, the British switched to this pre­
war source.
” . Ibid.
ON, SY 1948. p, 167. The data refers to K,0 content or equivalent of 
various potash salts mined. Not including DSSR and other some minor 
producing countries. Information on Soviet production of raw materials is 
inadequate in the economic surveys of the international organisations. It 
is, therefore, systematically excluded from the calculations made in this 
chapter. It does not significantly inpair the comparability of the series 
since net Soviet foreign trade in raw materials was small in relation to 
total world supplies.
**. PRO, BOT 11/3068: BT to FO, "Estimate of Alternative Sources of Supply 
for OK Raw Materials Needs from Spain", 19 November 1946. It considérés the 
year ending 30th June 1946, and the following fertiliser season for the 
1946/47 harvest.
Ibid., "Raw Material Supplies from Spain", cit.
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the so-called ‘spent pyrites’ used as low-grade iron ore. Because of the availability of 
better sources of iron, pyrites were not generally used as an iron ore for the iron and steel 
industry. Sulphur appeared to be the most important case in which the failure of 
production to keep pace with consumption requirements had serious consequences. The 
sulphuric acid extracted from the sulphur had widely varying uses and played some part 
in the production of nearly all manufactured goods. A major use of sulphuric acid was in 
the production of fertilisers. In 1944-1945 Spain produced roughly 13 per cent of the 
world production of pyrites. Discounting extra-European supplies for either financial or 
transport considerations, Spain represented 40 per cent of the pyrite production of Europe, 
a vital ingredient of Western European fertiliser programmes.40
The United Kingdom was dependent on Spain for about 90 per cent of its total 
pyrite supplies for 1945/46 with no other sizeable source of supply. For the year ending 
30 June 1947 Spain provided 100 per cent of British imports of pyrites. To obtain any 
current supply from Norway, Sweden and Cyprus, other European suppliers of pyrites, 
appeared to require great effort, unnecessary if Spanish supplies were available. A 
possible alternative was American sulphur but it involved a basic alteration of production 
plants. It was calculated to take six to twelve months to adapt production lines -to be at 
Government cost- so that production of sulphuric acid, sulphate of ammonia and 
superphosphates in the United Kingdom would inevitably be curtailed.41 Apart from that, 
dollar considerations made it undesirable to buy from the American market.
As far as France was concerned, a very limited amount of supply of pyrites from 
Portugal and Canada could be found in the international market by the end of 1944. 
France had obtained 100,000 tons from each when the monthly requirement of the French
40. Tha percentage refers to output of iron and cupreous pyrites plus pyrite 
concent rat,* 9 obtained as a by-product from copper, lead and zinc ore 
operations, whilst it refers only to iron pyrites for Spain. Not including 
USSR and a few minor producers. Own elaboration from UN, SY 1946, pp. 164- 
65.
41. PRO, BOT 11/3068: "Raw Material Supplies from Spain", cit., and BT to
FO, "Estimate of Alternative Sources of Supply for UK Raw Materials Needs 
from Spain", 19 November 1946.
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industry was 40,000 tons.42 The situation did not change in the following two seasons, 
there remaining a large shortage in the supply of fertilisers. The Modernisation 
Commission for Agricultural Production of the Plan Commissariat described the lack of 
fertilisers as an essential constraint on reaching the output targets for agriculture which 
the Plan had set The Plan de Modernisation de la Production Végétale presented in June 
1946 to the Plan Council required doubling the use of chemical fertilisers in five years.43 
Before the war, Western Europe accounted for about SO per cent of the total world 
consumption of fertilisers and in the post-war period it had even greater requirements. 
Post-war trade in chemicals and fertilisers was strongly distorted compared with the pre­
war panera (1937). In pre-war purchasing power imports from the United States in 1947 
were 260 per cent the value reached in 1937, while intra-European trade (excluding the 
USSR) was only 55 per cent44 With world fertiliser supplies substantially below the 
level needed to meet projected future food programmes, Spanish supplies were a key 
supply at this juncture.
The fertiliser bottleneck for an increase in agricultural production was a common 
feature in Western Europe during the period 1945-47:
"The diminution of supplies which would result from any 
rupture of trade relations with Spain would be little short of 
disastrous at this juncture, when every nerve is being 
strained to increase fertiliser production in the interest of 
the food supply."4$
"Lea produits espagnols, surtout les blendes et les pyrites 
sont indispensables à notre économie dont la reprise peut 
difficilement être assurée sans cet apport."44
"The serious character of the food situation in Europe speaks 
for itself [...] It can be safely asserted that an increase in 
food production in Europe is one of the most vital
43. AD, Z/E vol. 92, Director des Affairs économiques, "Note pour le 
Ministre. Négociations commerciales avec l'Espagne", Paris, 6 February 1945.
4*. AN, Commissariat général du Plan de Modernisation et de l'équipement, 
80AJ/15: "Résumé du Plan de Modernisation de la Production Végétale". The 
targets to reach in 1950 for the three main chemical fertiliser compounds 
were the following: 450,000 tons of nitrogen, 800,000 tons of phosphorus and
an another 800,000 tons of potassium fertilisers.
44. ECE, A Survey, table 26, p. 47.
45. PRO, BOT 11/3068: Intel no. 27.
44. AD, Z/E vol. 92: Head of the Economic Affairs Division at the Quai
d'Orsay, "Note pour le Ministre. Négociations commerciales avec l'Espagne”, 
8 February 1945.
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contributions that can be made to the recovery of European 
economy."47
Spain was an important European source for other raw materials. A rapid 
expansion of world industrial production required adequate raw material inputs. In 1946 
the rate at which metals and metallic ores were being fed into the production process 
lagged substantially behind the rate at which finished products were leaving the 
engineering industries.4* The most important ore that Spain actually exported to Western 
Europe was iron ore, completely tied to one industry, iron and steel, whilst the main 
bottleneck to an expansion of European industry was steel outputs. In this trend, the 
shortage in scrap and crude steel imposed a larger dependence upon coke and iron ore, 
the latter being smelted in blast furnaces to produce pig iron. World pig iron, which 
owing to wartime destruction had plunged by 25 per cent between 1939 and 1945, 
initiated a long recovery period so that by 1950 it was one-third greater than the 1939 
level (with almost half still being produced in the United States). Although Spain 
produced approximately 1 per cent of world output of iron ore in 1945, it was the fourth 
largest European producer, after the United Kingdom, France and Sweden.49 Even more 
important was that Spanish iron ore was of high grade, that is of low phosphoric content 
which saved on fuel in its processing and implying, thus, lesser complementary import 
costs as savings in coking coal and scrap. After March 1946 shipments from Northern 
Spain to the United Kingdom restarted and the British Supply authorities foresaw supplies 
at a rate of 1 >5/1.7 million tons a year.50 For the year ending 31st March 1947 about 20 
per cent of British iron ore supplies (7 million) were drawn from Spain and Spanish 
Morocco.
The attempt to enlarge the range of ores suppliers of low phosphoric content to
47. UN, Economic and Social Council, E/ECE/54, 20 September 1947: ECE,
Fertilisers Sub-Committee, Opening Statement by the Executive Secretary, 22 
September 1947.
4#. UN, Department of Economic Affairs: Economic Survey of Europe 1950,
Research and Planning Division of the ECE, Geneva, 1951, p. 5.
4#. UN, SY 1948, p. 139. Data referring to iron content of ores mines, 
excluding pyrites. Not including USSR and a few minor producing countries.
ao. PRO, BOT 11/3068: Ministry of Supply to Private Secretary of the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 21 November 194 6.
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France and Sweden was not very successful. On the one hand, British officials were at 
the time running into considerable difficulties with France over the price of North African 
ores, most particularly from Algeria. On the other hand, only a limited quantity of ore of 
a comparable grade to Spanish Moroccan ore could be obtained from Sweden. Larger 
amounts had to be made up of Swedish ore of lower grade demanding more fuel and coal 
for its metallurgical processing. On currency grounds this supply constituted an 
undesirable alternative; since Sweden was not happy to hold sterling thus an increase in 
purchases of iron ore was believed to imply a cut of supply of timber and pulp. The only 
alternative to replace Spanish ore implied thus an increase in the use of low grade British 
ore that would adversely affect not only the import bill via an increase in coal import 
requirements but also the British ability to produce and export steel.51 The British 
authorities believed that a cut in Spanish iron ore supplies would have implied that 
housing -to which the Labour Government was strongly committed- and many industrial 
sectors such as engineering, motors, textiles, machinery, would have been seriously 
affected.52
According to this, Spain's supplies to Western European countries were a good 
example of how the Spanish Administration appeared to benefit from the difficulties in 
conducting trade between Western European soft-currency countries. The strong lack of 
cash to maintain trade deficits and the necessity to import essential goods moved the
In May 1947 a member of the Foreign Office explained carefully to the 
Belgian Chargé d'Affaire* the consequences of economic sanctions against 
Spain using exactly the above-mentioned arguments. The United Kingdom would 
then probably be compelled to seek steel from Belgium and to request a 
larger allocation of coal from the European Coal Organisation (ECO) with a 
correspondingly diminished amount of coal to other coal consuming countries. 
It was reported that the Belgian Chargé was convinced and stopped a careless 
promotion of economic sanctions, FRUS, 1947, vol. Ill, "The Ambassador in 
the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State", London, 10 May 
1947, pp. 1077-76. The ECO was organised in London in May 1945 to reconsnend 
to its member governments the equitable the allocation of coal surpluses. 
It lasted until January 1948 when its functions were transferred to the Coal 
Committee of the ECE in Geneva; more datails in Nathaniel Samuels: "The
European Coal Organization**, Foreign Affairs, July 1948, pp. 728-36,
PRO, BOT 11/3068: Intel no. 27. Chapter 8 of Carl G la tt-Hackney,
"Industrial Reconstruction, Reparations, Science and Industrial Technology: 
The United Kingdom and Its Zone of Occupation in Germany (1944-1952) ", 
Doctoral thesis, EUI Florence (forthcoming), measures the commitment of the 
British Labour Government to housing with the result that it was priority 
number one in its investments plans. That economic retaliation against Spain 
could have created obstacles to house-building could have played an 
important role in determining British attitude.
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European countries towards a strict bilateral balancing of trade accounts with each other. 
The disadvantages of this system were obvious to everyone.53 Faced with import barriers 
and price competition overseas, European countries forced through combined sales 
established in the bilateral trade agreements to place non-essential goods in other 
European markets, affecting negatively the supply of essentials. An exporting country- 
agreed to supply essentials only if die purchaser agreed to issue licenses for a satisfactory 
volume of non-essential goods. In other words, intra-European trade was not free to buy 
or not to buy on the basis of relative qualities and prices. The mutual credit facilities or 
swings of trade that dominated the intra-European post-world war system of trade and 
payments were not a very satisfactory means of financing trade, although certainly they 
eliminated the necessity for a daily balancing of accounts, and thus permitted the building 
up of creditor and debtor positions over a period of time. Spain's supplies, therefore, gave 
the possibility to their buyers of increasing their bargaining power vis-à-vis other soft 
European suppliers to obtain a larger share of essentials. Also, Spain’s contribution to the 
recovery in production contributed to the capacity of Western European countries to 
balance their bilateral trade accounts. For instance, British steel production, to which 
Spain contributed by providing large quantities of high-quality iron ore, permitted Britain 
to balance with Sweden and Switzerland, whose credit arrangements required gold or 
dollar settlement. Furthermore, Spain seemed to spend sterling earnings very readily in 
purchasing goods from the Sterling Area and, always in consultation with the British 
Authorities, in non-sterling area countries short of sterling.54
Spain was also an important producer of mercury, zinc and tin concentrates, and 
lead and manganese ores, and had exportable surpluses of salt and fluor-spar. It was the
"Essential goods fail to go where they could make the greatest 
contribution toward recovery of production, while trade in non-essentials 
is unduly encouraged in some instances as a means of achieving bilateral 
balance.** UK, A Survey, p. xv.
54. The monetary agreements between the United Kingdom and Spain did not 
allow Spanish residents of the Spanish monetary area to transfer and pay to 
residents outside the sterling area without previous authorisation by the 
Bank of England. The right to spend part of their sterling earnings outside 
the sterling area was always a main goal of the Spanish commercial 
authorities, which was systematically rejected by the British commercial 
authorities who did not give up their main trade bargaining counter. The 
main case where this authorisation was asked for (and normally granted) was 
for the purchase of cotton from Brazil.
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world’s principal source of mercury, producing 28 per cent of world production in 
1944/45; it produced 50 per cent of lead ore, 42 per cent of manganese ore and 28 per 
cent of Europe's tin concentrates, and 33 per cent of the Western European zinc output55 
Other important items in Spain’s foreign trade were rosin and cork. It was, among the 
Southern European producers of these same raw materials, the only one to maintain and 
even increase its mining activity. The Portuguese economy, an important producer to 
which Western European could have diverted its requests if Spain was to be expelled from 
international markets, suffered in 1946 the most spectacular drop in output of the group 
of countries considered -Turkey, Spain, Portugal and Southern Italy.54
Post-world war demand for raw materials, especially non-ferrous minerals for this 
specific case-study, was high for several reasons. First, stocks were low relative to the 
high levels of demand for restoration of war damage and the expansion of industrial 
activity. Second, basic production was making an extremely slow recovery. In addition 
to civilian demands, there was also demand for strategic stockpiling purposes, particularly 
important for the United States where there were permanent stockpile programmes. By 
the end of 1945, the United States’ domestic natural reserves could offer short-run (two 
years) supply of manganese and (four years) of tungsten. Other important items with less 
than a thirty-five-year supply that Spain could offer included lead, tin, zinc.57 Spain was 
not to be an exception to "access on equal terms to the trade and raw materials of the 
world" called for by the Atlantic Charter of 194151 To the extent that European 
countries expanded manufacturing production, increased imports of raw or processed non- 
ferrous metals and chemicals were necessary, especially to support heavy industries. It
ON, SY 194B. pp. 153 and 136-46.
**. ON, Economic Survey of Europe in 1953. Study of Economic Development in 
Southern Europe. Geneva, 1954, p. 165. For an overview of Spain's place in 
general terms for the above-mentioned commodities see Economic Cooperation 
Administration, Special Mission to the Onited Kingdom: The Sterling Area. 
An American Analysis. London, 1951, p. 553; ON, Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics, vol. 27, no. 11, November 1946, pp. 491—93; and PRO, BOT 
11/3066: BT to FO, "Estimate of Alternative Sources of Supply for OK Raw 
Materials Needs from Spain", 19 November 1946.
Harold Ickes [OS Interior Secretary] "The War and Our Vanishing 
Resources", American Magazine. 140, December 1945, pp. 20-22, p. 22, as 
cited in A. Eckes, op. cit., p. 124. For an analysis of the post-war OS 
stockpiling programme, see the latter, chapter 5, pp. 121—45.
“ . Raw Materials and Foreign Policy. International Economic Studies 
Institute, Washington, 1976, pp. 27-28.
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appeared, therefore, as in the case of foodstuffs, that any net savings in imports was most 
unlikely and that, conversely, Europe's minimum requirements of imports of raw materials 
were to expand in consequence.
Western European post-war demand had also favoured a trauma-free reconversion 
of Spain’s pattern of trade between 1944 and 1945. This was so despite the decrease of 
£12 million in earnings of foreign currency, due mainly to the elimination of wolfram 
exports.5’ The Spanish commercial authorities considered obvious that wolfram exports 
had to cease once the hostilities were over, which provoked an immediate drop in earnings 
of £16 million. Their main concern were traditional exports, which, in turn, gave a 
satisfactory result. Without considering wolfram, Spanish exports were able to earn in 
1945 a little more than £4 million over their level in 1944 (partly due to price increase). 
Main export commodities were oranges, wine, iron ore, olives and olive oil, almonds, 
cork, hazelnuts, potash, and mercury, which in 1945 earned 58 per cent of total foreign 
currency earnings. The decrease of some traditional export commodities, in particular 
Sherry wine, was expected to be only temporary. Any artificial promotion of expons was 
excluded by the Minister of Industry and Commerce. He had argued that "the danger of 
a subsidy policy [is] that once the door opens, it is very difficult to limit the sectors of 
application.”*0 Although a system of premiums was studied after November 1945 for 
several products, it was announced at the end of May 1946 only with the idea of 
compensating Portuguese lower prices (the Iberian Peninsula had almost a world 
monopoly of cork production); wines, brandy and textiles would follow later on.61
The path from war to peace economy also meant that "war material" (which in 
1944 accounted for 18 per cent of the total purchases in foreign currency) disappeared 
from the import list. Raw cotton and textile-fibers, machinery, aircraft and its parts, 
electrical material, chemicals, and tobacco were the main import commodities.62 The low
**. AUBE, IEME, box no. 7; IEME Memoria de 1945, dated 28 March 1946.
AHBE, IEME, box no. 2: A/C, 21 November 1945. 
fl. Ibid., A/C, 21 November 1945, 28 May and 24 July 1946.
*a. It refers exclusively to commodities paid of£ in foreign currency.
Import of wheat from Argentina, for instance, took place on credit basis
involving no foreign currency expenditure.
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import levels were considered also transitional due to the relief demand in Western 
Europe, the disappearance of Germany, and the closing of many markets after the war. 
It was also due to the effort made in 1945 to pay off arrears, some previous financial 
credits and commercial debts, and to increase gold reserves. The intention behind this 
financial move was twofold: to present the Spanish economy as a good commercial dealer, 
ready to benefit freon an open economy, and to eliminate future obstacles in trade 
negotiations.63 A further reduction of imports was, however, imposed by the policy of 
cashing bonds in foreign hands. All these non-commercial operations involved a heavy 
drain of resources, accounting for 34 per cent of the foreign currency expenditure in 
1945.64 The IEME authorities considered this period as transitional to a future expansion 
of trade following the recovery of Europe. An efficient use of economic resources (once 
debts had been paid) and the network of bilateral agreements negotiated or being 
negotiated in the second half of 1945 would open prosperous perspectives for the 
future.65
2.3. Exigencies of French and British Economic Reconstructions
Spam's supply served to reduce the dollar drain. Its trading partners took as full 
advantage as possible from its raw material reserves, crucial at the time of world scarcity 
of supply and means of payment. While all over the world economic life had been 
disrupted by the war or by war-time production, and with only the countries in the 
Western hemisphere, especially the United States and the dollar area, as large suppliers, 
any non-dollar supply was to be highly valued. Spain appeared as a scarce but still valid 
source of supply to be used fully before importing from the dollar area or from countries
*J. Mentor ia de 1945. cit., p. 18.
**. The purchase of State bonda in foreign hands and the nationalisation of 
the National Telephone Company front the American ITT involved £11,003,442 
out of a total exchange expenditure of £68.645.045 in 1945, AHBE, IEME, box 
no. 7: IEME'a annual report for 1945, dated 28 March 1946. See the following 
chapter pp. 186—87, for a detailed account.
**. Negotiation of trade agreements in the second half of 1945 took place 
with Switzerland, France, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Argentina. This prosperous vision reflected in IEME's 
annual report for 1945, cit.
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more awkward on currency grounds. It was in the European interest that Spain continued 
to give its contribution to the economic recovery of Western Europe. This was the 
fundamental reason for avoiding economic sanctions or a blockade against Spain, the 
apparently most logical consequence of the political dislike towards the Franco regime. 
The possible economic contribution of Spain to European recovery was to be channelled, 
as all other available resources, into productive work in order to achieve fully effective 
national economies. It would have been very wasteful if, in the circumstances of 1944- 
1946, the resources of Spain were not to be available:
"At a time of world shortage of foodstuffs and when various 
countries need her raw materials for the revival of their 
industries, to seek to deny these goods to those who need them 
may be open to some criticism.
Despite the fact that the Spanish economy was making its contribution to 
European recovery, there were many problems of a political nature in not applying a strict 
approach, from an economic or technical perspective, to the problem of relations with the 
Franco regime. The alternatives to adopting sanctions against Spain were, in an ascending 
order of severity, the recall of ambassadors and the breaking off diplomatic relations, as 
demanded by several Governments at the United Nations, and economic sanctions. How 
and why did the French Provisional Government of the IV Republic and the British 
Labour Government adopt different courses of action and to what extent were they so 
different?
2.3.1. The French Provisional Government of the IV Republic
It is well known that active sectors of French public opinion and across the 
political spectrum wanted a rupture of diplomatic relations with Spain.67 The Foreign
PRO, BOT 11/3068: Minute Sheet of the interdepartmental meeting at the 
FO on the 28th February 1946. It was part of the general British policy: 
"His Majesty's Government regard the economic reconstruction of the world 
as a primary object of their foreign policy." Bevin's first address as 
Secretary of State to the House of Commons, 20 August 194 5, 413 HC DEB, p. 
287.
*7. George Bidault's memoirs are a useful and partial source of information, 
D'une Résistance à l'autre, Paris [Les Presses du siècle) 1965, translated 
as Resistance : the Political Autobiography of George Bidault, London
[Weidenfeld & Nicolson] 1967. Other direct accounts in the memoirs of 
Bidault's Secretary—General for the four years after January 1945, Jean
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Affairs Commission of the Provisional Consultative/Constituent Assembly proposed on 
different occasions to invite the Allies to ask Franco to resign or, if necessary, an 
individual rupture of diplomatic relations.6* The Government of National Unity, formed 
in September 1944 and presided over by General de Gaulle, resisted public and 
parliamentary pressure to break relations with Franco Spain. The problems posed by the 
imminent victory over Germany, the restoration of order and authority, the foundations 
of a new Republic, and economic reconstruction, were of a sort that made the Provisional 
French Government reluctant to create further upheaval. Moreover, formal diplomatic 
relations were de facto broken. The Spanish Government broke diplomatic relations with 
the Vichy regime on 24 August 1944 when its Ambassador to Vichy, Lequerica, was 
appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Madrid did not appoint a new Ambassador 
although they recognised Jacques Truelle as the official delegate of France. The French 
Provisional Government had not appointed an Ambassador to Madrid and could perfectly 
do without one in the future if public opinion pressed in that direction. On the other hand, 
the Presidency and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs were not ready to do without 
the simple delegate, whose activities were essential to keep the flow of the Spanish 
supply.
Attempts not to worsen the already delicate political situation with the Southern 
neighbour and to reach some trade agreement had been undertaken since Autumn 1944. 
Bilateral trade negotiations preceded the official recognition of the Provisional 
Government of the French Republic by the Spanish Government, which did not take place 
until mid-November. This suggests that a commercial agreement with Spain was 
desperately needed by the French economy and that, to proceed speedily, a normalisation 
of political and diplomatic relations with Spain was necessary. The French delegate in 
Spain, Truelle, was the strongest supporter of the line of action by which some political
Chauvel: Commentaire. D'Alcrer à Bern» (1944-1952), Paris [Fayard] 1972, pp. 
170-72; and in the manoirs of the Socialist leader who brought about the 
coalition of tha Laft in tha Popular Front in 1936 and was Pramiar for a 
little more than a month in 194 6—47, Léon Blum: L' oeuvre de Léon Blum, 1945- 
1947, Paris [Editions Albin Michel] 1958, pp. 184-85.
M . Archives de 1'Assamblée nationale, Procès-Verbaux de la Commission des 
Affaires étrangères de l'Assamblée consultative/constituante, meetings of
25 May, 4 August, 5, 19 and 26 December 1945 and 27 February, and Débats 
parlementaires, Annales de l'Assemblée nationale constituante, vol. II, pp. 
82-83, 107, and 452 for the minutes of 17 January and 22 February 1946.
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signs were to be made to Spain to obtain full economic advantage:
"Tell« est 1'importance des négociations, actuellement 
engagées (...) pour l'envoi de vivres et de matières premières 
en France et le financement de ces opérations, il est esentiel 
{d'1éviter des troubles à la frontiêre.". *'
There were serious incidents in the South of France where the largest concentration of 
exiled Spanish was placed, some of whom had played an active part in the resistance 
movement.70 Following the beginning of France’s liberation in August 1944, the Spanish 
refugees expected the liberation of their homeland. They started by occupying, with the 
help of county authorities, the Spanish diplomatic legations in the Pyrenees.
While some public pressure tended favour the cessation of relations, the 
Spanish Administration provided a first credit of Ptas 200 million in September of 1944. 
It allowed France to obtain 50,000 tons of blende (sulphide of zinc occurring as nature 
crystalline mineral) and 20,000 tons of pyrites, apart from other products such as cork, 
preserved food and citrus fruit. France offered North African phosphates and electric 
energy in exchange.71 How could France afford to forego this small but effective 
contribution to the relief of its population and industrial recovery, and which moreover 
brought no pressure on balance of payments and on dollar reserves?
"Dans l'immédiat., [Spain] est à même de nous fournir un 
certain nombre de produits de première nécessité tels que 
pyrites, blendes, mercure, oranges, fruits secs, tissus de 
laine, tissus de coton (et si les fournitures de matières 
premières sont suffisantes) conserves diverses, etc."72
"On peut considérer que les avantages d'ordre économique et 
commercial que nous pouvons retirer d'une normalisation de nos
°. AD, 2/E vol. 3: Truelle to Bidault, 22 September 1944.
70. Andrew Cowan, in an excellent article about the guerilla and its
connections with the origins of the Cold War, "The Guerrilla War Against 
Franco", European History Quarterly» vol. 20, 1990, pp. 227-53, puts the
figure of Spaniards within the French Forces of the Interior at 25,000, pp. 
229-30.
71. AD, 2/E vol. 92: Chief of the Direction des Affaires économiques, "Note 
pour le Ministre. Négociations commerciales avec l'Espagne", 8 February 
1945; and, 2/E vol. 48: Direction Politique, "Note", dated Paris, 1 June
1945.
7i. Ibid., "Note du Conseiller Commercial résumant la situation économique 
de l'Espagne", Truelle to Bidault, 3 November 1944, annex.
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r e l a t i o n «  a v e c  l ' E s p a g n e  s u f f i s e n t  à  j u s t i f i e r  c e l l e - c i . " 71
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Bidault, conscious of the anxiety 
of the French Delegate in Madrid and even more of the economic situation of the country, 
preferred to calm popular pressure in the Pyrenees.74 Bidault addressed a demand to his 
colleague Minister of Interior to quickly end the problem of the Spanish legations in the 
South. The frequent repetition of outbreaks of violence made even more difficult the 
already uncomfortable position of France regarding Spain, and "empêche la reprise des 
négociations économiques entre les deux pays, négociations auxquelles j'attache le plus 
[grand] intérêt."73 The result of this course of action was that by April 1945 the credit 
offered by the Spanish Government to France was increased to Ptas 500 million.76 These 
credit facilities offered the opportunity for French hard currency reserves to be devoted 
to the purchase of necessary raw materials for industrial and agricultural production. 
Therefore, instead of following the recommendations produced in the parliamentary 
commissions, the Government instead speeded up the attainment of a bilateral trade
13. Ibid, Truelle to Bidault, "Négociations avec le Gouvernement espagnol'*, 
28 March 1945.
74. Bidault's line to provide some satisfaction to the Spanish requests of 
a political nature, ought to have required his President's approval. General 
de Gaulle was aware of the economic advantages of keeping relations with 
Spain: "Vous savez que l'Espagne, aujourd'hui, a des relations économiques 
avec un grand nombre d'Etats du monde [explained de Gaulle], ce qui est 
d'ailleurs très naturel, car les moyens économiques de l'Espagne font partie 
de l'économie du monde. Les pyrites n'ont pas de parti." Discours et 
Messages vol.I, op. cit., Press Conference of 12 October 1945, cit. in 
footnote no. 1 of this Chapter. In 1947 he became head of the new party 
Rassemblement du Peuple Français until its dissolution in 1953. He only 
turned to politics in 1958. Spain was never one of his main concerns.
. AD, Z/E vol. 3: Bidault's Despatch no. 14 9, "Sécurité des Consulats 
d'Espagne en France", 9 March 1945. This was neither the first nor the last 
request that Bidault sent to the Ministry of Interior to put an end to the 
problem, i.e. "Consulats espagnols en France" and Despatch no 196, both 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ministry of the Interior, 18 October 1944 and 
28 March 1945, respectively. Spanish consulates were assaulted from August
1944 to March 1945 in different places in the South of France: Perpignan, 
Toulouse, Bordeaux, Marseille, and Pau. Bidault's policy was not independent 
from the general effort to restore order in France after the period of open 
political tension following the Liberation; Rioux, op. cit., chap. 4.
AD, Z/E vol. 92: Truelle's Telegram from Madrid, 7 April 1945. Using the 
rate of exchange adopted since November 1943 of Ptas 45 ■ £1, if pesetas are 
being converted to pounds, the Spanish credit was of £11.1 million. In March
1945 the British offered France £100 million (shortly to be stepped up to 
£150 million) as credit to cover the trade deficit, although, contrary to 
the Spanish credit, repayment was due in gold before the end of April 1946, 
Robert Frank, "France - Grande-Bretagne: la mésentente commerciale (1945- 
1958)", Relations internationales, no. 55, Autumn 1988, pp. 323—39, p. 333.
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agreement.77
The French received the help of the Spaniards who, fully aware of die situation, 
avoided major political problems while discussing the trade agreement7'  A Franco- 
Spanish trade agreement, the so-called Saint Sebastian Agreement, was signed on the 15 
September 1945, only four months after the end of the war and after two months of 
intense negotiation. This commercial agreement was quite beneficial for the French 
economy. It provided France with 400,000 tons of pyrites for the production of 
superphosphates and sulphuric acid required by agriculture, 50,000 tons of foodstuffs, 
especially fish and fruit, and finally the supply of textiles for a value of Ptas 63 million. 
The total value of Spanish exports to France was estimated at Ptas 552 million while 
France’s expons to Spain were expected to reach Ptas 210 million including 200,000 tons 
of North African phosphates, 70,000 tons of scrap, and 3 million Kwh electric power per 
month (after the restoration of the electrical connection between both countries). To cover 
the trade gap the Spanish negotiators offered a credit of Ptas 200 million (to be increased 
up to 240 million) to be payable in 36 months.79 This was the result of a policy-option 
that tried, as we shall see for the United Kingdom, to follow a foreign policy closer to the 
real needs of peace time than to ideological considerations.
The nature of French post-war politics left little room for further realism regarding 
Spain. In few cases, in this thesis, were domestic politics diametrically so opposed to 
selected options in foreign policy. The general elections to the Constituent Assembly of
. The Italian case is strikingly similar to the French one; see Alfredo 
Canavero: a) "Tommaso Gallarti Scotti and his Role in Foreign Policy after 
World War II", Journal of Italian History, 1978, no. 1, pp. 35—38; and b) 
"Nenni, i socialisti italiani e la politica estera", in Ennio Di Nolfo, 
Romain H. Rainero and Brunello Vigezzi (eds.): 1/Italia e la politica di 
potenza in Europa (1945-50), Firenze [Marzorati Editore) 1990, pp. 224-78, 
p. 248-4 9. Tommaso Gallarti Scotti, the first Italian Ambassador to Spain, 
sent to negotiate the settlement of the Spanish war dets with Italy.
7#. AD, 2/E vol. 65: Telegram from the Spanish Director-General of Economic 
Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Emilio Navasqiiés, to Bernard 
Hardion, appointed in May 1945, after Truelle's death, Charge d'Affairs in 
Madrid, Saint Sebastian, 7 August 1945. Navasqiiés was the leader of the 
diplomatic attempt at the end of 1944 to take over foreign economic policy, 
leaving the other ministries to act as simple technical advisers, see 
chapter one, pp. 29 ff.
,f. AD, 2/E vol. 66: Direction d'Europe, Sous-Direction de 1'Europe
Meridionale, "Note Relations franco-espagnoles", 28 January 1946.
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21 October 1945 put an end to the independent course of action -in relation to the new 
Republican parliamentary institutions- undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
French Communist Party became the strongest political party with 26 per cent of the 
electorate vote, claiming a much larger share of power in the Government. After the 
elections and in the first post-de Gaulle Cabinet, under the leadership of the Socialist Félix 
Gouin, Communists occupied several ministerial posts (Labour and Social Security, 
Industry and Commerce, Health and Population. Reconstruction and Housing) and 
demanded one of the three key posts, either Interior, Foreign Affairs or Defence. De 
Gaulle in November 1945 had refused this, creating the precedent to be followed by his 
successors.*0 When the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Constituent National 
Assembly in December 1945 repeated the call for breaking off relations with Spain, the 
political move made towards the Assembly, dominated by the Communists, to avoid 
widening the gap between the Government and the Assembly over the Constitution and 
the crisis over the composition of the Cabinet after the elections was a temporary solution 
to the problems with Franco Spain.
Franco-Spanish relations became a vital question in French foreign p o l i c y T w o  
set of circumstances could, in our view explain this. First, it was due to the domestic 
circumstances of political struggle between parties. Communists pressed for controversial 
action in foreign policy so as to publicly embarrass the MRP. Second, the importance of 
the problems created by the political nature of the Spanish regime enhanced by the 
meager results of French foreign policy and the recognition of France’s diminished 
importance in post-war international politics. The non-Communist French public and 
parliamentary opinion was convinced that action against Franco Spain would give the 
opportunity to France to take the lead in, at least, one issue in international politics. In 
Blum’s words:
<e. Edward Mortisiars "Franc*", in Martin McCauley (ad.): Conwtuniat Powar in 
Europe 1944—1949. London [MacMillan] 1977, pp. 151—67, p. 157. For earlier 
politics of tha 4th Republic see Philip William*: La via pollticrue sous la 
4* Ripubliqrue, Paris [Librairie Arroand Colin] 1971, and its foreign policy, 
John W. Young: Franca, tha Cold War and tha Western Alliance. 1944-1949. 
Franch Foreign Policy and Post-War Europe, London [Laicaatar University 
Prass) 1990.
**. J.W. Young, op. cit., p. 76.
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"La question espagnole est une de celles où il appartient 
légitimement à la France d'orienter la politique 
internationale, une de celles où, le cas échéant, elle 
pourrait le plus naturellement manifester sa 
«indépendance». " 2
Unilateral rupture of relations with Spain appeared expressly cited in the agreement 
reached on 21 November for the new government of national unity, which included 
Communists.*3 De Gaulle felt unwilling to leave the Spanish issue uncontrolled at this 
sensitive point in time, governed by an unwillingness to antagonise sectors of Government 
and risk public outbursts over foreign policy already soured over other aspects. He 
communicated personally to Franco that he had the intention to resist pressure and to keep 
diplomatic relations with Spain.*4 Spain was not only one question with considerable 
domestic ramifications but also a factor that intruded upon and further burdened an 
already complex agenda of international problems that the Presidency and the Quai 
d’Orsay faced. Hence a solution of the issue, albeit not the most satisfactory solution, was 
necessary and desirable if the potential of domestic political discontent was not to become 
permanent, and fester into an all-pervading resentment and disillusion liable to produce 
adverse consequences. Without alternative and despite being uncommitted to this, the 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 12 December 1945, called upon the Governments 
of the United States and the United Kingdom for joint action in breaking off relations 
with the Spanish Government to secure the downfall of General Franco and his regime.85 
The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, expected that the Allies would convince 
the forces supporting a break with Spain to reconsider their position.*6
M . Article appeared in Le Populaire, 19 December 1945, published in 
L'oeuvre de Léon Blum, op* cit., p. 184.
#*. L'Année politique 1944-45, p. 341, cit. in Brundu, "L'Espagne 
cit., p. 170.
•4. Artajo to Franco, 10 December 1945, Artajo's Private Papers, as cit. in 
Portero, op. cit., pp. 133-34. See chapter one, footnote no. 59, for the 
reason why I am using secondary sources in relation to Artajo's private 
papers. Details in Archivalia section at the end of this thesis.
•5. Note to the British and Americans in AD, 2/E vol. 67; PRO, FO 371/4 9614; 
and in FRUS, 1945, V, the Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 
Paris, 12 December, pp. 698-99.
M . PRO, FO 371/49614: Permanent Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Orme 
Sargent, to Prime Minister, 17 December 1945; and Sir Victor Mallet, British 
Ambassador to Madrid since July 1945, to Bevin, 24 December 1945; FO 
371/60350: "Extract from the Secretary of State's Record of his conversation 
with Monsieur Bidault on 1st February".
85
As expected, the official British and American replies were negative. As anxious 
as the French were to see the disappearance of Franco from power, the British argued 
against the proposed joint action in political terms. They expressed their concern that any 
joint action would not lead to the desired result but to die outbreak of disorder and 
renewed civil war. The bulk of the Spanish people, the Army and the important 
conservative sectors who disliked Franco but traded with the United Kingdom, feared the 
possibility that the sudden downfall of Franco could lead to another civil war. Resentful 
of direct foreign intervention in domestic affairs they would tend to reinforce the current 
situation, leading to a strengthening of General Franco’s internal position. '7 Following 
the proposed French joint action, the British argued, the three Governments would deprive 
themselves of direct information to what was happening in Spain and the means to 
exercise a moderating influence on the regime, and rejected it.“
The State Department was in full agreement with the line of argument set out in 
the British reply to the French. The policy of the US Government was to support all the 
international resolutions on Spain. Notwithstanding this, the US Government would take 
no action until an informal exchange of views with the Governments of France and the 
United Kingdom took place. Stalling was the American priority: 'To discuss changes and 
realistically [assess] all aspects of this question" .'9 The State Department informed the 
British Embassy in Washington that nothing good could come from a "premature” rupture 
of diplomatic relations with Spain. They had certainly no intention to break with Franco
The idea was also supported by some leaders of the Conservative 
opposition to Franco, AD, Z/E vol. 66: Despatch no. 1210/ED from French 
Ambassador in the Onited Kingdom to Bidault, 15 April 1946; and Z/E vol. 67: 
Telegram from the French Delegation in Madrid, 10 March 1946. Franco 
expressed perfectly this tricky manoeuvre: "Plus nous sommes incompris, plus 
on nous combattra de l'extérieur, plus on discutera nos gestes, plus nous 
serons amenés à affirmer notre révolution." Franco's public address in 
Segovia, 9 February 1946, ibid. Literature on the Franco regime still lacks 
—to my knowledge— an accurate explanation of the mechanisms that allowed 
Franco to benefit from any foreign difficulty to strengthen his personal 
power, passing from the post—civil war situation of Dictator holding an 
extraordinary office foreseen for emergency situations and, thus, limited 
in time to a permanent personal power.
**. "His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that any rupture of 
relations with the Spanish Government at the present stage would be both 
premature and unwise." PRO, BOT 11/3066: Telegram no. 3011, F0 to Paris, 21 
December 1945, approved in Cabinet and communicated to the Quai d'Orsay on 
the 24th together with the Americans, F0 371/60349: British Embassy to Quai 
d'Orsay, 24 December.
•*. PRO, BOT 11/3068: Telegram no. 8547, Washington to F0, 23 December 1945.
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and had only agreed to informal consultation without much publicity.*0 The French 
diplomatic records show that Anglo-Saxons were trying to convert the converted. The 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency of the Republic were aware of the 
situation described by them.*1 Domestic political circumstances reduced the room for 
policy manoeuvre.
The departure of de Gaulle on 20 January 1946, because it became obvious that 
his views favouring a strong executive would not be incorporated into the new 
Constitution, had left France not only with a solid Left-Wing influence at the National 
Assembly but with majority presence in Cabinet. In February 1946, Bidault confessed to 
Bevin and René Massigli, the French Ambassador to London, that he could do nothing 
else to restrain those fretful persons who were pushing France to an isolated move with 
the only result of strengthening Franco*2 If western democracies were hesitanting over 
whether to follow strictly from the principles for which they had fought the last world war 
or to forget conflicts in order to return to more profitable activities, that was not so for 
some sections of French public and parliamentary opinion. It is certain that the 
Communist Party was not the only one who pressed for the breaking off relations, since 
unanimity against Franco Spain, considered the last residue of European fascism, was 
deeply felt by most political parties, but it was the only one strong enough to force the 
decision upon the Quai d’Orsay.*3
*°. The American reply in BOT 11/ 306B: Telegram no. 8541, Washington to FO, 
22 December; FRPSf 1945, V, the Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador 
in France, 22 December; and AD, Z/E vol. 66: US Embassy in Paris to Bidault, 
24 December 1945.
91. AD, Z/E vol. 66: "Note pour le Général de Gaulle sur le problème
espagnol", 20 December 1945; the different despatches from Hardion between 
December 194 5 and January 1946; and Bidault's D'une Résistance, cit., pp. 
132-39.
M . Bidault declared to be "under extreme pressure", AD, Z/E vol. 67: 
"Espagne", record of a conversation at the FO, 1 February 1946; and PRO, FO 
371/60.350: "Extract from the Secretary of State's Record of Conversation 
with Monsieur Bidault on 1st February".
Although taken for granted, it is quite difficult to measure the 
influence of public and parliamentary opinion on policy-making. Recent 
French research has revealed that neither the press nor public opinion were 
so decisively in favour of a diplomatic break off with Spain: "En fait, il 
semble bien que les décideurs cèdent plus à une opinion active qui 
correspond à leur électorat qu'à l'opinion globale." Aline Angoustures: 
"L'opinion publique française et l'Espagne 1945—1975", Revue d'histoire 
moderne et contemporaine, vol. 38, October-November 1990, pp. 672—86, p. 
675. D.G. Boyce: "Public Opinion and Historians", History, vol. 63, no. 208,
87
Bidault had spent the previous sixteen weeks trying to placate the anti-Franco 
campaign and the second-last week of January declaring to the Constituent Assembly how 
frustrating a unilateral breaking off relations with Spain was to Allied policy and to 
French economic recovery.94 A new summit between Bevin and Bidault took place on 
the 18th February, where Bidault declared to be pressed by the French Assembly to close 
the border with Spain.95 Bidault recalls in his autobiography the Spanish problem as "a 
train of unpleasant and rather absurd developments".96 To be fully effective any action 
in the direction of breaking relations with the Spanish Government should have to be 
taken jointly by, at least, the British, American and French Governments, something that 
he perceived as highly unlikely.
Following unilateral action, France would suffer alone while the rest would benefit 
from a larger share of whatever the Spanish had to offer.97 The French population could 
easily forego Spanish oranges if they wished to do so but only with difficulty could the 
French economy forego, for instance. Spanish pyrites.9* New calls by the National 
Assembly on 17 January and 22 February 1946 for unilateral rupture of relations with 
Spain forced the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to abdicate from its realistic policy 
and left it without options. Bidault was asked by a majority of ministers to break off
June 1978, pp. 214—28, calls the historian's attention for the perils in the 
field of public opinion.
*4. Max Gallo: Histoire de 1'Espagne franquiste, Paris (Robert Laffont]
1969, p. 120.
*5. PRO, FO 371/60350: Record of the meeting Bevin-Bidault of 18 February
1946.
M . D'une Résistance, cit., p. 132. "fin 1946] I was not sure that I ought 
to complicate our existence, and even that of our neighbours, by arguing 
with Spain." ibid, p. 134.
t7. Tomas Sufter y Ferrer, Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs (not to be 
confused with Serrano Süfter, Spain's former Minister of Foreign Affairs], 
said to Hardi on, French Delegate in Madrid: "Vous avez certainement beaucoup 
plus besoin de nos produits que nous avons besoin des vôtres. L'Angleterre, 
les USA, la Suisse et l'Italie ne refuseront sans doute pas de nous livrer 
ce que nous aurions pu commander en France.** AD, Z/E vol. 84: Hardion's 
telegram frotn Madrid, 27 February 1946.
M . "L'interruption de nos relations avec l'Espagne n'irait pas sans 
entraîner des répercusions dont l'une serait très grave pour notre économie: 
nous importons d'Espagne, et ne pouvons, paralt-il, importer d'ailleurs, 
avec un nombre d'autres articles utiles, des pyrites, indispensables à la 
fabrication des produits dont dépend la remise en état et le rendement de 
nos vignobles, tant français que nord-africains." AD, Z/E vol. 66: Direction 
d'Europe, Sous-Direction de l'Europe Méridionale, "Note France-Espagne", 2 
January 1946.
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diplomatic relations with Spain once Trade Union officials had already taken unilateral 
efforts to speed up this decision, and the Post Telegraph and Telecommunications and 
Railways Trade Union Federations had called, on the 24th of February, for the breakdown 
of communications with Spain." Even then, it is important to note, the Foreign Minister 
made the Cabinet accept a less drastic measure: the Council of Ministers decided on the 
26th February 1946 to close down the frontier with Spain from the 1st of March, but this 
would not imply a break in diplomatic relations nor affect the Moroccan Empire.100 In 
other words, despite its gravity, the measure was the most limited the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs could obtain in view of the consensus in domestic politics. The decision, extracted 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was not one to favour the solution of the Spanish 
question but to avoid a crisis of the French Government Public and parliamentary opinion 
had removed any other possible course of action. Had de Gaulle not left office, the 
decision to close the border would have never been taken.
2.3.2. The British Labour Government
In the United Kingdom a different policy towards Franco Spain was followed in 
which decisive economic factors were not mixed with politics. After the war, the British 
Government was anxious to expand trade relations with Spain.101 With the arrival of the 
Labour Party to power, the similarities between the French and British political situations 
concerning relations with Franco Spain increased. Labour propaganda during the war 
agitated for the replacement of Franco. A British Labour Government’s move in that
M . See Alfred Grosser: La IV* République et sa politique extérieure/ Paris 
(Librairie Armand Colin] 3rd ed. rev., 1972 (1961], p. 195.
10C. AD, 2/E vol. 84: "Réunion interministérielle du 26 Février 1946*'. Copy 
of the memorandum din FRUS, 194 6, V, pp. 1043—44. "I never thought it was a 
good idea (wrote Bidault]; but it was either that or a complete diplomatic 
break. op. cit., p. 136. It was also decided to elevate the so-called 
'Spanish question' to the UN Security Council, which the French never did. 
Brundu argues that this French policy corresponded to Bidault's desire to 
come closer to the Soviets to obtain their support on the French claims over 
the Ruhr, "L'Espagne op. cit. It is argued here that it was an attempt
to force a more general involvement, following the French example, so France 
could keep its market share in Spain.
101. At Potsdam, Churchill told Stalin of the importance of trade relations 
with Spain; PRO FO 371/4 9612: "Extract of minutes of the Third Plenary
Meeting, Potsdam Conference", 19 July 1945.
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direction would have represented, presumably, a concrete application of socialist foreign 
policy.103 The Anti-Franco movement "became a kind of mass passion in party circles, 
the only subject in foreign affairs on which Left and Right, intellectuals and uneducated 
trade unionists, rank-and-filers and backbenchers, were able to fmd themselves in 
enthusiastic agreement."103 The demands ranked from economic blockade, rupture of 
diplomatic relations and, even, direct intervention. Despite the existing similarity between 
the general dislike against Franco felt in France and the United Kingdom, the Labour 
Government followed a different track to its French counterpart. The recall of 
Ambassadors, economic sanctions, and the breaking off diplomatic relations with Spain 
were made dependent upon what departments, other than the Foreign Office, thought 
about the possible effects of economic sanctions.104 When the question was posed the 
answers received from Treasury, Board of Trade, the Foreign Office and the Ministries 
of Fuel and Power, Food, and Supply decided the policy-option to be followed.
Economic sanctions against Spain could take different forms. An oil embargo, a 
traditional weapon in modem economic blockade and warfare, was the first to be 
considered. It was frequently suggested that a total and effective embargo on oil supply 
from the United States and British sources in South America, particularly Venezuela, 
would suffice to bring about Franco’s downfall. The Ministry of Fuel and Power denied 
the effectiveness of oil restrictions, given the multiple problems posed for implementation. 
A policy of enforcing oil sanctions, as any other economic sanction, would require the re- 
imposition of several war time controls and procedures such as navicerts and control of 
shipping that would put an appreciable strain on British resources, both in respect of
lca. The Chairman of th* Labour Party National Exacutiv«, Harold Laski, 
announced that the Labour Government was committed to the restoration of 
democracy in Spain and that it would, if necessary, use economic sanctions 
to allow a Republican coalition to organise free elections, Alan Bullock, 
Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (1945-1951), London [Heinemann] 1983, p. 
163« "Laski was not a member of the Government nor even of Parliament, but 
people abroad did not understand the position he held in the Labour Party 
(no more, it appears, did Laski) and were very likely to take what he said 
as authoritative**, ibid, p. 70.
101. Michael R- Gordon: Conflict and Consensus in Labourf s Foreign Policy 
1914-1965, Stanford [Stanford University Press] 1969, p. 131.
104. The nature of the French archives does not allow a precise determination 
of the position of the different administrative bodies involved in French 
policy-making. Details in section Archivalia•
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finance and man-power. The British had ended economic warfare immediately after the 
German surrender, terminating black lists and all controls once the supply situation eased. 
The Foreign Office was certainly not willing to re-impose them for political purposes 
when their definitive withdrawal was scheduled sometime between May and September 
1946.105 Previous bans on oil supply to Spain enforced by the United States during the 
war as a tool of economic blockade, most recently from January to April 1944, had not 
been encouraging. They showed the lack of agreement between Great Britain and the 
United States on embargo policies and how resistant Spain proved to the effects of an oil 
embargo. In a way, it proved the extraordinary capacity of the Spanish Administration to 
bring down the rate of consumption in the country. Churchill’s disposition to supply oil 
in 1944 to Spain from Middle Eastern sources despite an American ban to force an end 
to Spain’s exports of wolfram to Germany, made it uncertain whether the Americans 
would follow the British if they were to apply oil restrictions now.106 Even assuming 
the unlikely, that American owned oil companies would be all induced to follow British 
policy, it would probably take about eight months before oil sanctions brought Spain to 
anything like a stand-still.107 As in the winter of 1943-1944, the Spanish had 
accumulated some stocks, which provided time to the Spanish Administration to oppose 
foreign demands. Stockpiling was possible because, contrary to the United States 
Government’s intentions to keep the Spanish oil stocks low after the reassumption of oil 
shipments in April 1944, die British pressed hard in the opposite direction to get a share 
of oil trade for British companies. Documentation from the Spanish archives reveals that 
the British were using this argument as an excuse. In September 1945, the Head of the 
Fuels Commissariat presented a completely different vision (but probably also
1#s. W.N. Medlicott, op. cit., pp. €27—629.
104. For the Anglo-American divergence of views on the matter during 1944, 
see Brian Crozier: Franco. A Biographical History. London [Eyre (
Spottiswoode] 1967, pp. 363—85. Warren F. Kimball (ed.): Churchill and
Roosevelt. The Complete Correspondence. 3 vols., Princeton [Princeton 
University Press] 1984, for sources on the matter. Further technical 
insights into the question of Allied oil policy towards Spain in Medlicott, 
op. cit., vol. I chap. XV (v) , and vol. II chaps. X (iii) and XIX (i) . A 
brief account of Allied oil policy towards Spain during the war is in 
Herbert Feis (an economic adviser to the OS Department of State): "Oil for 
Spain. A Critical Episode of the War", Foreign Affairs. January 1948, pp. 
377-89.
1#1. PRO, BOT 11/3068: Minute Sheet of the interdepartmental meeting at the 
FO on 'the 28th February 1946. One idea was that Shell and Standard Oil 
Company were to be induced to operate such an embargo in return for a 
monopoly, BOT 11/3068: Telegram no. 219, Lisbon to FO, 19 February 1946.
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exaggerated) of the Spanish ability to face a cut in oil supply. He argued that the 
country's stocks would be completely exhausted in October if a cut took place in 
September.10*
The main reason for opposing an oil embargo seems to have been that any 
unilateral action by British oil companies without the Americans would simply deprive 
British companies of a market, with probable prejudicial effects both for the future of the 
companies and for the financing of British purchases in Spain. American business would 
gain, Spain’s oil supply would be little effected and progress towards democracy in the 
country limited. Furthermore, it was impossible effectively to control trade across 
Portugal’s frontier into Spain, and so the Iberian Peninsula had to be treated as a whole. 
An effective embargo of Spain implied imposing import rationing on Portugal causing 
dislocation and confusion for its economy and people with important effects on the 
stability of a harbour for western strategy. This contradicted Britain’s most cherished goals 
in their Portuguese policy: neither a return to pre-Salazar days, nor losing the very 
valuable strategic asset that Portugal constituted for the British Empire whilst obtaining 
the maximum commercial advantages from bilateral trade.109 Yet the British 
Government was precluded by the Azores agreement from imposing economic sanctions 
against Portugal.110 In April/May 1947, when Portugal was asked by the FO as to 
whether it would cooperate in economic sanctions, it "stated categorically" that it would 
not provide assistance to make economic sanctions effective against Spain.111 Finally, 
it could constitute an awkward precedent if, as the Foreign Office feared, the Americans
104. MAE, Leg. 1331, exp. 41: Report by General Fernando Roldan, Director of 
the Comalia sari at for Fuels, 5 September 1945, also cit. in Viñas et al., op. 
cit., vol. I, p. 474, footnote no. 36.
10\ PRO, BOT 11/3068: Intel no. 27.
110. Medlicott, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 563.
lu. "Therefore if they were to be made effective they would necessarily ha vs 
to be applied against Portugal also. This step would seriously impair 
friendly relations between Portugal and the UK and among other things might 
adversely affect the strategic advantages already obtained in the Portuguese 
islands (the Azores) and elsewhere.", FRUS, 1947, III, the Ambassador in the 
United Kingdom to Marshall, London, 10 May, pp. 1077-78.
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at a certain stage wanted the United Kingdom to join them in sanctions against 
Argentina.112 Conversely, oil restrictions could only lead to Franco’s downfall if 
complete economic breakdown was achieved, which was a most undesirable aim.
Oil restrictions having been rejected, trade discrimination entered the scene. Any 
restriction on trade flows with Spain caused problems for Ministries dealing with supply 
of foodstuffs and raw materials. The Ministry of Food thought that it was much easier and 
safer to stick to Spanish exports of foodstuffs, in spite of political considerations, than to 
desperately look for other sources of supply.113 The Raw Materials Department of the 
Ministry of Supply argued that "the curtailment or cessation of the supplies of raw 
materials which the United Kingdom is at the present drawing from Spain would be little 
short of disastrous."114 Furthermore, British industry could suffer "some permanent 
harm".115 It was believed that some of the Spanish supplies were indispensable to meet 
some orders. This was mostly the case in the iron and steel industries, as previously 
shown, to countries like Switzerland and Sweden if there was a falling off of Spanish iron 
ore and pyrites. In the financial field the situation was not perceived in a better light.
The British financial position was somewhat precarious by the end of the war. 
This was essentially due to the abrupt termination of Lend-Lease and Mutual Aid 
immediately after the end of the war with Japan, in August 1945. These financial 
programmes had provided the United Kingdom with essential and non-essential supplies 
during the war. By 31 October 1945 British net gold and dollar reserves were about £450
>u. In the case of oil sanctions, PRO, BOT 11/3068: Telegram no. 34 from 
Mallet to FO, 22 February 1946; extended to general economic sanctions, BOT 
11/3067: "Minutes of a Meeting held at the FO on the 28th February (1946) 
to consider the possible consequences of a rupture of relations with Spain".
111. The Ministry of Food "wish to make it clear to the housewife that we 
could afford to indulge in action against [Spain] only at the expense of 
variety in the larder." PRO, BOT 11/3068: Minute sheet on the inter­
departmental meeting of 28 February 1946.
114. Ibid., "Raw Materials Supplies from Spain", cit., 2 March 1946.
m . PRO, BOT 11/3067: "Minutes of a Meeting held at the FO on the 28th
February (1946) to consider the possible consequences of a rupture of
relations with Spain".
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million and Britain's external debts of £3*500 million.116 At that point, when the 
Americans proposed to the British the purchase of oranges at $4.5 standard box (all 
freights included), the British preferered to purchase at $8 in Spain with payments in 
sterling due to dollar shortages.117 With extremely limited financial resources and a large 
external debt, Spain’s continued the service of pre-world war debts. Moreover Spanish 
supplies were highly welcome to Britain. Spain had been setting aside a proportion of its 
sterling earnings to meet commercial and financial debts to the United Kingdom already 
after March 1940, when a clearing agreement was re-established by the Anglo-Spanish 
Trade and Payments Agreement. These debts were pre-civil war commercial debts 
amounting to about £8 million and a credit of about £4.5 million granted by the United 
Kingdom to Spain in 1940.11* Spain was earmarking 10 per cent of the value of exports 
to the United Kingdom for clearing the arrears of financial debts. British claims still 
amounted to about £8.5 million. Any break in the continuity of transfer of debts would 
militate against the eventual settlement of these claims.119 It was certainly not an 
excessive figure in all the conditions that confronted Britain but the Treasury considered 
Spain's granting the United Kingdom £4.5 million credit at the time of foreign exchange 
difficulties of considerable help. The Spanish holdings of sterling were to be raised to £10 
million in 1947 as a result of the bilateral trade and payments agreement
114. The Chancellor of the Exchequer to the House of Commons on 12 December 
1945, 417 HC DEB, pp. 226. The ins and outs of the British financial
situation are covered by J.C.R. Dow: The Management of the British Economy 
194 5-60, Cambridge [C.D.P.] 1964; Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery, cit.; 
A.J. Youngson: The British Economy 1920-1957, London {Allen 4 Unwin] 1960, 
chap. vi, and D.H. Aldcroft, op. cit., chap. 8. See the records of the House 
of Commons of 12 and 13 December 1945, "Debate on Anglo-American Financial 
and Economic Discussions, 12 and 13th December 1945", 417 HC DEB.
111. Cit. in Max Linigers L*orange d'Espagne sur les marchés européens, 
Geneva [Editions du Temps] 1962, p. 165.
114. A clearing agreement under which the proceeds of Spanish exports to the 
United Kingdom were collected by the Clearing Office and paid out to British 
creditors was concluded in January 1936 to recover outstanding debts due 
from Spain. The operation of this agreement was suspended shortly after the 
outbreak of the Civil War in Spain. Sterling standing to the credit of the 
Clearing remained blocked until commercial relations with Spain were resumed 
in 1940« The Anglo-Spanish Agreement of 18 March 1940 included a loan 
agreement under which Spain secured a sum of £2 million for expenditure in 
the sterling area. A further British credit of £2.5 million was agreed upon 
in November but could only be signed after overcoming opposition from 
Serrano Suifcer, Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 7 April, see Chapter 
One p ^ i U  Financial Agreement, signed on 2 December 1940, governed those 
sterling payments not covered by the Trade and Payment Agreement of March 
1940.
X1#. PRO, BOT 11/3068: Intel no. 27.
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There was also an important consideration; that of Britain’s immobilised assets 
and what a break would mean to put a stop to all British activities of control over former 
German assets in Spain or Safe-Haven. The latter corresponds to an operational code to 
block German assets in either occupied or neutral countries during the war period, which 
could be used by pre-eminent Germans to escape judgment at the end of the war. Under 
the Berlin Declaration of 5 June 1945 and in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration. 
2 August 1945, the Governments of the United Kingdom, of the United States and the 
Provisional Government of the French Republic were jointly responsible for the German 
assets within geographical limitations in which Spain was located. It was believed, 
however, that German capital and scientific personnel had infiltrated into Spain in 
different economic sectors such as insurance, banking, mining, transport, electrical and 
optical industries through branches legally established in Spain by complexes such as 
Krupp, LG. Farlen, AEG, Telefunken, and new Nazi industrial complex. German 
investment in Spain amounted to $46 million, of which $36 million in old investment plus 
$10 million in Sodinfus, an official German commercial company.120
The Spanish Government was so cooperative with the Joint Trusteeship that the 
Economic Warfare Department of the British War Office, in early 1946, reported as 
uncertain that "any Government which might take the place of the present regime would 
be equally co-operative."121 The Economic Warfare Department stated that, due to the 
Spanish Government’s cooperation, the United Kingdom "was steadily getting great 
quantities of German assets in Spain into its hands."122 In Austria the Allies ran into 
considerable problems with the Russians over the definition of German assets. The Swiss 
were not very happy about letting the Allies inquire into the state of German assets in 
their country. The Swedish were reluctant not to use German assets for the full recovery
1.0. Robert H. Whealey: Hitler and Spain. The Nazi Role in the Spanish Civil 
War 1936-1939, Lexington [University Press of Kentucky] 1989, chapter 4. 
There has been no research done for Spain on the matter of Safe—Haven, 
although Viftas promised a monograph that never appeared, op. cit., vol. I, 
p. 467, footnote no. 21.
1.1. PRO, BOT 11/3068: Minute Sheet of the interdepartmental meeting at the 
FO on the 28th February 1946.
112. PRO, BOT 11/3067: "Minutes of a Meeting held at the FO on the 28th
February (1946) to consider the possible consequences of a rupture of 
relations with Spain”.
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of their economies. The special circumstances in which Spain was placed due to its 
political regime, rendered its Administration more cooperative than one could have 
expected in order to reverse international political dislike or at least to compensate with 
a more pragmatic way of dealing with politics and economics. This would have been lost 
if a rupture of trade relations was to take place. The French experience was seen as very 
significant Closing the border with Spain meant the exclusion of France from the 
conversations that the Spanish Government was to undertake with the three Western Allies 
on war reparations following die Paris Conference resolutions of mid-January 1946. It 
seemed as if the German interests were to be supplanted exclusively by British ones since 
France, by means of its diplomatic action, was excluded from the dealings (situation that 
lasted until September 1946).123
Moreover, the Treasury argued strongly that Britain could not afford, at a time of 
a precarious financial position, to deprive itself of the advantages of buying in Spain:
"Spain was willing to give us substantial credit, being 
willing to hold sterling not only for our own purchases from 
Spain but also for purchases by other countries with which we 
have Payment Agreements. For some goods Spain was the only 
source of supply and in other cases where there might be 
alternative sources use of these would necessitate payment in 
more difficult currencies."114
To consider whether this situation was as extreme as British officials put it is a clear case 
of perception with difficult historical te st123 The important element, however, is that this
***. AD, Z/E vol. 86: "La fermature da la frontière Franco—Espagnol*. Ses 
conséquences économiques. La reprise des relations commerciales entre la 
France et lrEspagne". Perspectives actuelles", by the Comercial Counselor 
at the French Embassy in Madrid, 15 June 1946. As a matter of fact in 
October 1946 the Spanish Government recognised the authority of the Allied 
Control Council for Germany, including the Provisional Government of the 
French Republic, with respect to German assets in Spain, its Possessions and 
Protectorate, and declared itself prepared to undertake general negotiations 
on this subject, see Treaty Series no. 70 (1948): "Exchange of Notes between 
the Government of the United Kingdom and the Spanish Government for the 
Recognition of the Assumption by the Allied Control Council of Powers of 
Disposal in regard to German Enemy Assets in Spain (with Annex]", Madrid, 
28 October 1946, London [HMSO]• Documentation on the final setting of the 
problem of German external assets in Department of State: Germany 1947-194 9. 
The Story in Documents, 1950, pp. 385—409.
1,4. PRO, BOT 11/3068: Minute Sheet of the interdepartmental meeting at the 
FO on the 28 February 1946.
125• Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 135 ff, argues that the economic considerations of 
the British were "a flawed rationale". It has been shown here that this was 
not the case.
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situation was perceived among the British administrative divisions as a threat to the 
normal development of economic activity:
"In discussioni*) (at Cabinet] there was a general agreement 
about the importance of our economy of the supplies which we 
drew from Spain [. .. ] For the angle of our own economic 
interests, it was clear that we could ill afford to impose 
economic sanctions on Spain.**126
It seemed as, except the colour of its political regime, the Spanish Administration was 
generally co-operative and helpful. Any action leading to economic sanctions would create 
difficulties in the supply of goods at the time of reconstruction and world shortages. The 
United Kingdom could not afford to adopt a hard line, either unilaterally or jointly for 
fear of retaliation against the British economy. After the opinions expressed by the 
different technical components of the British Cabinet, there was no option for the British 
Labour Government except to avoid further upheaval with Spain, despite the fact that 
Clement Attlee as Prime Minister and Ernest Bevin as Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, were known anti-Franco leaders. The British Cabinet consequently acted by 
rejecting all the requests presented by the French after December 1945.127
Contrary to the French Cabinet, the British Authorities, instead of cutting off 
relations with Spain, started to consider devices for developing trade. As early as January
l3€. PRO, BOT 11/3067: CM(47)2nd, Conclusions, Minute no. 4, 3 January 1947.
137. "[In] altered circumstances the British economy and people might have
to forego important supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials which they at 
present obtain from Spain and of which this country stands in urgent need.” 
PRO, BOT 11/3068: FO Telegram no. 3011 to Paris, 21 December 1945. "The 
supply of food-stuffs essential to the diet of the British people would be 
seriously diminished; the production of food-stuffs in this country would 
be materially reduced; British heavy industry would be further hampered, if 
not curtailed, requirements of coal would rise and the output of steel would 
probably fall, and the production of a wide range of consumer goods would 
be adversely affected [...] The rupture of economic relations would also 
create fresh financial difficulties for His Majesty's Government and 
seriously prejudice the interests of British creditors ...” ibid, Intel no. 
27. The British Government followed this line on all the occasions it was 
requested to act against Franco, i.e. official replies to the French note 
of 23 March 194 6 in AD, 2/E vol. 68: Confidential Despatch no. 1316 from the 
US Ambassador in Paris, 7 April 194 6 and British Embassy in Paris to the 
Quai d'Orsay, 9 April 1946. French note of 13 March in FRPS, 1946, V, pp. 
1052-54. Note of 22 March to the British in F0 371/60354: Memorandum from 
the Quai d'Orsay to the British Embassy; and Note of 25 March in FRUS, 1946, 
V, telegram from Caffery to Byrnes, 25 March, pp. 1061-62. Even in Spring 
1947 when the initiative was American, to express their views to Franco, 
Generals, business men and members of non—Communist opposition, the British 
used the same arguments to oppose intervention, debate to be followed in 
FRPS, 1947, III, pp. 1066-82. See the following chapter, pp. 135 ff.
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1946, the Treasury’ and the Board of Trade argued that it was rather more beneficial to 
negotiate with a view to replacing the 1940 restrictive clearing with Spain by a more 
liberal type of agreement in accordance with British general foreign economic policy with 
Western Europe.1”  Bevin decided that it was "impolitic" to negotiate since any formal 
agreement could be presented either in Britain or in Spain "as giving countenance to the 
Franco regime." The material advantages to be derived from providing a more liberal 
treatment to Spain, convinced Bevin to agree with his colleagues and it was decided that 
Treasury should open informal discussions with the Spanish Administration.129 
Negotiations to replace the 1940 clearing system by a new Monetary Agreement started 
with visits of Treasury officials to Madrid and few Spanish officials, who did not 
occupied any political position, to London. In October 1946 official negotiations were 
opened and by the end of February 1947 the essential features of the agreement were 
agreed upon, although it could not be signed until the 28th of March when some political 
problems were finally overcome, coming into force on 8 April 1947.130
The payment agreement with Spain was on similar lines to the other payment 
agreements concluded by the United Kingdom between October 1944 and May 1946 
providing for a more flexible mechanism of payments, namely, in chronological order, 
with Belgium, Sweden, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Norway,
***. PRO, BOT 11/3068: Minutes of a meeting of BT, T and FO, 4 January 1946. 
Payments between the Sterling Area and Spain were governed by two agreements 
dated in 1940, the Anglo—Spanish Trade and Payments Agreement of 16 March 
and the Anglo—Spanish Financial Agreement of 2 December, both of them HMSO 
publications. The Trade Agreement was concluded for the settlement of Anglo- 
Spanish current trade, and for the payment of current financial claims on 
Spain and pre-Civil War debts. The Financial Agreement set up a special 
account system covering the settlement of debts and remittances between 
Spain and the Sterling Area as a whole in so far as these were not 
conclusively provided for by the March Trade Agreement. An Anglo-Spanish 
Clearing Office and a Spanish Special Account were established for payments 
for goods of Spanish origin imported into the United Kingdom or the Sterling 
Area (other than the United Kingdom), respectively.
m . "Making it perfectly clear to them that any publicity which might be 
twisted for political purposes would inevitably put an end to the 
discussions.” ibid.
lK. Treaty Series no. 23 (1947)s "Monetary Agreement between the Government 
of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Spanish State (with 
Protocol]", London (HMSO] 26 March 1947. The date was carefully chosen 
because Bevin would be absent from London and it was the last working day 
of Parliament so the debate was postponed until the end of vacations when 
the agreement was already fully operational, Portero, Franco aislado, cit., 
p. 262.
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Switzerland, and Portugal. A mechanism for payments between the Sterling Area and the 
Spanish Monetary area was based upon a reciprocal credit margin or swing, to permit 
as uninterrupted a trade as possible more in harmony with the exchanged obligations 
undertaken under the Anglo-American Loan Agreement. The Anglo-Spanish Clearing was 
abolished, arrangement being made instead for accounts to be opened by the Spanish 
Foreign Exchange Institute (IEME) with the Bank of England into which were paid the 
proceeds of imports of Spanish goods into the United Kingdom. The swing, also called 
manipulation credit, reciprocal revolving credit or working balance, consisted in an 
amount established in the agreement, after consideration of the volume and timing of 
reciprocal trade expected, as the limit up to which each partner was prepared to sell its 
currency for the other’s currency without demanding cover in convertible currencies or 
gold. The reciprocal swing margin was the essential feature of post-war payments 
agreement.131 The United Kingdom and Spain agreed to hold the currency of the other 
up to £2 million or its equivalent to cover the swing of trade. In addition, although it was 
not published, Spain had agreed to hold a further £8 million to cover the expected balance 
of payments in its favour. In other words, the swing agreed upon with the Spanish 
allowed the British to obtain credit facilities from Spain up to £10 million to finance 
essential imports of foodstuffs and raw materials.
Once the formal instrument for trade was agreed upon by both parties overcoming 
many technicalities involved, the problem was to find the right political occasion to sign 
i t  It was certain that the Spanish Government, always anxious of obtaining arguments to 
mark its return to world affairs, was going to exploit i t  Despite reiterated expressions of 
hostility, the United Kingdom was prepared to sign a formal agreement with them. This 
could have temporarily given the Spanish Government an appearance of increased stability 
and, on these grounds, political criticism at home and abroad was expected. The Foreign 
Office decided that, although important political arguments could not outweigh the 
practical and material arguments in favour of making the agreement. Therefore it informed 
the Treasury that in spite of the political disadvantages, the Chancellor of the Exchequer
1,1. Johan H.C. de Looper: "Current Usage of Payments Agreements and Trade 
Agreements", International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, vol. 4, 1955, p. 345.
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should defend the decision in the House of Commons, Cabinet, or elsewhere.132 It was 
soon learnt in Spain as well as in the United Kingdom and in rest of Western Europe how 
to overcome die extremely uncomfortable confrontation between politics and economics 
when trying to do business with Spain. The solution was to present the matters covered 
as technical dealings. This constitutes a main characteristic of Spain-Western European 
economic relations. The bilateral agreement provided the first grounds for this discovery. 
An official from the Foreign Office wrote:
"For the first time we have a serious conflict between our 
political attitude towards Spain and our essential economic 
advantage [...] We have consistently maintained commercial 
relations with Spain. We have opposed any form of economic 
ostracism. We have made our po—litical views clear in public 
and have shown that they are not incompatible with our 
economic policy. We are now in urgent need of a favourably 
economic agreement with Spain [ • • • ] and we can have it at once 
if we are prepared to face unjustified though perhaps bitter 
criticism at home and abroad. "11J
The new agreement was presented to Parliament as "essentially a technical 
readjustment" with no political implications and a necessity to secure trade with 
Spain.134 That is, it represented no change in the policy towards Franco nor any 
deviation from the obligations under the United Nations. It was recalled that neither the 
Assembly's resolution on 12 December 1946 nor any other act by the United Nations 
precluded bilateral arrangements between its individual members and Spain. This 
agreement provided for an intensification of bilateral trade relations.
Although the British Government did not consider the Franco regime as the most 
adequate political government for Spain, they concluded that there was no alternative 
Administration able to guarantee "a solid, representative and stable regime" as well as a 
"friendly Government" to the United Kingdom. They considered the Franco government 
to be able to guarantee supply and the protection of important British economic interests. 
This has important connotations for historical research. First and most importantly, it 
proves how the actual commercial and financial behaviour of the Spanish Government
ln. PRO, FO 371/67895: F0 to T, 4 March 1947.
1M. Ibid., Minutes by Mr. Hogg in jacket Z 1941, 24 February 1947.
l“ . Ibid., notes for a parliamentary question, 3 April 1947.
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during the few mouths after the world war, had a positive effect on Britain, but also in 
the rest of Western Europe, even in France, despite the ultimate decisions towards it. 
Second, the British position reveals the little impact the Spanish opponents of Franco had 
on Western policy-making.133 Support for the opposition to Franco served as testimony 
of goodwill for a democratic Spain to be used in public politics, but this was not allowed 
to disturb economic and commercial courses of action. The Allies disliked the Spanish 
regime, but valued highly its stability and the supply, although limited, of the Spanish 
economy. They neither considered supporting the active guerrilla nor substituting the 
Franco regime either by democratic institutions from the Republican era or by a Monarchy 
of a constitutional character, the latter remaining little more than a theoretical possibility. 
They did not wish to risk new outbreaks of violence in that region. Temporary 
continuance of Franco in power, which did not seem directly to threaten any vital British 
interests, was a lesser evil than ultra-violence and anarchy that British perceived as the 
possible outcome of a displacement of Franco. A few months after Nazi Germany’s 
capitulation, economics had imposed their logic of prudence upon political principles.
British policy towards Spain was not isolated from the general paradox of the 
Labour Government’s failure to implement a specific Labour approach to foreign affairs. 
Bevin had taken care in keeping contact with his Conservative predecessor, Anthony 
Eden, to show that Britain had one national foreign policy. In the Spanish policy the 
British Labour Party followed the same attitude as the War Cabinet had in the economic 
policy towards Spain.134 Bevin’s first appearance as Foreign Secretary in the Commons
1,s. The history of the Spanish political opponents of Franco received great 
attention at one point in time when the history of the Franco regime was 
deemed to be the history of its opponents. See similar appreciation in Juan 
Pablo Fusi: Franco, Autoritarismo y poder personal, Madrid [El Pais] 1985, 
p. 16. Complete references in Javier Tusell, Alicia Alted and A. Mateos 
(coords.): La oposición al régimen de Franco. Estado de la cuestión y
metodología de la investigación, Madrid (Universidad Nacional de Educación 
a Distancia] 1990, 3 vols.
1,€. Different from the position maintained in November 1944 by Attlee, then 
Lord President of the Council and Deputy Prime Minister, of economic 
sanctions against Spain to be taken jointly with the United States and 
France, opposed then by the Minister of Economic Warfare, PRO, PREM B/106: 
War Cabinet, "Policy Towards Spain", Memorandum by the Minister of Economic 
Warfare, 15 November 1944, and "Conclusions of a Meeting of the War Cabinet 
held at No. 10, Downing Street, S.W. 1 on Monday, 2th November 1944, at 5.30 
p.m." During the entire war, the idea of intensifying the economic blockade 
against Spain was opposed by the British Government. The motives argued by 
the Minister of Economic Warfare not to apply sanctions towards Spain were
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on the 20th August 1945 marked the lines of his policy towards Spain. He refused to 
embark on a policy of intervention in Spain, continuing the Conservative line. It was for 
the Spanish people, and them alone, to decide whether they would make any change in 
politics. For foreign powers to intervene would have the opposite effect to that desired 
and would probably strengthen Franco's position. It was a matter of principle that British 
foreign policy should be determined not by ideological sympathies or socialist solidarity, 
but by national interest. It was in British interests (as the Foreign Office perceived it) to 
keep a ‘stable’ international balance of power in the Mediterranean.137 Bevin was deeply 
convinced that it would be a major disaster if they could only oust the Spanish dictator 
at the price of another civil war, a Russian objective, which would be followed by active 
Communist intervention.1*1
as following: Whatever one could think of the incompetence, corruption and 
oppression of the Franco regime, it was no more authoritarian than Stalin, 
there was no moral justification for retaliatory action on a neutral 
country, the primarily to suffer were to be British traders and the people 
of Spain, economic sanctions would produce anti-foreign reactions in the 
country attacked, there could not be British interference in Spanish 
domestic affairs, what they needed then was peace and the revival of trade. 
Medlicott, based on a number of telegrams from Madrid to the FO during the 
first quarter of 1944, briefed the British position as follows: "Supplies 
of Spanish ores were necessary to maintain the British iron and steel 
output; British agriculture would suffer from shortage of potash.", op. 
cit., vol. 2, p. 157« For the British position during the war see chapter
I of Ahmad, the most original section of his book; Enrique Moradiellos: 
Neutralidad benévola: el Gobierno británico y la insurrección militar
española de 1936, Oviedo, 1990; Denis Smyth: Diplomacy and Strategy of 
Survival: British Policy and Franco's Spain, 1940-41, Cambridge, 1986; Jill 
Edwards: The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-193 9, London 
[MacMillan] 1979.
413 HC DEB, 20 August 1945, pp. 293 ff; and Bullock, op. cit., pp. 193- 
94 and 242. The reader is invited to compare this statement with Churchill's 
in the Commons on 24 May 1944 and his letter to Eden on 10 November 1944; 
PRO, PROM 8/106. On the same day as Bevin's first speech as Foreign 
Secretary to the House of Commons, Attlee demanded Laski, the Labour Party 
Chairman, "to refrain from issuing further pronouncements on what the 
Government would or would not do in foreign policy", Gordon, op. cit., p.
105, see above footnote no. 6.
1M. Bevin to Attlee, 14 November 1946, as cit. in Bullock, op. cit., p. 328. 
Literature evaluating Labour's overall record in foreign policy has put 
great stress on continuity in British foreign policy and the failure of the 
Labour Government to implement a specific Labour foreign policy. Ritchie 
Ovendale (ed): The Foreign Policy of the British Governments, 194 5—1951, 
Leicester, 1984, specially p. 2.: "Though it persuaded ideals of Socialism 
at home, the British Labour Government did not extend those to foreign 
policy." Pressed by an ambassador to pay a visit to the latter's country, 
Bevin replied: "I'll bring Anthony along with me. It'll show that we have 
one foreign policy.", Anthony Eden, the Earl of Avon: The Eden Memoirs. The 
Reckoning, London [Cassel] 1965, p. 506, no exact date is given. Gordon, op. 
cit., p. 105, reads as follows: "For Bevin, far from repudiating continuity 
in foreign policy, had in effect repudiated a socialist policy as fantasy". 
Criticism came more frequently from Labour backbenches than from the 
Conservative opposition: Frank K. Roberts, Bevin's principal Private
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Including Spain in broader frameworks than those traditionally offered by bilateral 
diplomatic relations provides a clearer vision of that country'’s foreign performance. 
Problems with Spain of political principle were not going to be allowed to become an 
obstacle that could avoid the concentration of efforts on the solution of main issues. 
Demands for economic reconstruction would modify in practice the ideological substance 
that had committed the French Government of National Unity and the British Labour 
party to certain principles. Post-war foreign policies were to be managed by the force of 
events. Many were already the controversial issues on which sections of official, 
parliamentary, press and public opinion diverged and caused dissatisfaction within 
Cabinet. French and British diplomacy had more important matters to deal with and, as 
a matter of principle, political disturbance should not interfere with a realistic economic 
policy based on an expansion of trade. This was a principle equally applicable to French 
and British foreign economic policies towards Spain. The British managed to overcome 
strong pressure coming from domestic as well as international quarters during 1945 and
1946 to avoid the imposition of economic sanctions to Spain. This was the immediate 
result of a pragmatic and non doctrinaire approach to foreign affairs; a stalwart defence 
of British interests in general. If France closed its border with Spain, it reopened it as 
soon as circumstances allowed it to do so and quickly agreed trade deals to recover the 
lost field in the economic sphere, the only real consequence of closing the border with 
Spain.
,
Secretary from 1947 to 194 9, "Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary", in 
Ovendale (ed) , op. cit., pp. 21-42, pp. 23 and 29; Sir Roderick E. Barclay, 
Bevin's last principal Private Secretary, after March 194 9, Ernest Bevin and 
the Foreign Office 1932-1969, London [Butler 6 Tanner] 1975, pp. 81-82; 
Roger Eatwell: The 194 5-1951 Labour Governments [Batsford Academic] 1979, 
pp. 228-29 and 503, and Victor Rothwell: Britain and the Cold War, 1941- 
1947, London [Jonathan Cape] 1982, pp. 228-30; Henry Pelling: The Labour 
Governments 1945-51, London [MacMillan Press] 1984, pp. 120-24; and Kenneth
O. Morgan: Labour in Power 194 5—1951, Oxford [Clarendon Press] 1984, pp. 60- 
61; Mark Hickeson: The British Foreign Office Influence on Labour Britain's 
Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1945-194 8, Ph.D.Diss., California State University, 
Fullerton, 1986. In May 1947 the State Department even called for an 
assessment of whether Bevin would survive at the FO, FRUS, 1947, I, pp. 750- 
51. Bullock, op. cit., sums up Bevin's action regarding Spain as part of 
Labour policy's of "continuity", pp. 71—72, 163-64, 193-94, and 278. D.N. 
Pritt: The Labour Government 1945-51, London [Lawrence £ Wishart] 1963, p. 
57, says that the Spanish press welcomed Bevin's first foreign policy speech 
as the first full anti-Soviet statement by a representative of the Western 
alliance. The failure to implement a specific Labour foreign policy has been 
applied, most recently, to the case of Spain; Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 163 ff.
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2.4. Trade versus Politics: An Instructive Debate
The idea that political discrimination comprised economic discrimination is 
common place in literature.139 This section will attempt to cast light on some revealing 
aspects of possible economic discrimination against Franco Spain: restriction in trade and 
US financial relief programmes. The first thing to notice is, however, that economic 
sanctions or a blockade was never agreed against Spain, apart from the clear economic 
consequences of the French decision to close its southern border. The use of economic 
sanctions to bring about the collapse of the Franco regime would have required the 
implementation of die blockade by as many foreign countries as possible. This proved 
unrealistic.140 France, who had decided to adopt the first and only real measure against 
Franco, made efforts to enlist the support of other powers. The first stage was to draw in 
Great Britain and the United States, as shown in section 2.3.1. of the present chapter. Both 
of them refused. Only when die French Government, with the closing of the border with 
Spain, decided to present the so-called Spanish question to the Security Council of the 
United Nations, was any positive reaction obtained from both powers.141 Since the 
Anglo-Saxons did not like the question being presented at the United Nations where the 
Soviet Union could interfere, they hurried to agree upon a common declaration on 2 
March 1946, providing no direct commitment. The Tripartite statement of the American, 
British and French governments on their relations with the Franco Government advocated 
the peaceful replacement of Franco by a provisional government that would restore a
1>’. i.«.( most clearly and recently expressed by R. Richard Rubottom and J. 
Carter Murphy: Spain and the United States Since World War II, New York 
[Praeger] 1964, p. 5, and Paola Brundu Olla: L'anello mancante. Il problema 
della Spagna franchista e l'organizzazione della difesa occidentale (1947- 
1950), Sassari [Università degli Studi di Sassari] 1990, p. 8.
14C. Apart from the Spanish case, consensus exists in literature that 
economic sanctions alone have been historically ineffective in the 
fulfillment of their objectives. See precise bibliographical references in 
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "The Limits of Economic Sanctions: The American-
Israeli Case of 1953”, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 23, 1988, pp. 
425-43. The recent military operation "Storm in the Dessert** saves any 
further comment.
141. The French maintained the idea of bringing the question of Franco Spain 
to the Security Council: see FRUS, 1946, V, pp. 1043 ff.
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system of freedoms.1*2
Neither was a general commitment reached at the United Nations regarding 
economic sanctions against Spain. Since its first meeting, held on 10 January 1946, the 
General Assembly had dealt with the Spanish question without much effective result for 
those in favour of breaking diplomatic relations or imposing an economic blockade against 
Franco’s Spain. An opportunity to involve a larger number of countries came, following 
an entire year of fruitless discussions, on 12 December 1946 with the approval of UN 
General Assembly’s resolution no. 39(I).,4J It condemned the Franco regime as a 
creation of the Axis powers, called for the withdrawal of Ambassadors from Madrid and 
barred Spain from membership of the United Nations and its Specialised Agencies as long 
as the Franco regime remained in power. It was still only a verbal attitude, avoiding the 
imposition of economic sanctions. It must be questioned whether those countries having 
at the time appreciable commercial exchanges with Spain or special links, such as 
Portugal and Argentina, would have been at all enthusiastic about a policy of economic
I42. AD, Z/E vol. 67: "Déclaration commune des gouvernements français,
anglais et américain, concernant l'Espagne, en date du 2 Mars 1946". English 
version in A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents, 1941-194 9, 
New York [Arno Press] 1971: Doc. no. 182: "Relations with Present Spanish 
Government. Statement by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, 
March 4, 1946", p. 887. The Note is also reproduced in Fernando Maria
Castiella Maiz and Lleonart Amselem: España y la ONU. Vol. I (1945-1946).
La «Cuestión Española». Documentación básica, sistematizada y anotada, 
Madrid [CSIC] 1978, p. 62. A common declaration most wanted by the US 
Administration to satisfy its public opinion, FRÜS, 1946, the Acting 
Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London, 18 January, pp. 
706-707. That the Anglo-Saxons did not like this last aspect of the French 
decision becomes clear in ibid, the Ambassador in France to the Secretary 
of State, 27 February, pp. 1043-44.
14i. A Decade of American Foreign Policy, cit., doc. no. 183: Relations
between Spam and the United Nations, (a) Resolution of General Assembly, 
February 9, 1946, and (b) Resolution of General Assembly, December 12, 1946. 
At its 1st meeting the Assembly endorsed the San Francisco and Potsdam 
declarations that Spain was not qualified to join the UN and recommended 
member—States to act in accordance with the letter and spirit of these 
declarations in their future relations with Spain. The Spanish question at 
the UN has been extensively treated and documented in Castiella and
Lleonart, ibid. ; Lleonart: a) España y la ONU, vol. II. La «cuestión
española». Estudio introductorio y corpus documental, Madrid [CSIC] 1983; 
and b) España y la ONU, vol. III, op. cit. The full story of Spain's early 
post-war relations with the United Nations is Roger E. Sanders: Spain and 
the United Nations 1945-1950, New York [Vantage Press] 1966. Several 
Doctoral theses in the United States deal with this specific point, i.e. 
Robert P. Huff: "The Spanish Question Before the United Nations", Michigan, 
Ann Arbor University Microfilms, 1966. A selective treatment of the main 
issues within the general circumstances of the UN is Evan Luard: A History 
of the United Nations. Vol. 1 The Years of Western Domination, 194 5-1955, 
London, MacMillan, 1982, chap. 19. The official Spanish response to the UN 
resolution, dated 2 January 1947 in FRUS, 194 7, vol. Ill, p. 1053.
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sanctions imposed by the United Nations.
From April to November 1946, the "Spanish question" was debated within the 
Security Council when it was transferred to the Assembly. The impossibility of proving 
that the existing political regime in Spain constituted a danger to world peace was the best 
argument against the imposition of economic sanctions. In April 1946 Dr Oscar Lange, 
Polish Delegate at the UN, described Franco’s Government as a threat to world peace.144 
Lange mentioned in his support the closure of the French-Spanish border in February, the 
subsequent concentration of troops there and the large German population living in Spain. 
Supposedly, German scientists and technicians were helping to prepare the Spanish Army 
and working on the production of an atom bomb some 70 kilometres from Madrid with 
the Nazi holdings amounting to between $100 to $200 million.145 British and Americans 
proved all of it to be very doubtful.146 They presented evidence that the Franco regime 
was far from being capable of developing atomic weapons and that its Army was unable 
to threaten anyone but die Spaniards themselves.147 Rejecting the hypothesis of Spain 
being a "threat to peace and security" was not just a question of semantic. It was an 
essential measure to avoid the adoption of drastic action.14*
144• United Nation«: Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of 
the Organization, New York, 1947, p. 2, and several despatches of the 
British Delegation to the UN to FO, April 194 6, in PRO, FO 371/60355.
145. David W. Pike: "Franco and the Axis Stigma", Journal of Contetnporary 
History, vol. 17, no. 3, July 1982, pp. 369-407, pp. 391 ff.
l44. PRO, FO 371/60355: FO to British Delegation at the UN, London, 13 April 
194 6; and FRUS, 194 6, V, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to the U.S. 
Delegation at the UN, Washington, 12 April 1946, p. 1067.
141. United Nations (Security Council): Official Records First Years Second 
Series Special Supplement, Report of the Sub—Coimiittee on the Spanish 
Question, 1946. Christian Tauch, an EU1 researcher studying French policy- 
making in the field of defence, argues that French military planners did not 
consider Spain as a possible military threat at the time, EUI seminar 
"Missed opportunities: French Military Policy in the aftermath of World War 
II**, Florence, 16 May 1991.
l4#. Art. 41 of the UN Charter reads as follows: "The Security Council may 
decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed 
to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the 
United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations." Should these actions be inadequate to maintain 
international security, the Security Council was authorised by virtue of 
Art. 42 to adopt measures such as "blockade, and other operations by air, 
sea or land forces".
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Application of economic sanctions, it was feared by many, would lead inevitably 
to political and economic chaos and the resumption of civil strife in Spain on a wide 
scale. Given the unwillingness of a majority to follow the path of economic sanctions, the 
UN General Assembly, in turn, emerged with the idea that if, in a reasonable period of 
time, the desired democratic change had not come about, the Security Council would have 
to adopt appropriate measures. All this was very ambiguous. Thirty member states of the 
United Nations had no diplomatic relations with Spain and so were unaffected by the 
resolution. The few ambassadors withdrawn were replaced by chargés s’affaires who acted 
to guard the national interests as before. None of the nineteen embassies accredited to 
Madrid was closed.149
The UN resolution is, somewhat, equivalent to the French unilateral action of 
closing the border with Spain. Both can be qualified as choosing the lesser evil, avoiding 
the rupture of diplomatic relations. December 1946 might have been the lowest point of 
toimal international recognition for the Spanish regime but the UN debates confirmed 
the Spanish Administration’s belief that the international community was unwilling to 
attempt a replacement of the Franco regime or, at least, it was unwilling to implement a 
de facto economic blockade. Political discrimination as a real and direct threat to Franco 
regime’s survival was then completely overriden, had it not been so much earlier.150
The fact that political ostracism at the United Nations was obtained with the 
greatest effort and once Spain had recovered its network of bilateral trade agreements, 
played in favour of lesser economic effects than it might have expected at that time (or
"The withdrawal of heads of mission was symbolic rather than practical 
in effect.» Of the fifty-two members, thirty states already had no diplomatic 
relations at this time and sixteen more had no ambassador or minister. Four 
[three] states did recall their ambassador or minister [the Netherlands, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom]; two others which had them, did nothing 
[Portugal and Switzerland].**, Luard, op. cit., p. 363. Diplomatic 
representation at the rank of Ambassador was limited to the latter two 
countries, Ireland, the Vatican, and, after January 194 6, Argentina.
15Ce The Area Handbook for Spain, Washington [US Government Printing Office] 
1976, written by a research team led by Eugene K. Keefe, refers as following 
to the UN resolution: "At best the December resolution was a minor
irritation to Franco, who used the UN attempt to isolate and topple his 
regime to strengthen his hold over the Spanish government. Inasmuch as the 
December resolution amounted to a mild diplomatic blockade devoid of any 
economic sanctions, Spain's survival was not jeopardy.*1, p. 271.
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argued nowadays).131 Spain bad continued to trade with France’s main European 
competitors. Trade agreements had been signed with the United Kingdom, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands and Belgium after the closing of the Franco-Spanish border. Since, the rest 
of Western European countries had some form of trade arrangement with Spain in place 
before March 1946, Spain showed little difficulty in disposing of its export surpluses, 
which in fact increased from 1946 to 1947 (see table 2.1). It is more likely that the 
significant fall in Spanish exports to the United States was not due to a sort of effective 
economic discrimination but to the lack of competitivity of Spanish export commodities 
in the US market, the most competitive in the world. In a way, while exports to the rest 
of the world partly compensated the decrease to the United States, the overall trade 
increase corresponds almost completely to the increase in exports to the OEEC countries, 
which in 1947, after the UN discriminatory resolution of December 1946, maintained the 
largest percentage of Spain's exports with a further increase in 4 points. The vacuum left 
by France and Germany was immediately taken up by the rest of Western Europe. As 
soon as France partially recovered the 1935 volume in 1948 and Germany started to 
reappear as a consumer market, all Western European countries, except Sweden, Norway 
and the United Kingdom, received less from Spain in percentage terms of overall exports.
TABLK 2.1
SPASM'S EXPORT TRADE 
BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES OF LAST CONSIGNMENT
(f.o.b. in million of gold pesetas)
1945 % 1946 % 1947 %
TOTAL TRADE 682.9 100 596.0 100 664 100
OEEC countries 413.5 60.5 320.6 53.8 385.1 58
US 177.6 26 159.7 26.6 77.2 11.5
Rest of the World 91.6 13.5 115.5 19.4 201.7 30.5
Source: 1947, UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1950, New York, 
1951, pp. 140; 1945 and 1946, Estadlstica de Comercio Exterior de Espafti. 
Peninsula and Balearic Islands.
As in the case of the export trade, Spain’s import performance with Western 
Europe did not follow from the degree of intensity of political dislike against the Franco
151. i.e. Joseph Harrison: Tha Spanish Economy in tha Twantiath Century, 
London (Croom Helm] 1985, pp. 125 and 131.
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regime (see table 2.2). While Spam’s overall imports increased 32.6 per cent from 1945 
to 1947, the percentage corresponding to the OEEC countries as a whole was 40.5 per 
cent. On the contrary, imports from the United States decreased 32 per cent. If Denmark, 
Norway and Turkey decreased their exports from 1946 to 1947, it was linked to factors 
other than political discrimination. The Spanish demand for foodstuffs from Turkey (97 
per cent of total Turkish exports in 1946, especially barley and rye) was diverted to 
Argentina. The latter offered a credit line while Turkey wanted payments in hard 
currencies. Trade relations with Norway and Denmark did not benefit from the possibility 
of accumulated deficit. In 1947 the scarce exchange stock of both countries' currencies 
imposed to pull down trade.152 The rest of the future members of the OEEC overtook 
France immediately as suppliers of the Spanish economy. Most of the countries listed 
show constant increases in export trade to Spain during the three first years of the 
immediate postwar period. Germany has disappeared for obvious reasons and France has 
stepped out as a supplier.
TABL* 2.2
SPAIN'S IMPORTS BY PRINCIPAL OZBC COUNTRIES AND THE USA
(c.i.f. in gold pesetas)
1945 1946 1947
TOTAL TRADE 743,665,118 773,109,036 986,068,563
Germany 17, 235, 935 1,. 617, 64 5 2, 064, 450Belgiuxn-Lux. 1, 438, 895 2, 837, 240 32, 057, 049Denmark 2, 497, 120 9, 582, 448 6, 555, 360Prance 12, 325, 520 4, 522, 872 967, 670
United Kingdom 36, 175, 754 77, 630, 334 *76, 992, 110
Netherlands 514, 521 4, 912, 309 27, 931, 599Italy 3, 036, 636 8, 806, 107 17, 870, 719
Norway 1, 689, 454 18, 921, 370 7, 058, 559Portugal 14, 294, 731 10, 932, 941 9,265, 414
Sweden 18, 652, 561 24, 984, 995 25, 292, 274
Switzerland 62, 825, 807 52, 522, 341 29, 156, 547
Turkey ---- 12, 882, 802 4, 649, 416
TOTAL OEEC 170, 686, 934 230, 153, 404 239, 881, 167
USA 157, 549, 412 162, 194, 961 107, 381, 800
Source: see table 2.1.
The marked increase in Spanish imports from Switzerland (and Sweden) in 1945 was due 
to their special position as neutrals. This increase was most marked in the case of 
Switzerland, which during the war years bought from Spain substantial quantities of fruits
l“ . AHBE, IEME, box no. 3: C/A, 16 October 1947.
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and wines, not obtainable elsewhere, and exported in exchange machinery and chemicals. 
With the resumption of world trade, however, Switzerland turned to other and cheaper 
sources of supply, and in 1947 the important decrease in the case of Switzerland, rather 
than to effective discrimination against Spain, was primarily due to the high cost of 
Spanish exports, which Swiss subsidies financed by a 40 percent surcharge on Swiss 
exports to Spain, were unable to reduce sufficiently, bringing commerce between the two 
countries almost to a standstill.133
If one supports the assumption that the decrease in export trade to Spain 
experienced by some Western European nations from 1946 to 1947 is a consequence of 
the logical extension of political dislike to the economic field, one should also note the 
fact that some other countries in Western Europe were happy to supply the gap. The total 
export decrease accounted for by some Western European countries towards Spain in 1947 
as compared to 1946 equals the increase experienced by die Benelux countries! Apart 
from Switzerland and France, the only country that went through a constant reduction of 
its export trade to Spain from 1945 to 1947 was Portugal. It is a historical irony that this 
country has been traditionally considered in the Spanish historiography as an axis of 
Franco Spain's foreign policy!
The economic implications of political ostracism did not concern exclusively the 
question of access to Spanish supplies, whatever the importance of these were, as this 
chapter has mostly focussed on. It also involved the problem of filling the Spanish market 
as a supplier of manufactured goods once German competition had disappeared after the 
war. Supplies from Spain were mostly relief goods that could soon be replaced by 
alternative sources, even non-dollar sources, as soon as reconstruction progressed. On the 
contrary, the substitution of German supplies to Spain had long-term consequences; the 
British and French were decided on profiting from it as much as possible.
Immediately after the Liberation of France (i.e. before the decision to close the 
border was adopted) French delegates in Spain wondered whether there was any other
lM. Ibid., S/C, 19 May 1947.
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market in Europe or outside Europe at the time offering to French industry similar 
possibilities.134 In the United Kingdom there were arguments over Spain, during the 
period end of 1944 to Spring 1947, as being a market offering large short and long-term 
prospects for United Kingdom goods.15* It is unclear what they may have thought as the 
real benefits to be obtained from the disappearance of the Germans. The trade situation 
in 1929, the maximum expansion of Spain’s import trade in the pre-Civil War decade, 
which level was to be reached again only after 1960, could provide some clues (see table 
2.3). Manufactured goods accounted then for a little more than 48 per cent of Spam's 
overall imports and four countries only counted for 71 per cent of total Spain’s imports 
of these commodities. The disappearance of Germany as a supplier of capital goods and 
the Spanish currency difficulties with the United States due to the scarcity of dollar, left 
ample room for competition between the United Kingdom and France, from which both 
thought to be able to benefit at the expense of the other.
h b l i  2.3
SPAIN'S IMPORTS IN 1929
(imports c.i.f. in million gold pesetas and %)
Total Imports 2,737 100
by Groups of Commodities
- Foodstuffs 554 20.2
- Manufactured Goods 1,323 48.3
— Raw Materials 847 31
- Live Animals 13 0.5
Total Imports of Manufactured
Goods by Countries 1,323 100
- USA 249 18.8
— Germany 248 18.7
- France 233 17.6
- Great Britain 208 15.7
TOTAL 938 70.9
Source: Estadlstica General de Comercio Exterior de Espafta. Peninsula and 
Balearic Islands.
Spain was one pawn in the general strategy to capture traditional German markets 
after the war. France, going alone along the path of bilateral sanction and discriminatory
154. HL'Espagne constitue un marché où nos industries lourdes pourraient
trouver un débouché important” AD, 2/E vol. 92: "Note du Conseiller
Commercial résumant la situation économique de l'Espagne”, Truelle to 
Bidault, annex, 3 November 1944.
155. Board of Trade, Department of Overseas Trade: Spain. Review of
Commercial Conditions» London [HMSO] October 1945 and BOT 11/3067 : 
CM(47)2nd, Conclusions, Minute no. 4, 3 January 1947: "From the long-term 
point of view, there was also a large potential market for us [in Spain)
I l l
action against Spain, was to suffer the economic consequences. The French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, despite the need to act very carefully in turbulent waters, was of a clear- 
cut position:
"Ce n'est pas au moment où les Américains et les Britanniques, 
sans se préoccuper de l'attitude passée du Gouvernement du 
Général Franco, deplaient tous leurs efforts pour s'ouvrir en 
l'Espagne des débouchés nouveaux et certains 
approvisionnements, que nous pouvons songer à rompre nos 
relations consulaires avec l'Espagne qui d'après notre 
Conseiller Commercial à Madrid, est disposée à expédier vers 
la France des matières premières nécessaires à la reprise de 
notre industrie."
"Le Department a toujours été d'avis qu'il n'y avait aucune 
raison de nous priver des conséquences heureuses résultant de 
nos relations d'échange avec l'Espagne et de laisser le champ 
libre à nos concurrents notament la Grande-Bretagne et les 
Etats-Unis."
"Notre presence en Espagne nous met à même, d'une part, de 
protéger nos très importants intérêts dans ce pays, d'autre 
part, de lutter pour la conservation d'un marché que nous 
disputent précisément les exportateurs anglo-saxons."15<
"La France doit prendre en Espagne une grande part de la place 
laissée vacante par la défaite de l'Allemagne."151
The French Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in Madrid and Barcelona, and the 
French Union Circle, representing all French business men dealing with Spain, also 
opposed the political decision to close the border. France had traditionally important 
economic interests in Spanish companies of automobile, chemicals, petroleum, phosphates, 
potash, insurance, banking, extracting industries of iron ore, zinc, and pyrites.15* It 
showed aspirations to take part in the hydro-electrical efforts and in the announced 
modernisation of the Spanish railroad system. All these financial and economic interests 
could no longer be effectively defended. In terms of capital, French investment in Spain,
1M. Kaapactivaly: AD, Z/E vol. 3: European Division at the Quai d'Orsay, 
"Note pour le Cabinet du Ministre**, 17 March 1945; Z/E vol. 92: General 
Director of the Economic Affairs Division at the Quai d'Orsay, "Note pour 
le Ministre", 23 November 1945; and, 2/E vol. €6: Direction d'Europe, Sous- 
Direction de l'Europe Méridionale, "Note France-Espagne", 2 January 1946.
157. AD, 2/E vol. 86: "La fermature de la frontière Franco-Espagnole. Ses 
conséquences économiques. La reprise des relations commerciales entre la 
France et l'Espagne91. Perspectives actuelles**, by the Comercial Counselor 
at the French Embassy in Madrid, 15 June 1946.
1M. It has been calculated that prewar British investment in Spain was of 
$194 million, French $135 million, American $80, and German $36 million, see 
Robert H. Whealey: "Economic Influence of the Great Powers in the Spanish 
Civil War: From the Popular Front to the Second World War", The
International History Review, Vol. 2, May 1983, pp. 229-54, pp. 231-32, and 
Whealey Hitler and Spain, cit., p. 93.
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about Ff 10,000 million, represented 50 per cent of total foreign investment in Spain or 
60 per cent of France’s total foreign investments by the date of the closing the border.
A negative economic effect was expected from the diplomatic move and confirmed shortly 
after the closure of the French-Spanish border:
" [L]e bilan d'une initiative qui, du seul point de vue de 
l'économie française, de notre effort de relèvement et de la 
reprise de notre expansion, peut être qualifiée de désastreuse 
[...] la nature de nos exportations à destination de l'Espagne 
est telle que la vie économique de la nation voisine ne dépend 
aucunement de leur maintien ou de leur arrêt. En l'ocurrence, 
nous sommes les seuls victimes. De même que les seuls 
bénéficiares seront nos concurrents qui sauront profiter de 
nos erreurs.”
"Au moment où la France doit reconstituer son économie et 
assurer son ravitaillement, faire 1'effort pour obtenir à 
l'étranger matières premières et produits alimentaires [...] 
le manque de relations économiques cause à nos affaires un 
dommage incalculable et permet aux autres nations étrangères 
de prendre une position prépondérante sur le marché espagnol 
au détriment du commerce et de l'industrie française."li0
"En Espagne où nous avions acquis l'assurance de pouvoir dans 
des nombreux secteurs et en tout cas, dans les plus 
importants, remplacer le fournisseur allemand, la fermâture de 
la frontière nous ammenait à abandoner notre place à des 
concurrents ".1€1
The first indicator of the economic effects on the French economy could be 
provided by the value of contracts either already signed before the date of the closing of 
the border or that were ongoing with Spanish public or private enterprises for French 
supplies in material or equipment during the following three years, that were immediately 
canceled. The total value of both categories of contracts amounted to about Ff 4,000 
million (see table 2.4). Half of the contracts with France related in one way or another to 
electrical equipment and to the modernisation of the Spanish transport system discussed
ls*. Figure* in AO, Z/E vol. 66: Direction des Affaires Economiques, "Note 
pour le Ministre a.s. des intérêts économiques français en Espagne", 10 
January 194 6; and 2/E vol. 48: Direction Politique, Quai d'Orsay, "Note”, 
dated Paris, 1 June 1945.
li0. AD, 2/E vol. 84: Hardion to Quai d'Orsay, 8 March 194 6; 2/E vol. 66: 
French Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Madrid, Circular no. 26 to the 
President of the Government, Gouin, 28 January 1946; and 2/E vol. 84: 
Director of the Chamber to Quai d'Orsay, 18 February 1946, respectively. 
Other complaints from Spain by French diplomatic personnel, the associations 
that represented French economic interests, individual entrepeneurs, as well 
as the rest of the French colony (around 20,000 people) in 2/E vols. 65, 82, 
84 and 85.
1,1 • AD, 2/E vol. 86: "La fermât ure de la frontière Franco-Espagnole. Ses 
conséquences économiques", Madrid, 15 June 1946, previously cit.
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during 1945 and formally proposed in January 1946.162
TABLZ 2.4
FINANCIAL LOSSES FOR THX TRENCH INDUSTRY
(In millions of French francs)
Contracts 
Signed before 
Items 1 March 194 6
% Deal
Orders
Lost
%
Electrical equipment 275 12.5 600 34.5
Equipment for public 
works & fire brigades(*) 8 0.4 220 12.6
Lorries and vehicles 
automobiles(**) 740 33.5
Peugeot tools 20 0.9
Optical apparatus 100 5.7
Material for Naval building 63 3.6
Mining equipment 700 31.7 557 32
Scrap 180 8.2
Dyes(#) 6 0.3
Textile Ind. Material 250 11.3 150 8.6
Equipment for Distilling 26 1.3 50 2.9
TOTALS 2,207 100 1,740 100
GENERAL TOTAL(1) 3, 947
Source: AD, Z/E vol. 67: "Pertes que la fermature de la frontière causé à 
l'industrie française", Note no. 139 of the dossier; and 2/E vol. 84: 
"Préjudice causé à notre industrie sidérurgique par la fermeture de la 
frontière", Hardion's Despatch, 12 March 1946. Slightly different figures 
are provided by other sources: (*) Ff 238 million, Z/E vol. 82: Hardion's
Telegram, 8 March 194 6; (**) Ff 820 million, 2/E vol. 68: "Notes établies
par le Conseiller Commercial de la Délégation Française à Madrid", 15 March 
1946; (#) Ff 36 million, ibid; and (3) Ff 2,679 million for contracts signed 
and Ff 1,690 million for those ongoing that could never be signed, that is 
Ff 4,370 million as general total, French Commercial Councillor, as cit. in 
Z/E vol. 84: Hardion's Telegram to Bidault, 12 March 194 6. This last figure 
is raised up to Ff 5,000 million in AD, Z/E vol. 86: "La fermeture de la 
frontière Franco—Espagnole. Ses conséquences économiques", Madrid, 15 June 
194 6, previously cit, and ibid, the Director General of Railways and 
Transports, "Note pour Monsieur le Ministre. Etude en vue d'une réouverture 
éventuelle de la frontière franco-espagnole", Paris, 27 August 1947.
French technicians, as on previous occasions, were called to supply the required 
material. Immediately after the decision of the Spanish Council of Ministers, French 
engineers representing a group of builders, especially from Alsthon, to which the
lu. See the following chapter pp. 156 ff., for more detailed information 
about Spanish transport and energy reconstruction and modernisation.
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development of the electrical engineering industry in Spain before the Civil War owed 
much together with some German firms, went to Madrid to hold talks with the Spanish 
National Railroad Company (RENFE). Spanish technical missions travelled to France.163 
It was perceived that Spain was at the time a market offering French industry immediate 
and large output targets.164 The French Embassy informed its Government that Spain 
was willing to sign contracts of the value Ffl.000 million, especially for electrical 
locomotives.165 These were all lost in February 1946.
Neither France nor Spain gained anything. On the one side, even if most countries 
were willing to trade once the French had decided to sept out of the Spanish market, 
Spain was not able to trade freely with most of them on a large scale due to payments 
problems, in particular concerning equipment supplies. On the other side, forcing Spain 
to obtain supplies from the United States, Great Britain or any other western competitor, 
made it difficult for France to regain the share of the Spanish market lost once the 
political decision could be withdrawn. Losing initial orders might have implied non-entry 
into the Spanish market until the 1960s. The personnel involved, it has been shown, 
presented several arguments to show the great damage done to the French economy. 
Although a bit of exaggeration was necessary to impress upon Paris the economic effects 
of the political decision in order to re-establish normal trade channels with Spain, several
xo. AD, 2/E vol. 94: Telegram from Hardion, 26 January 1946. A transport 
conference taking place in Seville in November 1945, with Spanish and 
Portuguese representatives, constituted the first exchange of views, AD, 2/E 
vol. 94: Hardion1s Despatch no. 320 to Quai d'Orsay, "Conférence ferroviare 
franco-hispano-portugaise à Seville", 12 November 1945. AD, 2/E vol. 86: "La 
fermature de la frontière Franco-Espagnole. Ses conséquences économiques", 
Madrid, 15 June 194 6, previously cit.
iU. "L'éléctrification des chemins de fer espagnoles et la signalisation
éléctrique offrent à notre industrie des débouchés substantiels et 
immédiats.", ibid, Hardion's Despatch no. S. 27, 29 January 1946. As RENFE's 
General Director, the Lieutenant-Colonel of Engineers José Maria Rivero de 
Aguilar y Otero, informed the French commercial attache, Spain required 
electrical equipment and technical assistance for the following 12-year 
period, although basic production was left to Spanish industrial capacity, 
ibid, Telegram from Madrid, 15 February 194 6. In 1935 five countries 
accounted for 74,7 per cent of Spain's total iirçport supply of electrical 
goods: Germany (27.8 per cent), the United States (25 per cent), Switzerland 
(9 per cent), the United Kingdom (8.5 per cent) and France (4.4 per cent); 
Antonio Tena Junguito: "Importazioni, livelli di protezione e produzione di 
materiale elettrico in Spagna (1890-1935)", Etudi Storici, no. 4, 1987, pp. 
1005-26. German suppliers disappeared and the Spaniards were running into 
payments difficulties with the United Kingdom and Switzerland, the market 
was left to competition between French and British suppliers.
1<s. AD, 2/E vol. 84: Hardion's Despatch no. NP 108 EU, 8 March 1946.
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other elements proved to be significant.166 It was not only that France had deprived 
itself of a main source of scarce raw materials and foodstuffs when the Monnet Plan was 
farcing every sinew of the country far an increase of productivity and output There was 
also the long-term effect of blocking trade with Spain. As Hardion repeated:
"L'Espagne se transforme. Elle modernise son équipement. C'est 
un des rares pays d'Europe qui restait ouvert à notre 
industrie. La coupure, si elle devait se prolonger aurait par 
conséquence d'orienter l'industrie espagnole vers des 
fournisseurs américains, anglais, suisses [...] Lorsque des 
modèles seron adoptés, les ingénieurs en place, nous ne 
parviendrons plus a reconquérir le terrain perdu. "lf7
From a historical perspective, one can argue that the so-called ‘modernisation’ of the 
Spanish economy did certainly not take place then. The following chapter will show that 
the intention was present within the Spanish Administration. The French carefully noted 
the intended modernisation since they perceived themselves as being an important 
beneficiary.
The British commercial authorities made available to Spain the administrative 
instruments for an expansion of trade, plus the political guarantee of avoiding economic 
retaliation linked to political quarrels. Table 2.5. shows how the only constant feature in 
trade relations between the United Kingdom and Spain during the period 1945 to 1947 
was the increase of British manufactures. The disappearance of Germans and French could 
perfectly explain this performance. With the signature of a Payment Agreement in March 
1947, coming into force on the 8 April, the United Kingdom had made available to Spain 
an important instrument of trade. It is interesting to notice, regarding the different and 
conflicting path followed in political and economic relations with Spain, two elements. 
First, that it happened three months before the Conference for European Economic
***. i.•. that the French National Railroad Society (SNCF) could not cash 
valuable Swiss Francs (estimates varied widely) of transfer duties in the 
traffic between Spain and Switzerland, necessary to balance the trade 
deficit with the latter, that 10 million working days were lost, and that 
a balance of $50 million in favour of France as a result of the initial 
implementation of the bilateral trade agreement was not returned by the 
Spanish authorities; ibid., "Réunion interministérielle du 26 Février 1946**, 
and AD, Z/E vol. 86: "La fermature de la frontière Franco-Espagnole. Ses 
conséquences économiques'*, Madrid, 15 June 1946, and "Etude en vue d'une 
réouverture éventuelle de la frontière franco—espagnole", Paris, 27 August 
1947, document cited previously.
irT. AD, Z/E vol. 84: Hardion to Quai d'Orsay, 8 March 1946.
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Cooperation started meeting. Second, that a revival of trade beneficial to Spain took place 
in 1947, after the famous UN resolutioa The programme of trade agreed upon provided 
for the export to the United Kingdom of its minimnm requirements of potash and iron ore 
and also its needs as regards pyrites, cork, rosin and other raw materials. Provision was 
made for substantial exports of numerous desirable, but less essential, Spanish products, 
all traditional exports to the United Kingdom, chiefly oranges, tomatoes, bananas, onions, 
fruit pulp, nuts, olive oil and sherry. In the first year of implementation, the agreement 
permitted the first big increase on British post-World War imports from Spain (about £6.7 
million of increase). The increase amounted by foodstuffs (£7.7 million) covered the bad 
performance in manufactured goods (£1 million fall). On the other side, British export 
trade to Spain maintained the level and prepared the conditions for a further increase in 
the following years. The important decrease of British exports of raw materials to Spain 
in 1947 responded to the fuel crisis in February and March which led to the suspension 
of exports of hard coal previously available from this source.
TABLE 2.5
BRITISH IMPORTS FROM AMD EXPORTS TO SPAIN, 1945-1947
(Value in £)
1945 % 1946 % 1947 %
TOTAL IMPORTS 19,976,167 100 18,727,101 100 25,571,00B 100
Class I 13,598,898 6B 10,656,665 57 18,316,060 72
Class II 4,242,957 21 5,005,593 27 5,042,270 20
Class III 2,135,525 11 3,060,518 16 2,212,417 8
TOTAL EXPORTS 3,142,531 100 7,250,319 100 7,387,669 100
Class I 185,423 6 325,456 5 153,882 2
Class II 559,706 18 1,081,966 15 691,574 9
Class III 2,373,497 76 5,806,508 80 6,497,652 89
Source : Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with
Commonwealth countries and Foreign Countries, imp. c.i.f., exports f.o.b.; 
including Canary Islands and excluding Spanish Ports in North Africa, except 
for raw materials. Value of total imports, not of articles retained in the 
United Kingdom. Class I: Pood, drink and tobacco; class II: raw materials, 
mineral fuels and lubricants; class III: manufactured goods.
In Britain, it was generally agreed that a break in commercial relations would be 
unfortunate coming just at a time when Spain was beginning to resume normal purchases 
from the United Kingdom. Avoiding economic sanctions meant to maintain British exports 
to Spain as well as British imports from Spain, which could be further increased in the 
immediate post-war period (although, certainly, very limitedly given the scarce increase 
in output in Spain). There was no claim that excluding Spain temporarily would seriously
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interfere with the development of British production and export trade since Spain was a 
small and highly protected market and world demand for British goods still greatly 
exceeded the possible supply. However, a prolonged break in commercial relations was 
undesirable. The British would not have voluntarily excluded themselves from a market 
perceived as having considerable potential for the British industry in machine tools and 
other manufactured goods, at the time when German competition had disappeared and the 
French were willing to abandon the Spanish market. On the contrary, any such action 
would probably increase Spain's tendency to economic protectionism and nationalism and 
intensify the main difficulties to the full development of trade. It is clear that Spain’s trade 
performance escaped something like international economic ostracism. The low levels of 
trade and the low recovery of pre-Civil War years finds no explanation in trade 
discrimination.
It is also argued that political dislike of Franco’s regime resulted in the US 
Administration’s unwillingness to provide credits to Spain.169 To argue that Franco 
Spain did not benefit from American aid due to political dislike implies the following 
initial hypothesis: that American aid could ever have been programmed for Spain. No real 
support can be given to this assessment.170 A completely different argument would apply
1M. As Hugh Ellis—Rees put it: "[The British] have always tried to take the 
long view in the hope that sooner or later we should return to normal 
conditions and reap son« benefit." PRO, BO? 11/3068: Minute Sheet by C.W. 
Senders, Economic Welfare Department of the War Office, on the 
interdepartmental meeting held at the FO on February 28, 1 March 1946.
lM. i.e. Viñas et al. op. cit., p. 469. Portero, op. cit., p. 221, without 
any documentary support whatsoever, argues that the UN resolution provoked 
a retraction of trade flows and that some governments discouraged credits 
and investment in Spain. It seems important to know that it was the Spanish 
legislation that limited foreign investment by restricting foreign capital 
in enterprises to a maximum of 25 per cent, Regulation and Defence of 
Domestic Industry Act of 24 November 1939. For the ideological reasons of 
this attitude see Juan Antonio Suances Fernández, minister of industry in 
Franco's first Cabinet, Instituto Nacional de Industria: notas en relación 
con la creación y desenvolvimiento de este Instituto. Madrid [INI] 1941, p. 
8. The reduction of foreign private investment is a general post-war 
phenomen, intensified in Spain due to unattractive investment and its 
inability to provide guarantees as blunthy stated in AHBE, IEME, box no. 2: 
C/A, 11 December 1945. For a more detailed account see the following chapter 
pp. 191 ff.
170. The literature has adopted this argument from the letter sent by 
Roosevelt to the then recently appointed US Ambassador in Madrid, Norman 
Armour, on 10 March 1945, FRÜS, V, pp. 667-668, and from a dispatch sent by 
the Acting Secretary of State to the US Ambassador in the United Kingdom, 
on 7 April 1947, FRUS, III, p. 1066. The President's letter says that 
"(t)here are many things which we could and normally would be glad to do in
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to American aid offered through the ERP after Summer 1947 to be used in a coordinated 
way by Europeans, when Spain was not included. But pre-ERP and ERP American aid 
did not constitute an unity, since they were different in nature and in economic and 
political goals and principles. The specificity of Spain in the latter cannot be extended 
backwards to the first. It was the specific nature of American financial relief in that 
period, very significant for some countries (see table 2.6), that deprived the Spanish 
economy of its benefits and not the nature of the Franco regime.
TABLE 2.6
U.S. European Economic and Military 
Assistanoe in the Post-War Period of Relief(*)
(in millions of dollars)
Countries US FY
1946—1948 %
United Kingdom 3,836.9 38
France 1,909.1 19
Federal Republic 1,344.4 13
Italy 1,271.3 13
Total Four 8,361.7 84
Greece 723.5 7
Yugoslavia 298.1 3
Netherlands 238.2 3
Belqium-Lux. 163.4 2
Turkey 113.3 1
Norway 75 1
Denmark 21 —
TOTAL OS AID 9,994.2 100
Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International 
Organizations. Obligations and Loans Authorizations July 1, 1945 - September 
30, 1982 (*) It also includes Export-Import Bank loans, which were not
included in reports of official economic and military assistance.
The first post-war American economic assistance was planned as short-term relief 
for countries that had participated in the war. American participation in programmes such 
as UNRRA or GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas), civilian supplies, 
dollar credits to purchase American property and government loans (i.e. Anglo-US and 
Franco-US loans) were planned not to be turned into medium-term reconstruction aid,
economic and other fields to demonstrate [Spanish-American] friendship. The 
initiation of such measures is out of the question at this time, however, 
when American sentiment is so profoundly opposed to the present regime in 
power in Spain.” The Secretary of State declared that as long as Franco 
continued in power "[w]e will continue to be blocked from providing the 
effective assistance which would make possible the economic reconstruction 
of that country". A further insight in the second document is provided in 
the following chapter, pp. 134 ff.
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used for long-range peacetime purposes, i.e. modernisation of the national economic 
structures.171 They were ad hoc measures waiting for full action by the International 
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The 
American relief made accessible through UNRRA (73 per cent of UNRRA’s total 
subscriptions) was intended for immediate postwar rehabilitation to be completed by July 
1946. Rehabilitation, Congress authorization was clear, was not to be considered the 
beginning of reconstruction with medium-term commitments, it was "coterminous with 
relief'.172 Government relief, as the Preamble of the UNRRA agreement stated, was 
immediate aid to the victims of war to diminish their suffering by providing food, clothing 
and shelter, aid in prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people, 
and for assistance in the resumption of urgently needed agriculture and industrial 
production and the restoration of essential services.173 Once export trade had recovered 
in the participating countries by August 1946, the UNRRA Council refused to recommend 
new contributions arguing that additional foreign exchange was to be obtained through 
the re-establishment of bilateral deals between countries.174 The Spanish Government 
could have never benefited from relief in the form of UNRRA, which accounted for 
almost 44 per cent of American post-war relief aid, independently of the colour of its 
political regime. The UNRRA programme by definition was limited to liberated areas, 
thus excluding neutral countries. Spain needed financial aid for reconstruction and 
modernisation six years after its Civil War but UNRRA explicitly excluded such purposes
m . A brief account of some of these programmes, in particular UNRRA, to be 
found in William Adams Brown and Redvers Opie: American Foreign Assistance, 
Washington [The Brookings Institution] 1953, pp. 87 ff and, more recently, 
in Charles P. Kindleberger: Marshall Plan Days, London [Allen 4 Unwin] 1987, 
pp. 96 ff. Both of them consider American aid provided to Europe during the 
fiscal years of 1945 to 1947 as a "transition** to the ERP.
177• American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents, 1941-1949, New York [Arno 
Press] 1971, doc. no. 12: "Participation in UNRRA, March 28, 1944. Joint 
Resolution to Enable the United States To Participate in the Work of the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Organization**, pp. 21-22. Of the 
$3,686 million in contribution made available to the UNRRA by its member 
governments, the United States Government contributed $2,700 million, ibid., 
p. 1237.
l,#. Ibid., doc. no. 11: "Agreement for United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration, November 9, 1943", pp. 14-21.
174. Brown and Opie, op. cit., p. 110.
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within its scope.175
Another important source of American financial relief, American loans granted 
to governments, came directly from the settlement of war-time Lend-Leases, of which 
Spain was not affected. Furthermore, American Government loans, accounting in the case 
of the four big for 50.5 per cent of total US post-war financial aid, were not a straight­
forward phenomenon of American generosity towards democracies but granted on ad hoc 
country-by-country basis for the promotion of long-run American politico-economic goals 
for post-war international economy. To obtain a loan of $3,750 million and a further 
credit of $650 million to settle debts under previous lend-lease, of a request of assistance 
of $6 billion, Great Britain had to declare the acceptance of the American proposals for 
an International Conference on Trade and Employment, including the principle of 
unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment, the reduction of quantitative restrictions and 
tariffs as barriers to free trade, and the removal of foreign exchange restrictions with the 
objective of making the pound sterling convertible on current transactions in July 1947. 
That Britain received treatment not comparable to the rest was somewhat obvious. The 
Sterling bloc, a large network of commercial arrangements based on Imperial Preference 
enabling trade on terms more favorable than those that were offered to other countries, 
made Britain one of the largest trading nations in the world. But only after a firm 
declaration to be associated with the United States in the effort to set a system of 
multilateral trade and payments, could Britain obtain transitional financial assistance from 
the United States and even then it took from December 1945 to July 1946 to get the 
Loan-Agreement definitively approved by the US Congress and signed by President 
Truman, ten months after lend-lease bad been suspended. When the French lend-lease 
settlement was negotiated in May 1946, providing 72 per cent of the total financial 
assistance provided by the United States to France, a declaration similar to that made by 
Britain was necessary. Moreover, in this case as in the case of Italy, with Communist
lT*. Most recently, in an excellent article, Jordi Catalán argues that the 
Franco regime rennounced to foreign financial assistance and that had Spain 
been a democratic Republic, it could have being able to benefit from UNRRA 
arrangements, "Los años cuarenta en la periferia de Europa: la economia
española en perspectiva comparada", in José Luis Casas (ed.): La postguerra 
española y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Córdoba [Diputación Provincial] 1990, 
pp. 91-94.
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parties sharing government responsibility, American financial relief was seen as necessary 
for a speedy economic success in economic recovery, although the acceptance of the 
American model for the international economic system was also the price to be paid for 
American financial relief. In Germany American financial aid was the strongest political 
sign that could then have been made to call for the allegiance of the German 
population.176 The Benelux countries, Norway and Denmark deserved limited attention 
because war-damage and Communist threat was much smaller. When President Harry S. 
Truman called for economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey on 12 March 
1947 (aid approved in May), it was directed against a perceived Communist threat. Whilst 
in Greece terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, 
threatened the stability of the country and thus, following a domino theory, the entire area, 
in Spain guerrilla activities, mainly Communist crossing the Pyrenees and attacking 
installations in Northern Spain, were successfully smashed by die armed forces of a 
Government declared itself as crusader against Communism.177 In other words, Spain had 
nothing to do with the reasons that impelled the Truman Administration to provide help 
to western Europe. Furthermore, apart from Turkey, none of the neutral countries received 
any American relief. Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland and Portugal, as well as Spain, did not 
receive one single American cent
It is certain however that the Spanish economy, contrary to the economies of the 
rest of neutral countries, was still recovering from civil war disruption. The Spanish 
economy showed a level of National Income 22 per cent below that of the last pre-civil
114. "The fact of Soviet occupation of Easter Germany has made competition 
among the occupying powers for the favor of the German population more acute 
in economic matters such as employment, standard of living and food rations. 
[...] The development of an adequate indigenous political basis for 
resistance to communism in Germany requires [...] much improved economic 
performance in the bizonal area [*..J which warrants them in cooperating 
with the occupying forces for the benefit of the electorate to which they 
must appeal.m, Kindleberger, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
177. See the following chapter pp. 132 ff., for the implications of the 
Truman Doctrine for Spain. Cowan, op. cit., is the best published work -to 
my knowledge— on the guerrilla at the beginning of the cold war. An 
exposition of the guerrilla infiltrations in Spain from France and the quick 
repression exercised by the Spanish armed forces, during the second half of 
the 1940s, in Hartmut Heines La oposición política al franquismo. De 1939 
a 1952, Barcelona [Grijalbo] 1983, pp. 221 ff. and 420 ff.; Valentina 
Fernández Vargas: La resistencia interior en la España de Franco, Madrid 
[Itsmo] 1981, pp. 91 ff.; and Sergio Vilar: Historia del antlfranquismo 
1939—1975, Barcelona [Plaza & Janés] 1984, pp. 130 ff.
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war year, an industrial output only slightly higher than that of 1925, and an agricultural 
output only 59 per cent of the 1935 level.17* This was, however, not a valid argument 
as far as the Truman Administration was concerned. No actual relief was pertinent in the 
case of Spain: it had been a neutral country -with all its different nuances-, it was 
perceived as not to be on the edge of economic collapse, it was far from being 
Communist-endangered, and it was up to its authorities to reconstruct the economy by 
joining the trend towards freer trade. If Spain had not taken full advantage of the benefits 
of neutrality, as other neutral countries had, who had derived substantial commercial 
advantages from the war and had achieved a positive structural development in the 
industrial sector, it had been its own choice.179 If Spain did not take full advantage of 
the opportunities offered by Western European reconstruction for a larger promotion of 
exports, it was certainly due not to the political ostracism in place between the end of
1944 until the Spring of 1947, but rather to its slow economic recovery.
The Spanish Administration perceived positively the immediate post-war period 
despite the unfavourable attitudes the regime was facing.110 The competitive purchasing 
of certain war materials by the belligerent enabled Spain to keep its balance of payments 
in a good position and to build up some modest reserves of foreign exchange. After the 
war this fortuitous support disappeared but Western European reconstruction allowed the 
development of traditional exports. The years 1944 and 1945 were positive in balance of 
payments and reserves of foreign currencies increased by 19 per cent (see table 2.7).
*’•. Carreras: "Depresión económica y cambio estructural durante el decenio 
bélico (1936-1945)", in José Luis Garcia Delgado: El primer franquismo. 
España durante la segunda guerra mundial, Madrid [Siglo XXI] 1989, pp. 3-33.
n *. Jordi Catalán "Autarquía y desarrollo de la industria de fábrica durante 
la segunda guerra mundial. On enfoque comparativo", in Garcia Delgado, op. 
cit., pp. 35-88, pp. 66—67.
1,0. See, for instance, the IEME annual reporta (Memoria) from 1944 to 1946 
in AHBE, IEME, box. no. 7.
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TARLI 2 .7
SPAIN'S FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES IN 1944-1*46
(position on 31 December, in pesetas)
1944 1945 1946
Currency Holdings Holdings Holdings
Dollar 269,,258,r 720 188,,758,r 181 21, 435, 437
Arg. peso 86,,418,r 662 49,,524,,521 -149, 491, 019
Swiss franc 37,,142,r 070 63,,031,f 169 -45, 338, 571
Sterling 24,,664,,472 103,,037,,179 138, 711, 616Escudo 13,r 845,» 727 38,,051,,108 16, 507, 986
Lira 6,,509,, 658 -28,,654,,183 -38, 834, 703Belgian franc 3,,098,r 640 2,,875,,010 26, 638, 489
Swedish kroner 715,, 993 36,, 935,,705 49, 874, 779
Dutch guilder 24, 429 -57,,398 4, 480, 4 95Drug, peso 3,.422 3, 443 3 , 773Norw. kroner -50,,126 1,,571,,019 -5, 049, 846Chilean peso -183, 949 504, 603 1, 153, 720Danish kroner -9, 843, 701 547, 704 1,043, 832French franc/ -11, 783, 448 -169, 431 -4, 136, 807Reichsmarks -41, 658, 617 -67, 283 63, 850
TOTAL 378, 161, 954 449, 788, 631 109, 316, 425
TOTAL - Arg. peso 258,807,444
Source: AHBE, IEME, box no. 7: IEME's annual reports for 1944, 1945 and
1946. (f) Including Moroccan francs.
Spain's economic policy makers looked anxiously to the transforming world 
economy. In December 1945, the IEME Chairman, Bias Huete Carrasco, explained to his 
Minister and other top civil servants from the economic departments gathered at the IEME 
Council, the benefits to be derived if the Bretton Woods Agreements established currency 
convertibility.181 The dominant position of the dollar and the sterling (65 per cent of the 
country's foreign reserves) and because the dollar decrease was offset by an increase in 
most European currencies, particularly sterling, could explain this position. In January the 
Minister of Industry and Commerce set up a commission to study, from a specifically 
Spanish perspective, the Bretton Woods agreements.112 This would have been senseless
ltl. AHBE, IEME, box. no. 2: C/A, 11 December 1945. Bias Huete Carrasco was 
Chairman of the IEME from 9 September 1939 to 26 July 194 9.
lt2. That is the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) , whose conventions were approved 
at the United National Monetary and Financial Conference of Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire, 1-22 July 1944. AHBE, IEME, box. no. 2: C/A, 15 January 1946. 
It included the General Directors of Political Economy, Trade and Currency 
under the presidency of the Under-Secretary of Commerce and Tariff Policy. 
A previous report on the IMF presented for consideration to the Council of 
the Bank of Spain on 6 July 1944, before the Bretton Woods Conference ended, 
was laudatory concerning the Bretton Woods system and considered it 
inevitable for all neutrals to join it, Servicio de Estudios del Banco de 
España: "Informe sobre el Fondo Monetario Anglo-Norteamericano”, n/d,
probably June 1944, cit. in Joaquin Muns: Historia de las relacione» entre
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if Hueie and Suances bad not been convinced that the Spanish economy could strongly 
benefit from freer trade.
The Minister recognised that the scarcity of strong currencies and the recourse to 
bilateralism did not promote purchases based on relative qualities and prices, which was 
to the disadvantage of everyone involved. The IEME Chairman also explained that there 
was no fixed criterion to maintain invariable the value of the peseta. For its modification 
it was necessary, however, to consider the measures undertaken by other countries looking 
for the most opportune time.1'3 As long as European sales stayed high there seemed no 
point in devaluing, for it would merely decrease the price of exports, put up the price of 
imports and possibly worsen the trade deficits. On the export side, the ability of the 
Spanish economy was likely to remain low due to output levels and that world demand 
had still not recovered pre-war levels concerning traditional agricultural exports, such as 
wine, fruits and vegetables. On the import side, any expansion was difficult given world 
levels of production and trade. The acute shortage of some products in Europe allowed 
export commodities to coexist with what it seemed an over-valued exchange rate and high 
prices.
The Ministry of Industry' and the IEME had assumed an increase of reserves in
194S and a somewhat large deficit in balance of payments in 1946, with an immediate fall 
in gold and foreign exchange reserves. Reparations, once some normality had returned to 
international trade, and various international payments due by the Spanish State were to 
be responsible. That import licenses were to follow closely the path of foreign currency 
reserves, was considered a transitory measure.1*4 The real problem came in 1947 when 
the deficit in balance of payments, which was expected to diminish, increased with its 
direct negative effect on foreign currency reserves. By comparing table 2.7 with table 3.4 
it comes clear that the post-war boom, had there ever been one at all, slowed its path 
during 1946 and died along the first half of 1947.
Eapaña v cl Fondo Monetario Internacional. 1958—1982. Veinticinco años de 
economía española, Madrid !Alian2a Editorial/Banco de España] 1986, p. 20.
l” . AHBE, IEME, box no. 2: C/A, 11 December 1945.
lM. Ibid., C/A, 28 March 1946.
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At the domestic level of policy-making, it seems important to note that only once, 
in the documentation consulted for the period, economic discrimination is assumed to 
derive from the general political situation in which Franco Spain was placed. The case of 
economic discrimination supposedly referred to credits, but it was recognised as uncertain 
whether the case had also to be extended to Argentina and Portugal.115 Curiously 
enough it is found in a document elaborated by the Director General of Economic Policy 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an attempt to implement the principle of "unity in 
foreign action" with a complete transfer of competence in foreign economic action to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.1*6 There are two important aspects to consider here. First, 
the image of a "foreign front" against Franco's political regime and by extension against 
"Spain" was a propaganda device to promote domestic support for General Franco. A 
diplomatic document showing policy recommendations for the post-war period argued:
"to obtain the maximum advantage from anglo-saxon pressure 
[...] to unleash in Spain an exaltation of the Caudillo as the 
Statesman who, despite the vicissitudes of the last ten years, 
has maintained Spain united, honourable and independent",1-'
If one considers that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whether consciously or not, played 
the most active role in this action, it could be argued that this Ministry was the main one 
responsible for the survival of Franco regime. Political ostracism, first, and a Communist 
threat, later on, required a strong man in power and justified a transition from a ‘crisis’ 
government which was brought to power because of the Civil War and maintained its 
controls because of the world war. Franco and his ministers, in particular that of Foreign 
Affairs, had to demonstrate that the menace of 'foreign intervention' continued alive as 
a rationale to maintain military control of the country. A second aspect relates to the 
institutional implications that the more favourable position of the Spanish economy within 
Western European economic reconstruction had in the administrative struggle over control
1,5. See the following chapter, »action 3.3.2. for a mor* detailed account
of the Spanish Administration's credit policy.
1M. MAE, Leg. 4616, Exp. 2: "Nota relativa a los problemas que se plantean
en la Subsecretaría llanada de Comercio, Política Arancelaria y Moneda", 
Saint Sebastian, 29 July 1946. See chapter one, note one and pp. 38 ff.
lr\ MAE, L«g. 3509, exp. 14, cit. in Viñas et al, op. cit, pp. 466—67. The
set of perceptions and policy-directives described by Viñas et al., op. 
cit., pp. 456-63 reinforces this hypothesis about the Spanish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.
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in foreign economic policy. The text of a conference presented at the Diplomatic School 
(Madrid) in April 1961 reveals the core of the question:
"The only possibility for Spain to break up the isolation that 
Allies and defeated nations had declared were bilateral trade 
agreements Although nowadays they are considered
useless, the origin of great inconveniences and ill-fated 
effects, in the period after 1945, they fulfilled an essential 
economic function, politico-economic and purely 
political."1“
The role that Spain played in European economic reconstruction, set against the 
background of an inefficient and frustrating diplomatic policy, made the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs more conscious than ever before of the strategic importance of 
commercial relations that Spain maintained with Western Europe. This was a potential 
element in pressuring for the solution of political disputes of a bilateral character. 
Consequently, a tight control over foreign economic policy was necessary and, as it was 
shown in the previous chapter, pursued by diplomats.'”
2.5. Conclusions
The problem in the attempt to cast light on the implications of foreign action in 
domestic strategies for growth lies, thus, in making a clear distinction between the 
economic effects stemming from foreign political ostracism and the direct effect of 
domestic policies and given courses of action adopted by the Spanish Authorities. This 
chapter has basically foregone an analysis of the domestic performance of the Spanish 
economy in order to concentrate on the external elements conditioning the formation of 
the country’s foreign economic policy. To confront the action described here with the 
poor domestic performance of the Spanish economy will be one of the tasks of the 
following chapter. The present chapter has strongly questioned the proposition that 
political ostracism had any real effect on Spain's economic performance. The following 
chapter will prove how domestic courses of action provide a better field of explanation 
for the state of post-civil war recovery.
ln. MAE, Leg. 6285, exp. 3: dated on 13 April 1961.
l” . See chapter one, pp. 28 ff.
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This chapter has argued that Spain suffered mainly from politico.1 discrimination 
in international politics which was not followed up by effective economic discrimination. 
This was especially true at a period when Spain was a real source of supply for an 
extremely limited European productive capacity. The national reconstruction policies 
developed in post-war Western Europe aimed at continuous high levels of output and 
employment and high rates of growth, demanding an uninterrupted import trend. 
Furthermore, the population of Western Europe wanted a higher standard of living with 
bener, and a more highly diversified supply of foodstuffs. Spanish supply made its 
contribution to a better use of tight dollar reserves, allowed to be transferred for capital 
goods, and raw materials and contributed to a diversification of diet. This role was not 
based on the potentiality of the Spanish economy but upon the short-term needs of relief. 
Therefore, the important point is not the low level of the Spanish exports and. thus, that 
Western European Governments did not need a large economic contribution from Spain 
to calm their thrust for democracy in Spain.190 The point is that anything that could 
hampered national reconstruction policies was immediately rejected, in other words 
Spain's limited supply had an "strategic" value in the circumstances of the immediate 
post-war period. There is no reference whatsoever in the IE ME records, for the period 
covered here, suggesting foreign economic discrimination.
The study on post-war commercial behaviour proves that politics and economics 
followed somewhat opposite directions. Where they were joined, great effort was taken 
to restore the first assessment The common denominator for Great Britain and France was 
that despite their opposite courses of action, policy makers understood the distinction 
between political ostracism and economic sanctions. Reconstruction policies and political 
stability, on the one side, and the elimination of Germany, leaving a (perceived) large 
potential market to be filled up, on the other, helped to draw a clear line between both.
Spanish historiography has assumed that Franco did not have a foreign policy in
1M. As it was than parcaivad by Spaniards in axila, "Tha nations' conscianca 
was bought with tons of oil, with tons of oranges.", Juan Hermanos: La fin 
de l'espoir, Paris, 1950, cit. in Gallo, op. cit., p. 201. Ahmad, op. cit., 
adopts this very similar position.
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the strict sense but a form of management of technical agreements with the foreign 
world.191 Whether or not this assessment is accepted is of no interest here. However, 
this chapter shows how technical deals, until now underestimated as simple foreign 
"management", could reveal themselves of extraordinary importance for the Spanish 
Administration. Spanish experiences with Western Europe in the immediate post-war 
period provided the Administration with some tools to be skillfully used in later years. 
First, the limited, although effective, bargaining power provided by economics to further 
the nation's foreign policy goals. Second, the fact that political gains were to be obtained 
through technical deals. Obviously, the meaning of technical turned out to be quite broad 
for the Franco Administration. In the Spanish case, trade relations proved useful means 
for international recognition. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially the economic 
divisions within it, were conscious that trade relations, at least, until the Spring of 1947, 
could be used to put some pressure upon Western European governments to avoid direct 
action against Franco’s political system. Could trade produce spill-over effects or benefits 
for politics? The Marshall Plan would demonstrate that it could not
This chapter provides the necessary background to understand in what 
circumstances the Spanish position towards the first form of European multilateral 
economic cooperation emerged. The official Spanish position towards the Marshall Plan 
was a reflection of this substantial ambiguity. The Spanish contribution to the immediate 
post-war European reconstruction efforts, limited as it might have been, provided the 
Spanish Administration with a distorted crystal through which look at future patterns of 
relations between Spain and its major Western European commercial partners. The future 
forms of reconstruction, no longer based on national policies, but in some sort of 
European economic cooperation were to become qualitatively different from this early 
phase and Spain would not have a place within them.
1M. As Fernando Morán López, former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first 
González Cabinet, argued in his prologue to José Mario Armero: La Política 
Exterior de Franco. Barcelona [Planeta] 1978.
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nlf there are eight hungry men on a desert island and a ship 
arrives bringing food for seven of them, imagine the 
sentiment of the eighth. Well, we in Spain happend to be 
that eighth man.”
"[Spain] needs especially machinery and industrial 
equipment with payment facilities [that] Spain would not 
exchange for one atom of its independence and 
sovereignty."
"I do not believe in this European Federation [...] I do not 
believe that those who erred so much at Yalta, Potsdam 
and Teheran have the moral credit and authority to defme 
what Europe needs in this hour."
Francisco Franco1
First quotation, Franco to Tha Daily Taleqraph and Morning Press. 1 
February 1949, cit. in Qasim Ahmad: Britain, Franco Spain, and the Cold War, 
1945-1950, Haw York [Garland Publishing] 1992, p. 155. Second quotation, 
Franco's declaration on 27 June 1947, can be considered the first official 
Spanish reaction to the Marshall call; ASMAE, Amb. Paris, b. no. 413: 
"Spagna-Piano Marshall. Dichiarazioni ufficiali", Attached form A to "La 
Spagna e il piano Marshall", telespresso no. 0893/150 from the Italian 
Embassy in Spain, Madrid, 24 February 1948. This document (henceforth, 
referred to as "Dichiarazioni ufficiali") contains a complete compilation 
of Franco and Minister of Foreign Affairs Artajo's early press declarations 
on the matter. Last quotation, Franco's statement to La Prensa on 26 June 
1948 in response to a question as to whether Spain would join in a united 
Europe, in Textos de doctrina politica. Palabras v escritos de 194 5 a 1950, 
Madrid, 1951, p. 263.
3.1. Introduction
The immediate origins of European multilateral economic cooperation have 
traditionally been placed in the speech of the US Secretary of State, General George C. 
Marshall, on 5 June 1947, for a coordinated programme for European economic as well 
as social and political reconstruction.2 That Spain was excluded from the European 
Recovery Program (henceforth ERP), commonly-known as the Marshall Plan, given the 
origins and nature of Franco’s regime, does not represent anything new, nor does the fact 
that it applied informally for Marshall Aid.3 It might be that Franco, personally, was 
ultimately responsible for Spain’s exclusion because he stayed in power and maintained 
unaltered the undemocratic institutional character of his regime. This research rejects to 
limit the view on the relation of Spain to the Marshall Plan in these terms. The object of 
historical inquiry here is that although Spain did not participate in the Marshall Plan, the 
Spanish Government perceived it, had expectations of Marshall Aid and, finally, 
responded to its exclusion.
The Spanish Government perceived Marshall’s offer from the perspective of its
2. See Marshall's speech in A decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic 
Documents 1941-1949, New York [Arno Press] 1971, doc. no. 300.
3. It was believed in Spain that the autarchic ideology prevented the Franco
regime from participating in the Marshall Plan, i.e. José Antonio Biescas, 
•’Estructura y coyunturas económicas", in Biescas and Manuel Tuñón de Lara: 
España bajo la dictadura franquista (1939-1975), 2nd ed., Barcelona [Labor] 
1985 [1980], pp. 19-164, p. 24. Angel Viñas published the first evidence 
that the Spanish Government wanted to join the ERP, in Viñas et al., 
Politica comer-cial exterior en España (1931-1975), Madrid [Banco Exterior 
de España] 1979, vol. I, pp. 475 ff., published subsequently as "El Plan 
Marshall rechazó a Franco”, Historia 16, no. 64, August 1981, pp. 27-42, 
reprinted in his collection of articles: Guerra, dinero, dictadura. Ayuda 
fascista y autarquía en la España de Franco, Barcelona [Critica] 1984, pp. 
265-87, Paola Brundu Olla: a) Ostracismo e Realpolitik. Gli Alleati e la 
Spagna franchista negli anni del dopoguerra, Cagliari [C.E.L.T. Editrice] 
1984, pp. 164 ff., and b) L'anello mancante. Il problema della Spagna 
franchista e l'organizzazione della difesa occidentale (1947-1950), Sassari 
[Università degli Studi di Sassari] 1990, pp. 31-51, reduces the substance 
of this chapter to mere diplomacy. The literature concerning the Marshall 
Plan observes exclusively that Spain had been excluded. The exception is 
Alan S. Milward who speculates what the opinion and stance of the Spanish 
Government might have been and whether was it ready to co-operate, 
Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945—51, London [Methuen] 1987, p. 69. The 
reader interested on specific literature on the Marshall Plan and American 
involvement in Western Europe after 1947 could trace it through references 
provided by the titles mentioned in this section. The roost updated reading 
guide on the Marshall Plan is provided in Charles S. Maier and Günter 
Bischof (eds.): The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German development
within the framework of the European Recovery Plan, New York [Berg] 1991.
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own economic needs and financial resources. It expected to obtain the necessary assistance 
for economic modernisation. It finally responded to its rejection by offering bases in 
exchange for economic assistance and by stressing its trade dependence on Western 
European countries and the beneficial aspects of bilateral trade.4 After demonstrating the 
logic of Spain's exclusion, I will present the terms of the Spanish Government’s request 
for economic aid and the limits of the then available financial resources. This section will 
serve as a watch-tower from which to observe previous and subsequent events. The 
chapter will end formulating an alternative course of action which could have been 
adopted regarding Spain. These are the points which render significant the question of 
Spain and the Marshall Plan. This chapter attempts to remove the case of Spain out of 
footnotes and tries to contribute to a better understanding of the origins of Western 
European cooperation by presenting the position, goals and response of the only country 
in Western Europe not invited to join.
3.2. The Origins of the Marshall Plan and Spain
Secretary of State Marshall did not explicitly exclude Spain. It is, however, likely 
that he intended to do so. The Spanish Administration believed then, as do many scholars 
today, that Marshall offered unconditional assistance to the whole of Europe, directed 
against no one country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, despair and chaos.3 
However, the previous attitude of the State Department precluded financial aid to Spain 
prior to the Franco regime adopting far-reaching political changes, which included General 
Franco leaving power. This attitude appeared necessary in the search for a new policy 
towards Western Europe which the State Department was looking for after President 
Truman’s special address of 12 March.* When the new policy was finally found in June,
4. This point will be developed in chapter five.
s. The Spanish Chargé d'Affaire* in Washington explained to his Minister 
that Marshall's reference to "governments [...] which seek to perpetuate 
human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise" did not 
concern Spain but the Soviet Union, MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 2: German Bar&ibar 
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Diseurso General Marshall sobre 
politics exterior norteamericana", Washington, 10 June 1947.
*. See Truman's speech about Greece and Turkey, in A decade of American 
Foreign Policy, cit., doc. no. 295.
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initially articulated in the most famous of Marshall’s speeches, the exclusion of Spain 
was, in a way, a condition for its success.7
The State Department was at pains to figure out how it could by-pass the negative 
implications of what was shortly to become the Truman doctrine. Truman’s speech was 
not identified as a call for an American crusade to restore democracy all over the world. 
Despite its anti-totalitarian wording, it was perceived as the official announcement of a 
break with the Soviets and as a statement against the expansion of Communist tyranny.8 
The Franco regime provided the State Department with an initial chance to distance itself 
from the Truman doctrine. American assistance was not meant to be extended to anyone 
who claimed to be anti-Communisu as the Spanish Government had expected to do. The 
Spanish Council of Ministers’ approval of the project of Law of Succession on 28 March 
attempted to present an image of a stable and democratic country, apart from being anti­
communist, which could fmd accommodation within the new strategy of containment 
against the Soviet Union. One could argue that the Law was the logical culmination of 
ideas vaguely but persistently expressed by Franco, but one cannot overlook the fact that 
the timing coincided with the new direction in American foreign policy.9
Whether or not the offer of assistance to the whole of Europe was sincere 
is open to debate, though it is usually explored only in connection with the 
possible participation of the Soviet Onion. Charles P. Kindieberger, Chief 
of the Division of German and Austrian Economic Affairs at the Department 
of State, who participated in various interdepartmental committees on the 
Marshall Plan, makes the strongest pledge for the sincerity of the offer, 
Marshall Plan Days, London [Allen 4 Unwin] 1987, p. 92.
#* Kindleberger recalls the "negative, retaliatory, counter—punching 
features" of the Truman Doctrine; op. cit., pp. 25-32. In this connection 
see also the reactions of Marshall, former Secretary of State James Byrnes 
(1945-47) and George F. Kerman who was about to be named head of the State 
Department's Policy Planning Staff (henceforth, PPS), in Richard M. 
Freeland: The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthvism, New York [New 
York University Press] 1985, p. 100. More details about the PPS and its role 
in modifying American policy towards Spain, in supra pp. 229 ff. For further 
information on the Truman Doctrine see John Lewis Gaddis: Strategies of
Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security 
Policy, Oxford [Oxford University Press] 1982, pp. 22-23 and 58—59.
f. Javier Tueell: Franco y los católicos. La política interior española 
entre 1945 y 1957, Madrid [Alianza] 1984, pp. 155-59, shows the efforts made 
to push Franco to ward the Monarchical solution and the surprise of those 
who intervened in drafting the Law when it was unexpectedly passed. Spain 
was to become a monarchy without a king and Franco its head of State. The 
Law was approved by a referendum vote on 6 July and officially proclaimed 
a few days later. See Juan Pablo Fusi: Franco. Autoritarismo y poder
personal, Madrid (El Pais] 1985, pp. 102-108, for the political domestic 
consequences of the Law; more details in Stanley G. Payne: The Franco Regime 
1936-1975, Madison [University of Wisconsin Press] 1987, pp. 369-75.
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Early in April 1947, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, consulted the 
British upon a joint plan of action to eliminate Franco and replace his regime with a 
democratic one.10 Only Franco’s departure would allow an extension of American 
assistance to Spain:
"As long as Franco remains in power (the USA] will continue to 
be blocked from providing the effective assistance which would 
make possible the economic reconstruction of that country and 
thereby build an effective barrier to civil strife and 
communist domination«"11
All interested Spaniards should know that "gains" would accrue to Spain from a change 
in regime. Internationa] public opinion should also come to know that America’s National 
interest was not limited to the military aspects of the Truman Doctrine. The action 
promoted by the Department of State regarding Spain was thus an initiative necessary for 
broad ideological reasons. Acheson argued that without some form of approach to Franco,
" [he] might well be justified in continuing to believe his own 
propaganda to the effect that US-British opposition to his 
regime is nominal, and that, insofar as the United States is 
concerned, the recently announced policy of the President 
would indicate that we are prepared to shift our policy in 
regard to Franco and support any non—communist regime in 
Spain, including his own."12
This was not necessarily a message addressed to the British and the Spaniards exclusively, 
but to the entire international community.
Franco'» declarations regarding the matter in Pensamiento politico de 
Franco. Antología, Madrid [Ediciones del Movimiento] 1975, pp. 729 ff. The 
reaction of the British Charge d'Affaires in Madrid, D.F. Howard, can be 
found in PRO, FO 371/67976: Despatch to Bevin, "Report on Law of Succession 
Referendum", Madrid, 12 June 1947; and that of the American Chargé, Phillip 
W. Bonsai, who served ad interim between March 1946 and June 1947, in FRUS, 
1947, III, Bonsai to the Secretary of State, Madrid, 1 April, pp. 1065-66.
10. Acheson was probably instructed from Moscow by Marshall who was detained 
at the Council of Foreign Ministers for seven weeks until late April 194 7. 
The debate on the question (kept bilaterally between Americans and the 
British) can be followed in FRUS, 1947, III, pp. 1066-86. Acheson, future 
Secretary of State (1949-53), personally disliked Franco. The former's 
memoirs, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, London 
[Hamilton] 1970, provide no details on the subject, but the point has been 
confirmed to the author by Douglas Brinkley, biographer of Acheson 
(Brinkley's Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years is expected to appear in 1993) .
11. FRUS, 1947, III, Acheson to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 
Washington, 7 April, p. 1066.
12• Ibid., Acheson to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, 25 
April, p. 1074.
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It was not clear what the State Department meant by gains. Pre-June 5th 
published documentation shows, in common with the literature on the origins of the 
Marshall Plan, that there was no plan before the Harvard speech. It cannot be argued, 
therefore, that Acheson and Marshall intended Spain’s exclusion from what was soon to 
become the Marshall Plan, simply because it did not yet exist. The State Department, 
however, had come progressively to the conclusion that a programme of aid to Europe, 
different from the relief programmes previously carried out, was becoming increasingly 
necessary for America’s national interests and security.0 Neither the Spanish 
Administration nor other Spaniards had any perception of the set of ideas concerning the 
future aid to Europe that US officials were elaborating at the time. However, would 
Spaniards have regarded any American initiative, even if incompatible with the country’s 
political structure, in terms of a missed opportunity?14 The question remains unanswered.
The Foreign Office stopped the State Department from taking any effective step 
towards a plan to eliminate Franco which had appeared to them unconvincing from the 
outset: "The matter was too dangerous to take up."15 The same arguments used against 
the French proposals since December 1945, served now to stop the State Department. The 
American proposal was based on the assumption that the economic situation of Spain was 
critical and that an alternative Government could be formed. Published records show, 
however, that the State Department was perfectly aware that the Spanish economy was 
not on the edge of collapse and that there was no stable alternative government in the 
wings. Major political forces in opposition to Franco had pursued different and conflicting
“ . See ibid., pp. 197—223, for the emerging new conception of aid to 
Europe.
14 • "Much of the Generala, businessmen and Government officials would 
welcome economic aid from outside, I do not therefore think that in order 
to secure this they would think themselves compelled to adopt the course 
which on other grounds seemed to them undesirable or dangerous, while a 
warning or threat of sanctions might in my view well be more to exasperate 
than to intimidate them." PRO, FO 371/67867: British Charge d'Affaires in 
Madrid Douglas F. Howard to FO, Madrid, 15 April 1947; a resumé of which is 
in FRUS, 1947, III, Ambassador in the United Kingdom to Marshall, London, 
19 April, pp• 1071-72.
15. PRO, FO 371/67868: British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin to Orme
Sargent, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1946-49), 
London, 25 April 1947, also quoted in FRUS, 1947, III, the Ambassador in the 
United Kingdom to the Secretary of State, London, 1 May, p. 1075. Hector 
McNeil, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, had proposed similar 
action to Bevin. For this latter point and the subsequent support of this 
line of action within the FO, see Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 66 ff. and 172 ff.
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individual strategies in the expectation that the Allies would unseat Franco and place them 
in power.16 This could further support my hypothesis that Acheson's initiative was a sort 
of propaganda device addressed to the international community. The British did not take 
i t  No securer alternative to Francoism appeared feasible to the British. They saw no 
guarantee that the alternative to the fall of Franco would be necessarily an ordered 
democratic process but feared an anarchical situation tending towards Communism. 
Between Franco and democracy there seemed to be, the British argued, civil strife, chaos 
and misery.17
On die economic side, there was little reason to suppose that the Spanish economy 
was likely to collapse if economic sanctions were not applied. Marshall and Bevin agreed 
that the economic situation was improving." In 1946 there was a marked improvement 
in electricity output. If a slight drought at the end of that year had not occun-ed, 
production would probably have been close to the 6,000 million kw/h mark, a level which 
was in fact almost reached in 1947. Argentina’s renewed credits to Spain granted in 
October 1946, increased the import supply of cereals and meat. Moreover, the 1946 
harvest showed the highest output level since 1939 for all major crops, in particular 
cereals.19 A temporary improvement of food supply and of power shortages, due to a 
better harvest and the initial supply from Argentina and an increase of hydro-electric 
power, reduced the economic pressure for change.
There was no need to foster unstable politico-economic conditions in Spain. Any
**. The first attempt at coordinating the two major forces, Socialists and 
Monarchists, took place only in the autumn of 1947. It was concluded a year 
later, when the monarchical forces identified with the figure of the 
Pretender to the Spanish throne and Don Juan de Borbôn y Battenberg himself, 
had already opted for collaboration with Franco.
17. This paragraph and the following one are based on documentation in FRUS,
1947, III, pp. 1066-85, and, PRO, FO 371/67897: Report by the Economic 
Intelligence Department at the Foreign Office, "Vulnerability to Import 
Embargo", 23 April 1947.
11. FRUS, 1947, III, the Ambassador in the United Kingdom to Marshall, 
London, 1 May, p. 1075, and Marshall to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 
Washington, 15 May, p. 1078, respectively.
19• See Carlos Barciela: "El sector agrario desde 1936", in Albert Carreras 
Odraizola (ed.)s Estadísticas históricas de España. Siglos XIX y XX, Madrid 
[Fundación Banco Exterior] 1989 (henceforth referred to as Estadísticas 
históricas), pp. 131-67, table 4.8, p. 145.
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such action would have meant intervention in the internal affairs of another country which 
had not requested it, providing a precedent for similar intervention by the Soviet Union. 
It ran counter to previous Allied recommendations which left it to the Spaniards 
themselves to solve their political problems. It would have only strengthened the position 
of those who asked for more extreme forms of intervention at the United Nations Security 
Council The Allies, the British firmly believed, should not risk finding themselves 
progressively forced down the path of intervention which might in the end have led to 
armed force. Moscow had already derived considerable benefit from the situation of 
status Quo reached with Franco by placing the Western powers as defenders of fascism. 
However, an action as that proposed by Acheson would have involved, in British eyes, 
playing the Russians' game of spreading instability. For the British, since the Franco 
regime did not threaten any British vital interest, it was preferable to the risk of civil war 
in Spain.10
It is difficult to believe that the State Department could have ever considered 
Spain joining the Marshall Plan when their initiative to remove Franco from power was 
being discussed with the British until die end of July 1947.21 The inclusion of Spain 
would have fed Soviet propaganda about America’s intentions and distorted the plan’s 
ideological support based on the highest ideals of Western civilization. By demanding 
mutual coordination of Europeans, Madrid was automatically excluded, since many 
participating countries could never have joined in a common effort with Franco, while 
Marshall avoided any responsibility. To trade openly with Spain was completely different 
from inviting Franco to join an initiative with the declared intention of building up 
European Unity.22
10. "Surely even temporary continuance of Franco in power (which so far as
I know does not directly threaten any vital British or American interests) 
is a lesser evil than [growing ultra-violence and anarchy]." Résumé, cit., 
p. 1073.
11. On 26 July, Bevin coneyed the final rejection of the initiative put 
forward by the U.S. Depatment of State to everthrow Franco from power; PRO, 
FO 371/67869.
22. The State Department was interested in promoting a united Europe and in 
the preamble to the Economic Recovery Act of 194 8 the US Congress virtually 
called for the formation of a political union in Europe. It does not imply, 
however, that logically the Marshall Plan initiated the process of political 
and economic integration In Western Europe, as Michael J. Hogan believes: 
The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western
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At the same time as the Russians, some Spanish top civil servants were unwilling 
to accept the proposed American conditions and recommended the Government not to join 
the common effort in order to preserve national sovereignty. The pre-conditions made 
explicit by Marshall seemed to imply the surrender of part of the Government’s absolute 
rights to economic planning in deference to the United States or to a multilateral planning 
body which would set priorities and supply quotas and allocate resources. The aim of 
Spain was to make an inventory of its economic needs to avoid inquiry into its resources. 
This attitude departed from the deep conviction that the United States would help Spain 
in any case. Some officials at the Spanish Embassy in Paris feared that the British and 
French, agreeing before consulting anyone else on the fundamentals of the European 
response, would place Spain exclusively as a supplier to the French economy.23 It is 
obvious that Spain’s diplomatic personnel was not gifted with a keen perception of reality. 
It was not difficult to perceive that France had no place for Spain within any common 
European reconstruction plan!
The exclusion of Spain was not the consequence of the American commitment 
towards democracy, liberty and justice (whilst ensuring the restoration of the economic 
health and vigour of Europe). It was the result of the vast amount of emotion poured into 
discussion of Spain, making any move towards closer relations with the Franco regime 
unpalatable to public opinion. The Spanish regime did not present any of the 
circumstances which favoured other non-democTatic governments to be invited to join.
Europe, 1947-1952, New York [Cambridge University Press] 1987. For a summary 
of the main conclusions of the book see Hogan: **11 piano Marshall: 1'America 
fatta all'europea**, Passato e Presente, vol. 9, no. 23, May-August 1990, pp. 
26-33. An opposite position is maintained by Milward who argues that 
European economic cooperation stopped short of America's goal and was the 
result of European rather than American initiative and, at certain points, 
the result of a reaction to, rather than a consequence of, America's agenda 
for Europe. Milward's interpretation appeared firstly as **L'integrazione 
dell'Europa occidentale negli anni dell'ERP: l'esperienza del Gruppo di 
Studio Europeo per l'Unione Doganale”, in Elena Aga Rossi [ed.]: II Piano 
Marshall e 1'Europa, Roma [Instituto della Enciclopedia Italiana] 1983, pp. 
109-18; received a more intensive treatment in Reconstruction, op. cit.; and 
has been most recently recalled, within a "map of controveriies", in his 
"Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?**, Diplomatic History, vol. 13, no. 2,
1989, pp. 231-53.
2J. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 2: Antonio Mosquera Losada, Commercial Counsellor 
in Paris, to the Under-Secretary for Foreign Economy and Commerce, "Sobre 
la propuesta norteamericana de auxilio financiero para la reconstrucción 
europea", Paris, 18 June 1947.
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Greece and Turkey could not be left outside if the Marshall Plan wanted to replace the 
multiplicity of piecemeal, ad hoc and emergency economic and military programmes 
with a comprehensive and consistent plan. There was some cogency in the argument that 
Portugal also belonged to the club of dictatorships and there was no question about the 
arbitrary and undemocratic character of the country’s Government and political 
institutions.24 Notwithstanding this, Portugal’s experience was less turbulent and the 
origins of its dictatorship were somehow lost in the past, while the Spanish Civil War, 
with the intervention of Hitler and Mussolini, was fresh in the individuals’ memory. 
Portugal, it was argued, behaved more neutrally than Spain during the Second World War 
and, in a way, Dr Antbnio de Oliveira Salazar, Portugal’s Premier after 1932, had rejected 
-more prudently- the fascist, totalitarian and military covering which characterised the 
earlier years of the Franco regime. If the formal liberalisation of the political and 
parliamentary systems adopted since 1945 were perceived to have a greater appearance 
of democracy in Portugal than in Spain it was exclusively because the Allies preferred to 
see things that way. If the Portuguese authoritarian political system deserved different 
treatment by the Allies, it was certainly not for its contribution to constructing a new 
democratic Europe or for its commitment towards European unity.25 The certain point 
was that after 1945, Salazar held an iron rule over Portugal as Franco did over Spain but 
that international public opinion had made the Franco regime a moral question. The 
continued existence of political passions amongst the peoples of Western Europe and 
elsewhere, precluded the use of a possible analogy between Franco and Salazar's regimes 
as a conclusively valid argument in favour of Spain. The question of easing the 
negotiations to secure for the United States permanent base rights in the Azores, might
74. Toro Gallagher: Portugal: A Twentieth-Century Interpretation, Manchester 
[Manchester University Press] 1983. Tusell's La dictadura de Franco, Madrid 
[Alianza] 1988, pp. 272-305, contains an interesting comparative essay on 
the Iberian dictatorships. For opposition to Salazar and repression in 
Portugal see Dawn L. Raby: a) Fascism and Resistance in Portugal.
Communists, liberals and military dissidents in the opposition to Salazar, 
1941-74, Manchester [Manchester University Press] 1988; and, b) "Controlled. 
Limited and Manipulated Opposition under a Dictatorial Regime: Portugal, 
1945-49", European History Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 1, 1989, pp. 63-84.
2S. For Salazar's perception of the Marshall Plan see José Galvet de 
Magalhaes: "Salazar e a Unidade Europeia", in Hipólito de la Torre Gómez 
(ed.): Portugal, España y Europa. Cien años de desafio (1890—1990), Mérida 
[Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia] 1991, pp. 129-45, in 
particular pp. 133-34.
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in part explain the paradox.16 The exclusion of Spain added some guarantee of 
collaboration in Western Europe and diminished the opposition an Capitol Hill. The 
inclusion of Portugal could be diluted in a package of sixteen nations. To obtain the 
necessary support, die Marshall Plan demanded that Spain could find no place unless it 
amended its political structure to fit American requirements.
It was not necessary to make publicly explicit the possible implications of any 
Spanish participation in the joint venture. With the Franco-Spanish border closed and 
having denounced the Franco regime as a potential danger for international peace, France 
dared not to consider Spain’s inclusion in any common initiative. Bidault’s opening 
address to the Three Power conference of 27 June 1947 and the French proposal for 
Marshall Plan membership presented the following day, envisaged the participation of all 
European countries except ("provisionally’') Spain.27 After the Russians had abandoned 
the conference, die joint Anglo-French note of 3 July explicitly excluded Spain. An 
invitation was addressed the following day to all the European countries, except the Soviet 
Union and Spain, to send representatives to Paris where a European Conference for 
Economic Cooperation (ECEC) was convened for 12 July to determine the resources and 
the needs of Europe.3
**. In October 1943 the Portuguese government agreed to grant shipping 
facilities to Great Britain in the Azores for the duration of the war. In 
May 1944 the Roosevelt Administration signed an executive agreement with 
Salazar providing for military base facilities in the Azores and 
renegotiated it in 194 6 for the duration of the period of the Allied 
occupation of Germany and Japan. Since July 194 6 the transit facilities, 
initially conceived for short-term duration, were negotiated for 
transformation into long-term military bases. On the question of obtaining 
permanent base rights in the Azores see FRPS, 1947, III, pp. 1019—52. On the 
strategic importance of the Azores, see references provided by Nuno 
Severiano Teixeira: "From Neutrality to Alignment: Portugal in the
Foundation of the Atlantic Pact", EUI Working Paper HEC No. 91/9, Florence, 
March 1991, pp. 9-10.
21 • Notwithstanding this expected French attitude, it seems that British and 
Americans agreed viewpoints on the issue of Spain not joining the 
conference; ASMAE, Amb. Parigi, b. 413: Telegram no. 10287 from Italian 
Embassy in London, "Spagna e Conferenza di Parigi**, London, 30 July 1947. 
There is also reference to an Anglo-American entente on the question of the 
exclusion of Spain in FRUS, 1948, III, Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of 
the Division of Western European Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, 
Outerbridge Horsey, of conversation with the Second Secretary of the British 
Embassy in Washington, 16 February, p. 1026.
3t. Documentation in Ministère des Affaires Etrangères: Documents de la 
Conférence des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères de la France, du Royaume- 
Uni, de l'Ü.R.S.S. tenue à Paris du 27 au 3 Juillet 194 7 et pièces relatives 
aux négociations diplomatigues engagées à la suite du discours prononcé par
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The Spanish Republican Government, for its part, attempted unsuccessfully to gain 
more international backing from the ECEC. Bevin was asked to make the Conference end 
the ambiguity of the formula excluding Spain ("temporal exclusion") by expressing its 
desire to see Spain join the European economic organisation only after the return of a 
liberal democratic government The British Government never officially acknowledged the 
request as "not representing the Spanish public opinion".29 This move again demonstrates 
that the British Government was not going to favour any group opposing Franco. The 
maximum punishment the British were ready to accept was Spain’s exclusion from the 
initiative. Further ostracism was unnecessary and dangerous.
3.3. Import Requirements for National Reconstruction and Modernisation
On the Spanish side, apart from the general diplomatic mobilisation which we will 
see in section 3-5, the first step at the domestic level was to determine the needs of the 
country’s economy. In Summer 1947, reserves of foreign exchange, international credits 
and assistance to the Spanish economy were totally insufficient to fmance the import 
programme needed to complete recovery from Civil-War damage and for the 
modernisation of the basic industrial plant. Marshall Aid appeared as the opportunity to 
overcome the structural deficit of reserves produced by a weak export sector and, at the 
same time, served to end the international isolation of the Franco regime. The position the 
Administration adopted towards the Marshall Plan was the direct reflection of the 
interaction between the needs of reconstruction and the country’s financial resources.
The Ministry of Industry and Commerce, in 1947 (probably summer), drafted an
1« Sénéral Marshall Secrétaire d'Etat dea Etats-Pnis, le 5 Juin 1947, Paris 
[Imprimerie Nazionale] 1947 (commonly known as French Yellow Book). Some 
unnamed officials at the American Embassy in Paris directly involved with 
the ERP publicly expressed criticisms about excluding Spain from the 
Conference; ASMAE, Arab. Parigi, b. 413: Telegram no. €02/454 from the
Italian Ambassador in France, Piero Quaroni, Paris, 25 July 1947.
**. ASMAE, Amb. Parigi, b. 413: Telegram no. 102B7 from the Italian Embassy 
in London, "Spagna e Conferenza di Parigi", 30 July 1947.
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estimate of imports necessary to complete national reconstruction.30 It was to be 
presented in the eventuality of Spain joining the negotiations for European economic 
cooperation and used in subsequent diplomatic moves to gain ERP membership. Although 
the Import Programme did not mention this eventuality, this conclusion derives from the 
fact that its estimates served as economic content to the Memorandum drafted by the 
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated IS November 1947, which exposed the official 
reasoning of the Spanish Administration about die Marshall Plan and intended to provide 
Spanish diplomatic personnel with die necessary arguments to promote Spain’s ERP 
participation.31 A propaganda leaflet published and distributed by the Embassy in 
Washington was also based upon the estimates of the Import Programme.32 
Notwithstanding this, the Spanish Government presented no official request for 
membership, certainly due to the fear of rejection. Portugal’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Caeiro de Mata, suggested proposing, at the first meeting of the Paris Conference, a 
debate on Spanish participation. He was advised to propose a vote if a previous count 
gave him some hope.33 This was normal diplomatic practice. Most of the official 
requests this dissertation has dealt with followed intense unofficial negotiations to reach 
a previous agreement that the official request, to be issued shortly after, was to be 
accepted or at least officially considered.
Contrary to the short-term plans discussed in Pahs, the Import Programme called
K . MAE, Leg. 5281, exp. 13: Ministry of Industry and Commerce: "Cuadros 
resúmenes de las import.seiones necesarias para la reconstrucción nacional 
(1* y 2* solución)", n/d, henceforth referred to as Import Programme, see 
table 3.1* This document contains many ambiguous points, some of which could 
be partially clarified by access to documents which, based on its 
calculations, were subsequently drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 2, henceforth referred to as "Memorandum".
*2. Ibid., "Spain Must Cooperate. How Spain can help the American tax­
payer", n/d, n/s (henceforth referred to as "Spain Must Cooperate"), 
attached to Note from the Director General of Economic Policy to the 
Director General of Foreign Policy, Madrid, 2 December 1947. This document 
obtained much publicity at the time, i.e., Jaume Miravitlles: Franco et le 
plan Marshall, Paris, [n/d, probably 1948], consulted at the French National 
Library, leaflet written contemporary to the events. Arthur Whitaker might 
refer to it when arguing that Madrid expected to be included in the ERP and 
established a figure of $676 on the amount of aid to request, Spain and the 
Defence of the West; Ally and Liability, New York [Harper & Brothers] 1962, 
p. 34.
MAE, Leg. 3159, exp. 26: Cifra no. 500, from Aguirre de Cárcer, Spain's 
Attaché in Paris, 6 July 1947.
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far the foreign capital (expressed in dollars) necessary to finance a one-year package of 
imports. Although the plan we are about to study was a strict import programme, it 
reflects die framework of the government-financed reconstruction programme and the 
priorities assigned to the different economic sectors. It also shows clearly the lack of 
success of previous State initiatives in the basic sectors of the economy.
The total value of the imports required to complete reconstruction amounted to 
$676 million.14 Some comparative figures might help the reader to assess the Spanish 
request It doubled the value of foreign currency expenditure (Spain’s basic balance of 
payments) in 1946 and it was 68 per cent above what it was in 1947.** It was 2.3 times 
the value of total imports in 1946. In this line, it should be considered that the Import 
Programme was restricted to a few sectors and excluded, in particular, agricultural 
commodities which accounted, in 1946, for 23.3 per cent of total imports. The Import 
Programme’s dollar request represented 5.4 times the accumulated commercial deficit 
registered in 1946 and 1947 and 3.2 times the value of the accumulated deficit during the 
ERP period, 1948 to 1952.34 To generate $676 million worth of resources, without 
foreign credits and allowing for some duplication with current imports. Spain’s exports 
would have had to grow by 161 per cent
**. It seems reasonable to consider that if Spain had joined the 
negotiations, the Import Programme would have been cut by a fixed percentage 
on the total, as happened with each ERP country's aid request in the first 
weeks of September. A leading Spanish industrial bank, Bank Urquijo, 
estimated the special imports required up to 1952 to place the Spanish 
economy on a sound footing at over $1,475 million, $777 million of which
corresponded to capital goods and raw materials for basic industries and
$438 million for foodstuffs and feeding stuffs, Informe presentado a la 
Junta general del Banco ürguijo celebrada el 16 de marzo de 1948, por el 
President del Consejo, Excmo. Sr. Marcrués de ürguijo, sobre el ejercicio del 
año 1947, Madrid, 1946, p. 72. Higinio Paris Eguilaz: Diez años de politica 
econòmica en España 1939-194 9, Madrid [Sucesores de J. Sánchez Ocaña] 1949, 
pp. 235—40, put the annual amount of minimal aid required for urgent 
investment for reconstruction in $200 million. For the entire period covered 
by this chapter the peseta was officially exchange (for imports) at 10.95 
Pts to 1$.
*5e As given in Santiago Chamorro, Ramón Comendador, Juan José Dolado,
Rafael Repullo and Julián Rodriguez: Las balanzas de pagos de España del 
periodo de autarguia, Madrid, 1976, p. 16; recently reproduced in Carreras: 
••Renta y riqueza", in Estadísticas históricas, pp. 533-88, table 13.26, p. 
573.
*** As given in gold-pesetas in Antonio Tena: "Comercio Exterior**, in
Estadísticas históricas, pp. 327-61, table 8.3, pp. 344-45.
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The Programme’s first draft was a shopping list of goods the Spanish Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce would have loved to purchase if it had had the resources. With 
the feeling that the amount of dollars required initially was too high, a second (and more 
economical) version of the same Import Programme was drafted. The second draft 
amounted to $451.2 million. It included cuts worth $224,731,000, 43 per cent of which 
were at the expense of the transport sector, 39 per cent of industries producing semi­
manufactured goods and 18 per cent of basic production. All transport items were cut by 
half, as well as the production of cars, the supply of parts to the shipbuilding industry', the 
investment of the textile and food-processing industries, tools and machinery. Output 
targets for fuel and lubricants were reduced by 100,000 tons, and the iron and steel as 
well as the refining capacity were reduced by half. Consequently, this second draft can 
be considered the Ministry of Industry’s true minimal import requirements for 
national reconstruction.
The Import Programme selected (by order of importance) transportation, energy, 
equipment and tools for the machinery and tools industry', agricultural machinery, 
fertilisers and iron and steel, as economic priorities. Public intervention in basic sectors 
was a common feature of the economic planning in the post-1945 period. Ad hoc 
committees to study means to increase output in these same economic sectors were set up 
in Paris, as French and British had agreed before the CEEC met. The CEEC’s final 
general report of September 1947 proposed a general effort to increase output in 
agriculture, energy, iron and steel, transports and general modernisation of industrial 
equipment. The Plan de Modernisation et d'équipement de la France, the so- 
called Monnet Plan, established the investment objectives for re-equipping in four years 
(1947-1950) in six basic sectors (coal and steel, electricity, cement, agricultural machinery 
and transport), to increase production and rise productivity for the French economy.37 
When the European Cooperation Administration requested in July 1948 that the French 
plan coincided with the ERP period of implementation (up to June 1952) and the first plan 
was updated, petroleum, chemicals, synthetic fertilisers and textiles, and shipbuilding.
. The Commissariat's Rapport qénéral sur le Premier Plan de Modernisation 
et d'équipement, novembre 1946-ianvier 1947 (AN, 80/AJ/14) is the basic 
planning document referred as the Monnet Plan.
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were added as basic.3*
These economic sectors were considered "basic" (with the "highest repercussion” 
for the national economy, in the Import Programme's jargon), that is, able to act as 
multipliers for the entire national economy following vigorous public intervention. The 
selection criterion was thus, the importance of the industry’s output to industrial 
rehabilitation. The production capacity of the country could not be fully exploited until 
certain bottlenecks were eliminated. Factories required power, the transport system had 
to permit the movement of goods and agriculture had to free some exchange resources to 
import raw materials and equipment.
The other criterion was to continue earlier public intervention and, thus, the 
Import Programme was an estimate of essential needs of the public sector. It was firmly 
believed that the aims of efficiency and the channelling of all available resources into 
productive work could only be effectively induced from the public sector. Those economic 
sectors where public firms existed -not necessarily in monopoly terms- provided (in 
principle) a better guarantee of control over imports and the implementation of planned 
targets. Most of the industrial plants mentioned in the Programme related to the State 
sector, RENFE, Iberia and in particular the National Institute of Industry (henceforth, INI). 
This is not surprising considering that the INI was designed for the industrial recovery of 
the country in priority sectors and that the INI’s President was, in perfect symbiosis, the 
Minister of Industry, J-A_ Suanzes.39
**. For specific literature on the Monnet Plan see Frances M.B. Lynch: 
"Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet Plan: National and International
Planning in French Reconstruction", The Economic History Review. 2nd. s., 
vol. 37, no. 2, May 1984, pp. 229-43; Philippe Mioche Le Plan Monnet. Genèse 
et élaboration 1941-194*7. Paris [Publications de la Sorbonne] Paris, 1987; 
and Bernard Cazes and Philippe Mioche: Modernisation ou Decadence. Aix-en- 
Provence [Publications de la Oniversité de Provence] 1990. For a general 
approach to French planning see the classical work of Stephen S. Cohen: 
Modem Capitalist Planning; The French Model. Berkeley [University of 
California Press] 1969. For a first-hand account on the origins and 
conditions of the Plan see Jean Monnet: Mémoires, Paris [Fayard] 1976, pp. 
275-311.
Juan Antonio Suanzes Fernández (b. 1891), Naval engineer, Franco's
friend from childhood, Minister of Industry and Commerce in Franco's first 
Cabinet (February 193B—August 1939); appointed President of INI in 1941, 
returned to Cabinet in August 1944 as Minister of Industry and Commerce. 
From August 1944 to July 1951 combined the charge of minister with the 
presidency of the Institute, continuing with the latter until 1963. Suanzes
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The INI was the organisation set up in 1941 to expand total domestic industrial 
output through direct intervention. The INI’s interest lay in those sectors where there was 
an overriding government interest (military or otherwise) and in those considered the most 
dynamic industrial sectors but which could not be tackled by private enterprise either 
because the capital required or risk element was too great. The INI really consisted of a 
conglomeration of companies, in some of which it held all the shares, while in others it 
had a majority, or even only a minority holding. A number of these companies, including 
the most important, were deliberate creations of INI, others were semi-state or private 
companies which the INI took over and tried to expand.40
Action from the public sector also eased the technical problems involved in the
remained until about 1959 one of Franco's most trusted economic advisers and 
received the aristocratic title of Marquis of Suanzes for his contribution 
to the industrialisation of Spain.
40. Pedro Schwartz and Gonzalez: Dna Historia del Instituto Nacional de
Industria (1941-1976) , Madrid [Tecnos] 1978, is the only work —very 
unsatisfactory- till now on the INI, to which the reader interested in 
further details concerning the INI firms which will be mentioned in this 
section, should refer to. Other useful references for the INI's history and 
action are Miguel Boyer: "La empresa pública en la estrategia industrial 
española: el INI", Información Comercial Española, no. 500, 1975, pp. 94- 
123; Rafael Myro: a) "La estrategia de la expresa pública concurrencial en 
España: un análisis de la actuación del Instituto Nacional de Industria*1, 
Investigaciones Económicas, no. 15, 1981, pp. 23—49, and b) "La empresa
pública en la economía española (1940-1985)", Revista de Historia Económica, 
vol. 5, no. 2, 1987, pp. 371—79; and, Javier Braña and Mikel Buesa: "La
intervención directa del Estado en la producción: Algunos aspectos de la 
actuación del INI en el periodo 1941-62", Presupuesto y Gasto Público, no. 
10, 1981. The disastrous state of the INI's archives makes them completely 
unusable at this stage. A research team hired by the INI is slowly producing 
some results: Pablo Martin Aceña and Comin: a) "Una nota sobre los origenes 
del Instituto Nacional de Industria", Economía Industrial, no. 22, 1988; b) 
"El Grupo INI en perspectiva histórica: una aproximación cuantitativa (1941- 
1986)", Papeles de Economía Española, no. 38, 1989; c) "La acción regional 
del Instituto Nacional de Industria, 1941—1976", in Nadal and Carreras 
(eds.): Pautas regionales de la industrialización española (siglos XIX y 
XX), Barcelona [Ariel] 1990, pp. 379-419; d) "Industrial Planning in Spain 
under the Franco regime (1940-1975)", in Erik Aerts and Milward (eds.): 
Economic Planning in the Post-1945 Period, Leuven [Leuven University Press]
1990, pp. 61-72; e) "El Instituto Nacional de Industria: Inversión
industrial y especialización sectorial", in Martin and Comin (eds): Empresa 
Pública e Industrialización en España, Madrid [Alianza Editorial] 1990, pp. 
117-36; and f), finally, INI 50 años de industrialización en España, Madrid 
[Espasa Calpe] 1991. The latter is a major history of INI which reveals no 
new material or perspectives to the matter and serves, basically, to replace 
the previous piecemeal work (most of it produced by the same authors) . 
Suanzes' account of the origins, aims and conditions of the INI in: a) The 
Spanish Commercial and Industrial Policy, Madrid, speech delivered in Cortes 
on 3 May 1950; b) "L'Institut National d'Industrie, pivot de 
1'industrialisation de l'Espagne", Synthèse, no. 199, December 1962, pp. 
217-45; and, c) Ocho Discursos de Suanzes, Madrid [Centro de Estudios 
Económicos y Sociales del INI] 1963.
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drafting. The Import Programme summed up, arithmetically, previous individual piece­
meal plans in the different public sectors into a global whole. The Ministry of Industry 
argued that the Import Programme included exclusively those industrial projects at the 
final stage of construction. The Ministry explained that cases were frequent of industrial 
plants having completed capital formation, obtained the necessary quotas for raw 
materials, built housing, arranged transport and other auxiliary services -such as energy 
and water equipment-, but still requiring equipment to complete construction and the 
actual supply of raw materials to initiate production. This argument was far-fetched. 
Although work had been started on a number of ambitious schemes for industrial 
production, in many cases Government sponsored, only few schemes, as we will see, were 
nearing completion and some were scarcely beyond the drawing-board stage. The vast 
majority of requests were for investment plans which were considerably less advanced. 
It was expected, thus, that Marshall Aid rendered effective and adequate the State’s 
previous efforts to obtain the development and modernisation of a small group of 
industrial sectors which could produce a feed-back effect bringing about general economic 
recovery and expansion.41
The Import Programme was complementary to the country’s normal pattern of 
trade. Imports coming through bilateral channels would continue to help achieving the 
recovery of pre-civil war levels of output and. in particular, provide consumer goods and 
foodstuffs. The Import Programme concentrated resources where trade channels appeared
41. A "bottleneck" approach is common in the documentation consulted and in 
contemporary literature, i.e. the different reports drafted by the Bank 
Urquijo's Research Service: Informe(s) presentado(s) a la Junta general del 
Banco Orqruiio celebrada el (9.15. and 16) de marie de (1946. 1947. and
1946). por el Presidente del Conseio. Excmo. Sr. Marqués de Orguiio. sobre 
el eiercio del afto (1945. 1946. and 1947), Madrid, 1946, 1947, and 1948,
respectively. These reports influenced particularly the perception of the 
Spanish economy by the British Conmercial Counsellor in Madrid, John Walker: 
Economic and Commercial Conditions in Spain. April. 1948. London (HMSO] 
1949. Further references will be addressed to the latter, which is more 
accessible to the international research community than the former, to be 
consulted exclusively at the bank's library. The minutes of the Spanish 
Board for Foreign Trade (Junta Espaftola para el Comercio Exterior -JECOEX—, 
partially reproduced in MAE, Leg. 2185, exp. 9 and 10 for 1948 and 1949, 
respectively) and of the executive bodies of the Spanish Foreign Exchange 
Institute (henceforth, IEME) point at the country's import needs as major 
bottlenecks for reconstruction. The lEME's records constitute the main 
documentary source of this section because they show how internal and 
external circumstances appeared to the economic policy-makers of that day 
(see Archivalia for more details).
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insufficient to finance ambitious plans, most particularly concerning the immediate short­
term goal of breaking bottlenecks. The term reconstruc tion  which qualified the Import 
Programme meant, for the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, structural modernisation 
and regeneration of the country’s economy, based on decisive action from the public 
sector. The Ministry was conscious that removing specific obstacles which impeded the 
full utilisation of the then existing capacity was not enough and that new industrial 
capacity was necessary. The Americans had clearly argued that long-term investment and 
expansion could not take precedence over immediate rehabilitation of existing productive 
capacities. Most Western Europeans, including Spain, disregarded it. Power installations, 
oil refineries, railroad equipment and steel plants attempted everywhere to expand 
industrial capacity beyond short-term needs.
This significant list of economic requests that the Import Programme represents 
could be considered a mirror-image of the country's economic situation and a useful 
instrument to study the results of Spanish economic policy during the period.42 Within 
the country's economic situation, the entire energy sector commanded the highest attention
4i. The late 1940s have received little specific attention from scholars. 
For general economic accounts see the following: Antoni Montserrat and 
Jacint Ros Hombravella: "Entorn del retard en el recobranent dels niveils 
macroeconomics de pre—guerra a l'Espanya dels 1950", Recerques, 1972, no.
2, pp. 231—46; Josep Fontana and Jordi Nadal: "Spain 1914-1970", in Carlo 
M. Cipolla (ed.): The Fontana Economic History of Europe. Contemporary
Economies. Part Two, vol. 6.2., London [Collins/Fontana Books] 1975, pp. 
4 60-529; Juergen B. Donges: a) "From an Autarchic towards a Cautiously
Outward-Looking Industrialization Policy: The Case of Spain",
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, vol. 107, 1971, pp. 33-72, and b) : La
industrialización en España. Políticas, logros, perspectivas, Barcelona 
[Oikos-Tau] 1976, chapter 3; Manuel—Jesús González—González: "La historia 
económica de España en el periodo 1939-1959. Dna interpretación", Moneda y 
Crédito. Revista de Economía, no. 143, December 1977, pp. 3—106, re­
elaborated as chapter two of his La economía política del franquismo (1940- 
1970) . Diriqismo, mercado y planificación, Madrid [Tecnos] 1979; Joan 
Clavera et al., Capitalismo español: de la autarquía a la estabilización 
(1939-1959), Madrid [Edicusa] 2nd ed., February 1978; Viñas et al., op. 
cit., chapter 4; Ramón Tamames: La República. La Era de Franco, Madrid
[Alianza/Alfaguara] 10th ed. 1983 [1973], in particular pp. 408-17. For an 
overall view of the political economy of Spain during the period 1939-1959, 
in English, see Joseph Harrison: The Spanish Economy in the Twentieth
Century, London [Croocn Helm] 1985, pp. 120—43, and Payne's The Franco 
Regime, cit., pp. 384 ff. A most recent (and challenging) publication on the 
period is Jordi Catalán: "Los años cuarenta en la periferia de Europa: la 
economía española en perspectiva comparada”, in José Luis Casas (ed.): La 
postguerra española y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Córdoba [Diputación 
Provincial] 1990, pp. 59-96; somehow continuation of his "Autarquía y 
desarrollo de la industria de fábrica durante la segunda guerra mundial. Un 
enfoque comparativo", in José Luis García Delgado (ed.): El primer
franquismo. España durante la segunda guerra mundial, Madrid [Siglo XXI] 
1989, pp. 35-88.
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of the Import Programme’s draftees (headings no. 3 to 6). Primary energy supply was 
basic to industrial development Top priority thus went to expanding production of coal, 
electricity and oil. In both drafts, they were allocated an average of 32 per cent of total 
planned investment Since the energy sector was the State’s priority immediately after 
1939, with little practical results, it is not surprising it received much attention. Fuel and 
power shortage characterised post-World War II economic life in Spain. The country had 
no refining capacity' and there were periodical petrol shortages. The disappearance of the 
bulk of rich British coal could not be compensated by an increased use of poorer 
indegenous substitutes. Demand for electricity could not be met. Low electricity prices 
stimulated industrial demand for electricity while depressing private investment This was 
the main result of subjecting electricity to "political prices".49 Furthermore, being 
primarily dependent on hydro-electric power, an occasional drought, as in 1944-45, could 
temporarily cripple the Spanish economy.44 Despite the lack of significant increases in 
capacity’, a marked increase in output nevertheless took place. This rise in output, 
however, meant that the existing plant was over-worked and required replacement, making 
the supply of equipment the sector’s main problem.49
43• A defence of this consideration to be found in Enrique Fuentes Quintana 
and Juan Plaza Prieto: "Perspectivas de la economía española (1940-1953)", 
Revista de Economía Política, vol. 4, no. 1-2, May-September 1952, pp. 1- 
117, pp. 47—48. The policy aimed at maintaining an equilibrium between 
prices and salaries at the 1936 level; Jordi Maluquer de Motes: "Precios, 
salarios y beneficios. La distribución funcional de la renta", in 
Estadísticas históricas, pp. 4 95—532, table 12.16, p. 521. The most 
appropriate study of the energy sector is Sudrià: a) "On factor
determinante: la energía", in Nadal et al. (eds.), op. cit., pp. 313—63; and 
b) "Les restrictions de la consommation d'électricité en Espagne pendant 
l'après-guerre 1944-1954", in Fabienne Cardot (éd.): 1880-1980 Un siècle 
d'électricité dans le monde. Actes du Premier colloque international 
d'histoire de l'électricité, organisé par 1'Association pour l'histoire de 
l'électricité en France, Paris, 15-17 avril 1986, Paris [Presses 
Universitaires de France] 1987, pp. 425-35.
Source: Carreras: "La industria", in Estadísticas históricas, pp. 169-247, 
table 5.15, p. 196. Sudriá, op. cit», p. 333, has calculated that the 
electric supply remained some 33 per cent below demand in 1945.
45. José Luis Redonet: "Inventario de las posibilidades eléctricas
nacionales", Revista de Ciencia Aplicada, no. 11, November-December 1949, 
pp, 401-12; José Jiménez Mellado: "El mercado de la industria eléctrica
española", De Economía, no. 31-32, pp. 794-808; Ministerio de Industria y 
Comercio, Dirección General de Industria: La industria de la electricidad 
en España. Su desarrollo v las perspectivas del plan en ejecución, Madrid,
44 ELECTRICITY OUTPUT, 1935-1947 
(in millions of Kw/h)
1935 3,272
1939 3,111
1944 4,720
1945 4,173
1946 5,411
1947 5,970
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The Import Programme aimed at increasing capacity and output Previous INI and 
private programmes aimed at bringing plants into service by 1953 to increase total 
capacity by 800,000 Kw. The 1944-1945 crisis gave an added impetus to many schemes 
to step up the output of electricity. The various private companies producing electricity, 
mainly grouped, since 1944, in «U nidad  Eléctrica S .A .» , aimed to bring into service 
an increase of capacity of 200,000 Kw. For its pan, the INI hoped, by 1953, to put into 
service power plants with a total capacity of 400,000 Kw, most of it by the «Em presa 
Nacional Hidroeléctrica de Ribagorzana», set up in December 1946. The INI’s firm 
«Em presa Nacional de Electricidad, S A .» ,  set up in 1944, implemented some long­
term plans for a further increase of 200,000 Kw.46 It was to create power stations 
consuming low grade coal produced at the INI’s industrial complexes unsuitable for other 
purposes. The INI considered that its own demands for electricity would not be attained 
without a parallel increase in electricity output by the same INI plants. The construction 
programme increased Spain’s total electricity capacity, which had been 1.9 million Kw 
in 1939, by 454,200 Kw at the end of 1947,47
The Ministry of Industry’s new targets were for a new potential capacity of 2 
million Kw with a production of 7,000 million Kw/h, hydroelectric and thermic (heading 
no. 4). A doubling of the country’s electricity capacity and an increased output of 217 per 
cent could be possible only through the sector’s modernisation. The Ministry requested 
imports up to a value of $100 million, or 14.8 per cent of the total investment programme. 
It was the highest single heading of the whole programme. There had been an equal 
amount for imports of machinery and tools, but it was cut by one-half in the second draft. 
Since the reduced draft had not modified the amount corresponding to energy, its share 
of the overall rose to 22.2 per cent. Overcoming the electricity supply problem was 
therefore priority number one.
Imports of $100 million constituted a sum which the Spanish authorities had all
May 1952; and José Castañeda and Redonet: "Incidencia de las restricciones 
eléctricas sobre la economía nacional", in Juan Velarde Fuertes (ed.): 
Lecturas de economía española, Madrid [Credos] 1969, pp. 397—421.
44. Walker, op. cit., p. 45.
47. Anuario Estadístico de España. Año 1946 (henceforth AEE), p. 597.
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the difficulty in providing, in view of their heavy foreign exchange commitments for 
scarce foodstuffs and basic raw materials. The largest orders for heavy electrical 
equipment in 1945 and 1946 went to Switzerland and the United States. When drafting 
the Import Programme, exchange difficulties had almost completely stopped imports from 
both hard currency countries (see section 3.2). The closing of the border with France 
prevented any diversion of pan of the demand to the French electrical industry, while 
British exports of electrical goods, which had expanded 9.3 fold in 1946 over 1945, could 
not meet the Spanish demand during 1947, largely because of the immense power 
generation re-equipment programme under way in the United Kingdom.4* Marshall Aid 
was thus expected to provide die possibility to overcome the shortage of raw materials 
and to increase the capacity of local electrical engineering industry.
The British commercial counsellor in Madrid believed that the Spanish industry’s 
productive capacity' was technically adequate to produce most of the necessary items, if 
sufficient supply of some equipment and raw material was granted: copper and magnetic 
plate and to a lesser extent steel and cotton, the lack of which had seriously hampered 
production since 1945; heavy electrical equipment (especially alternators up to 10,000 kva. 
cables, electric meters, insulators for more than 60,000 volts, small type of fractional h.p. 
motors, transformers, steam turbines and heavy hydraulic equipment) by-passing world­
wide delivery delays and Spain’s shortage of foreign exchange.49
Petroleum products were the second major category within the energy sector 
(heading no. 5). As in the previous case, the sector inherited earlier ineffective public 
action. In May 1944, the Cortes approved a national plan to obtain petroleum products, 
including motor spirit and lubricants, with a total budget of $183.6 millions. The INI was 
charged to carry it out through its largest subsidiary enterprise, «E m presa Nacional 
Calvo Sotelo de combustibles líquidos y lubrificantes», created in January 1942. The
4*. British exports of electrical machinery, apparatus and goods dropped 
from £1.4 to £0.5 million from 1946 to 1947. In Spring of 1947 the French 
Embassy informed that the offer of Ff 1,000 million for electrical supply, 
suspended in February 1946 (see chapter two, p. 115), was still valid since 
contracts could not be signed, AD, Z/E vol. 95: Despatch no. 234 from R. de 
Bercegal, Interim Chargé at the French Delegation to Quai d'Orsay, 
"Eléctrification des chemins de fer espagnols”, 11 March 1947.
4#. Walker, op. cit., pp. 46—47.
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1944 Plan included the setting up of three integrated industrial complexes and an oil 
refinery.30
The three integrated industrial complexes defined in the 1944 Oil Plan and in the 
Import Programme were Puertollano (in Ciudad Real), Escatrón (on the Ebro river, near 
Sagarossa), and Puentes de García Rodriguez (in La Coruña). The oil refinery was at 
Escombreras (Cartagena). Puertollano's industrial plant aimed to obtain petroleum 
products from distillation of bituminous shales, to produce nitrogenous fertilisers and to 
construct coal fired power stations. Estimates were of an animal output of 132,000 tons 
of petroleum products to be obtained from the distillation of 1.200,000 tons of shales. The 
industrial complex in Ebro included plants for lignite mining and their industrial treatment 
to obtain petroleum products (annual planned output of 100,000 tons), production plants 
for nitrogenous fertilisers and coal fired power stations. Puentes included another coal 
fired power station, installations for lignite distillation and fertilisers production and other 
mining installations. Lignite m ining was to produce annually 450,000 tons, treating part 
of which would produce an annual output of 15,000 tons of refined oil products. The 
1944 Plan’s target was an output production of 335,000 metric tons of petroleum products 
per year from the distillation of shale, lignite and agricultural by-products (in particular 
olive oil). The treatment of imported petroleum and primary petroleum products at 
Cartagena, whose oil refinery could not be completed until 1949/50, was to produce
450,000 tons more.
Having failed to achive previous planning targets, the Ministry of Industry 
included the 1944 Oil Plan within the scope of the Import Programme. The three 
industrial complexes and the oil refinery of the 1944 Plan were to be the sole beneficiaries 
of the future American aid. The target was identical, production of 335,000 tons of 
petroleum products, although now it was considered to represent only 20 per cent of the 
country’s requirements. The Import Programme’s target was distributed as follows: 
Puertollano 120,000 tons, Escatrón 100,000 tons and Puentes de García Rodriguez 15,000 
tons; distillation of agricultural by-products would represent additional 100,000 tons.
"Plan para la fabricación nacional de combustibles líquidos, lubricantes 
e industrias conexas", Law of 26 May 1944, BOE of 27.
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Concerning the oil refinery, recent previous experience favoured the doubling of the 1944 
output target to an annual output of one million tons (heading no. 6).S1 This sector 
shows, better than any other, that the Import Programme reflected the frustration of 
previous State intervention to improve the state of those sectors considered strategic for 
the entire national economy. It was impossible to end dependence on foreign supply of 
petroleum products but an expansion of domestic output was to act as a very important 
future exchange-saver.
American assistance would, in addition, alleviate the heavy burden which import 
of high-technology involved and accelerate its supply. In the circumstances of foreign 
exchange reserves, these kind of requests placed to foreign enterprises could only be 
financed at a very slow rate.52 American assistance was also designed to redress the 
technological dependence which the plan had originally on Germany, a permanent feature 
of Spain industrial development in the second half of the 1940s. Most of the new 
industrial plants were initiated in the early 1940s, depending originally upon German 
exports of machinery and technological support. After the war, with the elimination of 
Germany as the main capital supplier, great difficulty was experienced in obtaining 
technical aid and equipment from other countries, many of which were busy with their 
own projects. Some of the firms concerned contracted for the supply of machinery from 
Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, but Spain’s shortage of foreign 
exchange impeded these plants from approaching full production as planned.
The following three examples could illustrate how industrial development was 
retarded by the fact that many orders for equipment were placed in Germany during the 
World War years and hardly any was delivered. «Sefanitro, S .A .»  was a firm created
**. Motor spirit, Diesel oil and lubricants, which had been strictly 
rationed throughout World War II and placed on free sale in August/September 
1946, were rationed again in October 1947. The mechanism used then was to 
prohibit private motor cars from circulating on a varying number of days of 
the week according to their horse-power; Walker, op. cit., p. 96.
**. For a complete list of requests placed abroad by Calvo Sotelo during 
1944-1948 see INIs Resumen sobre finalidades y actuacifen hasta el 31 de 
diciembre de 1948, cit. in Schwartz and González, op. cit., pp. 260—65. 
Calvo Sotelo received, during 1942 to 1947, only Pts 405 million out of Pts 
1,993 million promised initially to finance the ambitious plan. For credits 
to Calvo Sotelo see INI: Memoria del ejercicio de 1948. cit. in Schwartz and 
González, op. cit, p. 53.
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in 1941 to produce nitrogen fertilisers which planned to initiate production in 1944 with 
excellent economic perspectives. Contracts with Germany were signed immediately but 
the supply never reached Spain. Only the partial substitution of Switzerland for Germany 
could complete the construction of the industrial plant which initiated production in 
1951.53 «Fábrica Española de Fibras Artificiales S .A .»  set up in 1941 was 
handicapped by its original association with the Hamburg concern PHOENIX Ltd, which 
by the spring of 1948, as subsidiary of INI, was still unable to obtain the machinery and 
equipment ordered from Germany from some other source.54 When in June 1942, the INI 
decided to install furnaces for steel production that could be use Spanish raw materials, 
low in iron-content, to reduce dependence on scrap and coke imports, Krupp engineering 
capacity was requested. After some interesting Spanish-German relations, the project had 
to be suspended in 1944.Si The project could only be retaken in 1950 (see chapter six). 
In sum, exceptionally could Spanish engineers carried out any degree of scientific 
autarchy.
Coal production -as elsewhere in Europe- constituted probably the most crippling 
bottleneck in the whole Spanish economy. The inadequacy of domestic coal supply 
blocked any increase in iron and steel supplies and prevented any relief of the acute 
transport problem by seriously hampering the working of railways. Although Spanish coal 
production had increased considerably (output levels in 1940 and 1947 exceeded those of
1935 by 30 and 60 per cent, respectively) chronic shortages occurred, and each winter the 
delays in transport became especially serious.* The expansion of output was achieved 
by extracting lower grades of coal, bringing on steam unmined anthracite deposits and 
developing lignite deposits in the north. No real improvement could be expected without 
a further increase in domestic production and imports of high-grade coal.
51. José Maria Lorenzo Espinosa; Dictadura y dividendo. El discreto negocio
de la burguesía vasca (1937—1950), Bilbao [Universidad de Deusto] 198 9, pp.
173-79.
54. Walker, op. cit., p. 58.
Martin and Comin, INI 50 aftos, cit., pp. 173-75.
s*. Coal production data in Sebastián Coll and Carles Sudrià: El Carbón en 
España, 1770-1961. Una historia económica, Madrid [Turner] 1987, p. 563.
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The Import Programme aimed at the modernisation of existing mines with an 
estimated output of some 6 million tons (heading no. 3.1). The incorporation of mining 
machinery, which shortage of foreign exchange and difficulties in world supply had 
previously made impossible, would raise productivity (kg/day/ miner) by 10 per cent after 
three years. This could be considered to be a modest productivity increase. However, 
without the planned investment, the productivity in the coal sector dropped from 81.2 in
1947 (as compared to 1933=100) to 77.9 by 1952, while in most of the ERP countries it 
increased at the end of the ERP period.57 New mines would further increase output in 
3 million tons of coal, anthracite and lignite (heading no. 3.2). The Spanish authorities 
also considered imports of high quality coal. Before the war, Spain imported 1.7 million 
tons of coal and over one million tons of high grade coal a year, in particular from the 
United Kingdom. The decrease in world-trade after the World War, the low quantities of 
coal which the British authorities allowed for trading and Spain’s currency problems, had 
reduced imports to a minimum Total coal imports from 1940 to 1947 were less than the 
imports of 1935 alone and represented 1 per cent of the country’s total consumption 
(against 20 per cent in 1935). The country’s mines produced 10 million tons of hard coal 
against a requirement of 12 million tons for heavy industries and transport. The deficit to 
be covered by imports was 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 tons (formerly imported from the 
United Kingdom) plus 60,000 tons of coal tar.5'  In sum, Marshall Aid would have 
decisively helped to push up imports, to increase output and to raise the productivity level 
of the sector.
Contrary to the energy sector and, despite the fact that the shortage of iron and 
steel created a spiral of frustration throughout Spanish industry, the iron and steel industry 
was not a high priority for the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Only 3.9 per cent of 
the Programme’s imports were reserved for the sector and it was further reduced to 3.5 
per cent in the second draft (heading no. 7). The priority given by the State to unblocking 
bottlenecks for industrial development meant that, in the years before 1951, domestic steel 
production was not perceived as a key element for the development of the other
*\ Ibid., p. 577.
**. MAE, Leg. 2309, axp. 2: "Spain Muat Cooperate”.
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industries, lu fact, the INI's investment in the mining and steel industry was only 5.5 per 
cent of its total investments from 1942 to 1951, while it was 49.3 per cent in the energy 
sector.59
Shortages of scrap, coking coal and iron ore prevented Spam’s iron and steel 
industry from working at full capacity. In 1947, output of iron and steel ingots was 87 per 
cent and 79 per cent, respectively, of the 1940 levels of output, which were in turn 
already almost 30 per cent below the levels of 1929, the maximum historical level of 
output“  The scrap problem proved intractable to solve. The country’s shortage of 
foreign exchange and world scarcity had pushed down scrap import figures to an almost 
insignificant level. The gradual exhaustion of the more easily worked high-grade ore 
deposits (hematite) in Vizcaya and coal shortages could not compensate for the shortage 
of scrap. A further diversion of Spanish Moroccan ores of high mineral content (Rif ores) 
to local industry would have reduced the country’s capacity to earn foreign exchange, 
which was by far the most important problem facing the Spanish economy. Finally, 
although the iron and steel industry was receiving more coal than before the war, much 
of it was poor quality' and demanded greater allocations for the same caloric content. Any 
increase in coal consumption required a decrease in the railways quota, since economies 
in consumption were not to be easily obtainable from other sources. In fact, the pattern 
of coal consumption shows that only the lowering of the railways’ share allowed the iron 
and steel industry’s coal consumption to be increased, at least until the mid-1950.61 
There was no prospect of early relief while bottlenecks of all kinds remained and until a 
way to finance the large equipment purchases could be found.
A lower dependence on coal supply necessarily implied the modernisation of the 
existing productive capacity, which was hampered by the shortage of foreign exchange. 
A total amount of $6 million was requested to modernise existing iron and steel mills with 
a total productive capacity of 750,000 tons (heading no. 7.1). The installation of electric
5>. United Nations, Economic Survey of Europe in 1953. Including a Study of 
Economic Development in Southern Europe, Department of Economic Affairs, 
Geneva, 1954, table 67, p. 143.
<0. Carreras: "La industria", in Estadísticas históricas, cit., p. 202.
Estadística general de consumo de carbones por las distintas industrias.
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furnaces and a shift from the Siemens-Martin process (still producing 65 per cent of total 
steel output by 1947) to the Thomas process, together with larger supply of ferro-alloys 
(vanadium, molybdenum, phosphorous and nickel) would raise productivity by 6 per cent. 
Another investment of $20 million was intended for the installation of new plants to 
increase annual output by 500,000 tons after three years. The only hope for developing 
production at low cost appeared to be establishing a new steel works in Asturias using 
low grade ores and the coal available close by and speeding up the electrification of the 
railway-network.62
The state of transport, in particular the railways system, constituted a big handicap 
to the economic recovery of the country and to the programme of industrial expansion 
which the Government hoped to be able to carry out. In this sense, the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce assigned a high priority to transport in both drafts, 36 per cent 
on average. Railways (RENFE) received the lion’s share, 25 per cent (on average) of the 
total figure of imports and 70 per cent of the sector.63 As previously, the Import 
Programme combined the more pressing features of earlier plans of investment.
On 25 January' 1946, the Council of Ministers decided to modernise the railway 
network, to replace rolling stock and locomotives and to undertake the electrification and 
modernisation of the signalling of the whole network. A first Five-Year Plan (1946-50) 
for reconstruction and modernisation of RENFE and the General Plan of Railway 
Electrification covered the then urgent work applying to 4.500 kilometers of track with 
limited budgets of $137 millions and $27.5 millions, respectively.64 The funds authorised
42. See chapter seven, pp. 462 ff. for the development of the production of 
iron and steel in Asturias.
In 1941, all the railway companies of broad-gauge which could not cope 
with the reconstruction of their individual network after the Civil War, 
were rescued (expropriated in proper terminology) by the State and grouped 
together as one system under the Spanish Railways System (RENFE), which also 
operated some of the narrow lines. See the rescue scheme in Miguel Artola, 
Ramón Cordero, Diego Mateo and Fernando Menéndez: Los Ferrocarriles en
España, 1844-1943. Vol. I El Estado y los Ferrocarriles, Madrid (Servicio 
de Estudios del Banco de España] 1978, pp. 442-45.
44. Information about the different railways plans in RENFE: Los
ferrocarriles en España 1848—1958, Madrid, 1958, and Carlos de Inza y 
Tudela: ’Transportes*1, in Estudios sobre la unidad económica de Europa, vol. 
7, Madrid [Sociedad Estudios Económicos Españoles y Europeos, S.A.] 1957, 
pp. 799-812.
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under earlier plans had, in pan, been swallowed by the mounting costs of labour and the 
rising price of both imported and local materials, notably coal and steel. In the first two 
post-world war years progress was slow in spite of RENFE’s efforts, because of three 
major problems: inadequate supply of high-grade coal, insufficient rolling stock and the 
state of the track. These three elements could only be satisfactorily solved within a general 
programme of economic modernisation.
To overcome the most serious problems of the Spanish railways, the Import 
Programme initially planned an investment of $193 million. Proof that the Ministry of 
Industry was not daydreaming in the drafting of the figures comes from the fact that this 
figure, reduced in the second draft to $97 million, was far from RENFE’s original request, 
which amounted to $395.“  The first draft envisaged $45 million of railway equipment 
to assist the replacement and rehabilitation of the entire state-owned and operated track 
network, 12,775 kilometres of normal gauge (heading no. I I ).66 With a time limit of 
three years, this section of the programme was the logical implementation of the first five- 
year plan approved in 1946. The modernisation of the network deserved $10 million. An 
up-to-date telecommunications system and adequate signalling equipment would be 
installed on the lines to be electrified and on the existing steam lines, over five or six 
years, respectively (headings nos. 14 & 15). The section concerning the electrification of 
the network maintained the period of implementation (twelve years) and the track affected 
(4,500 kilometres of normal gauge) announced in previous governmental planning 
(heading no. 16). Marshall Aid would have allowed the cost of the scheme to rise from 
$27 to $45 million, since State guarantee for RENFE bonds would have no longer been 
necessary.
The second major problem of the railway system, insufficient and inappropriate 
rolling stock, resulted in a planned investment of $93 million, divided equally between
45. MAE, Leg. 2185, exp. 9: "Nota sobre las necesidades de importación de la 
RENFE", n/s, Madrid, 11 April 1947.
44. 638 kilometres of which were electrified. The project does not clarify 
whether it also considered the 4,782 kilometres of narrow gauge in the hands 
of private companies, 903 kilometres of which were electrified. Data for 
1946, AEE. Normal gauge is considered the standard Spanish 1,672 metres 
gauge•
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new rolling-stock and repairs of the existing capacity (headings no. 12 & 13). The initial 
planned investment was to allow domestic industry, after two years, to reach the following 
targets: twenty electric Diesel locomotives, two-hundred metallic passenger-cairiages, 
twelve autorails and ten freight cars, one hundred ballast wagons for track-reparation 
works and one hundred-thousand goods-wagons. The rolling-stock provisions show how 
the Programme was not aimed at completing civil war recovery but was an ambitious 
attempt at modernisation.
The construction of electric and Diesel locomotives bad no relation whatsoever 
with the 1930s (see table 3.2). It was die logical consequence of modernisation. The 
electrification of a major sector of the network, the increase of electric locomotives and 
the plans to improve the supply of fuel, were the first signs of the official attempt to 
reduce dependency upon an inadequate local coal supply. Although the railways obtained 
50 per cent more fuel than before the Civil War, this increase was largely counterbalanced 
by the low-calorific content of Spanish coal and the wastefulness of obsolescent and 
inefficient locomotives. A drought could divert part of the coal production to power 
stations, strongly limiting the coal quotas for railways. During the period of drought in 
1944-45, the contraction of hydraulic power supplies diverted large quantities of coal to 
the coal-fired power stations leaving the railways with one week’s stock.*7 Without the 
possibility of resuming large-scale imports of high-quality coal, in particular British coal 
which the railways had consumed before the Civil War, no real relief for the railways 
could be expected before the electrification of the system.
TXBLZ 3.2 
BROAD GADGX R0U.XHC STOCK
YEARS 1936 1939 1945 1946 1947 O o M
Stea» Locomotives 
Electric Locoaot. 
Carriages 
Goods Wagons
2,800
4,383
69,222
1,837
1,740
41,700
2,705
782,797**
72,526*
2,712
80
2,719**
70,042*
2,689
79
2,868**
71,085*
529
30
539
5,927
Source: JLEE, p. 734. Situation as recorded on 31 December, except 1st April 1939. 
Units out of service (O.o.S.) recorded by the British Commercial Counsellor in 
Madrid, G. Clinton Pelham, Spain. Economic and Commercial Condition» In Spain, London 
[HMSO] 1952, p. 155. (**) Including autorails: 75 electric and 40 thermic ones in
1945, €9 electric and 43 thermic in 1946, and 74 electric and thermic in 1947. (*)
Including freight cars: 1,851 in 1945, 1,830 in 1946, and 1,872 in 1947.
Walker, op. cit., p. 110.
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Two hundred metal passenger carriages were certainly not designed to restore the
1936 figure of output. Post-1939 reparations and new constructions resulted in 1947, in 
a deficit of 1,515 passenger cars over 1936. Planned new cars would only alleviate the 
unpopular situation of overcrowded trains. In 1947 there were 51 million more passengers 
than in 1935 in 1,515 less carriages.6* Foreign assistance was destined to expand those 
sectors considered top priority, which was not the case for passenger cars. Further 
recovery could be reached by repairing those units out of service by 1947. The Import 
Programme reserved a high amount of investment to accelerate repairs of the then existing 
rolling-stock (heading no. 13).49 The only fundamental solution was the renewal and 
modernisation of a large pan of the equipment in addition to an adequate level of normal 
maintenance and repair work. Marshall Aid would help Spam's exchange reserves to 
import the required material to proceed adequately with the normal renovation of the 
rolling-stock and its repairs overcoming chiefly the scarcity of key materials and the 
shortages of electric power and liquid fuels.
Marshall Aid was not aimed at returning to pre-war levels, but rather at 
modernising basic structures and creating a railway system which could serve the Ministry' 
of Industry's industrialisation plans. The target of one hundred ballast wagons was in 
direct relation to the building of new lines, particularly destined to improve access to the 
coal mines in the north of Spain and to the laying of a double track on many lines. The 
figure of 100,000 units of goods wagons certainly did not attempt to restore the number 
of broad gauge goods wagons in service in 1936. The Spanish railways had made a rapid 
recovery from the losses of good wagons which they had suffered during the Civil War, 
repairs of which were given an absolute priority over passengers' carriages (see table 3.2). 
The spectacular increase the Government expected to emerge in local traffic of goods 
from the industrialisation schemes projected, explains the target set for goods wagons. It
Figure for passengers in Antonio Gómez Mendoza: "Transporte y
comunicaciones”, in Estadisticas históricas, pp. 269-325, table 1.3., p. 
289; for passenger cars see table 3.2. The return to an intensive use of 
coal and railways by the Spaniards is perceived by Carreras as a historical 
step backwards, as a return to the 1st industrial revolution, "Una 
generación entre paréntesis, 1936-1953’*, in Ministerio de Industria y 
Energía: España 200 años de tecnología, Madrid, 1988, pp. 149—60.
Most of it was over-run, with the consequence that reparations 
constantly increased from 194 4 to 1947; AEE, p. 736.
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is really significant that the forecast figure could not be reached in Spain until 1974! The 
size of the task compared to the limited resources, allowed slow progress bequeathing the 
miserable state of the sector to future generations. Marshall Aid, the Spanish Ministry of 
Industry had expected, would have helped it solve the most important deficiencies of the 
railroad system. It would have ended the unremitting efforts to expedite its rehabilitation 
and modernisation.
Road, air and sea were the transport means considered other than railways. Road 
transport was limited to Diesel tracks and private cars production (headings 17 & 18). The 
poor conditions of the road system received no attention. When drafting the Import 
Programme the roads suitable for motor transport were, by and large, the same as in 1935, 
although in worse condition due to shortage of bitumen, again the result of foreign 
exchange difficulties. The priority went to increase the number of vehicles in circulation 
and their poor conditio©.10 Supplies valued $24.8 million would allow the Spanish 
industrial capacity to produce (after five years and one-time shortages of petrol, tyres and 
other parts, had been overcome) an annual output target of 16,000 cars. Diesel trucks were 
to be built, after four years, at an annual rate of 1,500 units with an initial investment of 
$7.5 million. The annual savings which the planned targets would produce in the future 
were estimated at $30 million, second only to agriculture.
Promotion of local manufacture of vehicles was not expected to result in 
immediate import savings but to reduce a heavy burden on the balance of payments in the 
future. Few cars and lorries could be imported during the nine years following the 
outbreak of the Civil War. In 1946 only 1,400 vehicles were imported as compared with 
the 22,000 units imported in 1935. The 1300 units (mostly passenger vehicles) imported 
in the first six months of 1947 from the United States entered the country without foreign
,e. Including tractors, tha number of plates issued on average between 1945 
and 1947 was 5,972 units, while it had been 18,600 units between 1930 and 
1935. With losses running well ahead of replacements, the total number of 
vehicles fell from approximately 180,000 before the Civil War to 150,000 by 
the end of 1947 (68,000 passenger cars and 42,000 lorries). The average age 
of the vehicles still in use was probably high and their general condition 
and reliability was therefore low: 90,000 cars in circulation in 1947 were 
registered before 1936. See AEE, p. 738, and G6mez Mendoza: "Transportes y 
coounicaciones", op. cit., p. 306. Another INI company, «Empress Nacional 
de Autocamiones», was to produce motor lorries and tractors.
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currency expenditure. It was the main result of an administrative measure adopted on 30 
August 1946 allowing the grant of import licenses without the provision of any foreign 
exchange by the Spanish authorities (the so-called "sin divisas" licenses). Their purpose 
was to mobilise any foreign exchange held by Spaniards living either in Spain or abroad. 
The great bulk of licences granted "sin divisas" was for the import of motor vehicles; 
other goods authorised for imports in this way were essential products such as foodstuffs, 
raw materials and certain types of machinery.71 Moreover, the protection of local 
manufacture, after its incipient development during the war years, and the country's 
shortage of foreign exchange, resulted in a marked restriction of imports of motor spares 
and accessories. Imports related to the automobile sector fell from a pre-war figure of 
1,500 tons a year to a post-war figure of 100 tons. Distributors were no longer allowed 
to impon a full range of spares with the vehicles they brought into the country except 
where they could not be produced locally in any quantities.
The Ministry of Industry faced a situation where imports of motor vehicles, 
ranked as a comparative luxury, were clearly inadequate compared to requirements. The 
Impon Programme revealed the Ministry’s intention to cover a minimal percentage of 
what it was supposed amounted to the actual demand, if the basic car population had been 
kept reasonably efficient and sufficient foreign exchange made available. Difficult to 
estimate precisely, the Ministry of Industry placed the initial annual production target at
16,000 passenger cars, which was the number of cars imported in 1935.
The Impon Programme also wanted to improve air transport. It aimed at renewing 
50 per cent of the existing non-transatlantic capacity, obtaining one year of repairs parts, 
and purchasing five transatlantic aircraft. The heavier types of long-range aircraft were 
capable of earning foreign exchange in voyages to Central and South America and were 
expected to show a return of the initial investment in two years. An investment of $11.2 
million (heading no. 19) went to the Spanish State airlines, « Ib eria  Líneas A éreas», 
founded in 1943, which held the monopoly of Spanish regular civil air lines. A further
71. "Post—war Import Licensing Policy in Spain", The Board of Trade Journal,
28 August 1948, pp. 411-12, p. 412. Licences of this type were freely 
granted during 1947, their issue being suspended at the beginning of 1948.
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investment of $5 million went to private companies and $4 million for airport equipment, 
airfield construction, radar, radio, and other items of modem communication equipment. 
Imports in 1945 and 1946 of aircraft and air transport accessories consisted almost entirely 
of United States passenger aircraft and aircraft parts available to Iberia. In 1947, Spain’s 
dollar shortage had diverted most of the licenses to the United Kingdom, mainly for 
freight planes or small touring aircraft required by newly formed charter companies. 
Difficulties in obtaining aircraft and aviation spare parts, hampered IBERIA’s 
development The then existing ban on the sale of military aircraft and equipment of any 
kind to the Spanish Air Force also affected non-military production.72 The Import 
Programme wanted to restore the United States as main supplier and the State company 
as the leading air company.
Finally, the transport sector involved ship equipment for the merchant fleet. 
Production of ships in Spanish yards had been exceedingly low since the war years. Since 
1942 the State had decided to build ships itself (Laws of 7 and 11 May 1942 for the 
development of the Spanish merchant and war fleets). Complaining about high 
shipbuilding prices and uncertain dates of delivery, some orders were placed by the para- 
state organisation «E m presa Nacional E lcano» , a subsidiary of the INI, with yards at 
Seville and Barcelona. While the official aspirations of the Spanish shipping authorities 
were to possess a Merchant Fleet of at least 1,500,000 tons gross, on the 31st December 
1946 the Spanish Merchant Fleet consisted of 1,193 vessels and of 1,099,807 tons register 
(excluding ships of under 100 tons), while on the outbreak of the Civil War it consisted 
of 955 ships of 1,177,357 tons gross register.73 Efforts to increase output from Spanish 
shipyards had little result, the difficulty in the supply of raw and auxiliary materials being 
apparently insurmountable. There was a great scarcity of every kind of ship-building 
material, whilst the situation regarding auxiliaries -pumps, winches and electrical 
equipment- was particularly difficult. Some of these items could not be produced locally
71. Th« United States Government's ban on the sale of military equipment of
any kind to Spain was approved in early January 1946 and affected also 
Austria, Switzerland and Germany; FRÜS, 1946, I, Report by the Subcommittee 
on Rearmament to the State-War-Wavy Coordinating Committee, Washington, 21 
March, p. 1150; and Memorandum by the Central Secretariat of the Policy 
Committee on Arms and Armaments, Washington, 7 June, p. 841.
Fuentes and Plaza, art. cit., p. 72«
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and Spain lacked foreign exchange for acquiring them abroad, whilst supply difficulties 
abroad also impeded acquisitions even when exchange was available. An import-package 
of $20 million was requested in order to reduce the construction-term of the State plans 
for an expansion of shipbuilding capacity, which was imposed, as everywhere in Western 
Europe, due to the shortage of foreign exchange and the high dollar cost of using 
American ships.74
The INI also controlled the «Em presa Nacional Bazin. S .A .» , which became 
responsible in 1947 for the building of all warships for the Spanish Navy and does not 
appear in the Import Programme. As in the case of military aircraft, the Navy could not 
be considered within the scope of American assistance. The ban on the sale of military 
aircraft was maintained when the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out the necessity of 
having three airfields in Spain for the heaviest bombers.75 In common with the U.S. 
Government, and followed to a decreasing extent by the French Government, the British 
Government refused to supply Spain with aircraft and aero-engines of a military nature 
and to allow Spanish industry to benefit of technical advice and assistance in all spheres 
related to armament and defence which might have increased the effectiveness of the 
Spanish armed forces. According to British manufacturers, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands. Belgium and even France, had fewer inhibitions about Spain and captured 
the benefits derived from the Anglo-Saxon ban on the supply of military and semi-military 
equipment to Spain. This applied particularly to the aircraft industry and to naval 
construction.76 The French were anxious to infringe the agreement.77
I have no information about any official modification towards Spain of the
14. See Milward'a Reconstruction, cit., p. 3B.
FROS. 1948, III, Memorandum of Conversation, by Horsey, 29 March, pp. 
1034-35.
British position and complaints based on PRO, FO 371/79211: "Policy
towards Spain", agreed memorandum prepared by Sir Ivo Mallet after meeting 
with Sir R. Makins and Sir Williams Strang", 8 August 194 9. These British 
top civil servants questioned the validity of the ban when it cut off 
British manufacturers from "a market of some importance" and deprived 
British manufacturers of participation in Spanish development over a fairly 
wide technical field."
11. PRO, FO 371/96202: "Military equipment for Spain", by G.P. Young,
London, 2 July 1951.
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embargo policy on export of military equipment as applied by the Allies. It is reasonable 
to image that, on the American side, it took place along the military negotiations for bases 
in Spain during 19S2. A modification of the embargo policy took place in the United 
Kingdom in December 1952 when the total ban was lifted by allowing sales of so-called 
"common-use" and of obsolescent war material for civilian and military.7* But only on 
14 December 1953 was officially announced in Parliament that the United Kingdom was 
prepared to allow the sale to Spain of all manner of military equipment except the latest 
operational jet aircraft and similar so-called classified armament.79 It was the immediate 
result of the new situation produced after the conclusion of the U.S.-Spanish bases 
agreement of September 1953. Economically, the Spanish market, with an infusion of new 
dollars, was an attractive proposition to all manufacturers in Western Europe. The 
possibility’ of off-shore purchases eliminated the problem that increased sales of war 
material could be made at the expense of traditional exports due to Spain’s traditional 
shortage of the main trading currencies. Strong economic arguments were in favour of a 
relaxation and British armament producers, and the Ministries of Supply and Defence, 
pressed for a modification of policy on the export of arms to Spain. The French, in 
practice, allowed the sale of small jet aircraft engines much earlier.
The Import Programme, as with the Monnet Plan, concentrated its resources on 
the reconstruction and modernisation of heavy industry, leaving agriculture outside the 
"basic sectors". However, if Spain was to stand on its own feet in the future it was 
necessary to increase its agricultural production. In 1947 agricultural output was at the 
level of 85.6 as compared with 1935=100.*° This decline is most relevant since 
agriculture appears as Spam’s most important industry, directly employing about 55 per 
cent of the working population and accounting for one-third of the country’s GDP.11
PRO FO 371/107662: "Notas prepared for the adjournment debate on Anglo- 
Spanish relations", 13 May 1953.
PRO, FO 371/107682: Secret Note, "Anglo-Spanish Relations: Possible
Action Towards an Improvement", 8 December 1953.
•°. Carreras: "Indices de la producción agricola (IPA)N, in
Industrialización española: estudios de historia cuantitativa, Madrid
[Espasa Calpe) 1990, pp. 168—70, p. 169.
#1. Roser Nicolau: "La Población", in Estadísticas históricas, pp. 4 9-90, 
table 2.15, p. 78; and Carreras: "La renta y la riqueza", ibid, pp. 533-88, 
table 13.21, p. 569.
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While before its Civil War the country was entirely self-supporting in all essential 
foodstuffs, having only to import some wheat when the harvest was extremely poor, it had 
become an important importer due to the stationary inadequate level of output after 1939. 
In 1944-47 Spain produced one million tons less wheat than the average in 1931-1935. 
Considering the extremes of both periods, in 1945 Spain produced 2.8 million tons less 
wheat than in 1934.82 Foodstuffs (particularly wheat) now weighted heavily on the 
import bill and the low level of agricultural output affected foreign currency earnings 
negatively through a fall in agricultural exports. Agricultural produce had accounted, on 
average, for 67 per cent of Spain’s exports in 1931-1935. It decreased to 53 per cent in 
1944-1947. Conversely, the percentage of foodstuffs in total imports increased from 17 
per cent to 23 per cent The import bill for agricultural commodities during those same 
years amounted to an average value of $284.5 million. Imports of foodstuffs, beverages 
and tobacco increased from $50 million in 1945, to $111 million in 1947.83 This amount 
represented three times the figure of annual import savings that the planned output in 
nitrogenous fertilisers and tractors was to produce!
Imports of foodstuffs did not increase further due to restrictions in consumption. 
Ration books were issued in May 1939 and not abolished until 1952, in particular, for 
bread and other essential foodstuffs. Black markets satisfied an important part of domestic 
consumption not covered by imports or officially recorded domestic output. Although 
production diverted to black markets was not statistically considered, the black market was 
even larger than the official market In 1946/48 clandestine wheat accounted for 44 per 
cent of total wheat sales.*1
Data concerning 1934 from Grupo de Estudios de Historia Rural: "El
sector agrario hasta 1935", in Estaditicas históricas, pp. 91-129, table 
3.11, p. 108; post-1936 data from Barciela: "El sector agrario desde 1936", 
cit., table 4.8, p. 145.
-J. Figures given by González, La economía política, cit., pp. 374-77.
•4. Barciela: "El mercado negro de productos agrarios en la posguerra", in 
Fontana (ed.), op. cit., pp. 192-205, table 2, p. 195. The only (upward) 
revision concerns wheat, Barciela and Aurelio Garcia González: "On análisis 
critico de las series estadísticas de los precios del trigo entre 1937 y 
1980", Agricultura y Sociedad, no. 29, 1983, pp. 69-151. For the clandestine 
market in wheat and other commodities see further references in Barciela: 
a) "Las investigaciones sobre el mercado negro de productos agrarios en la 
postguerra: situación actual y perspectivas", Revista de Historia Económica, 
no. 3, 1985, pp. 513-18; and, b) "La España del «estraperlo»", in Garcia 
Delgado (ed.): El primer franquismo, cit., pp. 105—22. It was this same 
phenomenon of incipient breakdown of the exchange economy of the time, as
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At the time of drafting the Import Programme, an expansion of agricultural output 
was necessary due to an increasing population (0.7 per cent annual growth rate from 1940 
to 1950) and for economic stability. A bad harvest, such as that of 1945, could have 
brutally aggravated the national economic situation. A large share of foreign exchange 
(already reduced by the fall in exports) would have then been committed to obtain 
essential foodstuffs rather than capital goods and raw materials. In other words, the 
Spanish economy, due to the poor performance of agriculture, was in a state of permanent 
instability. This was incompatible with the efforts at modernisation and reequipment to 
which the Ministry of Industry’s Import Programme had invited the Cabinet and the 
Marshall Plan to finance.
Agriculture also received attention for reasons of import savings. Stepping up 
agricultural output would alleviate a heavy burden on the balance of payments. 
Eliminating (or at least majarly reducing) imports of agricultural commodities would 
automatically free foreign exchange to import raw materials and capital goods to continue 
the industrial effort. It was estimated that the production of chemical fertilisers and 
tractors would produce 26 per cent of the annual savings which the Import Programme 
was to achieve after five years (raised to 32 per cent in the second draft). Savings 
stemming from increased agricultural output were not estimated and the export side of 
agriculture, as financier of economic growth through foreign currency earnings, was of 
no concern to the Import Programme. However, decreased imports and increased exports 
were important elements in the strategy to generate resources for industrial development.
Agriculture benefited neither from imports nor from investment, despite the 
Phalange’s agrarian idealism where peasant fanners embodied the values of the 
Nationalistic Spain as against the urban and industrial population.13 Investment into 
agriculture until 1952/53 was extremely limited. The Ministry of Agriculture’s
it happened in the rest of Western Europe, which particularly impressed 
William L. Clayton, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs; see Clayton's memorandum on the European crisis in FRUS, 
1947, III, 27 May, p. 230.
•5. Carlos Velasco Murviedro: "El pensamiento agrario y la apuesta
industrializadora en la España de los cuarenta", Agricultura y Sociedad, no. 
23, April—June 1982.
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appropriations within the national budget represented 0.8 per cent of the total budget, an 
insignificant share considering that Spain was basically an agricultural country. On the 
other hand, 3.8 per cent of total private and public investment reached the countryside 
between 1942 and 1947.16 The orientation of the nation's importing capacity towards 
essentials left no room for imports of capital goods for agriculture. These accounted for 
0.8 per cent on average of total imports from 1939 to 1946.*7 It was not possible to 
substitute tractors for animals as imports since the outbreak of the Civil War had been 
negligible.
Insufficient importation of chemical fertilisers was considered the main cause for 
the slow recovery in agricultural output and the fall in productivity levels. Import trade 
had traditionally satisfied Spanish agriculture’s consumption of nitrogenous fertilisers. In 
the early 1930s, the Spanish producers proposed to raise the level of tariff protection in 
order to develop local manufacturing capacity. They were successfully opposed by 
agricultural export-crops growers who sought low-priced supply and who wanted to derive 
benefit from the export facilities offered in the countries exporting chemical fertilisers to 
Spain.1* During the five pre-Civil War years Spanish agriculture benefitted from average 
imports of 513,000 tons of nitrogenous fertilisers. These decreased, on average, by 95.000 
tons in 1941-45 and by 122,000 tons in the following five-year period.
Local production of superphosphates decreased. With a capacity of superphosphate 
production presented at 2 million tons per year, real output in 1948 was 50 per cent of 
pre-Civil War levels. Spain previously imported North African phosphates bought from 
France, as Spain’s production was very small. The interruption of trade relations with
•*. Henry Marti: "Agriculture and Politics in Spain, 1936-1960”, Doctoral 
Diss., University of Michigan, 1979, pp. 157-58, as cit. in Payne, The 
Franco Regime, cit., p. 387. See Servicio de Estudios del Ministerio de 
Comercio: "Cómo y cuánto ha crecido la economia española en la década 1951- 
60", Información Comercial Española, January 1962, pp. 57-99, table 111-12, 
p. 73, for the changed pattern in the early 1950s.
In 1947 the percentage increased to 1.09 per cent, González, La economia 
política, cit., pp. 369-77.
•*. Francisco Bustelo: "La industria del nitrógeno en España", in Problemas 
técnicos de importancia económica en la nueva organización de España, 
Barcelona [Universidad de Barcelona] 1940, p. 37, and Román Perpiñá Grau: 
De economia hispana, infraestructura, historia, Barcelona [Ariel] 1972, pp. 
79-80.
169
France after March 1946 had obliged the Spanish Administration to use domestic 
phosphates of a poorer quality and to import phosphates and potash from the United 
States. The substitution of North African phosphates by American potash caused problems 
in production lines, apart from constituting a severe strain on Spain’s dollar holdings.*9 
National production of nitrogen was also very limited and foreign allocations to Spain 
allowed no relief. The International Emergency Food Council (IEFC) allocated 31.632 
tons of N2 to Spain for the crop year 1947-1948, but this, plus domestic production of 
3,600 tons, still left a deficit of 74,768 tons to cover minimal import requirements in the 
field.90 In 1947, some 200,000 tons of phosphate rock imported from Sudan, somewhat 
larger shipments of Chilean nitrate, which increased to a figure similar to the 1935 level 
and an exchange of potash for Belgian ammonium sulphate, slightly reduced the 
deficiency, but there was such shortage that a large and unsatisfied demand for fertilisers 
remained. Difficulties in supply would continue as long as the world fertilisers situation 
and Spain’s purchasing capacity did not improve.
The shortage of fertilisers had important policy effects. A Decree of 14 December 
1942 fixed an upper limit to the planting of orange trees and gave priority in the use of 
limited fertiliser supply to basic commodities, such as wheat, some vegetables and sugar- 
beet. Wheat farmers, as in many other countries, had taken advantage of conditions of 
scarcity to improve their position regarding the rest of the agrarian community. This 
affected in particular citrus growers and, in turn, foreign currency earnings. In fact, the 
land dedicated to orange-tree cultivation was reduced by 7,000 acres between 1939 and 
1947, reaching the lowest point in 1950, with 69,000 acres.91 This policy was the 
outcome of pressure from interest groups and not of an ideological commitment against
MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 2: "Spain Must Cooperata”.
*°. Ibid., "Spain Must Cooperate". One of the aims of the IEFC was to match 
supply and demand of nitrogen fertilisers; it was transferred to the Food 
and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations in January 1948. Almost 
identical figures are provided by M. Gutiérrez Barquin: "España”, in
Estudios sobre la Dnidad Econòmica de Europa, vol. 3, Madrid, 1953, p. 220; 
31,662 tons of N, assigned by the IEFC and 3,800 tons of domestic production 
of Nj. The IEFC quota was distributed as following: 16,000 tons from Chili, 
10,000 tons from Belgium, 1,862 tons from the United Kingdom and 1,800 tons 
from Norway.
n . Barciela: "El sector agrario desde 1936”, cit., table 4.6., p. 144.
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export crops by Franco’s "obsession with self-sufficiency".92 Franco himself had a 
personal and direct experience in the field of agricultural export-crops. In fact. Franco was 
said to have taken them into consideration in his military strategy during the Civil War, 
occupying Valence first when he could have occupied Barcelona, so that orange exports 
could finance cotton imports for the Catalonian textile industry 93 The main problem of 
Spanish agriculture was, however, its low productivity. The orange-tree surface in 1947 
(90.9 per cent as compared to 1935) produced only 79.6 per cent of the 1935 output. In 
the case of wheat, output in 1947 was 79.2 per cent as compared to 1935 in 94.4 per cent 
of the 1935 cultivated surface.
Spanish agriculture, without adequate capital infrastructure, was closely dependent 
upon climatológica] factors. Rainfalls in the second half of the 1940s were not so much 
lower than in previous years, but given the conditions of capital infrastructure, any 
reduction in water-fall produced an important drop in output levels.91 Spanish agriculture 
suffered, furthermore, from intense State intervention which held back the transformation 
of the countryside. The first Franco Government set up the National Wheat Office to 
control the sale and distribution of wheat and its main by-products. The General 
Commissariat of Supply and Transport was responsible for marketing many other essential 
foodstuffs. They were to guarantee prices and buy entire harvests at State regulated prices 
(initially lower than expected market prices) with the intention of keeping down the price 
of wheat, expanding output and reducing dependence on foreign supply to a minimum. 
Peasant resistance to the system of compulsory Government purchase of cereals at low
**. Harrison, op. cit., p. 126.
Franco Salgado—Araujo: Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco. Barcelona 
[Planeta] 1976, p. 202. The author was Franco's cousin and military 
secretary from 1956 to 1975.
M . Carreras: "El clima", in Estadísticas histfcricas. pp. 19—48, table 1.1, 
pp. 30-31. An analysis of the effects of climatology on the recovery of pre- 
civil war levels of output is Montserrat and Hombravella, art. cit. 
Economists writing contemporarily on the events considered the lack of 
fertilisers and agricultural machinery and the climatological conditions as 
the explanation for the low level of agricultural output, i.e. Paris, op. 
cit., p. 47. So did the Bank Orquijo's reports and the British commercial 
counsellors in Madrid. The minutes of the IEME Council show the permanent 
preoccupation due to the lack of fertilisers, i.e. in May 1945 the Director 
General of Agriculture, Manuel de Goytia y Angulo, representing the Ministry 
of Agriculture at the IEME Council, called his colleagues' attention to the 
important need to increase imports of fertilisers and capital goods, AHBE, 
IEME, box no. 2: C/A, 25 May 1945.
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prices discouraged production. It favoured local consumption and diverted a substantial 
proportion of production to the more profitable black market. Furthermore, it provoked 
a shift from the production of cereals and pulses to uncontrolled products, such as conon, 
tobacco, grass, fruit and vegetables, meat and eggs, which were fetching high prices.93
The Import Programme was certainly not designed to change agrarian policy. It 
was limited to pointing out the need to improve productivity. From the Ministry’ of 
Industry’s viewpoint, as is true for the Commissariat au Plan in France, modernising 
agriculture passed necessarily through increased mechanisation, extended use of chemical 
fertilisers and the development of the food-processing industry. When the Director General 
of Agriculture complained about the price policy for wheat, defined as the main obstacle 
to any increase in output, the Minister of Industry said that it was up to the Minister of 
Agriculture to adopt tbe necessary measures: "On my side, I would be delighted to save 
foreign exchange.”*“
The institutional effort to boost production of farm machinery and nitrogen 
fertilisers had taken place since the beginning of the 1940s by declaring both sectors of 
national interest according to the Act for Protection and Promotion of New Industries 
of National Interest, 24 October 1939.97 The benefits of national interest were extended 
to production of farm machinery and nitrogenous fertilisers by decrees of 10 February 
1940.M Such declaration did not entitle tbe firms concerned any special priority in the
,5. A guide to intervention in agricultura ara Barciela's publications,
basad upon his Doctoral Diss., "La agricultura cerealista en la España
contemporánea. El mercado triguero y el Servicio Nacional del Trigo (1937- 
1971)", Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 1981.
M . AHBE, IEME, box. no. 2: C/A, 17 October 1945.
91. For early 1940e industrial legislation see Buesa: "El Estado en el
proceso de industrialización: contribución al estudio de la política
industrial española en el periodo 1939—1963", Doctoral Diss., Universidad
Complutense, Madrid, 1982, synthetically published as: Buesa "Algunos
aspectos de política económica e industrialización en España (1939-1963)",
Comercio Exterior, vol. 33, no. 4, March 1983; and, Braña, Buesa and Molero: 
"El Estado en los procesos de industrialización atrasada: notas acerca del 
caso español (1939-1977)", El Trimestre Económico, vol. 50, no. 197, 
January-March 1983.
M . BOE of 25.
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allocation of foreign exchange for their imports of equipment" In the field of chemical 
fertilisers, the National Nitrogen Plan of February 1940 forecast an annual output capacity 
of 121,355 tons of N2, based on domestic raw materials.100 The military interest of some 
nitrogen components was an important input in the decision to announce the Plan, 
although not the exclusive one.'01 A percentage of 30 per cent was to be produced at 
the four industrial settings of Calvo Sotelo, mentioned earlier and a further 7.4 per cent 
by «Sociedad Ibérica de N itrógeno», with INI participation.102 During the summer 
of 1947 the desirability of setting up fertiliser manufacturing industries for currency 
conservation purposes through import substitution was reaffirmed, which implies the nil 
effect of previous State initiatives.103 None of the forecast installations initiated 
production before the drafting of the Import Programme (in fact, not before 1950).
On the other hand, although production of farm equipment is not intensive in 
high-technology and the domestic industry was technically capable of undertaking 
production on a large scale, output levels were extremely low. The INI firms «Em presa 
Nacional de Autocamiones S _A .» and « S A .  de Construcciones A grícolas» had plans 
for the production of 1,000 tractors a year by 1951, which it could not implement. An 
output of 1,000 units was more a legal fiction than a real economic target. In order to 
benefit from the advantages of being declared of national interest the producer ought
Buesa: "Industrialización y agricultura: una nota sobra la construcción 
de maquinaria agricola y la producción de fertilizante» en la politica 
industrial española (1939-1963)", Agricultura y Sociedad, no. 28, July- 
September 1983, pp. 223—48. This article analyses the promotion of 
industries of agricultural equipment and nitrogenous fertilisers during the 
194 0s and 1950s.
10°. Bustelo: "La industria del nitrógeno en España", cit., pp. 247-52 gives 
account of the technical details to accomplish the task. Antonio Robert: On 
problema nacional: la industrialización necesaria, Madrid (Espasa-Calpe]
1943, p. 132, argued the need to obtain complete self—sufficiency in the 
sector.
101. On the military interest see Ministerio de Industria, Dirección General
de Industria: Situación y perspectivas de la industria del nitrógeno en 
España, Madrid, 1952, p. 22. The contrary view is maintained by the then 
Minister of Industry and Commerce, Demetrio Carceller, who, in 1944, 
expressed the need to produce nitrogenous fertilisers as follows: "[the
production of nitrogenous fertilisers] is not caused by autarchic feelings, 
which do not attract us, but in order to pay regularly for the imported 
quantities", "Conferencia en el Circulo de la Unión Mercantil de Madrid",
2 August 1944, Información, August 1944, quoted by Lorenzo, op. cit., p. 46.
102. Buesa, "Industrialización y agricultura", art. cit., table 8, p. 244.
10\ AHBE, IEME, box no. 2: C/A, 8 July 1947.
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to declare that figure.104 The problem was that the regular supply of raw materials to 
the sector proved to represent too heavy a burden on the balance of payments, especially 
when foreign exchange was necessary to import raw materials far heavy-industry. 
Consequently, Spanish agriculture remained hardly mechanised at all, since annual imports 
of tractors were limited to a few hundred, the consequence of a combination of foreign 
exchange shortage and world supply difficulties. Reaching none of the targets set 
previously in the sectors concerned, the Import Programme took up the commitment to 
end the traditional backwardness of the country’s agriculture.109
The group of activities with a direct contribution to agricultural production 
(including food-processing) received an investment of $50 million, that is 9 per cent of 
the total (headings nos. 1, 2 & 23). In the food-processing sector, Spain, it was argued, 
needed 30,000 tons per year of tin plate for its canned-goods industries (fish and 
vegetable industries), a commodity whose scarcity had imposed limits on the sector. 
Concerning nitrogen, the output target was set at 100,000 tons of N2, similar to the target 
of the 1940 National Plan for Nitrogen.106 The target was to be reached once the initial 
industrial installations had received equipment during the following five years. It was 
calculated to be only 60 per cent of the country’s overall needs, set at 166,000 tons per
104. Buesa, "Industrialización y Agricultura", art. cit., pp. 226 ff. Spain's 
production of tractors remained as follows:
Years Units Years Units
1947 30 1954 60
1948 85 1955 850
1949 137 1956 750
1950 188 1957 1508
1953 47 1958 2943
Source: Carreras: "La producció industrial espanyola i italiana des de
mitjans del secle XIX fins a 1'actualitat", Doctoral Diss., Bellaterra, 
Barcelona, 1963, p. 345.
105. The Civil and World wars slowed down the movement from the country to 
the towns, a notable trend of the previous thirty years, and the 
agricultural labour force available actually increased. For the so-called 
crisis of the traditional model of Spanish agriculture see José Luis Leal, 
Joaquin Leguina, José Manuel Naredo and L. Tarrafeta: La agricultura en el 
desarrollo capitalista español, 1940—1970, Madrid [Siglo XXI] 1975.
1{H. Manuel Fuentes Irurozqui: Algunos aspectos de la economía española, 
Madrid [Monografías Industria y Comercio] 1949, p. 63, placed exactly at the 
same level the minimal requirements in nitrogenous fertilisers. It was 
estimated, some time later, that 100 kilograms of nitrogenous fertilisers 
would bring an increase of between 120 to 160 kilograms of wheat by acre; 
AHBE, I EME, box no. 2: The Director General of Agriculture at C/A, 13
September 1949.
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year, capable of producing approximately 775,000 tons per year of by-products. 
Concerning tractors, the Import Programme doubled the 1940 target. Even then, 2,000 
units were still considered to cover only half of the production needed. Annual output 
targets for the production of nitrogenous fertilizers and farm tractors were to be reached 
in 1952. The subsequent savings of $35 million would allow the redemption of the credit 
in one and a half years. The reduced version did not modify the investment figure (except 
for food-processing), representing essential minimal imports for the sector.
The Import Programme aimed at modernisation (not Civil War recovery) when 
dealing with agriculture. The output targets set had nothing to do with previous Spanish 
production. The maximum output level of nitrogenous fertilisers reached by the Spanish 
economy in the 20th Century was 5,100 tons in 1929 and Spain had no productive 
tradition in farm tractors.107 Pre-war Spanish agriculture was, on the whole, backwards, 
employing a total of 4,000 tractors (or only about one tractor per 5,000 hectares of 
cultivated land), many of which were destroyed during the fighting, or else deteriorated 
since then. A problem lies in determining whether there was any large demand for tractors 
in a country with labour surpluses and fanners who were traditionally mechanisation- 
unconscious. That agricultural prices grew faster than industrial prices, general wholesale 
prices and cost of living, and that the black market had brought great prosperity to many 
farmers, could not escape the attention of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.108 
Many farmers had learnt during the post-war scarcity period to appreciate the value of 
fertilisers and farm machinery and now had liquidity to purchase them if given the 
possibility to do so. This was the task of the Ministry of Industry. On its side, the 
Ministry of Agriculture could distribute tractors among agricultural co-operatives and 
small-farming installments promoted by that Ministry.
101. Carrera*: "La industria", in Estadísticas históricas, cit., table 5.19, 
pp. 206-207.
101. A general redistribution of income took place in the 194 0s in favour of 
the countryside, in particular the great estates in the south with easier 
access to fertilisers and larger profits by speculating on the shortages at 
the black market. See Bank Urquijo: La economia española*y la reconstrucción 
1947-1951, Madrid, 1952, pp. 102 ff.; Fuentes and Plaza, art. cit., pP*
34 and 38—39; Fontana and Nadal, op. cit.; Naredo: "La incidencia del
estraperlo en la economia de las grandes fincas del sur", Agricultura y 
Sociedad, vol. 19, 1981, pp. 81-115, shows how large landlords benefited 
from black marketing.
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The Government bad embarked on a number of projects to improve fanning 
methods. Interest-free loans to the value of 40 per cent of the work undertaken could be 
made to farmers willing to make various improvements of their land. Credits on a large 
scale were under study, to be administered through the co-operatives or the syndical 
organisation which would buy tractors and machinery and then hire them to members who 
lacked the resources to buy their own. As soon as further supplies became available the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s intention was to extend this practice, which had been common 
before the civil war. In addition, the Instituto Nacional de Colonización purchased land 
of large estates to distribute between small-holders. However, the debate still remains as 
to whether the size of the new estates could allow mechanisation.109
Finally, it is important to notice that the Programme was not concerned with the 
impart of foodstuffs. The Spanish Administration requested no imports of foodstuffs 
despite the country’s urgent needs (see table 33). It can be argued that the Government 
did so because it expected to boost output and because Argentina was to provide the 
necessary minimal supply in the meanwhile. Imports of foodstuffs were not to be allowed 
to sacrifice the possibilities for industrialisation and reequipment which Marshall Aid 
seemed to offer.
TABLE 3.3
EXPECTED DEFICIT IM AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT IK 1946
(in tons)
Wheat 4,500,000
Barley 2,800,000
Maize 1,000,000
Other Cereals 1,450,000
Pulses 760,000
Vegetables 7,300,000
Oil 400,000
Unfermented grapes 2,200,000
Meat 468,000
Fish 500,000
Milk (litres) 1,200,000
10*. Gutiérrez Barquín, op. cit., p. 220, argues that the geography and the
dimension of land tenure, apart from oil supply and difficult repairs, 
allowed no large scale mechanisation. Biescas, op. cit., p. 31, argues that
reduced land-holdings made it difficult to derive any benefit from 
agricultural machinery. See a more detailed account and further references 
in Biescas' "Réplica a una nota sobre la econosnia española bajo la dictadura 
franquista”, Investigaciones económicas# no. 16, September-December 1981, 
pp. 171-186, pp. 174-75.
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After 1941, Argentina had made a major contribution to alleviating the hunger of 
the Spanish people. A few months after the war, however, the Argentine-Spanish clearing 
was exhausted. Argentina, which had traded with Spain on a credit basis, suddenly 
reduced supply due to the inability of Spanish exports to provide compensation and asked 
for a revision of the bilateral trading agreements. Spain’s compensatory exports were 
reduced by Argentina to 2,500 tons of thin steel plates to be supplied in three months, 
which turned out to be too short a time to be met by Spanish industry.110 The need to 
satisfy Argentina’s position was necessary to maintain the flow of foodstuffs, in particular 
wheat, and the IE ME Council tried to expand exports to Argentina at any price.111 It 
must be considered that, for instance, in May 1946 the maximum daily ration was 150 
grams of bread.112
Juan Domingo Perón rose to prominence in 1943 as Secretary of Labour and 
Social Welfare. His political prestige grew by his imprisonment in 1945 after a coup and 
his release following mass demonstrations by workers. An anti-Perón "Blue Book” issued 
by the US State Department during the 1946 elections helped rather than discredited him. 
A violent Argentine nationalistic reaction against foreign intervention gave Perón the 
Presidency. Franco and Perón had important common links. Both were military men who 
had achieved absolute political power, both developed policies originally close to 
totalitarian lines, both suffered intervention and both were adepts at turning foreign 
difficulties into a reinforcement of their roles in domestic politics. The vicissitudes of 
Perón's access to power and the fact that the Spanish Government was the first and for 
some weeks the only one, to grant official recognition to Perón’s government in February
1946, eased the path for an improvement of relations.
The bilateral trade and payments agreement, signed between Spain and Argentina 
on 10 October 1946 with a validity of five years, was perhaps the most important of all 
the Spanish post-war trade agreements. It differed from the rest in so far as it provided
110. AUBE, IEME, box no. 2: C/A, 17 October 1945.
lu. Ibid., C/A, 17 October 1945, 15 January and 28 March 1946.
lu. MAE, Leg. 3085, exp. 30: Communication by the Wheat National Service,
14 May 1946.
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a large credit to Spain. Under its provisions, revolving credit facilities of 350 million 
Argentine Pesos were granted to Spain for the acquisition of Argentine produce (mostly 
cereals and meat). In exchange, Spain was to export substantial quantities of textiles, as 
well as lead, steel products, cork, olive oil and machinery. Realising that immediate 
Spanish exports could only amount to a fraction of the imports from Argentina, the latter 
granted to Spain the 3i/4 per cent External Redeemable Loan of 22 November 1946, of 
400 million Argentine Pesos, repayable within 25 years by half-yearly redemptions of 
1.225 per cent in order to settle outstanding debts with Argentina and to continue 
purchases in that country up to 1951.1U Immediately after the United Nations resolution 
of December 1946 condemning Franco’s Spain, President Perón refused to lend support 
to international intervention in domestic affairs and two weeks after the arrival of the new 
Argentine ambassador, the second bilateral trade agreement was signed on 30 January 
1947, along identical lines to its predecessor.
Imports from Argentina were largely responsible for Spain's overall import 
increase in 1947 of about 213 million of gold pesetas, 28 per cent above the 1946 level 
(see table 2.2). Argentina was to provide the following during 1948: 300,000 tons of 
wheat, at a rate of 40,000 tons per month between January to June; 110,000 tons of maize 
plus 40,000 tons remaining from the 120,000 tons of the 1947 quota; 38,000 tons of 
barley, 20,000 tons of frozen meat, 10,000 tons of bacon and fats, 500 tons of industrial 
grease, 1,000 tons of powered milk, apart from beans, salt meat, wool, cotton, fresh eggs 
and vegetables.114 Imports from Argentina were far from covering the needs of the 
domestic market, but allowed the Ministry of Industry to concentrate the possible 
American assistance to foster industrial production.113
The Argentine credit was to be spent in Argentina solely on foodstuffs but not on
***. A report., drafted years after, contains detailed information about the 
main features of Spain's bilateral trade relations with Argentina, MAE, Leg. 
5919, exp. 1: "Información confidencial sobre el contenido y negociación de 
los recientes acuerdos económicos con la República Argentina", 26 February 
1958.
114. AHBE, IEME, box no. 117 bis: Note on Argentine Supply, 31 January 1948.
115. The only food commodity requested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 
Memorandum of 15 November consisted of 80,000 tons of sugar (apart from the 
$50 million of goods directed to farm machinery and fertilisers production) •
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the capital goods most needed to achieve recovery and modernisation:
"An enlargement of the Argentine credit will solve food 
situations of unquestionable inqpcrtance for some time, but it 
will not resolve the basic problem of our economy at present 
most needed of equipment and production goods for its 
development. "11‘
Trade with Argentina, supposedly the bridgehead of Hispanidad, was neither the 
evidence of Spain’s foreign policy redirecting towards Latin America, following the ideal 
community of Hispanic nations, nor a substitute to other long-term commercial partners. 
Commercial relations with Argentina were clearly of a transitory nature." 7 Argentina 
could be neither a market for Spanish exports nor a supplier of capital goods which the 
Spanish economy desperately required. It provided for supply of expensive wheat, outside 
the favourable purchasing conditions of the International Wheat Agreement.11® 
According to Franco, Argentina charged Spain five times the production price.119 On 
its side, Argentina received high cost and slow delivery of Spanish manufactured goods. 
This clearly unbalanced commercial relation certainly did not help Spanish industrial 
modernisation, but it did provide necessary relief.110
In the case of the textile industry -the most important industry' in Spain- where 
de-concentration was at a maximum, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, as in the 
case of agriculture, did not risk direct involvement and the Import Programme did not set
114. AHBE, IEME, box no. 3: S/C, 16 October 1947. "The problem that we really 
want to solve is the supply of equipment and capital goods to increase 
domestic output”, MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 2: Arta jo's cifra no. 1196 to Charge 
in Washington, Madrid, 6 November 1947. Already in 1945, Emilio Navasqüés, 
Director General of Economic Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
explained to the IEME Council in these terms the core of the problem of 
economic relations with Argentina; AHBE, IEME, box no. 2; C/A, 17 October
1945.
111. An abuse of dependency/interdependency theories could lead to misleading 
conclusions in the case of Spanish-Argentine relations as Marisa González 
de Oleaga: **La alianza Franco-Perón: Una aproximación critica desde la
perspectiva de la dependencia, 194 6-1951", Hispania, vol. 4 8, no. 169, 1988, 
pp. 625—89.
11#. See chapter seven, p. 540, for further references on the IWA. 
llf. Salgado-Araujo, op. cit., p. 17.
1,0. The different credit facilities granted by Argentina at the end of 1947 
amounted to 33.2 per cent of the foreign currency earned in 194 6 (as 
registered by the IEME), to 23 per cent in 1947 and to 75 per cent of the 
increase between 1946 and 1947; AHBE, IEME, box no. 7: IEME's annual report 
for 1947.
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any precise output targets. It limited itself to set an import figure for raw materials and 
equipment to renew the looms. A committee appointed by the Government to assess the 
needs of Spain’s textile industry reported that an expenditure of £2 million a year, over 
the following five years, would have been required if the industry was to be placed on a 
modem footing and compete successfully on world markets.121 The shortage of foreign 
exchange prevented any real start upon the project of imports of textile machinery. It was 
difficult to give priority to this sector, in view of the large quantities of foreign exchange 
required for imports of hydro-electric machinery and other top-priority needs. Spain, it 
was argued, had 1,315 textile factories working 79,875 looms and 2,039,000 spindles 
consuming about 15,000 tons of cotton per month. The requirements (discounting 
domestic production) were placed at 110,000 tons of raw cotton per year, against imports 
of 57,200 tons in 1947.122 Since the end of the Civil War imports had, on average, only 
amounted to some 80 per cent of the target import figure.123 Local production, in spite 
of strong Government encouragement, was not able to do much to bridge the gap, while 
being more expensive than imported cotton.
The textile industry was considered as one of the few manufacturing industries 
able to export The Government made strenuous efforts to encourage the export of textiles, 
using the allocation of raw cotton to force out a given percentage of production. The 
value of exports of textiles in 1946 tripled their 1945 value, while their foreign currency 
earnings in 1947 (an increase of £8.3 million over 1946) covered completely the loss 
involved in traditional export commodities.124 It seemed necessary to boost these 
exports, following the recovery of Western European purchasing power, when it was 
perceived that traditional exports had difficulties in expanding due to prices and to a
1,1. It w u  recommended that half of the machinery required should be 
imported and the other half manufactured locally; Walker, op. cit., p. 93.
122. Figure for cotton requirements in MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 2: "Spain Must 
Cooperate*'. It is interesting to notice that Fuentes Irurozqui, op. cit., 
p. 61, gave similar figures for annual requirements of cotton (105,000 
tons).
***. The rise in the cotton price could partially explain Spain's low import 
capacity: the export value of American cotton rose by 354 per cent between 
1938 and January 1947, United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe: 
Economic Survey of Europe in 1948. Geneva, 1949, p. 95.
U4. AHBE, IEME, box no. 7: lEME's annual reports for 1946 and 1947.
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change in international demand. Serious competition on the world market was to take 
place only if -it was stressed on different occasions- Spanish industry could overcome its 
raw material difficulties with foreign supply.125 Otherwise, Spanish textile prices would 
remain high and with the revival of competition in a number of markets, orders would be 
more difficult to obtain.
Synthetic textile fibre and cellulose accounted for 2.1 per cent of the overall 
import figure (headings no. 9 & 10). Previous State intervention in these sectors had little 
success. The «Sociedad Nacional de Industrias y Aplicaciones de la Celulosa Española» 
-to produce staple fibre yam using eucalyptus wood as a raw material- and the 
«Fabricación Española de Fibras Artificiales S .A .»  -based on the use of straw- were 
set up in 1941. Both plants could not start manufacturing cellulose and synthetic fibre 
until after 1950 when the first supplies and foreign technical cooperation had arrived.126 
The Import Programme requested $14 million aimed at producing 50,000 tons of cellulose 
and 10,000 tons of synthetic textile fibre. The important feature of both sectors (and 
aluminum) was that in one year on average the import savings would cover the value of 
the initial import bill.127
Finally, the Import Programme requested $100 million to supply the necessary 
machine-tools and spare-parts to produce 25,000 tons of tools and machinery by local 
manufacturing industry over five years. This constituted a serious obstacle to Spanish 
economic development. While Germany, Spain’s largest pre-war supplier, remained unable 
to deliver, imports came mainly from Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. After supplying the bulk of the trade in 1945, Switzerland lost much ground during 
1947, owing to exchange difficulties and for the same reason imports from the United 
States also fell away. Consequently, the United Kingdom's share of the trade actually 
increased. There had also been some imports on a smaller scale from Sweden and Italy.
1IS. AHBE, IEME, box no. 7: IEME's annual report for 1946, dated on 25 April 
1947, pp. 2-3; and, ibid, box no. 3: S/C, 16 October 1947.
u>. Fontana and Nadal, op. cit., pp. 506—507.
. The Import Programme aimed at increasing domestic output of aluminum by 
2,500 tons per year (after three years), as complement to the INI output 
produced by <«Sirpresa Nacional de Aluminio, S.A.».
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Supplies from all sources, however, did not satisfy more than a small fraction of the 
potential demand. With the help of Marshall Aid, imports would have worked for the 
modernisation of the obsolete industrial equipment. The procedure to be followed might 
have been that foreign firms were invited to submit preliminary offers based on the 
production of all equipment in Spain under license.
The reader's first reaction might be to think of the Import Programme exclusively 
in terms of reducing dependence on foreign supply and increasing self-sufficiency. 
However, the two main incentives behind the Programme, foreign exchange difficulties 
and economic modernisation, were outside any ideological commitment towards autarchy. 
The Import Programme estimated that future foreign exchange savings, if domestic 
production reached the planned targets, was to be $134.25 million ($108.25 million m the 
second draft), which would have covered in five years the cost of the initial investment 
(see table 3.1, g & h). Reducing the need for imports, which it was anticipated was to 
remain far in excess of Spain’s capacity to earn foreign exchange, implied the possibility 
to make full use of foreign exchange reserves to increase imports aimed at breaking 
bottlenecks to allow sustained growth. It was to be a spill-over process departing from 
strategic sectors to the future economic development. The full productive capacity of 
existing plant could not be used due to shortages of raw materials, especially those of 
foreign origin, and shortage of spare-parts kept a proportion of the machinery idle. There 
could be no relief for the engineering industry as a whole without technological 
modernisation. Imports could be arranged through bilateral dealings but the volume, which 
was limited by reduced availability in the international market as much as by Spain’s 
scarcity of foreign exchange, proved not sufficient to prevent further decline in operating 
efficiency. It proved at best to be able to cany out only limited modernisation. There 
could be no recovery in agricultural or industrial production without a large expansion in 
imports of essential materials and equipment with the objective of raising productivity. 
Overcoming bottlenecks as well as increasing output could not be conceived outside 
modernisation. This is the deep sense of the Spanish Ministry of Industry’s 
reconstruction of the national economy.
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3.4. Limited Financial Resources
When the US Secretary of State Marshall offered American economic assistance 
for the reconstruction of Europe, the Spanish economy was finding it most difficult to 
finance its planned programme of imports. The country’s export potential generated only 
few financial resources and its post-world war foreign exchange situation showed a 
decreasing trend, which accelerated during 1947. The deficit in current account, which 
was expected to diminish in 1947, increased with a direct negative effect on foreign 
currency reserves. The post-war boom, if there had ever been one at all, slowed its pace 
during 1946 and died during the first half of 1947 (compare table 2.7 with table 3.4). For 
the Minister of Industry and Commerce, the lack of foreign currency reserves to pay for 
imports represented the "main Spanish problem” in July 1947.1M The Minister declared 
the need to increase threefold the then existing resources to enable the reconstruction and 
modernisation of the Spanish economy.
A seasonal fluctuation in Spain’s earnings of foreign exchange was normal since 
they largely derived from agricultural products, which impose a seasonal fluctuation also 
in the granting of import licenses. The greatest influx occurred in the early part of the 
year and the lean months were in the summer (August and September), when 
comparatively few licenses were granted for imports from any country. During the 
summer months of each year, when Spain's earnings of foreign exchange were at low ebb, 
the authorities granted some licenses with deferred payment terms involving payment in 
the autumn or the winter, when sufficient exchange would be available to cover the 
operation. This was a stop-gap measure, never fully used and abandoned when the foreign 
exchange position improved. The situation in the autumn of 1947 was perceived as 
different from summer gaps. After the summer the exchange reserves decreased (except 
for escudos and Swiss francs).
AHBE, IEME, box no. 2: C/A, 8 July 1947. This IEME Council of
Administration's meeting is particularly important. It was its only meeting 
in 1947. It had not met since 24 July 1946 and was not to meet again until
4 January 1949.
183
4  OH SE
c •
■H •
* 5
•o
c
a  •
U <H
O *0 
X  c
4J U 
3  ü  
<
XT**» 
C •
■H #  
Ï &  • •
o« o£
o  -H
-c t >
Ai •
P  *  
«  U
V© m vo « i 
f O H  W M *
T r* r> .-i v© « ro in r> * i
in r* «h »1 »  o>«h v oí o r*- o in a» o\ r> f» «h ot o
® P- rH r> rH O 
» N W W H O ^  
W  d  N  r -  O  H
i f t i n  r*** w  h  f» V  ID V ro H N * (N
r-* ©  r> o \ cm
» C D M 6 C »  A
1-1 V  M «  h> 9t » h m r* V r* * 4 
r - o m m f H ^ r — '■
«H lf» cm «r r» *H 
w n n i D H  CM
I C œ O M f t t  H ®
n  cd (V m  »  h  9 t  n  
* > r » 0 ' H t e » H « n o
V V m c M o T u T v c M
H O N V ^ t C M n  
« 9 i « o » n n o  a
« n o T o » H » ® C h ^ r  
N  ^  H  I CM i n I 
I r 4  I
r » r * ^ O t H O N < n o D
H N o n s n w o t
M 9 t W M O f M f ) H
9 1 » 0 » h V * » V *
n o w m w e n
m » i f t » e N n N
C M « n r ) v m o i e c M
I I  «■
I
Is
i
i
i
i
i
! **
i
i! -  <* 1 *
¡ 1
13! "
I
! *> 
¡ 2
! -  
«  i « 
I s
I
I
I «o 
I «
» ®
.*
O'
C JC
V Vc c 
i« mu ki
kl *4 *M
o  •  r« ^ -h *0 TJ ® • •
<-t I j  T ) 3  H  (  O v ^ i
^ • • Ü - h -h *h C 
O ü  I  •  3  )  C 4
Ü C O O O a d U C Q f l Q O
f 4  w  m  \ o  (M m  m  
« D H f n i f t H f n ' f i  m Mn h « œ o
f )  H  <D (N 9i  9« 9lH0D»®MCM
»  »  r> »  »  n  »
oT © V in in oí cd*
m o n  h v H
r» a> r» r> o
IO CD 9> V  W  9>
N 9 >  W  CD 9 l f t
« i n i n r m v  
m  ®  o  ▼ N  n  ♦  «
r * c D C M r * r * < * ^ ' —'
o «■< ** m o «h 
M n  h  ^  »H
« H V O V O t r H
O O N H 0 H P «
r » * H i n o k C D m e > m  
» n « H « 9 i N  A  
H O H H O H O t C D
N » H « H H I n  ^  
h  i n  h  I i n  10 I 
I r-l I
o n i n « N » n N0»N09I»NH V 
C D i n N H O t D H  CD
i H C M ^ T o T V r ^ i n r - î
H n t 0 « V ( D « H
I I CM CMI I
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I
1 10 n Î "i 
! ^  ! 2 
• * 
! a  10 
! n  
i
i °** Lft
<*>
U
•c
o
M
Jtf
D*C Xi u *h m o
u u  u  • C •
V V m G 
H C h O
•H 0  »4 kl
P  kl J*6"W C 
4  X
h <h T 3 X  •
** u v  p  U •  17*-H
o * > » « p » « «
Û M C O H O C O 0 Û
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I
i S
¡2
¡ 5
! <*>'! «
I *+
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
II
I »  
I
I +
I
: 1
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i
l l
* o • • ry •
U £  4  O üCD C *> M C
0 4  «  •  «m C i4«i I ü*u
•H «M 0  •  •
* ' V  0 C +>£
t*  C •  m *  kl ü5 0  «  !  Ü O Cü .'H11 »  ! h  F u* • 65 J5 M I»453 M r • *
5  *  C S2 o ** M C TJ •
- ü • • ? • •z Ä «£ c <
£ E <k> TJ 5 *h „
o w i K ¿ » -
**> »
«H po
^ » ü  *g 
•  « MC ?
fi-»“ # - J l .
0^ ■»< li : t
»■««S S §*8
•  S  « f  l o - c
v 5  5 '
i 0— V «n
S  o i  o  •  *  t  o U ff •< S ■“ o 6 c e g
_  •  *> _  •  t5 *-• r *  ü .  ü .  - ,• ® cp * co o r?
»  »  aiP  O  •  O ¡
c  kl ‘  -  JC x» J■H « V • i- 2B Z CD ^  > .  •
%  u> •  • *; ¡Í
•  «  « 9  E *h S 
£  w i n  ? 3  m  cfr* an  tr-H o -• _  • 0<x • 
•2 c  *  t*ff l  •  ^  
*  £«h Tí ^  *0 c o £
t í  •  ^  C *  <* g  l> *0 * m 3
•  w  W  O L *  M c
S-8S . S g Ss 8^-5 8*®a 
* «  *0 *  «  •^ 5 -ä 8 *5  c Ï  ^ 0 ii
jQ •  «  e  ■ o j; m .  o
4;  I  O fl
i> W ü ti
H kl O -H
• • S e ! i 0 - • *  Ç f g
o
s 5 « s J 5
1 S S 3 - S 2 Í
B . . C . Í  ! o
J - 1  u  «  •*»
o • 'S s -  0 "
0) 2 c
e  •  •  V
^ • : h ï
• « • * 2 § t  
g - 2 «»
k 2 * o' 5 * ,' S  - 5 5£ * 3
¿ S * 2 ï S
s ' - ” I I h
" . S i s ä S ! |
M * D» ^ •  «H§ « c *0 *o mí
«  c  •  ^  •  0 e
*• . 4 0 0 ««<*> 0 a a w f
V ü • • -H c 
M . u  u  c  c
P  Q . «  u  b  «  «  Io kjc o o • a  ki co u ü¿n 4
. r  K
th
»y
 
we
r*
 
of 
no 
ut
* 
to 
im
po
rt
 
tr
ad
*.
Without considering the debt with Argentina, which consisted of the full use of 
credits, Spain’s reserves of its main trading currencies had decreased by 96.6 per cent 
during the twelve months of 1947.129 In September, the country's reserves of its main 
seven European trading currencies plus the dollar, which had already decreased by 57 per 
cent with respect to 31 December 1946, could not cover authorisations for the first time 
after the world war. The corresponding departments suspended import licenses and credit 
authorisations (except a limited number of licenses with deferred payment). The IEME 
had wrongly expected larger earnings of foreign exchange and had, consequently, granted 
authorisations at a faster rate than that which foreign exchange earnings would have 
permitted it to do. In September, foreign exchange reserves remained at 29 per cent of the 
value of authorisations and at 16 per cent of total demand (authorisations plus pending 
requests). Fifteen days later, BEME’s exchange stock covered only 11 per cent of the 
potential import demand to be paid off in the main trading currencies. Spain’s reserves 
of foreign currency had to be multiplied 4.4 times to cover authorisations, 9 times to 
satisfy demand completely and, spliting the Import Programme into four years. 7.4 times 
to finance the annual import quota of the Ministry of Industry’s second draft of minimal 
import requirements.
The main obstacle to financing the reconstruction programme was the dollar 
shortage. Dollar holdings passed from the position of being the largest reserve at the end 
of 1944 and 1945, although further reduced, to that of the second largest deficit after the 
Swiss franc (compare table 2.7 with table 3.4). A credit of $3.5 million granted in the 
summer of 1947 by the Société de Banque Suisse, Geneva, allowed for the dollar 
deficit.130 By then, the IEME’s dollar reserves amounted to $1.4 million.131 That is 7 
per cent of the credit authorisations granted plus the pending requests to import from the 
dollar area. Dividing the Import Programme’s second draft into four years, dollar reserves 
by October 1947 could only finance 1.2 per cent of the annual rate.
121. On 31 December 1947, the IEME'a foreign exchange reserves, discounting 
the debt with Argentina, were only Pts 8,892,672, while they were Pts 
258,807,444 on 31 December 1946; see table 2.7 and AHBE, IEME, box no. 7: 
IEME'a annual report for 1947.
110. AHBE, IEME, box no. 3: S/C, 14 July 1947.
l>1. Ibid., S/C, 16 October 1947, which is a splendid compilation of all the 
Spanish financial difficulties at that time.
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The Government had important non-commercial dollar commitments which further 
reduced the use of dollar reserves for commodity trade. This concerns, in particular, the 
nationalisation of the Spanish Telephone Company. On 1 January 1945, a 4 per cent 
External Redeemable Loan was issued for $50 million, in payment for the majority 
holding of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) of New York in 
the « C ia . Telef6nica Nacional de E spaña» . Repayment was to be made by 1960, by 
annual redemptions of not less than $2 million (which, however, the Spanish Government 
paid off by June 1952).132 Although it followed ideological commitments, this was the 
immediate consequence of an overestimation of future dollar earnings.133 Unexpected 
circumstances turned this decision, adopted at more prosperous times, into a heavy burden 
for all dollar payments.
The disastrous 1945 wheat harvest and the sudden decision adopted by Argentina 
to reduce supply made clear that the Spanish Administration had misjudged the capacity' 
of the Spanish economy to finance the ITT debt The 1945 wheat harvest -1.5 million tons 
less than in 1944- increased the already high Spanish demand for cereals. The reduction 
of Argentina’s supply imposed an expansion to dollar suppliers, which ran counter to 
dollar payments to ITT. The import authorities estimated essential wheat imports from 
North America at 160,000 tons in October and November 1945, at a total cost of $12 
million.134 The need to cash on the nail pushed wheat purchases down to 50,000 tons. 
On the contrary, ITT received $6.7 million before the end of the year and $2 million of 
the loan the Spanish Government had floated were paid off.135 If the dollar situation in 
1945 was still not perceived as pressing (the annual ITT redemption was much higher 
than necessary and paid two months in advance), it changed in 1946 so that ITT payment
1B. As announced by the ITT itself; Shneidman, op. cit., p. 83—84.
1M. The positive results between 1941—1945 allowed to create a small gold 
stock, to cancell some conmercial and political debts, to provide some 
credits and to nationalise the telephone company. Explicitly recognised by 
Antonio de Miguel, Councillor of National Economy and former Director 
General of Commerce and Tariff Policy; AHBE, IEME, box no. 66: "Nota sobre 
la balanxa de pagos en relaci6n con la situaci6n econ6mica en general", n/d, 
probably May 1946. Once the decision to "rescue'’ the telephone company had 
been adopted, its payment could not be a matter of discussion at the time. 
It would have destroyed the Spanish Administration’s financial reputation.
1M. AHBE, IEME, box no. 2: C/A, 17 October 1945.
1M. Ibid., C/A, 7 September 1945.
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became a serious strain placed on Spanish limited dollar resources. The cancellation of 
some contracts of Spanish manufactured goods to be paid for in dollars after the Summer 
of 1945 reduced dollar earnings while ITT payments ($6.3 million plus $4 million of the 
loan floated) subsisted. The result was the collapse of the IEME’s dollar holdings by the 
end of 1946 to 8 per cent of the 1944 level (see table 2.7).134 By the end of September 
1947, the IEME’s dollar reserves were already below the annual ITT debt repayment due 
before the end of the year.117 Under these circumstances, dollars for trading purposes 
were reduced to zero and all dollar imports suspended, leaving this currency supporting 
the largest pent-up demand. Consequently, the IEME Assistant General Director presented 
the dollar situation as "disastrous".13*
Exports into the United States were un-promising (see table 3.5). They dropped 
after 1945, losing in two years the level gained after the war. In 1947, the effort to 
maintain a high level of imports (index value of 116 as compared to 1943=100) at the 
time of rising inflation in the United States resulted in a dollar shortage since exports 
financed only 70 per cent of imports.1M> Exports to the United States were not sufficient 
to enable Spain’s imports from that country to be resumed on anything like their pre-war 
scale. In 1947, high Spanish export prices combined with high priced American imports 
to reduce trade between both countries by almost 50 per cent.
1M. Ibid., C/A, 17 October 1945, gives account of the cancellation of 
contracts payable in dollars.
ir. The IEME's dollar reserves amounted to $2.1 million while ITT payments 
amounted to $2.6 million; AHBE, IEME, box no. 3: S/C, 6 October 1947.
x>#. Manuel Vila Còrriz, future IEME Director from August 1949 to February 
1955; ibid., S/C, 30 October 1947. He asked for an immediate enlargement of 
the $3.5 million credit granted in the summer of 1947 by the Société de 
Banque Suisse at a high interest. It was obtained, increased up to $9 
million, with gold guarantee in February 1948; ibid., S/C, 30 October and
3 November 1947, and 6, 9, and 16 February 1948.
1,1 • The Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations estimated that, 
in January 1947, American export prices had increased by 243 per cent as 
regards the 1938 level and by 301 per cent in January 1948, wheat and cotton 
being above both levels, Economic Survey of Europe in 1948, cit., p. 95. In 
Spain, as in the rest of Europe, the deterioration of the terms of trade 
with the United States was partially created by American inflation, see 
Giorgio Fodor: "Perché nel 1947 l'Europa ebbe bisogno del Piano Marshall?", 
Rivista di Storia Economica, n.s., voi. 2, no. 1, 1985, pp. 89-123. There 
was an open concern about the rise in prices of most import commodities 
which drastically reduced the import levels in volume; AHBE, IEME, box no. 
7: IEME's annual report for 194 6, dated 25 April 1947.
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TABLE 3 .5
SPAIN'S TRADE WITH USA, 1943-1947
(in millions of gol¿-pesetas)
YEARS
1935
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
IMPORTS 
147 000 
92 671 
111 835 
157 549 
162 195 
107 381
EXPORTS 
55 900 
77 147 
134 570 
177 573 
159 673 
75 543
BALANCE
- 91,100
- 15,524 
4 22,735 
+ 20,024
- 2,522
- 31.838
Source: AEE, years from 194 6 to 1948
The imbalance in trade commodity composition added desperation to any future 
change in the situation. Agricultural commodities accounted for 65 per cent of Spain's 
export trade to the United States in 1946. Cotton, oil, machinery and vehicles accounted 
for 68 per cent of total imports from the United States in the same year. Cotton was 
necessary to provide potential exports to those countries unwilling to expend their scarce 
dollars to purchase cotton textiles from the United States, while oil, machinery and 
transport equipment were major bottlenecks of the Spanish economy. Spain was unable 
to expand exports to the United States, while it could not further reduce its dollar imports 
if reconstruction was not to be impaired. An expansion of exports to the United States 
could not be achieved through the restriction of domestic consumption (as to free 
additional exports) or dumping mechanism. The Spanish Administration had already 
attempted both, with little success, when the first signs of a decreasing trend of exports 
to the United States appeared. At the end of 1945 the Spanish Minister of Industry 
proposed to export 10,000 tons of oil (5 per cent of the annual output) to the United 
States to increase dollar earnings. Given the extremely low level of oil output in 1945 
(68.5 per cent of 1944 and 43 per cent of 1935) the measure was to be implemented 
secretly.*40 Secondly, the subsidies for cork exports were answered by the United Stated 
import authorities by imposing a charge (40 per cent ad valorem) on these same exports 
since November 1947.141 The only way to increase dollar earnings lay in a normal 
panern of trade based on increased output and productivity which would enable the 
Spanish exporters to sell on the United States* market. That meant high investment into
14e. AHBE, I EME, box no. 2: C/A, 17 October 1945.
141. AHBE, IEME, box no. 117 bis: "Inform* relativo a las cuentas combinadas 
de isnportación y exportación", by the National Import—Export Federation, 
Barcelona, 31 October 1947.
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the Spanish economy as the Import Programme had requested.
The Ministry of Industry and Commerce had relied on the United States to 
provide assistance to the Spanish production capacity. It forwarded all imports from the 
United States, which yielded savings in the cost of commodities and delivery and 
technological adjustment to the requirements of Spanish industrial plants. If supply or 
financial difficulties appeared, at least between one third and one half of the total 
requested should come from the United States. The rest could be obtained through normal 
trade channels from traditional suppliers of manufactured goods, the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, Italy and eventually, France.
The second main feature of EEME’s exchange stock was the leading position of 
the pound sterling, which had followed a continuous increase since 1944 (see table 2.7). 
In the autumn of 1947, sterling holdings compensated for 85 per cent of the accumulated 
deficit of the rest of the European currencies and for 60 per cent of the accumulated 
deficit of the European currencies plus the dollar deficit. The surplus position of the 
sterling attracted the largest share of import demand: authorisations to purchase in sterling 
accounted for 60 per cent of authorisations in all currencies.
The large sterling and much reduced dollar holdings could, in part, be explained 
by the expectation of sterling convertibility announced for the 1st of July 1947, under the 
provisions of the Anglo-American Financial Agreement of July 1946. Spanish and British 
officials had already agreed in principle, in February 1947, that Spain, as part of the 
British transferable account area, was to benefit from the announced convertibility. The 
British Transferable Accounts were intended to become the basis of a multilateral trade 
settlements structure in Europe, based on sterling freely transferable among those 
European countries which agreed to accept and hold sterling.145 An official agreement, 
complementary to the monetary agreement of March 1947, was definitely signed in June 
that year (at the time of the new trade and payments agreement). The British desired to
141. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs of the Economic 
Commission for Europe: Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects for 
Europe, Geneva, 1948, p. 99.
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link the Spanish economy to the international economy, or at least to the British one, and 
to end its inward-looking character.143 The agreement, coming into force on the 1st July 
1947, provided for the free convertibility of Spain’s held sterling at the disposal of the 
IEME, as agent of the Spanish Government, for current account transactions to residents 
of countries outside the Spanish monetary area. The prospect of a flexible system of 
compensation, including conversion into dollars for current transactions, may have 
provided an incentive to the Spanish authorities to accumulate sterling and allowed them 
spend dollars beyond prudent limits.
Unfortunately, the convertibility exercise for the pound sterling collapsed on 20 
August 1947 after only six weeks. Transferability rights for sterling accounts and the right 
to automatic convertibility into dollars were suspended.144 The supplementary agreement 
providing for the expendability of Spain’s current sterling, was at first virtually placed in 
abeyance and then formally abrogated in June 1948. It was the dramatic end of the 
Spanish dream of benefitting from a multilateral payments scheme. Spain, without ERP 
membership, could not take pan in the First Agreement on Multilateral Monetary 
Compensation signed in November 1947, which came into effect on 1 January 1948, 
covered only France, Italy and the Benelux countries and lasted ten months.145 It 
remained locked in a suffocating bilateral system of payments, acting as the most effective 
constraint to trade promotion. The only oxygen came from the British facilities for 
obtaining import supplies of cotton, rubber, jute and other raw materials from the Sterling 
Area and petroleum products from British controlled sources. This was a device which 
the British used constantly to improve their commercial bargaining position vis-à-vis the
>4>. "Agreement Supplementary to the Monetary Agreement between the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Spanish Government dated 28th March, 1947", London [HMSO] 26 June 1947. 
The agreement was not signed in February because it was felt that it would 
be embarrassing to give Spain currency spendability then, ahead of some of 
the Allied countries; PRO, FO 371/67895: Treasury to FO, 18 June 1947.
144. For Britain's financial problems and the convertibility crisis of 1947, 
see Sir Alec Cairncross: Years of Recovery. British Economic Policy 194 5-51, 
London [Methuen] 1985.
145. Milward, Reconstruction, cit., p. 263, describes the first monetary
agreement as "of little importance" because the volume of settlements made 
under it was very small: automatic compensation covered about $1.7 million 
out of payments debts totalling $762.1 million; R.W. Bean: "European
multilateral clearing". Journal of Political Economy« vol. 56, 1948, cit. 
in Reconstruction.
190
Spaniards. Trade relations with the United Kingdom were pivotal in these circumstances, 
as will be shown in the following chapter.
The reader should consider other circumstances concerning some of the main 
trading currencies. Most of the inter-bank and commercial credits which fed the deficits 
shown in table 3.4 required either immediate repayment or were exhausted. The IEME’s 
reserves of 35.7 million escudos were necessary to cancel the Bank of Portugal’s 
revolving credit facilities of 40 million escudos before the end of the year. A credit of 8 
million granted by Crédit Suisse, Zurich, allowed for one third of the deficit in Swiss 
francs. Although the credit was not to be repaid before the end of June 1948, by mid- 
October 1947, 96 per cent of the credit was exhausted. On the other hand, Spain had 
exceeded the swing allowed by the bilateral clearing (a maximum of 10 million) by 5.7 
million Swiss francs. This caused the Swiss to cancel all payments to Spain and end 
temporary bilateral trade. With respect to Belgium, by mid-October, Spain had used 71 
per cent of the maximum trade deficit allowed by the National Bank of Belgium. 
Furthermore, it was often necessary to hold part of the reserves to pay pending 
commercial debts. The situation was so critical that even payment to the Spanish 
diplomatic personnel appeared problematic.146
Spain's invisible earnings were also much reduced. The difference between 
official and free market rates of exchange diverted the flow of the possible invisible 
earnings to the black market and to other obscure operations. Despite their constant 
increase between 1941 and 1946, invisible earnings were way below their past 
contribution to the balance of payments. Problems with entry visas for visitors and 
complications over peseta rates did not help tourism to ease balance-of-payments 
difficulties, as would be the case after the mid-1950s onwards. A preferential tourist rate 
(approximately 50 per cent above the commercial rate), initially limited to the dollar, was 
extended to other currencies (sterling, Swiss francs, escudos and Argentine pesos) in 
August 1946. When the restoration of the preferential rate of exchange, suspended in 
1942, was discussed, it was feared that the country’s poor tourist structure (hotels and
***. Paragraph based upon AHBE, IEME, box no. 3: S/C, 3 and 16 October 1947.
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transports facilities) would mitigate against any benefits and would only open a door to 
illicit foreign currency operations.147 This was partially avoided by the requirement for 
travellers entering Spain to exchange officially a certain minimum amount of foreign 
currency. At the same time, foreign exchange was only granted to Spaniards for travel 
abroad when the journey was considered to be in the national interest, the Spanish 
authorities making no provision for tourist travel. Income from tourism increased 
progressively but weakly from 1945 (£811,555) to 1947 (£3 million).14*
The extension of the preferential rate in August 1946 to capital transfers to Spain 
by Spaniards and to remittances did not compensate for changing at official rate other 
than in the black market149 Remittances increased slightly between 1945 and 1947 in 
£710,396.150 The transfer entry in Spain's balance of payments for 1946-1947 remained 
at 30 per cent of its 1931-1932 level The tourist rate served, however, to open the door 
for pressure groups to request its extension to other various financial operations.151 The 
application of the preferential rate was extended, in December, to cover a variety of other 
transactions for living expenses, fares payable in foreign currency, travelling and 
education expenses, private insurance premiums and newspaper subscriptions, but, as far 
as possible, its application was designed to avoid affecting the amount in foreign currency 
due to a foreign creditor.132
The regulation about foreign investment mentioned in the previous chapter did not 
change. Spanish legislation limited the contribution of foreign capital to capital formation, 
balance of payments and increase of productivity, by restricting foreign capital in 
enterprises to a maximum of 25 per cent (up to 45 per cent with the explicit permission
AHBE, IEME, box no. 2: C/A, 21 November and 11 December 1945.
14*. AHBE, IEME, box no. 7: IEME'» annual reporta for the corresponding
years.
AHBE, IEME, box no. 3: S/C, 16 October 1947.
>M. AHBE, IEME, box no. 7: lEME's annual reports for the corresponding
years.
“J. AHBE, IEME, box no. 3: S/C, 29 May 1947.
. A guide to the conplexities of financial legislation is Fernando 
Eguidazu: Intervención monetaria v control de cambios en España (1900-1977) 
Orígenes v evolución del control de cambios en Espafta. Madrid [Héroes] 1978.
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of Council of Ministers) and virtually blocking the transfer of dividens and royalties.133 
In July 1947, a law was passed reasserting the existing prohibition on foreign holdings 
of more than 25 per cent in Spanish companies. This prohibition now affected all Spanish 
companies instead of only Spanish manufacturing companies as before. This amount could 
be raised to 45 per cent in special circumstances. Any higher percentages could only be 
authorised by the Council of Ministers, although commercial associations could never 
surpass 10 per cent of foreign capital and in mining no more than 49 per cen t154 A 
relaxation of legal dispositions was discussed in 1947 but the legislation lasted until 1957 
as a discouragement to foreign investment133
There had also been significant liquidation of foreign overseas assets during the 
Spanish Civil War and the immediate post-war, in particular in Argentina, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States.136 Furthermore, restrictions applying in 
several countries, especially in the United States, did not allow to transfer benefits. The 
Spanish-owned assets in the United States, amounting to some $50 to $60 million, 
remained blocked by the Truman Administration and could not be used by the Spaniards 
as guarantees in obtaining bank credits. Their release depended upon the conclusion of 
the Safe Haven negotiations.137 After a seven-year freeze, they were released on 28 May 
1948.13' It had taken place a few days after the signature of the agreement on German 
assets and the agreement in principle with the Spanish Government to restore to the Allies
1M. Act. for the Promotion and Defence of Domestic Industry, 24 November 
1939, art. 5.
154. Ramón Tamarnes : The Spanish Economy. An Introduction, London [C. Hurst] 
1986 (English version of Estructura Econòmica de España, Madrid [Alianza 
Editorial] 1985 (16th ed.)], p. 181.
1M. AHBE, IEME, box no. 3: S/C, 22 May 1947.
154. See the negative short-term capital balance of the Spanish balance of 
payments during 1941-44 in Carreras: "La renta y la riqueza", cit., table 
13.26, p. 573.
181. FRUS, 1948, III, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs Norman Armour of telephone conversation, Washington, 26 
March, p. 1030.
lM. Area Handbook for Spain, Washington [US Government printing Office] 
1976, p. 275.
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the gold identified as Nazi loot.139 The gold assets in the Bank of Spain were equivalent 
to Pts 1,215 million at the end of 1947, one half those in 1935. The IEME Steering 
Committee proposed to maintain them since their amount could never cover the deficit 
in current account140 Finally, the potential response of borrowing from abroad as to 
finance imports was, only partially, a feasible option for Spain.
It has been most recently argued that the Franco regime had an adversión to 
international financial aid.161 Contrary to this opinion, in the summer of 1946, the credit 
policy regarded "indispensable” to bind "the largest possible number of foreign interests" 
to the Spanish economy.162 Foreign private credits flew lixnitedly to Western Europe as 
a whole, while the Spanish economy did not attract them and the Spanish authorities 
found it most difficult to provide gold as collateral. They presented, however, the most 
undesirable profile: short tom  profitable investment at high interest rates. With respect 
to government long-term loans, only Argentina was a possible creditor. With this country', 
despite the already pending credit, financial bilateral negotiations were under way.163 
However, as it was already mentioned, Argentine credits could not be used for industrial
l5f. AHBE, box no. 3: S/C, 1 June 194B. The Spaniards, however, had melted 
previously part of the gold which was identifiable as Nazi loot; MAE, Leg. 
2309, exp. 2: session of 2 March 1944 of the Interministerial Commission of 
Treaties. For details on the Safe Haven negotiations from the French 
viewpoint, see Jean—Marc Delaunay: "La liquidation des avoirs allemands en 
Espagne (1945—1961)", in Jean—Pierre Etienvre and José Ramón Urquijo Goitia: 
España, Francia y la Comunidad Europea, Madrid [Centro Superior de 
Investigaciones Científicas] 1989, pp. 219—45. Portuguese assets in the 
Onited States were unblocked in September 1946, FRUS, III, note on p. 1002.
1#0. Already in July 1946, an operation to feed the country's foreign 
reserves was the selling of 200 tons of silver in New York and gold in 
Switzerland; AHBE, IEME, box no. 2: C/A, 24 July 1946. The purchase of 50 
tons of ingot silver interested the Chase National Bank of New York at the 
end of 1947; ibid, box no. 3: S/C, 8 November 1947. The selling of silver 
was about to be suspended in May the following year due to ; rice decrease. 
The situation in reserves forced the selling; ibid, S/C, 12 and 16 May 1948.
m . Catalan's "Los años cuarenta...", cit.
143. MAE, Leg. R. 4618, Exp. 2: "Nota relativa a los problemas que se
plantean en la Subsecretaría llamada de Comercio, Política Arancelaria y 
Moneda", Saint Sebastian, 29 July 194 6, probably drafted by the Director 
General of Economic Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Emilio 
Navasqüés, for his Minister. This section deals with the problems posed to 
foreign economic policy while, for the institutional implications of this 
document see chapter one, pp. 39 ff.
1<J. Spain had expanded so much foodstuffs supply from Argentina, which 
accounted in 1947 for 43.6 per cent of total Spain's imports, in particular 
wheat, that by mid-October 1947, 82 per cent of the credit facilities
granted by Argentina in 1946 had been consumed; AHBE, IEME, box no. 3: S/C, 
16 October 1947.
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purposes. The Swiss only accepted profitable financial operations and it was doubtful 
whether they could grant any large credit for industrial modernisation. However, it was 
also evident that they could not step out too much from the general pattern adopted 
regarding Spain.164 In such circumstances, there could be no hope on counting on 
foreign credits to purchase an appreciable proportion of the extra imports requested for 
the rehabilitation of the Spanish economy and productive capacity (see table 3.6).
TABLE 3.6
INTER-BANK CREDITS AND GOVERNMENT LOANS GRANTED TO SPAIN, 1945-1947
1945
Société de Banque Suisse 7.5 million Swiss francs
1946
Argentine Government
External Redeemable Loan 400 million pesos
Revolving credit facilities 350 million pesos
Bank of Portugal
Revolving credit facilities 40 million escudos
Credit Suisse 8 million Swiss francs
1947
Société de Banque Suisse $3.5 million
Source: Own elaboration from IEME files. See detailed
references at different points in text.
The IEME considered the obtainment of American public credits either in direct 
form or through the ERP as out of the question.165 Any financial assistance from the 
United States, the country able to grant assistance on a scale large enough to serve as a 
basis for medium-term industrial plans, presented a most undesirable political character. 
Top American officials, as will be shown in the following sections, had constantly 
declared that the United States Government was not considering granting any credit to 
Spain unless a change in its political regime took place. The application for Marshall Aid 
shows by itself that the Franco regime did not have a sui generís adversión to 
international aid. It was always a matter of the political conditions involved. The official 
Spanish policy determined to accept credits "when the credit and investment conditions 
are economic without mortgaging or injuring other national interests.”166 Despite the 
clear needs of the economy, the Spanish Administration would not accept economic and
1H. ibid.
AHBE, IEME, bo* no. 2: C/A, 8 July 1947, and ibid, box no. 3: S/C, 16 
October 1947.
MAE, Leg. 4618, exp. 2: Note dated Saint Sebastian on 29 July 1946, cit.
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financial assistance if it risked Franco’s political regime. In other words, the Spanish 
Government would only accept credits free from political conditions.
Spain could only rely, in the main, on its own resources to finance the additional 
supplies of goods and raw materials required from abroad. Export trade had earned 75.8 
per cent of all foreign currency earnings registered by the IEME in 1946, while it had 
been 66.6 per cent in 1945.167 Prospect of obtaining either long or short-term 
international credit was virtually non-existent in the immediate future and other non­
commercial earnings of foreign currency could only provide little relief. Imports could 
only be financed by the equivalent exports, which had then to be fully promoted:
"To alleviate the precarious foreign exchange position and 
seen that in the near future we cannot count upon any other 
assistance [the Minister of Industry and Commerce] estimates 
that there is no other procedure than to stimulate 
exports.
Spain’s main trading feature after its Civil War was a decline of about 50 per cent in 
trade volume as shown in the following quantum index, which measures changes in the 
value of trade when effects of price movements are removed:
TABLE 3.7 
SPAIN'S QUANTUM INDEX, 1930-1948
Export Import
1935 100 100
1944 65.3 41.5
1945 61.6 46.8
1946 50.8 51.8
1947 53.4 63.3
1948 65.1 69.3
Tena, op. cit., table 6.6, p. 353.
The adverse visible balance, which was so characteristic of the pre-1936 years and masked 
temporarily by heavy Allied preemptive purchases of wolfram during the world war, 
reappeared in 1946 and increased still further in 1947 and 1948. Spain's exports could not 
expand greatly due to the slow recovery of output and the comparatively high and rising
>r>. AHBE, IEME, box no. 7: IEME'a annual reports for 1945 and 1946.
***. AHBE, IEME, box no. 2: C/A, 8 July 1947. See also ibid, box no. 3: S/C,
16 October 1947.
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cost of many Spanish products.1*9
The decline in agricultural production (the sector accounted for 67 per cent of 
pre-Civil War exports) held up any substantial expansion of exports. Without much 
greater supplies of nitrogenous fertilisers and a wider use of farm tractors, progress toward 
larger output was bound to be slow. It could only do little more than cover the additional 
consumption needs arising from the one percent growth of population per annum. The 
contribution of raw materials (chiefly minerals) to exports, important during the war due 
to price increases (31 per cent of total exports in 1940-1944), progressively declined from 
1944 as result of the fall in home production and foreign prices. Iron ore and pyrites, at 
the time two of Spain’s most important basic industries and traditional expons, were 
producing below the 1935 level, leaving little margin for increasing the exports in the 
field. The downward trend of mineral production, with a few notable exceptions, could 
only be reversed by a rise in productivity levels via reequipment. The suspension of trade 
with Germany and France, after the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1946 respectively, 
imposed important limits to the degree of recovery of Spanish expon trade. Both had been 
important traditional expon markets for Spain. Before the Civil War, Germany and France 
were Spam’s second and third largest consumers, taking 25 per cent of Spanish exports. 
The commodity composition of Spanish export trade, dominated by agricultural produce, 
reduced her capacity to replace traditional export markets. It was then believed that an 
effective promotion of exports, following the rise of purchasing power in Europe, went 
necessarily through a promotion of manufactured goods, in particular textiles, chemicals 
and goods from the coal and steel industry. Manufactured goods, headed by textiles, had 
made a striking advance aided by the keen demand created by world shortages. 
Compensation for the diminution in traditional exports had partially come from this side. 
It remained to be seen, however, how Spanish textiles and many other manufactured
**'. For remainder of the chapter it is important to bear in mind that not 
all trad« earned foreign exchange. Undetermined percentages of Spain's 
export trade took place on the basis of a barter system of exchange or 
diverted exchange earnings to the black market. This percentage of trade is 
unimportant for the purpose of this section because it could not be 
channelled to finance the Import Programme. The reader should also consider 
that the IEME recorded trade involving foreign exchange operations. Those 
commodities imported on the basis of credits (the total imports of cereals 
from Argentina in 1946) or through a barter system of exchange (Chilean 
nitrate) are, therefore, excluded.
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goods were to fare when price again became a deciding factor on world markets.
The high price of domestic raw materials was a main obstacle to the development 
of some competitive industries and hampered the sale of the export surpluses. When at 
the beginning of 1947 the EE ME announced that new possibilities to place manufactured 
goods in foreign markets existed, requested larger imports of raw materials to keep 
production prices as low as possible.170 The first alarm bells rang in the spring/summer 
of 1946 when the constant decrease in the position of foreign currency reserves revealed 
the weak potential of Spanish exports.171 The export expansion expected for 1946 had 
not taken place. The lack of recovery of some traditional markets, in particular Germany, 
was considered partially responsible. However, the major obstacle was perceived to come 
from the inflationary tendency of the domestic market. Discounting rationed commodities, 
Spain’s wholesale prices by May 1946 increased between 200 to 300 per cent compared 
to 1939.172 Spain could not hope forever to place high-priced exports on the European 
markets. Moreover, the very remunerative prices obtained on the domestic market made 
exports unattractive. Transitory measures concerning individual commodities (export 
subsidies combined with import surcharges) could only be considered a prelude to more 
general measures.
The reports favoured some reforms to activate trade but a straight-forward 
devaluation was not recommended. Its possible inflationary effects were most feared. It 
was also believed that sterling convertibility would have a positive effect on Spain's 
balance of payments, making unnecessary, or at least postponing, any decision on the 
matter. The IEME authorities considered that the increase in prices affected a limited 
range of products. The important decreases that had taken place between 1945 and 1946
170. AHBE, IEME, box no. 7s IEME's annual report for 1946, dated 25 April
1947, p. 3.
171. AHBE, IEME, box no. 117 bia: "Disminución de exportaciones" by Florencio
Sánchez, Chief of the Export Service at the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce to the General Director of Trade, 10 May 1946; ibid., box no. 66: 
"Consejo de Economía Nacional, Nota sobre la balanza de pagos en relación 
con la situación económica en general" by Antonio de Miguel, n/d, probably 
May 1946; ibid., box no. 2: the Minister of Industry and Commerce at C/A,
28 March and 24 July 1946; MAE, Leg. 4618, exp. 2: Note dated Saint
Sebastian, 29 July 1946, cit.
173. AHBE, IEME, box no. 117 bis: "Disminución de exportaciones", cit.
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m traditional commodities, such as hazelnuts, almonds, mercury and iron ore, were not 
always linked to p ice  effects. The decrease in mercury exports was attained as other 
sources of supply recovered and iron ore exports fell because of local output levels. The 
fall in exports was considerably balanced by increases in olives, cork, textiles, oranges, 
wine and the reappearance of tomatoes and bananas. Spanish exports appeared to continue 
to benefit from the discrimination against hard currency which followed the collapse of 
the sterling convertibility and the desire to improve diets. Rather than resort to devaluation 
to redress the situation, the Spanish Government adopted a variety of expedients as an 
indirect specific corrective mechanism to the exchange rate. Compensation, combined 
accounts, some ad hoc subsidies and compulsory export quotas (for conon textiles, olive
oil and lead) appeared sufficient for the purpose of promoting exports.173
The compensation system allowed exporters of some industrial commodities, using 
raw or semi-manufactured goods scarce on the domestic market, to import duty-free a 
given quantity of goods necessary to produce the commodity previously exported. The 
system attempted to favour exporters via imports at prices lower than domestic supply to 
increase their international competitiveness. Combined accounts allowed exporters 
(especially of industrial goods) to retain part of their exchange earnings in order to import 
goods directly related to their productive activity. The compensators imports could be 
authorised up to the value of either 34, 50 or, in some exceptional cases, even 100 per 
cent of the goods exported, the exact percentage calculated to cover the loss suffered on 
the exports.174 The condition was that the account gave a general profit never lower than 
66 per cent of the total value of exports under the combined operation, 25 per cent of 
which ought to be in hard currency. The system was originally designed to free 
export/importers from strict dependence upon IE ME. The weight exercised by pressure 
groups turned it into an indirect subsidy of the export concerned. The exporter covered
171. A package of measures was adopted on 30 August, Ministerio de Industria
y Comercio: Disposiciones legales sobre operaciones de comercio exterior 
(Admisiones temporales, repatriación de divisas, cuentas combinadas y
exenciones arancelarias), 2nd ed., Madrid [Gráficas Larra] 1947.
174. In Italy a similar measure applied to 50 per cent of the foreign 
exchange earned by the exporter; Paolo Savona: "La stabilizzazione monetaria 
in Italia e il Piano Marshall", in Aga Rossi (ed.), op. cit., pp. 161-88, 
p. 182. Strong criticisms of the measure were formulated in terms that the 
benefits of the export boom ended in the exporters' pockets rather than in 
increasing the country's reserves.
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any loss be might have suffered as a result of exporting goods below cost by importing 
certain goods on which he could recoup his loss owing to the difference between Spanish 
and world prices. The system has been strongly criticised by most authors. However, 
criticism does not correspond in proper terms to the system itself (adopted in several other 
Western European countries at the time), but to the conditions of the domestic market 
which distorted it, making a caricature of the original intentions out of it.
Trade performance in the first half of 1947 was disastrous. The first seven months 
of the year accounted for 66 per cent of the accumulated deficit since 1945. Although 
unbalanced trade constituted a traditional feature of Spain’s foreign sector, now it 
appeared as most dangerous, because the country’s reserves of foreign exchange were 
unable to finance any large deficit. An increasing number of Spanish export commodities, 
it was said, had reached price levels which, at the official rate of exchange, placed them 
at a crippling disadvantage on world markets. If, in 1946, only few exportable 
commodities were affected to an important extent, in 1947, production costs of some of 
the major export items rose, making exports increasingly difficult, unless prices below 
cost were accepted. Woollens, it was argued, were offered at prices 60 per cent above 
world prices; cotton textiles, nuts, onions, lead, wines, canned fish, wolfram, raisins at 50 
per cent: oranges at between 40 and 60 per cent; olives at 40 per cent; sheny, grapes, 
brandy, bananas, minerals and cork at between 20 and 30 per cent. During 1947 it was 
estimated that exports of cotton textiles, wines, cork, rosin and brandy would only reach 
60 per cent of the 1946 level Some citrus fruits, apricots, bananas, canned goods and iron 
minerals would only reach 50 per cent of the 1946 level, while olives, skins and 
turpentine would only reach 30 per cent. The only products Spain could export at 
international prices with benefit for the exporter were basically, olive oil, tomatoes, potash 
and iron pyrites. In these circumstances, the different expedients did not give the desired 
results creating many complications and inequalities of commercial return and treatment 
without building up exports on a firm and permanent basis.175
Different sectors within the Spanish Administration favoured devaluation to
l1s. Paragraph based on AHBE, IEME, box no. 3s S/C, 16 October 1947.
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remedy the situation and proposed even an 85 percent devaluation vis-à-vis the dollar.176 
There seemed to be no more opportunity for transitory measures. The measures adopted 
in August 1946 and subsidies were considered by the IEME as obstacles to a normal 
development of trade "acceptable only at a given circumstance” and to be abolished as 
soon as possible.177 Subsidies could only work efficiently exceptionally. They had no 
flexibility to adapt prices to the changing conditions of international markets. Furthermore, 
a subsidy system extended to most export commodities would find it most difficult to 
raise enough money, apart from the risk of general retaliation.178 Combined accounts 
did not produce the expected results due to the permanent lack of supply to the internal 
market The trading system adopted in the summer of 1946 neither promoted exports nor 
gave satisfaction to the internal market. Its main results were an increase in import prices, 
an acceleration of the inflationary rate and speculative financial operations with its direct 
reflection on the weakening of the peseta on the international exchange markets. If the 
different commercial practices amounted, in essence, to partial devaluation, was it not a 
more sensible option to devalue, thereby side-stepping many administrative and 
obstructionist procedures?
Devaluation would have certainly helped Spanish exports in the long term. The 
problem, however, was to determine its short-term effects on the supply side and its 
capacity to finance, in particular, the immediate commercial deficit. Pent-up demand 
would ensure a high level of imports, and their higher-price (because of the lack of 
reserves) would immediately raise the import bill. This, it was feared, would speed up the
m . Ibid, containing a report presented to the Council of Ministers, via the 
Minister of Industry. The report was signed by all the IEME S/C members: 
Emilio Navasqüés, Under—Secretary of Foreign Economy and Commerce; Mariano 
Yturralde, Director General of Economic Policy; Luciano Albo, Director 
General of Commerce and Tariff Policy; Juan Fernández Casas, Director 
General of Banking and Exchange Stock; Manuel Vila, Assistant Director 
General of the IEME; Alejandro Bermúdez González, Secretary of IEME; and the 
IEME Chairman Bias Huete.
177. AHBE, IEME, box no. 7: IEME's annual report for 1947.
17#. AHBE, IEME, box no. 3: S/C, 19 May 1947; and ibid., box no. 2: C/A, 8 
July 1947. The chief commodities to which subsidies applied were cork and 
almonds. The funds derived largely from an ad valorem surcharge of 30 per 
cent and, in few cases 70 per cent, on imports of items of Class V 
(machinery) of the Customs Tariff. Generally speaking, the Spanish 
authorities were reluctant to subsidise exports directly and preferred, 
whenever possible, to have recourse to the indirect subsidy under a combined 
account operation.
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inflationary tendency of the internal market, which would reduce in the short-term the 
price advantage supposedly obtained by export commodities from devaluation. The 
Spanish economy was starving for imports and no further restriction (even temporary) was 
possible. Spanish imports were essential to feed the population and to avoid strategic 
bottlenecks, the minimum the Spanish economy could afford to avoid a collapse. The 
supply of the domestic market in the short-term (even on a day-by-day basis) remained 
by far the most important concern of the Spanish Government. An economy characterised 
by a conglomeration of bottlenecks could not forego any temporary diminution of imports.
Without any substantial foreign assistance and, in the absence of hard currency 
reserves to finance the Import Programme’s minimal requirements, to follow an 85 
percent devaluation -as was requested-, meant that Spanish 1946 exports had to expand 
by 243 per cent Could it be assured that Spanish exports would automatically expand 
sufficiently enough to cover the import bill? After the first three months of the year a 
drastic change in the country’s export trade was observed. A general stagnation in 
traditional exports had taken place. International demand was perceived as increasing the 
pressure on the import of capital goods. In fact, the results at the end of the year 
(regarding foreign exchange earnings exclusively) confirmed this (see table 3.8).
TABLE 3 .8
EARNINGS OF FOMEXCN EXCHANGE BY EXPORT COMOOZTY CROUPS
(in peseta*)
1946 % 1947 %
Agricultural comm. 31,623,527 70 32,413,665 57
Raw materials 4,381,592 10 7,707,112 14
Manufactured goods 9,240,219 20 16,258,802 29
of which textiles 2,474,093 5 11,245,573 20
Source: AHBE, IEME, box no. 7: IEME's annual report for 1947.
Spain’s imparts could be broken down into about eight hundred commodities of industrial 
and manufactured goods, most of them indispensable to the development of domestic 
industry. These imports needed to be financed mainly by exports of perishable foodstuffs 
(mainly fruits, wine, alcoholic beverages and olive oil). The Spanish Government had 
little hope that lower priced exports, more than 50 per cent of which were non-essentials, 
would increase in the short-run. Most Western European countries had fostered domestic 
production, imposed import restrictions and distorted trade in agricultural commodities,
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which affected semi-luxuries such as lemons, preserved vegetables, sherry and grapes. 
Decreasing international demand for agricultural commodities prevented expansion in the 
volume of the main category of Spanish exports with the consequence of diminishing 
export returns. Spain’s second biggest export trade sector, raw materials, minerals in 
particular, ran counter the exhaustion of the mineral richness of the soil. With agricultural 
exports facing difficulties, once immediate relief had passed, the export of industrial 
products seemed to offer the only way of achieving the supplies required. The structural 
modification of Spain’s export commodity composition was a long-term task. Devaluation, 
it was feared, would have a negative direct effect, via higher-priced supply of raw 
materials, on what appeared the most dynamic export sector, manufactured goods (mostly 
textiles). Until the national economy overcame specific import bottlenecks, thereby raising 
efficient production, there would be no solution to Spam's export trade. Devaluation 
unsupported by outside financial resources was perceived as running counter to the 
interests of the Spanish economy. The Government relied on the above-mentioned 
expedients with all their inequalities and administrative difficulties as palliative to the 
exchange rate adjustment. In the attempt to boost exports without reducing imports, 
devaluation appeared as too drastic an alternative and was rejected in November 1947 by 
the Council of Ministers who, in turn, proposed a deflationary policy.179
The Import Programme could be perceived as the Ministry of Industry’s response 
to inflation from the supply side.1*0 It was believed at the time that inflation was caused 
by the scarcity of consumer goods and crippled industrial plant incapable of turning out 
the necessary quantities of goods. It was also partly caused by the lack of foreign
X7>. AHBE, IEME, box no. 3: S/C, 11 November 1947. Special powers were also 
taken by the Government on 14 November to promote exports of "national 
interest" by exceptional measures including compulsion; Vinas et al., op. 
cit., p. 518. The National Federation of Importers and Exporters agreed with 
the Government that devaluation was not the best way out. They preferred an 
extension of the combined accounts as a corrective measure of the exchange 
rate; ibid., box no. 117 bis: "Informe relativo a las cuentas combinadas",
31 October 1947, cit.
1,0. José Antonio Piera Labra, State Commercial Technician soon to be 
appointed as liasion—official with the American Embassy for the investment 
of the U.S. assistance, adopted the same attitude to the Ministry of 
Industry, calling for the participation in the Marshall Plan and the 
drafting of a reconstruction plan, "Economia española y politica econòmica 
exterior", Información Comercial Española, no. 348, August 1962 [written in 
1947/48], pp. 119-33.
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assistance which forced the Spanish authorities to choose an inflationary path to 
recovery.1*1 The shortage of foreign exchange produced a shortage of raw materials, 
obliging manufactures to use expensive and frequently inadequate local substitutes and to 
cover their demand by recourse to the black market at exorbitant prices, thus inflating 
costs. Shortage of equipment resulted in continued re-use of obsolescent machinery which 
raised the cost of manufactured goods. The Import Programme aimed at the recovery of 
the broken-down industrial plant, based on foreign assistance, so as to create an industrial 
plan able in the future to mass-produce a flow of consumer goods. Any other action on 
the demand side, the end to large and persistent government deficits, fiscal reforms, 
rigorous enforcement of direct controls, price-wages pauses and the reduction of military 
expenditure, escaped the Ministry of Industry’s direct attributions.142
Short-term inflation was not, however, the primary objective of the Import 
Programme. The targets selected to remove bottlenecks would add pressure to short-term 
inflation and the programme was not designed to supply consumer goods to the economy 
but basic goods to heavy industry. The programme of extensive railway electrification in 
a time of scarcity of capital and electrical equipment and power shortage could not be 
conceived as anu-inilationary. It might be for this reason that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs requested $600 million of interim aid to import consumer and capital goods. That 
Ministry used the Import Programme's second draft to unofficially present the Spanish
1#1. Clavera et al., op. cit., p. 242; Bustelo and Gabriel Tortella-Casares: 
"Monetary Inflation in Spain, 1880-1970", The Journal of European Economic 
History, no. 1, 1976, pp. 141-50, p. 148; and González, La economía
política, cit., chapter two.
lft2. Few authors had paid attention to the measures adopted to stabilise the 
Spanish economy during 1948: i.e. Emilio Fontela Montes: Commerce extérieur 
et dévelopement économique: L'Espagne, cas particulier, Geneva [Librairie 
E. Droz] 1962, pp. 37 and 39; Clavera et al., op. cit., p. 146; and Juan 
Velarde Fuertes: a) "El intento de estabilización económica española en 
1947-48", paper delivered at the School of Economics, Universidad de 
Barcelona, n/d, for which I am most grateful to Professor José Maria Serrano 
Sanz who provided me with a copy of the text; and b) "1875-1986: Historia 
de un proceso de apertura económica al exterior", Política Exterior, vol.
I, no. 2, Spring 1987, pp. 91-113. The latter speaks of the "1948 
Stabilisation Plan" in an attempt to counterbalance the 1959 Stabilisation 
Plan. Action to curb the persistent inflationary tendency consisted in a 
reduction of public expenditure, a rise in interest rates and credit 
restrictions. It had been the readiness of the banks to provide advances in 
a buoyant market which had helped to stimulate a sharp rise in prices in
1946. Inflation stopped momentously in 1948 as did the cost of living index. 
Prices increased by only 7 per cent when the rise had been 31 per cent in
1946 and 18 per cent in 1947.
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request for ERP membership.1*3 Despite the fact that the Ministry of Industry had felt 
that a cut of almost $225 million was necessary from the first to the second drafts, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs unilaterally increased the import bill to $1,051 million. That 
is, $375 million over what the Ministry of Industry had already considered difficult to 
obtain.
The financial situation this section has tried to show -the unfavourable relation 
between resources and import needs- was a transitional as well as a permanent 
situation of crisis. The need to halt the issue of import licenses and payment was a 
temporary- expedient and not the signal that the country was on the edge of collapse. As 
the new year of 1948 started, new commercial credits became available. The paucity of 
exchange reserves during 1947 was provoked by the exhaustion of the commercial 
facilities allowed by the bilateral trade and payments agreements due to the rising demand 
of imports for higher output. During the second half of 1947 imports climbed to a 
maximum, while exports showed a progressive incapacity to finance them. The difficult 
Spanish payments position in current account of 1946 became very disturbing during 
1947. The Spanish Administration did not request Marshall Aid to rescue a country on 
the edge of collapse but to help it to get the dollars they needed for modernisation and 
development.1*4
In January 1948 a Commission was set up to allocate the foreign exchange 
available for imports. The total resources available for the first half of the year were
1,1. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 2: "Memorándum", 15 November 1947.
lM- Credit authorisations were suspended for good commercial reasons. Had 
it not been so, it was feared, Spain would have been deprived of its only 
solid base for trading relations: "crédito de buenos y puntuales pagaderos"; 
MAE, Leg, 2185, exp. 9: "Su nota 22.5.47. Importaciones de carbón y
chatarra", Under—Secretary of Foreign Economy and Commerce to the Under­
secretary of Industry, 26 May 1947. An interesting hypothesis, which 
requires further testing, is that the industrial "boom" taking place in 1948 
(a rise in four and a half percentage points over 1947) had its immediate 
roots in the high import demand taking place in 1947. The highest industrial 
rate of the 1930s was finally and definitively (after the 1949 recession) 
reached in 1950. For Spain's industrial index and long-term industrial 
perspective see Carreras: "La producción industrial española, 1842—1981: 
construcción de un Índice anual", Revista de Historia Económica, no. 1, 
1984, pp. 127-57, reproduced in Industrialización, op. cit., pp. 65—88; 
"Consecuencias a largo plazo de la Guerra Civil sobre la industria 
española", Economistas, no. 21, August—September 198*6, pp. 12—15; and "La 
industria: atraso y modernización", in Nadal et al., op. cit., pp. 280—312.
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calculated to reach Pts 2,071 million. '15 This figure was the result of commercial credits 
granted through bilateral trade dealings, a few inter-bank credits, plus an estimate of 
export earnings. The Commission reserved the necessary money to purchase commodities 
under State trade (tobacco and petroleum products) and to cover the State's financial 
payments abroad. Both categories amounted to 20 per cent of the resources. The 
Commission also reserved a special fund (the so-called ’’incidentals” account), amounting 
to a further 10 per cent of the total. The Commission, after reducing the total amount of 
foreign exchange available by 30 per cent, distributed the remaining Pts 1.500 million into 
seven categories of essential imports (see table 3.9). Annual provisions doubled the 
amounts available with a very similar allocation by categories.
TABLE 3.9
ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESOURCES, 1" HALF OF 1948
(in millions of dollars)
CATEGORIES QUOTA %
Transport 15.6 11.7
Canary Islands# 4.8 3.6
Agricultural Commodities 55.4 41.4
Chemicals and Fertilisers 14.1 10.5
Textile-fiber, paper pulp,
wood and dyestuffs 34.6 25.9
Metals, oils, coal, scrap íelectric material 9.3 6.9
TOTAL 133.8* 100
Source: AHBE, IEME, box no. 117 bis: "Memorandum relativo al plan de
distribución del contingente de divisas para el primer semestre de 194 8", 
30 January 1948. (*) Out of a total figure of $137 million (♦) The Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce allocated exchange for inports into the Islands.
Exchange resources for 1948 represented 40 and 60 per cent of the amount of imports 
required by the Import Programme’s first and second drafts, respectively. In relation to 
the Import Programme, considered as a four-year programme of imports, exchange 
resources for 1948 were 160 per cent and 240 per cent of the annual import requirements 
of the first and second drafts, respectively. However, several further qualifications seem 
immediately necessary.
The Import Programme had concentrated all financial resources on raw materials
ABBE, IEME, box no. 117 bis: "Memorándum relativo al plan de
distribución del contingente de divisas para el primer semestre de 1948", 
30 January 1948.
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and capital goods, while now the Commission had to allocate 41.4 per cent of the 
available resources to purchase agricultural commodities. Discounting them, the resources 
available for 1948 amounted to 90 per cent and 137 per cent of the total annual amount 
of the first and second drafts, respectively. Another major difference is that the Import 
Programme represented investment additional to the normal trade pattern. Normal trade 
allocations, which was the case of the Commission in January 1948, could finance the 
Import Programme only partially. Transport and fertilisers received similar annual 
allocations: $32.5 million and $29.5 (chemicals) while the Import Programme allocated 
$36.7 million and $10 million (exclusively to fertilisers), respectively. On the contrary, 
basic industries received $9.2 million while the Import Programme had forecast $47.4 
million for them and tractors as well as machine-tools had disappeared from priority7 
purchasing.
Furthermore important was the fact that while the dollar purchasing programme 
had assumed massive dollar assistance, now the allocation Committee had to face the 
problem of distribution of the different inconvertible currencies (see table 3.10).
TABLE 3.10
SPAIN'S EARNINGS BY MONETARY AREAS OF ORIGIN 
PROVISIONS FOR THE 1** HALF OF 1948
(in percentage over total earnings)
Pound sterling 31.25
Argentine peso 30.40
Dollar 18.60
Dutch guilder 4.95
Pesetas 3.44
Belgian franc 3.20
Swedish kroner 2.40
Swiss franc 2.00
Danish kroner 1.30
Escudos 1.20
Norwegian kroner 0.53
French franc 0.40
Chilean dollar 0.06
Italian lire 0.05
Moroccan franc 0.02
TOTAL 100
Source: AHBE, IEME, box no, 117 bis: "Memorandum relativo al plan de
distribución del contingente de divisas para el primer semestre de 194 8", 
30 January 1948.
The breakdown of Spain’s earnings by monetary area provides a more stressing image of 
the limited room for manoeuvre of the Spanish Administration in January 1948. Import
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requirements were to be distributed by countries according exclusively to currency 
holdings. Purchases in Argentina of non-capital goods corresponded to 30.4 per cent of 
total earnings. Only 58 per cent of dollar resources could be used for commodity trade, 
the rest being necessary to pay financial debts.116 The sterling area provided greater 
relief, since only 18 per cent was to be reserved for non-commercial purposes. The 
amounts of the various kinds of foreign exchange held at any given moment influenced 
most the Spanish import licensing policy. Licenses were granted for a certain commodity 
from one country and refused for the same commodity from another, which maybe even 
offered better qualities or prices, because Spain was then much shorter of the currency of 
the latter country than that of the first Prices meant less than the currency in which the 
price had to be paid. The financial limits of bilateralism, as we will see in the following 
chapter, constituted the main hindrance to any substantial expansion of trade. Furthermore, 
it provides the grounds for assuming that Spain’s exclusion from the European Payments 
Union (EPU) represented the most disturbing feature of the country’s future relations with 
the different institutionalised forms of economic integration. Excluding Spain from the 
EPU meant depriving her of the benefits of a system in which surpluses and deficits were 
balanced for each country with the whole group of trading partners, rather than with each 
partner separately.1*7
The permanent weakness of the situation this chapter has described -limited 
financial resources to undertake modernisation attempts- was that the Spanish economy 
could not, on the basis of the country’s own resources, stage major recovery. Foreign 
trade could only provide the basis for the long-term transformation of the Spanish 
economy; a slow process which implied a widening of the gap with the most 
industrialised economies of Western Europe. Within a bilateral trading framework, Spain, 
as any other country in Western Europe, was forced to purchase non-essentials to obtain 
the quantities and qualities of essentials from a given country. Token imports were 
imported at a higher quantity than the import authorities would have allowed, in an
AHBE, IEME, box no. 117 bias Consejo Regulador dal Comercio Exterior, 
25th and 26th sessions: "Anejo al memorandum confidencial relativo al plan 
de distribución del contingente de divisas. Primer semestre de 1948", 30 
January 1948.
irT. See chapter five, section four, for a detailed analysis of the question.
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attempt to expand imports of essentials.11* Conversely, the intrinsic aim of bilateral trade 
agreements -equilibrium in payments between the two countries concerned- meant that 
once a country surpassed the margin of permissible debt any further imports would have 
to be paid for in gold or hard currency. Spain’s foreign exchange stringency meant that 
once the always limited commercial credit granted by a given country had been exceeded, 
imports from that country would have to stop.
Foreign exchange earned by exports increased too slowly to serve as a stable basis 
for economic modernisation and growth. In 1947, for instance, they only grew by £7.6 
million over 1946. Credits from Argentina added some £23 million as extraordinary 
resources. They could maintain the economy running day by day, with recurrent stop-and- 
go measures provoked by specific bottlenecks, such as the shortage of energy supply and 
the inadequate transport system, which required larger investments than the Spaniards 
could not undertake with unaided resources. Growth would have to keep pace with 
structural bottlenecks.1*9 So progress was being made, and there were signs that, in 
general, the modest advance was to continue, except perhaps with respect to the 
development of dollar earnings which suffered most from non-competitive prices. The 
important point, from a historical perspective, was that the speed of progress was slower 
from a comparative perspective. A higher industrialisation rate could not be achieved 
owing to the need to import machinery and raw materials.
,M. One the factor» which explains the importance of Spain'a commercial 
relations with the United Kingdom is that the British authorities, in the 
face of Spain's failure to fulfil its undertakings on the so-called non- 
essentials, did not inclement any retaliatory measure which would have 
reduced bilateral trade.
1". Manuel de Torres Martinez's introduction to P. Nyboe Andersen: La
politica econòmica en el clearing internacional (Spanish edition of
Bilateral Exchange Clearing Policy), Madrid [Aguilar] (April) 1947, p. xix,
pointed out that the clearing system could be maintained as long as desired
but it could not avoid a constant shortage of foreign exchange and a
reduction in trade volumes. De Torres was one of the leading economists at
the time who asked for a more liberal economic policy. As professor in the
first school of economics opened in Spain he played an' important role in the
formation of future generations of Spanish economists.
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3.5. The Initia) Spanish Struggle for ERP Membership
Spain's first official reaction to the British and French joint initiative against 
Spain was one of pride and feigned ignorance. Protests went to the British and French 
immediately.190 The Charge in Washington was instructed to say, "with discretion and 
sense of touch and speaking on own account”, the following: Spain, always ready for 
peaceful international collaboration, was less in need of aid than the rest of Europe. It 
would not accept Marshall aid if it conflicted with its national dignity and sovereignty. 
Spain had requested nothing and only aimed to be left in peace to continue its path 
towards "national unity and political perfection" (sic). The Spanish Government would 
only join the Conference if officially invited, it would never request it, and in case Spain 
joined the Conference it would only collaborate in economic matters without political 
compromise.191 Since this attitude certainly did not help the economic needs of the 
country, the Government changed attitude.
Once the Spanish Government had made clear its official position that Spain 
would not beg for dollars, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to beg for them 
unofficially. Spanish diplomacy was, however, very ineffective in the initial European 
phase of the Marshall Plan. The sixteen future OEEC members met in Paris in July 1947 
to detail their needs for recovery and the conference, after having set up a Committee of 
European Economic Cooperation (henceforth CEEC) and several subcommittees, 
adjourned to await committee reports. On the one hand, Europeans had turned a deaf ear 
to the Spanish complaints, on the other, American officials' initial response was that the 
United States Government had voluntarily excluded itself from the Paris Conference so
1,c. PRO 371/67869: "Memorandum" by the Spanish Embassy in London to the
Foreign Office, 4 July 1947, and MAE, Leg. 3159, exp. 26: Artajo's Cifra no. 
340, Madrid, 8 July 1947. The British Foreign Office only agreed to consider 
the question of Spain joining the ERP if the Spanish Government could argue 
some advantages for European reconstruction as a whole which could 
compensate political considerations; MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 2: Cifra no. 1076 
from the Spanish Chargé in London, 30 December 1947. At the end of the year, 
with an improvement in bilateral relations under way, the FO did have to be 
rude vis-à-vis the Spaniards when it could be ambiguous enough as to render 
ineffective any initiative.
1,1. MAE, Leg. 3159, exp. 26: Artajo's cifra no. 836, Madrid, 18 July 1947.
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as not to influence the deliberations, therefore it could do nothing to modify their 
course.192 It was up to Spain to improve its image vis-à-vis Western Europe if it wanted 
to obtain something regarding ERP arrangements.
In the following American phase of the Marshall Plan the major Spanish 
diplomatic effort was made. The CEEC, which had worked in sessions until 27 September
1947, presented its general report for discussion in Washington. After the first fruitless 
initiatives, the Spanish Administration outlined a basic array of arguments to convince the 
Americans of the benefits deriving from Spanish membership. A direct dialogue with the 
United States seemed to Madrid to have more probability of success than either with 
France and Great Britain or with the sixteen nations as a whole. The Spanish Government, 
in their over optimistic interpretation of the possible American position, believed that once 
the Americans were convinced, they could make Western Europe comply.193
The interest of joining the Marshall Plan for Spain was obvious. In economic 
terms, any international relief was welcome to confront the backwardness of the economic 
structures of the country'. The effect of ERP aid. financing essential supplies of capital 
goods and raw materials in a world shortage situation and for an economy structurally 
short of hard currencies, would not have been negligible. In political terms, Spain's ERP 
membership would have represented the definitive overcoming of international ostracism 
with the possible withdrawal of the Spanish question at the United Nations and Spain's 
official return to international politics.194
Top official» of the European Political Affairs Division at the 
Department of State, AS MAE, Amb. Parigi, b. 413: "La Spagna e
l'organizzazione economica europea", Telegram no. 10183 from the Italian 
Embassy in Washington, 28 July 1947.
XMe MAE, Leg. 2418, exp. 33: Note resumé (uncompleted) of an interview 
between the American Charge d'Affaires in Madrid, Culbertson, and the 
Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alberto Martin Artajo, 23 February
1948. Paul T. Culbertson, the most misspelt name of Spain's diplomatic 
history, former Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs at the 
Department of State and head of the Spanish Desk, was Charge ad interim in 
Spain between June 1947 and December 1950, when he was replaced by Stanton 
Griffis, the first American ambassador to Spain after the United Nations' 
resolution of December 1946.
1M. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 4: "Condiciones generales del Plan Marshall y del 
Plan Bevin", n/s, n/d; presented to the Spanish Council of Ministers on 12 
March 1948.
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The Marshall Plan was consciously presented by the Spanish Administration in 
economic terms, as a technical matter dealing with commercial policy. Had it been 
considered a political issue, it would have been most difficult to find appropriate 
arguments for Spanish membership. Being a piece of planning about finances and trade, 
with no other ultimate goals, there was no reason to exclude Spain. This country had 
satisfied all its financial obligations, granted important credits to some of the participants, 
whilst it had never received assistance from the United States. Franco declared that this 
was a valuable record to be considered: "It seems to be better affair to give as gift credits 
to those who will not pay them, instead of providing normal credits to good 
creditors."195 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also argued that there was no reason to 
deprive Western European recovery of a possible, although limited, economic contribution 
from Spain.196
"If the big powers conserve, as expected, the wise political 
judgement and they really want to use all the resources for 
European reconstruction, benefitting at the same time from an 
important market, they will provide Spain with facilities for 
its purchases of raw materials and machinery tools to allow it 
to increase production and contribute with its surpluses to 
the re—establishment of the economic equilibrium of 
Europe"1'7
Clearly, on the basis of indigenous wealth and resources alone, Spain's contribution would 
necessarily be a very limited one: initially mineral raw materials, fruit and vegetables, 
wine and textiles (table 3.11). The Spanish economy, once it had been satisfied 
concerning the minimal import requirements presented previously in section 3.3, could 
increase "twofold and even threefold” many of its exports providing an "essential” 
contribution to the economic recovery of Europe.19*
1,s. Franco to the United Press, 27 June 1947, in ASMAE, Amb. Paris, b. 413: 
"Dichiarazioni ufficiali** »
lM. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 2: "Memorandum" and "Spain Must Cooperatew.
ir*. Artajo to Logos News Agency, 4 January 1948, published in Arriba. The 
latter together with Gótnez Aparicio's article published in La Hoia del 
Lunea, 12 January 1948, represented the official criterion of the Spanish 
Government, as the Spanish Ambassador in Peru and Culbertson were officially 
informed, MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 2: "A.r. Despacho 178 y remite recortes de 
prensa s/ Plan Marshall", Madrid, 16 January 1948, and MAE, Leg. 2418, exp. 
33: Note resumé (uncompleted) cit.
1H. Spain's economic contribution to European recovery could also be 
exaggerated by propagandists : "A single or unified Europe is impossible
without Spain and Europe's permanent recuperation would be blocked until 
Spain participates in the common effort", Frank Henius: O se ayuda a Espafia
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The Spanish Government’s reasoning was the mirror image of their post-world 
war trading experience with Western Europe, as explained in the previous chapter. Their 
miscalculation was to believe that Spain’s limited economic contribution would be 
perceived as important by Western European policy-makers as it had been in previous 
years.
TABU 3.11
SPAIN'S POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPE'S RECOVERY, 
EXPORT PERIOD 1»47-1948
(in '000 metric tons)
Iron Ore 1,000 Hazel Nuts 7
Pyrites 1,000 Onions 27
Lead 10 Anchovies 3
Wolfram 3 Canned Fish 7
Mercury (*) Paprika 2.3Potash 50 Tomatoes 125Rosin 15 Lemons 20Turpentine 7 Mandarins 25Cork 83 Oranges 618
Skins 3 Bananas? 18
Salt 1,000 Grapes 8
Olive Oil 40 Brandies** 4,000
Olives? 42 Wine** 26,500
Dried Apricots 3 Cotton fabrics# 110,000
Apricot Pulpî 3.5 Wool fabrics# 11,000
Almonds 20 Rayon# 16,300
Source: MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 2: "Spain Must Cooperate”. (*) "Preponderant 
share of Western European consumption”; (5) Different figures in ibid, 
"Memorandum": 22,000 tons for olives, 3,000 tons for apricot pulp, and
15,000 tons for bananas; (**) in '000 gallons; (#) in '000 yards.
The Spaniards were unwilling to realise that circumstances had changed substantially. The 
immediate post-war system of bilateral trade and payments was based on the reduction 
of dollar purchase to a minimum and the greatest possible diversion of supply sources. 
Spanish exports could not be considered as dollar-savings when the Marshall Plan was to 
pour dollars to Western Europe. Spanish exports remained high priced commodities when 
a recovery in output was finally coming to international trade. Most important, was it 
necessary to include Spain in the ERP to obtain 27,000 tons of onions or 1 million tons 
of iron ore? What was then the need for the network of bilateral trade agreements 
constructed with Spain after World War n? The Allied declarations and the United 
Nations’ resolution of December 1946 did not forbid economic relations with Spain and 
all Western European countries except France traded with Spain. Whatever the importance 
of Spanish export commodities to European economic recovery and welfare was, it could
o »• hunde Europa. Madrid, 1952, p. 107.
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be channelled through bilateral trade.
Since the CEEC’s first meeting Spain had concluded commercial agreements with 
Sweden (17 July 1947, prolonging the 1946 trade and payments agreement), Ireland (3 
September), Turkey (8 and 16 September, comercial operations through compensation), 
the Netherlands (3 December) and Switzerland (17 December, an additional protocol to 
the 1935 agreement, preceded by an exchange on notes on 22 March).1”  The trade 
agreement signed with Belgium in February' 1946 still remained operative; Denmark did 
not extend that year its 1941 bilateral agreement, but it was under negotiation; the United 
Kingdom signed a trade agreement on 28 March 1947, obtaining £10 million as credit 
from Spain; Italy renewed the January 1946 agreement on 20 June; Norway never 
suspended its commercial operations through compensation; and Portugal continued to 
maintain its agreement revised half-yearly (18 January and 24 April).200 Bilateral trade 
was a form of collaboration which international public opinion did not consider as a 
favourable sign towards the Franco regime but as a source of welfare for the receiving 
countries.
The Marshall Plan had, however, an important political dimension which was hard 
for the Spanish Government to assume. The only political implication of the Marshall 
Plan for the latter came with the refusal of the Soviet Union, which gave it a strong anti­
communist slant. Franco, had constantly declared the official propaganda, had been the 
only successful fighter against Communism. Spain’s international political ostracism was 
the result of the lasting enmity of countries in which Marxist philosophy strongly 
influenced governments. From this perspective, the Franco-British Note of 3 July was the 
result of "violent reaction by the Soviets and leftist press" to Spain’s possible 
inclusion.201 The Spanish authorities continuously declared that fifth columns were
MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 3: Art«jo's telegram no. 10 to all diplomatic 
posts, 22 January 1949.
200. MAE, Leg. 2306, exp. €: Note by the Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy
and Commerce: "Actividad internacional española en el campo económico
comercial durante 1947", Madrid, 30 December 1947.
201. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 3: Cifra no. 45 from Arta jo to the Chargé
d'Affaires in Washington, 21 January 1948, and "Nota confidencial sobre el 
Plan Marshall", n/s, n/d; probable date, January 1948.
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marching in all over Europe, even in the United States.202
Spain was presented as a rock against Communism. Franco and all the Spanish 
political groups, including the overwhelming majority of the clandestine and exiled 
opposition, were strong anti-Communists and would participate to some extent in anti- 
Soviet and anti-Communist activities: "Pour I’Amerique -declared an official of the French 
Quai d'Orsay- l’Espagne est avant tout le seul pays ou il n ’y a pas de cinquième colonne 
communiste".203 Political vulnerability, the best asset for some countries (France and 
Italy), were of no advantage to Spain.20* Franco had been too effective in eliminating 
the Communist danger. A CIA’s report argued that although the political future of Spain 
was unresolved, in the short-term the Franco regime was stable and definitively anti- 
Communist.205 The updated version of DRUMBEAT considered that only the violent 
downfall of Franco could lead to Communist influence.206 The anti-Communist 
sentiment of the Spanish Government led it even to draw an ideological affinity between 
American goals in Europe and Franco’s in Spain.207 In France a wave of industrial 
strikes initiated in April 1947 and lasted through the year, most intensively after receiving 
the French Communist Party’s support in November. The Spanish Ministry of Foreign
202. Paul G. Hoffmann, future ECA General Administrator, also saw fifth 
columnists marching in France, Italy and Germany; Peace Can Be Won, New York 
[Garden City] 1951, p. 28. Many were those who agreed with this vision 
concerning the United States. Nine days after his speech on Greece and 
Turkey, President Truman had set up the first witch-hunter body, the 
Employee Loyalty Review Board, to guard against infiltration by disloyal 
persons; Charles L. Mee, Jr: The Marshall Plan. The Launching of the Pax 
Americana, New York [Simon and Schuster] 1984, pp. 71-72.
20J. A Quai d'Orsay record quoted in Pedro Antonio Martinez Lillo: "Una
introducción al estudio de las relaciones hispano—francesas (1945-1951)", 
Madrid, Juan March Foundation, University Brochure, no. 228, 1984, p. 38.
204. Many in Western Europe saw a chance for dollars in the communist
hysteria. Pierre Mendés—France, then French executive director of the 
International Bank, argued as follows: "The Communists are rendering us a 
great service. Because we have a "Communist danger", the Americans are 
making a tremendous effort to help us. We must keep up this indispensable 
Communist scare", in Alexander Werth: France, 1940-1955, New York 1956, p. 
351, cit., in Mee, op. cit., p. 234.
*05. "Strategic Intelligence Digest: Spain, Armed Forces", 31 July 1947,
quoted in Antonio Marquina Barrio: España en la política de seguridad
occidental (1939-1986), Madrid [Servicio de Publicaciones del Estado Mayor 
del Ejército] 1986, pp. 139 ff.
,M. "The Current Situation in the Mediterranean and the Near East", 17
October 1947, quoted in ibid.y pp. 148 ff.
,<p. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 2: "Spain Must Cooperate", second point.
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Affairs presented Spam’s social o rd e r as a conquest in the economic field. All economic 
factors were under control and "the possibility that a decisive factor in production might 
fail at the decisive moment” had been eliminated.20* Spain’s social order was disliked 
because it was based upon a repression of the labour movement without equal in Western 
Europe.
Franco also argued that Spain's strategic position, apart from the factors already 
mentioned, imposed the need to ease commercial relations between Spain and the United 
States.209 Early references to Spain’s geographical position have been considered 
directed towards the United States’ intentions to insert their attitude towards Franco’s 
Spain within strategic considerations. They would present the early intentions of the Chief 
of State to move towards a bilateral dealing with the United States in terms of an 
exchange of military rights against economic assistance.210 There is too much eagerness 
to grasp any reference to Spain’s strategic value in the attempt to create a comfortable 
continuum from 1947 to the 1953 Spanish-American agreement for military bases.
The American military' interest on Spam’s strategic value was low and the political 
objectives prevailed. In April 1947, an interim report of an ad hoc committee, instructed 
by the US State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) a month ear her to 
investigate the extension of American aid to various countries similary to Greece and 
Turkey, considered any aid to Spain as "contingent”, since "military assistance to the 
present Spanish Government would be contrary to current US policy."2” A few days 
later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (henceforth, JCS), representing the collective opinion of the 
military hierarchy, compiled a list of nations which were desirable to aid. Their 
importance to national security and the urgency of their needs were jointly considered. 
Spain came after the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Austria,
,0*. Ibid., "Memorandum".
Franco'» declaration» to International News Service, 16 August 1947, as 
reproduced in ASMAE, Amb. Parigi, b. 413: "Dichiarazioni ufficiali”.
310. Vifias: Los pactos secretos de Franco con Estados Pnidos. Base», ayuda 
econòmica, recortes de soberanía, Barcelona [Grijalbo] 1981; and, Brundu, 
op. cit.
211. FRPS. 1947, I, Report by the Special Ad Hoc Committee to the SWNCC, 
Washington, 21 April, pp. 727 and 730.
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Japan, the Benelux countries, and Latin America.212 On 1 May the JCS considered the 
occupation of Spain by the Soviet Union as the biggest danger in the Mediterranean.213 
Few days later, the analysis of the possible Soviet threat against the Iberian Peninsula by 
the US Joint War Plans Committee concluded that there was no evidence that the Soviets 
would attack over the following three years.214 The system of military base-rights 
approved by the JCS at the beginning of June 1946, a highly inflated estimate, included 
the Canary Islands in the section "required (if reasonably obtainable by negotiations, but 
not absolutely essential to the base system)".215 The JCS’s revision of the system of 
military base rights, in September 1947, included a possible base on the Canary Islands 
as "desired" (versus "required"), if rights at the French Casablanca-Port Lyautey were 
unobtainable, which was not the case.216 Spain was strategically desirable, but not 
essential.
With respect to Spain’s direct contribution to the defence of Western Europe, the 
country’s war capacity was nil.217 Notwithstanding this, American military held little 
doubt that in case of war it would come in on the Western side. José Sebastián de Erice, 
Director General of Foreign Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained to Paul 
Culbertson, the American Chargé who had recently replaced Philip Bonsai, that in event 
of a war with the Soviet Union
"there could not be question as to [the] eventual position of 
Spain, although the general weakness of the country and its 
ill-equipped army could force a neutral status or a very
212. Ibid., "United States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint 
of National Security. Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee”, dated
29 April and attached to the Memorandum by the JCS to the SWNCC, Washington, 
12 May, pp. 734-50.
2X1. "Strategic Guidance for Industrial Mobilization Planning", document 
reproduced in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis: Containment: Documents 
on American Foreign Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, New York [Columbia 
University] 1978, pp. 302-11.
214. "The Soviet Threat Against the Iberian Peninsula and the Means to Meet 
it" (DRUMBEAT), dated 8 May, quoted in Marquina, op. cit., p. 139.
2X5. FRUS, 1946, I, Memorandum by the JCS to Marshall, Washington, 7 November 
1945, pp. 112-18.
2X4. FRUS, 1947, I, Memorandum by the JCS to the SWNCC, Washington, 9 
September, p. 768.
2n. For the military ef f ectiveness of Spain's ajmed forces see the 
previously mentioned Intelligence Division of the War Department, Marquina, 
op. cit., p. 139.
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l i m i t e d  i n t e r v e n t i o n .
Representatives of the regime’s high echelons and Franco himself had made declarations 
along the same lines. Although, the real value of such commitment was more than 
doubtful, it was believed in Washington that hostility between Spain and the USSR was 
so intense that Spain could not hope to remain neutral in an East-West conflict.
Europe required economic, political and military stability. The latter was not 
pressing, while Spain’s was not only unnecessary for the economic and political stability 
of Western Europe but even disturbing, as the debate at the United Nations had shown. 
Spain’s anti-Communism embarrassed the Truman Administration and put the future of 
its policy towards Europe at risk. The downfall of the Czechoslovakian government, the 
only democratic government left in Eastern Europe, helped to feed Communist hysteria 
all over Europe and on Capitol Hill. On the 30 March 1948, the Republican 
Representative of Wisconsin, Alvin E. O’Konski, succeeded in having the House of 
Representatives approve an amendment to allow Spain to receive similar treatment to the 
other Western European countries through Marshall Aid.
"Let us include the country that is the most anti-Communist of any country in 
Europe at the present time", declared O’Konski.21* The latter is the perfect 
representation of a member of the group of people supporting Spanish demands in 
Washington: catholic (educated by Jesuits), violently anti-Russia (of Polish extraction), 
Spain-lover (married to an Irish descendant and enthusiastic hispanist), with the possibility 
of influencing opinion (Professor of oratory with a seat in the House and owner of a 
journal and a radio station in Wisconsin). He maintained direct contact with the Spanish 
embassy in Washington.220 To give more substance to his request, O’Konski used the
FRPS. 1947, III, Culbertson to Marshall, Madrid, 23 October, p. 1089.
*” • See the intervention of O'Konski and other representatives in favour of 
Spain's inclusion in the Marshall Plan in Congressional Record, Proceedings 
and Debates of the 80th Congress, Second Series, Washington, vol. 94, no. 
56, Wednesday 24 March 1948, pp. 3521-3. The initial quotation is in p. 
3522.
. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 8: Antonio Cacho Zabalza, Diplomatic Information 
Bureau (OID) at the Embassy, to Luis Maria Lojendio, head of the OID at the 
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 April 1948.
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memorandum drafted by the Spanish Embassy, to which we have referred as "Spain Must 
Cooperate" and inserted it in the diary of sessions of the United States Congress. The 
amendment consisted in including Spain under Title 1, "European Cooperation Act", 
section 3, "Participating countries", of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948.
Initially neither the Administration nor the report on foreign aid by the special 
committee appointed in the House of Representatives, known as the Herter Committee, 
which, was among a number of studies undertaken in the United States about the limits 
of American assistance, specified the geographical scope of the Marshall proposals.221 
It was assumed that any country willing to adhere to the conditions and purpose of the 
bill was to be eligible for assistance. This might have satisfied those who complained 
about the Marshall Plan being an anti-Soviet Union tool but it did not so with those who 
wanted the inclusion of Spain.
Spain received the O'Konski amendment, on the anniversary of Franco's military 
victory, with delirium. The general comment on the Spanish controlled press was that 
Spain’s truth had been definitively understood.222 The Spanish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, who had been prudent and made no declarations to diplomatic representatives, 
asked for a general mobilization to request Spain's ERP membership.223 He was aware 
that O’Konski had followed the most difficult of the then existing alternatives.
The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Artajo, had requested the Spanish Chargé 
in Washington to propose to Spain's friends in Capitol Hill a general reference regarding 
ERP membership instead of listing the European countries benefiting from ERP aid.224
221. William Adams Brown, Jr. and Redvers Opie: American Foreign Assistance, 
Washington (The Brookings Institution] 1953, pp. 14 9-50. For the activities 
of the Herter Committee and other special committees appointed by the 
President and different departments, see ibid, pp. 136 ff.
222. A complete summary of the Spanish press declarations in AD, DE-CE 1945-
1960, vol. 371: Telegrams from the French Charge in Madrid, Hardion, dated 
on 1, 2 and 3 April 194 8 and his Despatch no. 44 4 to his Minister,
"LrEspagne et le Plan Marshall", 6 April 1948.
2al. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 8: Telegram to all diplomatic posts in Western 
Europe, 1 April 1948.
224 . MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 2: Art a jo's cifra no. 1335r, Madrid, 24 December
1947 •
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This more elastic and general formula would have allowed the subsequent incorporation 
of Spain. Artajo was aware that the strong political propaganda campaign which had 
addressed the Marshall Plan with democratic and anti-totalitarian directives would self­
defeat any attempt to include Spain by name. In fact, it led to a negative boomerang 
effect The inclusion of Franco’s Spain in the ERP represented a great risk for the 
American policy in Europe by providing grist to the Communist mill against the true 
character of the American economic involvement in Europe. It necessarily led the 
President and the State Department to re-state their opposition to Spain ending the 
previous apparent thaw in relation to the inclusion of Spain in the ERP.223
Previously to the events described above, Marshall had given proofs of his 
personal willingness to look for a positive solution to the Spanish problem. On 12 January
1948, be replied to a question before the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Congress by 
saying that "there is nothing in the bill that prevents [Spam’s equal treatment]" but it was 
up to the 16 European nations to take the initiative.23* Again, at a press conference held 
on 11 February, the Secretary of State expressed the view that there was no objection 
from the United States’ point of view about Spain joining the ERP, as long as the sixteen 
ERP nations wished Spain to do so. Marshall's declarations caused strenuous reactions 
on the part of British Trade Unions and Bevin asked Marshall in the future to avoid any 
similar declaration if he did not want to put the ERP at risk in its most delicate phase.227 
The vote at the House, by bringing to day light what it had previously been a smooth and 
careful diplomatic consideration, meant to end the ambigous position on the matter. This 
episode, which has attracted the attention of all authors in the field, is presented as 
representing the division between the State Department and the President, on the one 
hand, and strong anti-communists and military men, on the other hand. Not exclusively.
***. I fully disagree with Ahmad, op. cit., p. 79, who argues that the 
O ’Konski incident "was perfectly in line" with American policy towards
Spain.
***. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp.3: "Extract from Testimony of Secretary Marshall 
before House Foreign Affairs Committee", 12 January 1948, handed by 
Culbertson to Artajo on 2 February 1948.
See Brundu, op. cit., p. 37; Ahmad, op. cit., p. 78; and FROS, 1948,
III, Memorandum of Conversation by Horsey, Washington, 16 February, p. 1026.
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The O’Konski amendment showed that many in Washington understood the 
Marshall Plan unilaterally as an anti-Communist tool, considering neither its whole 
complexity nor its delicate political mechanism. It was not so much a revelation that many 
in the United States were not only convinced but desirous of seeing Spain’s international 
rehabilitation. This remained in the bag of wishes. The President and the State Department 
were perfectly aware that it endangered the delicate equilibrium reached by the sixteen 
Western European nations in eight weeks of meetings regarding four years of planning 
ahead. It was obvious that the amendment to the Economic Cooperation Act making Spain 
eligible to take part in the ERP could not be agreed by the participating nations and it 
could not, certainly, be imposed upon them by the United States Congress. The prolonged 
build-up of emotional thinking on the question of Franco Spain could not be wiped away 
so easily.
The political proportions of the Spanish issue in Europe were unforeseeable. The 
British Government had made crystal clear that it was politically impossible for them to 
cooperate with Spain within the ERP. There was no need for a new clash with the Trade 
Union Congress and the Labour Part)' when there was nothing to gain and so much to 
lose, especially in Italy at the time of the elections. Hector McNeil, British Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs, speaking in the House of Commons declared that it had never 
occurred to Britain that Spain could form part of a Western European Union as long as 
it maintained a totalitarian regime.22* A "Memorandum by the British Labour Party on 
European Cooperation within the framework of the Recovery Program", dated on 28 
February 1948, declared at point no. 75, that "Spain cannot participate in the work of 
cooperative unity until its people is freed from the Franco regime."229 Bevin informed 
Marshall that the House’s decision
"caused serious difficulties In England whilst in Italy it 
[came] as a terrible shock. The State Department will 
appreciate all the steps that have been taken in connection 
with Italy. [...] all the good that had been accomplished has 
been undone [...] It seems to make the whole Marshall Plan
447 H.C. DEB. 5 s., Oral Answers, 9 February 1948, p. 25.
MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 4: Annex no. 1 to despatch nd. 278 from the Spanish 
Embassy in London, 28 February 1948.
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a p p e a r  a s  a  l i n e u p  b e h i n d  F a s c i s m  a n d  R e a c t i o n .
It was most desirable to avoid providing any possible ammunition in favour of the 
Communist electoral campaign.231 The red threat was vividly perceived in relation to 
Italy. The Communist seizure of power in Prague in February was perceived as able to 
stimulate a Communist take over in Italy.232 The United States National Security 
Council, whose first report was on Italy’s prerrevolutionary conditions (NSC 1/1), had 
hypothesised, previous to the Prague events, that a pan of Italy could be taken by 
Communists.233 Franco Spain appeared as a source of weakness to western democracy, 
the ERP, and the consolidation of a Western European democratic front.
2,c. PRO, FO 371/73335: Bevin to Lord Inverchapel, British Ambassador to the 
United States, London, 1 April 1946; also reproduced as "Aide-memoire for 
Marshall" in FRUS, 194 8, III, Acheson to the Ambassador in the United 
Kingdom, Washington, € April, p. 411.
221. For action concerning the Italian elections see documentation reproduced 
in ibid., pp. 765 ff. Literature about the April 194 8 elections and the 
American involvement is rich: i.e. Antonio Gambino: Storia del dopoquerra; 
Dalla Liberazione al potere Dc, Bari [Laterza] 1978, pp. 484-517; Severino 
Galante: "La scelta americana della Dc", in Mario Isnenghi and Silvio Lanaro 
(eds.): La Democrazia cristiana dal fascismo al 18 aprile, Padova [Marsilio 
Editore] 1978, pp. l/2—47; James E. Miller: "L'ERP come fattore determinante 
nelle elezioni italiane del 1948", in Aga Rossi (ed.), op. cit., pp. 139-47; 
and, Pietro Pastorelli: La politica estera italiana del dopocruerra, Bologna
III Mulino] 1987, pp. 123-4 4. Most recently, excellent material has been 
published concerning Italy and the great power, in which the connection 
between American assistance and perceived internal threats is well 
considered: contributions to Ennio di Nolfo, Romain H. Rainero and Brunello 
Vigezzi: LfItalia e la politica di potenza in Europa (1945-50), Firenze 
[Marzorati Editore] 1990. The American role in the Italian policies of 
economic stabilisation is studied in detail by John L. Harper: America and 
the Reconstruction of Italy, 1945-1948, Cambridge [C.U.P.] 1986; and,
Miller: The United States and Italy, 1940-1950. The Politics and Diplomacy 
of Stabilization, Chapel Hill [The University of North Carolina Press] 1986.
2,2. FRUS, 1948, IV, Marshall to Jefferson Caffery and Lewis Douglas, 
American ambassadors in Paris and London, respectively, 24 February, pp. 
735-36.
23J. FRUS, 1948, III, NSC 1/2, "The position of the United States with 
respect to Italy", 10 February, pp. 768-9. For NSC 1/1 of November 1947, see 
ibid., p. 724. The Spanish Government believed (as Marshall and the NSC) 
that the Italian elections would lead to either of the following results: 
a majority vote for Communists or a necessary coalition government which, 
as happened in Czechoslovakia, would prepare the coup. The Americans were 
asked by Franco himself to postpone the elections, see Di Nolfo, op. cit., 
pp. 559 ff. Brundu, op. cit., p. 58, note 14 gives details (taken from 
Hardion's despatch to Bidault, 6 April 194 8) of the military measures 
supposedly adopted in Spain in case of Communist revolts after the Italian 
elections. The Prague coup in February and the Italian elections in mid- 
April served the purposes of official Spanish propaganda that Communism, 
defeated once in the Civil War, was still threatening Spain, thus justifying 
some of the excess of domestic repression. After the Communist set-back at 
the Italian elections, the Government announced future municipal elections, 
which were finally held on 21 November, to distract public opinion from 
Spain's remewed isolation.
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The French Government had decided, shortly before the O’Konsky amendment, 
to solve the border conflict with Spain in the name of realism.234 The Spanish and 
French Governments agreed to the progressive opening of the border after 10 February
1948 for passengers and postal communications and for mercantile traffic after 1 March. 
Immediately after the reopening of the frontier, the French Government negotiated a 
commercial agreement with Spain. Any support to the inclusion of Spain in the ERP 
would have meant to go too far in terms of concessions to the Franco regime. The 
hesitations of the French Socialists about the previously mentioned two issues insured that 
no further positive steps towards Franco's Spain could possibly be made in the name of 
realism. Any amelioration of relations with the Franco regime could not come through the 
ERP, a highly political issue, but exclusively through a promotion of trade and other 
technical questions with less impact on public opinion.
The rest of the participating countries, more or less interested but not committed 
at all to the matter, had left the British and French to solve the question. The support the 
Spaniards received from Marshall Plan members was very weak. A most unrealistic view 
of the different national positions was presented to the Spanish Council of Ministers on
12 March.235 Despite that the Spanish Government wanted to believe that eleven 
countries would have actively supported the Spanish request, few countries, Portugal, 
Ireland and Turkey, had vaguely expressed a pro-Spanish sentiment. Had they decided to 
propose it, which they did not, their position within the Sixteen was too weak to achieve 
much. Portugal, which had explicitly declared its support for Spain, proposed nothing at
tu. "Il est claire -said Bidault to the National Assembly- que la décision 
de la fermature de la frontière n'a été pas l'objet de tentative d'imitation 
de la part de personne et qu'on conséquence, le commerce entre l'Espagne et 
le reste du monde a continué de s'exercer, la France étant la seule 
exception. Il n'est pas besoin d'être un partisan de la politique dite 
réaliste pour constater que le préjudice économique qui nous est causé et 
l'inefficacité de l'exemple, nous imposaient de reconsidérer la question. 
La prolongation de la situation ne pouvait bénéficier qu'à des concurrents, 
même amis. Il n'y a pas d'exemple que des sanctions économiques prises par 
un seul pays sans appui ni concours, aient obtenu un résultat très 
appréciable. Seuls sont favorisés ceux qui ne prennent pas les sanctions. 
Nous avons restauré les conditions de présence, que l'économie et le bon 
sens imposaient.** Archives de l'Assemblé nationale, Annales, vol. 14, 5th 
to 20th March 1948, p. 1657.
2M. MAE, Leg, 2309, exp. 4: "Actitud de los paises participantes en el Plan 
Marshall ante la posible inclusión de España en dicho plan", n/d.
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the CEEC's meeting of 16 March.236 Bevin and Bidault had convinced Caeiro da Mata 
that although Spain was a "cornerstone" for the community of nations it was inconvenient 
to suggest it publicly; it was preferable for Spain to send an observer and to let the 
working parties consider the possibility of importing pyrites and iron ore. Artajo rejected 
it.237
In the implementation of the United States policy towards Spain its political 
effects abroad had to be considered. Western Europe was more important for the United 
States than Spain and Spain was more important for Western Europe than for the United 
States. Spain was a highly controversial subject in domestic policies in the United 
Kingdom, France, the Benelux countries, Scandinavia and (though temporarily) Italy. The 
different government coalitions and the moderate left would have appreciated, in political 
and public opinion terms, a quick and happy end to the question. Apart from these 
circumstances. President Truman did not need pressing on the question of Spain.238 On 
the 1st of April, the joint session of the Senate and the House, meeting to produce the 
final text of the Foreign Assistance Act, rejected the O’Konski proposal. This was done 
in accordance with the State Department and President Truman. The latter had publicly 
declared to be "utterly opposed" to making Spain eligible to receive ERP aid and that he 
hoped die Senate-House joint conference would strike out the mention of Spain in the 
final bill.239 The President signed the Foreign Assistance Act on 3 April (Public Law 
no. 472). For his part, Marshall reassured Bevin that the view of the US Government 
remained that it was for the European countries setting up the OEEC to decide whether
. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 5: CEEC, "Allocution prononcée par M. le Professeur 
Dr. José Caeiro da Mat[t)a, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Portugal À 
l'occasion de la réunion du Comité de Coopération économique européenne, le
16 mars 1946".
2rr. Ibid., cifra no. 34 56 from Consul at Hendaye (at request from the Chargé 
in Paris) to Artajo, 18 March 1848, and Artajo to Nicolás Franco, Franco's 
brother and Ambassador in Lisbon, 19 March 1948.
a*1. Acheson wrote: "Truman held deep-seated convictions on many subjects, 
among them, for instance, a dislike of Franco and Catholic obscurantism in 
Spain", Present at the Creation, cit., p. 169. Truman has been traditionally 
considered as "a staunch critic of Franco", i.e. James W. Cortada: Two
Nations Over Time. Spain and the United States, 1776-1977, London [Greenwood 
Press] 1978, p. 217.
a,f. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 8: Cifra no. 75 from the Spanish Chargé in
Washington, 1 April 1948.
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or not to include Spain.140
Culbertson informed the Spanish Government that Truman’s decision was 
motivated by a report of the American Ambassador in Rome, James Clement Dunn, on 
the unfavourable repercussions for the Italian elections. Artajo declared "unbearable not 
to irritate an enemy -Italian Communism- by maltreating a friend [Spain]".241 The 
Spanish Government believed that had a more decisive action been taken by Congress the 
President would have been obliged to comply. Madrid sent José Félix de Lequerica, 
former minister of foreign affairs and skilled diplomat, who had been appointed by the 
Council of Ministers as Inspector of diplomatic and consular missions in mid-April 1947, 
to Washington for a two-months inspection on 6 April 1948. He was to organize the so- 
called Spanish lobby in Congress, after the experience of the O’Konski amendment, 
and act as semi-official Ambassador in Washington.242 Immediately after arrival.
24°. Marshall's reply to Bevin's aide-memoire of 1st April, in FROS. 1948,
III, the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain, Washington, 6 
April, p. 412.
a41. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 8: Arta jo's Cifra no. 39, 3 April 1948. Dunn's 
despatch to Truman on 1 April has not been printed. A subsequent despatch 
is, however, useful: "Italian sensitivity to OS moves was strikingly
demonstrated in Communist field day and chill among moderate parties 
occurring when Spain provisionally named by House of Representatives vote 
as eligible for ERP. Italian Government and moderate left heaved sigh of 
relief when final congressional action changed this." FRUS, 1948, III, Dunn 
to Marshall, Rome, 7 April, p. 869. Dunn would become Ambassador to Spain 
between April 1953 and February 1955.
342 . On 31 October 1948 Lequerica was placed as head of the Spanish Embassy 
in Washington until 4 January 1951, when he was officially accepted as the 
Spanish Ambassador by the United States' Government. Catholic groups, 
anticommunists, naval officers interested in bases, Truman's critics in the 
midst of a presidential election and business people (i.e. cotton merchants) 
were all part of Lequerica's clientele; Maria Jesús Cava Mesa: Los
diplomáticos de Franco. J.F. de Lequerica, temple y tenacidad (1890-1963), 
Bilbao [Universidad de Deusto] 1989, pp. 254 ff., using Lequerica's private 
papers. For the so-called Spanish lobby, see the classic work by Theodore 
J. Lowi: "U.S. Bases in Spain", in Edwin A. Bock and Alan K. Carrpbell: Case 
Studies in American Government, London [Prentice-Hall International, Inc.] 
1962, pp. 265-300, also reproduced in Harold L. Stein (ed.): American Civil 
Military Decisions, Birmingham {University of Alabama Press] 1963, pp. 265- 
300. As a result of the interest in bureaucratic policy-studies during the 
late 1960s and the early 1970s, after Lowi's pioneering study, numerous 
doctoral dissertations were elaborated in the United States on the forces - 
particularly in the U.S. Congress- bringing about the shift in the official 
policy towards Spain: Riley William Gilmore: "The American Foreign Policy- 
Making Process and the Development of a Post—World War II Spanish Policy, 
1945-1953: A Case Study", University of Pittsburgh, 1967; General Brent 
Scowcroft (a National Security Adviser since the Presidency of Gerald R. 
Ford): "Congress and Foreign Policy: An Examination of Congressional
Attitudes Toward the Foreign Aid Programs to Spain and.Yugoslavia", Columbia 
University, New York, 1967; Albert Joseph Dorley Jr.: "The Role of Congress 
in the Establishment of Bases in Spain", St. John's University, 1969; Arlene
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Lequenca, gave his own version of facts concerning the O’Konski amendment. The 
intervention of President Truman followed upon pressure from the leftist sectors of his 
party. More influential than the Italian elections, following Lequenca, was Truman’s links 
with the Masonry and his desire not to injure the susceptibility of his party’s numerous 
Jewish supporters. Only a Republican victory in the November elections, he concluded, 
could reestablish the "era of friendly collaboration".243 It is important to notice bow little 
attention one of the most important diplomats within the Spanish diplomatic personnel 
paid to other circumstances than the fight that Jews, Communism and Masonery 
supposedly deployed against Spain’s high Christian destín.244 Judaism, Communism, 
liberalism, trade unionism, Masory are dumped together as orchestrors of a conspiracy 
against Franco’s Spain. It is even more significant the fact that the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs sent Lequenca’s dispatch to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers for the 
highest consideration!245
The commercial agreements with France, the United Kingdom and, in particular, 
Argentina, would undoubtedly provide partial relief of Spain’s economic problems but 
capital equipment and long-term loans were still required for the rehabilitation of Spain’s 
economy. To counterbalance the effects of Truman’s declarations, the Spanish 
Ambassador in Buenos Aires, José María de Areilza, was instructed to end the 
negotiations under way for a bilateral agreement since September 1947 and proceed to its 
immediate publication as the Franco-Perón protocol, which was signed on 9 April. The 
immediate publication of the Franco-Perón Protocol on 4 April, even before it had been 
signed, had been a useful propaganda device, in particular, at the domestic level, as an
Idol McCown: "Spain and the Spanish Question: External/Internal Sources of 
Foreign Policy", The American University, Washington D.C., 1973; Ronald
Franklin Hadian: "United States Foreign Policy Towards Spain: 1953-1970", 
University of California, Santa Barbara, December 1976; and, finally, 
Stanley Byron Weeks: "United States Defense Policy Toward Spain, 1950-1976", 
The American University, 1977.
34>. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 8: Le que rica to Arta jo, Washington, 10 April 1948.
*“ • World conspiracy against Spain was a contnon feature at that time. This 
is what an eminent scholar of Spanish history labelled the "police 
interpretation" of History by the Franco regime, Manuel Tuñón de Lara: 
"History", in La cultura bajo el franquismo, Barcelona [Ediciones de 
Bolsillo] 1977, pp. 23-46, p. 26.
í45. APG, JE, Leg. 13, no. 4.4: "[Extract] De una carta del encargado de 
negocios de España en Washington dirigida al Sr. Ministro, con fecha 10 de 
Abril de 1948".
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antidote to Truman’s refusal to include Spain in the Marshall Plan.246 It was considered 
a "little Plan Marshall at indigenous style [estilo criollo]”, as Perón liked to call it.247
This economic agreement, by far the most important one signed by Spain up to 
that date, provided new credit facilities over the years 1948-51 for a value of Argentine 
pesos 1,750 million. The new credit facilities included the 350 million pesos outstanding 
at the end of 1947 under the old revolving credit. Annual revolving credits were to be 
opened in January of each year 1949,1950 and 1951 to the amount of 350 million pesos 
while 350 million pesos were to be available for use in 1948 with the stipulation that an 
additional 100 million pesos could be utilised that year, but the same amount would then 
have to be deduced from the amounts for succeeding years. The interest rate was 2.75 per 
cent. The credit was to be repayable in the first instance by Spanish exports of industrial 
materials (steel products, lead, cork, cigarette paper, apart from olive oil and olives). 
However, the annual adverse trading balance plus the 350 million pesos pending from
1946 were credited to the Argentine Government in pesetas to be used in Spain for a 
variety of purposes including the construction in Spanish yards and factories of ships, 
railway material, marine engines and port equipment for expon to Argentina. The funds 
were also supposedly to be used to finance the installation and upkeep of works and 
buildings needed by the Argentine Government in Spain and in the free pon to be 
established in Cádiz as a transshipment depot for Argentine exports to Europe.
This time records and memoirs coincide: MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 8: Arta jo's 
cifra no. 89 to Ambassador in Buenos Aires, 2 April 1948, and Areilza: 
Memorias Exteriores, 1947-1964, Barcelona [Planeta] 1984, p. 52. Areilza, 
future Count of Motrico, came to Franco's attention in 1941 as the coauthor 
of a book setting out Spain's claims to large parts of France's African 
empire and to the return of Gibraltar. Areilza was appointed as ambassador 
in Buenos Aires (1947—1950), in Washington (1954-1960), and in Paris (1960- 
1964). His diplomatic career reached its highest point when he became 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first Monarchic Cabinet 1975-1976 and was 
elected President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 
May 1981.
*4\ Manuel Espadas Burgos: Franquismo y politica exterior, Madrid [Rialp] 
1988, p. 174. Perón was delighted to defy Truman. For him the bilateral 
commercial agreement running prior to the Franco—Perón agreement was the 
complement to the Marshall Plan that Argentina dared to give to the only 
true anti—Communist country in Europe. MAE, Leg. 2418, exp. 1: Despatch no. 
1060 from Areilza to Artajo, Buenos Aires, "Conversaciones con el General 
Perón en esta Embajada**, 30 September 1947. See Perón's schizophrenic ideas
on the Marshall Plan in Areilza's despatch no. 267 to Arta jo, **S/ 
Conversaciones con el Señor Presidente de la República General Perón*1, 
Buenos Aires, 3 Aprii 1948.
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In the short-run Argentina provided the equivalent of US$200 million credit to 
cover imports of cereals and other Argentine foodstuffs (such as 3 million tons of wheat, 
1 million tons of com, 8,000 tons of oil). It assured Spain of vital food imports that it 
would have found it otherwise difficult to finance otherwise. Argentina’s credit facilities 
during the period 1947 to 1949 permitted the purchase of commodities at a value of 
$2643 million.241 The reader should not, however, overestimate the overall importance 
of Argentina’s credit facilities. Imports financed this way during 1947 to 1949 amounted 
to only 62 per cent of imports in the single year of 1949. Furthermore, the Protocol was 
not designed, as in previous bilateral agreements, to help to finance the extra imports 
required to rehabilitate the Spanish economy. These remained matters in which assistance 
from the United States was necessary.
3.6. Was there an Alternative Course of Action?
Recent literature has assumed that the only alternative open to Spain was that of 
becoming a respectable democracy within Western Europe. This section will try to show 
that there was another alternative which might have brought more effective results than 
the policy then carried out. This second alternative would have consisted of Spain moving 
towards the abandonment of its economic inward-looking orientation, without immediate 
political change, had the Americans agreed to extend assistance to Spain. The 
modification of Spain's political structure would have then been left to blosson from the 
economic growth speeded up by American assistance.249 It should be recalled that the 
Marshall Plan was based, among a variety of other things, upon the assumption that 
economic growth was a precondition for stable and democratic governments. Had this 
second alternative been followed and had the Truman Administration not subordinated
*4*. Viña»: "La primara ayuda económica norteamericana a España", in Lecturas 
de economía española e internacional: 50 Anniversary del Cuerpo de Técnicos 
Comerciales del Estado, Madrid [Secretaria General Técnica del Ministerio 
de Comercio] 1981, pp. 49-90, p. 89.
ío. This was the alternative then open to Eastern Europe: "There was general 
agreement [.*.] that Eastern Europe could participate, provided the 
countries would abandon near—exclusive Soviet orientation of their 
economies.m FRÜS, 1947, III, "Summary of Discussion on Problems of Relief, 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Europe**, Washington, 29 May, p. 235.
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economic assistance to prior political transformation, Spain might have anticipated 
economic stabilisation and liberalisation by a decade.
The Truman Administration renounced the use of its strong bargaining position 
as leverage to impose political and economic changes in Spain. The initial American 
policy towards Spain, made explicit by Acheson in April 1947, that only after Franco had 
been overthrown and replaced with a more liberal government would Washington aid 
Spain, changed only slightly at the end of the year. The following conversation between 
Erice and Culbertson reveals perfectly the essence (or lack of any) of the bilateral 
dialogue: Erice asked Culbertson to be precise about what the State Department meant by 
"evolution". The American Chargé did not endeavour to correct him by saying that US 
policy "had not envisaged evolution under Franco."230 However, between November 
1947 and January 1948 the State Department had come progressively convinced of the 
need for normalisation of relations between Spain and Western democracies, particularly 
the United States.
The PPS proposed some positive action in the Spanish problem. The PPS was 
established on 5 May 1947 in the office of the Under-Secretary of State to assure the 
development of long-range policy drawing together the views of the geographical and 
functional offices of the Department of State and other non-departmental sources.251 In 
October 1947, the PPS perceived that the policy of ostracism had tightened the dictator’s 
rein whilst it impeded the recovery of the Spanish economy. Franco had turned 
international ostracism into a monster demonstration of domestic support and belt- 
tightening as the supreme proof of patriotism.252 Washington needed a new policy
,so. Ibid., Culbertson to Marshall, Madrid, 23 October, p. 1090.
251. Information on the establishment and terms of reference of the PPS is 
included in documentation on national security policy in FRUS, 1947, I. For 
organisation of the PPS see George F. Kennan: Memoirs, 1925-1950, Boston 
(Little, Brown and Company] 1967, pp. 325 ff. and 343; and Acheson's Present 
at the Creation, cit., p. 228.
2Sa. Raymond Carr: Spain 1808-1975, Oxford [Clarendon Press] 2nd ed., 1982 
[1966], pp. 715 and 740. Fernando Vizcaino Casas: La España de la poscruerra 
1939—1953, Barcelona [Planeta] 1978, pp. 185-88, gives a relaxed account of 
the popular reaction to support the Caudillo. Franco furiously refused to 
beg for dollars and in the face of tin just treatment accentuated Spanish 
bravery: "When a country receives assistance from others in the form of 
loans or nobel and just financial collaboration, reaches recovery and
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toward Spain:
"Thus, instead of contributing to the rapid deterioration of 
the economic situation, as we are doing at present, we would 
provide the opportunity for Spain to develop its resources and 
play a normal part in the revival of world commerce and 
industry."253
George F. Kennan. head of the PPS, advised an immediate initial relaxation of 
official restrictions to normal trade, to be followed, in the short term, by the opening up 
of the possibility of financial assistance for the rehabilitation of the Spanish economy. The 
situation appeared clear to Kennan. Depriving the Spanish economy of the benefits of 
international economic relations could push the country to the edge of disorder and civil 
strife, an explosive situation bringing no benefit to anyone except the well-organised 
Communists. Depriving Western Europe of Spain's possible economic contribution, 
although necessarily a limited one, seemed unnecessary. This famous PPS's report was 
presented to the newly created National Security Council in December 1947 (as NSC 3) 
and it was approved by Truman on 21 January 1948. Although Marshall and Truman in 
essence approved the PPS's recommendation, its real implications were not fully assumed 
by the State Department.2**
The State Department maintained Spanish political and economic housecleaning
equilibrium sooner, when it has to do it with its own means by labour 
economy and sacrifice, the path is slower but, obviously, worthier since it 
has the entire Nation contributing directly with its sacrifices to its 
renaissance. This is the case of Spain." Franco interviewed by the United 
Press, 27 June 1947; ASMA£, Amb. Paris, b. no. 413: "Dichiarazioni
Ufficiali". In view of Spain's exclusion from the ERP Franco maintained that 
the other nations of the West were not as able as Spain to live by their own 
efforts; for some, he argued, the Marshall Plan was a matter of life and 
death, but for Spain it was not indispensable; Franco's declarations to 
Clarín of Buenos Aires, 8 July 1948, in Textos de doctrina política. 
Palabras y escritos 1945-1950, Madrid, 1951, p. 263.
2%i. FRUS, 1947, III, "U.S. Policy Towards Spain", Washington, 24 October, 
pp. 1092-95.
3U. The only real effect of Kennan's call was an effective modification of 
the United States' policy towards the Spanish question at the United 
Nations. When, in mid—November 1947 the General Assembly proposed the 
reaffirmation of the resolution of 12 December 1946, it failed, in part due 
to effective opposition from the United States delegation. See detailed 
accounts in Robert P. Huff: "The Spanish Question before the United
Nations", Doctoral Diss., Stanford University, 1966, pp. 342-69; and, 
Alberto J. Lleonart y Anselem: España v la ONU, vol. II. La «cuestión 
española». Estudio introductorio y corpus documental, Madrid (Centro 
Superior dm Investigaciones Científicas] 1983, pp. 272—306.
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as a pre-condition to any modification of the American policy. The recently appointed US 
Under-Secretary in the State Department, Robert A. Lovett, acting as Secretary of State, 
informed the Embassy in Madrid that the new policy aimed at normalisation "would be 
difficult if not impossible without substantial political and economic changes within 
Spain."235 While the Marshall Plan had opted to restore French and Italian economies 
at the same time pushing out of Government their Communist ministers, the State 
Department insisted upon political change in Spain prior to any economic assistance. In 
other words. Franco Spain’s restoration of international respectability should precede 
American relaxation towards the regime.
The Americans adopted limited and insufficient economic measures to help the 
Spanish economy during the early months of 1948. As afirst step towards gradual and 
unobtrusive relaxation of the then existing trade restrictions, Spain was placed on an equal 
footing with all other Western European countries with respect to American export 
controls. The second measure adopted was the State Department eliminating the initial 
political objections to private credits granted by American banks to private entrepeneurs 
or the Government. The American Chargé, Culbertson, personally informed the Spanish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs about the changes in the American policy towards Spain and 
the specific measures adopted in the economic field.154
The Spanish Government had already been thinking of a three-stage plan to 
provide American credits to the Spanish economy and now rushed to agree on details. 
There would be, initially, an agreement between an American pool of banks and the 
Spanish counterpart, for a short-term inter-banks credit of $300 to $500 million with a 
guarantee of annual supply of certain commodities agreed upon beforehand. The 
Eximbank would then gather all private credits and enlarge them to a given amount. The 
total credit line would, finally, reach a maximum with the incorporation of Spain to the
1S!. FROS, 1947, III, Lovett to the Embassy in Spain, Washington, 18
December, p. 1096; repeated in the most similar terms by the Chief of the 
Division of Western European Affairs, Theodore C. Achilles, to Culbertson, 
FROS. 1946, III, Washington, 5 January, p. 1017.
***. FROS, 1948, III, Memorandum of Conversation with Artajo and attached 
"Motes" by Culbertson, Madrid, 2 February, pp. 1020-24.; and, MAE, Leg. 2418, 
exp. 33: Note resumé (uncompleted) of an interview between Culbertson and 
Artajo, n/s, n/d.
231
ERP. A figure of $1,000 million had been proposed initially by some Spanish officials. 
Obviously, the Spanish Administration held little hope of accomplishing all three stages, 
but, had it accomplished just the first it would have been satisfied. The Spaniards thought 
that the first stage provided a useful basis for negotiation. It was not a public deal, it 
provided security of investment, unity of action, a sufficiently large amount of money to 
provide room for manoeuvre and it spared the inconvenience of sporadic private aid while 
it did not renounce its versatility, elasticity and flexibility. The American diplomatic corps 
in Madrid were limited to hear, to approve in principle the possibility to present it to 
Washington and to obtain few guarantees from the Spanish counterpart.
The American commercial counsellor in Madrid, Mr. Randall, the first to be 
approached on the matter, requested and immediately obtained a twofold guarantee. First, 
a freer selection of the goods to be exported to Spain and their allocation. Second, given 
the normal administrative delays in any industrial and commercial deal with any Spanish 
counterpart, the Spanish pool of banks would obtain beforehand a formal compromise of 
delivery of licences and goods from the Ministry of Industry. While Randall thought he 
had obtained a modification of the Spanish economic system, the Spanish officials 
considered these points to be "without substantial importance",157
Top Spanish civil servants travelled to Washington to visit financial personalities, 
the Eximbank and the State Department, as the main actors in the three-stage process.25' 
They received the same response from all their American interlocutors: no long-term 
credits were granted by US banks, apart from oil companies, American private capital was
. Previous two paragraphs based on APG, JE, records from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Leg* 13, no* 1.5: "Acuerdo entre un grupo de bancos
españoles y otro de bancos americanos que facilite a los primeros un crédito 
de 300 a 500 millones de dólares a un plazo de cinco años”, attached to 
Memorandum of conversation with Mr Randall, 29 January 1948, and, MAE, Leg. 
10077, exp* 26: Emilio Navasqüés, Director General of Economic Policy at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Artajo and Suanzes, Madrid, 12 February 
1948, giving account of a meeting he held with the Director General of 
Commerce and Tariff Policy at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Mariano 
Yturralde, Culbertson, Randall and the Chief of the Spanish Desk at the 
Department of State on a visit to Madrid, William Denham.
***• MAE, 2418, exp. 33: "Informe reservado a petición del señor Martin
Artajo. Impresiones de un viaje a Norteamérica, 9 de Marzo-1 de Abril" 
[1948], n/s, n/d, giving account of the conversations held by José Fariña, 
executive of the Banco de Crédito Local and the diplomats Francisco Elorza 
and Luis Maria Lojendio.
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not interested in investing in Europe, and long-term credits required prior political 
approval through Eximbank intervention. The Eximbank’s Chairman stated that his bank 
was unable to consider any proposal from Spain. The State Department repeated that no 
economic help would be possible without a clear movement in the direction of greater 
political liberalisation. There was, thus, no other way to obtain short-term private credits 
than to offer gold as collateral and, as a result, private credits were granted in extremely 
limited amounts due to the lack of gold as collateral and previous economic 
springcleaning which could have made investment attractive.259 Uncoordinated 
piecemeal private short-term credits could not, however, serve as a stable basis to redress 
the Spanish economy. Moreover, they were likely to have no effect on economic policy 
and certainly none on the political course of the Spanish Government. The measures 
adopted by the Truman Administration did not help to unblock the problem of raising the 
productivity of Spanish industrial plant, leaving unresolved the country’s dollar shortage. 
Spanish production would continue to be internationally uncompetitive until a large range 
of competitive goods could be incorporated into its production lines. It was a straight­
forward vicious circle that could only be broken by an infusion of investment.
The lack of Spanish recovery and modernisation continued to be the chief obstacle 
to any increase in bilateral trade. The State Department, however, contemplated neither 
direct nor indirect governmental financial assistance to Spain. The US Government would 
not participate in credits extended by private US firms to Spanish private or public firms, 
nor extend Eximbank’s credits, the only measure which could provide any large injection 
of capita] with practical effects in the economy.
"The Department would be glad to consider it as and when the 
regime gives concrete signs that it has the intention of 
moving toward greater democratic and economic efficiency and 
that it has begun to do so.",<c
American material assistance to Spain was, thus, conditional upon convincing evidence 
of economic and political liberalisation.
***. Before 1950 only a S25 million revolving credit was granted to Spain by 
private banks in the United States; see chapter four-, table 4.1.
,M. FRPS. 1948, III, Achilles to Culbertson, Washington, 5 January, p. 1018.
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On the economic side, it meant that Spain had to reform its economy 
drastically.261 Immediate stabilisation, as the Americans asked, could only come with 
a relaxation on the supply side. Excessive intervention and the priority given to the public 
sector in import allocation were presented by the Americans as the reasons for the limited 
flow of American private credits to Spain. The answer from the Spanish officials was 
immediate:
"It is precisely the scarcity of financial resources to 
purchase the supply required by the Spanish economy that 
imposes inter version. The latter is not a whim but a 
necessity. As financial resources improved formulae similar to 
those in practice in other countries would be looked for."*42
They argued that the extreme features of the Spanish import licensing policy were a 
consequence of the fact that Spain was able to earn only a part of the foreign exchange 
needed to meet its essential import requirements. The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
declared that the Spanish Government agreed with a liberalisation of its economic policy, 
although it requested previous financial commitment263 Franco declared to Truman’s 
special ambassador to the Vatican, Myron C. Taylor, early in March 1948. that there was 
no obstacle in principle to a reduction of State intervention in the economy if the 
necessary financial backing was granted.264 Without the latter. Franco saw the risk of 
a situation similar to that of Italy and France, where Communists were free to instigate
2<1. The Americans held a long list of economic complaints: APG, JE, records 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Leg. 13, no. 1.5: Memorandum of
Conversation with the American commercial counsellor Randall on 29 January 
1948, n/s, n/d.; MAE, Leg. 10077, exp. 26: "Short reference of the interview 
of monday March the 6th", presented by Culbertson to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; the following documents sent by Culbertson to Washington: 
Memorandum of Conversation with Artajo and attached notes, dated 2 February, 
and, despatch to Marshall, dated 13 June, in FRPS, 1948, III, pp. 1020-25 
ans 1037-38, respectively; and, MAE, Leg. 2418, exp. 33: Note sent by 
Culbertson on 25 June 1948 on obstacles to economic and financial relations.
,M. APG, JE, records from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Leg. 13, no. 1.5: 
Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Randall, 29 January 194 8.
,M. MAE, Leg. 10077, exp. 26: "Short reference of the interview
[Culbertson/Artajo] of monday March the 8th".
2M. As informed the Italian Embassy in Madrid, on 3 April 1948, ASMAE, Amb. 
Parigi, b. 413: "Spagna: Piano Marshall", telespresso no. 12/4943 to several 
Italian embassies, 4 May 194 8. In the memorandum of his conversation with 
Franco that Taylor sent to Truman on 1st April, this aspect was not 
mentioned; see document no. 313 in Ennio Di Nolfo: Vaticano e Stati Uniti 
1939—1952. Dalle carte di Myron C. Taylor, Milan [Franco Angeli Editore] 
1978, pp. 557-58. This was Taylor's first post-1945 mission to Madrid, which 
he had previously visited during the world war as Roosevelt's special 
representative.
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the revolutionary vims.
Real international financial backing was required prior to any reform of the 
Spanish economy. Did the CEEC report not argue that "effective stabilization measures 
could only be adopted after external aid commenced and production substantially 
increased”?265 In the analysis of the economic advantages to be derived from Spanish 
participation in the Marshall Plan, presented to the Spanish Council of Ministers on 12 
March 1948, "financial and monetary stabilisation" were argued to be possible.266 This 
was not the aim of an individual civil servant, but the conclusion of the Spanish Council 
of Ministers. A few months later Culbertson explained to Marshall that the Spanish 
economy was
"largely the result of an attempt to cope with relative 
isolation plus certain official preference for controlled 
economy. If Franco can see [his] way out of that isolation, 
corrective measures to the present policies [were] quite 
possible. "tri
In August 1948, the semi-official Spanish Ambassador in Washington, Lequerica, 
deprecated the need for any political change, but argued that "economic changes [were] 
desirable and possible."268 Unfortunately, the Spanish Administration had no opportunity 
to be more explicit since exclusion from the ERP and the permanent rejection by the
*w . FRPS, 19<7, III, American Ambassador in France, Jefferson Caffery to
Marshall, 12 September, p. 426. The original CEEC report's final section 
suggested that financial stabilisation was to be postponed until aid had 
been received and output had increased. After the American intervention in 
September 1947 the CEEC's general report, vol II, 4th point, was explicit 
that no country could expect aid without stabilising the economy. CEEE : 
General Report, 2 vols., London [HMSO] July—September 1947. See also Enrique 
Rodriguez Mata: "El Plan Marshall y la politica econòmica internacional”, 
Moneda y Crédito, September 1947, pp. 31-47, presenting a summary of the 
CEEC report.
li4. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 4: "Condiciones generales del Plan Marshall y del 
Plan Bevin", n/s, n/d, presented to the Council of Ministers on 12 March 
1948, 4th and last point under economic advantages that would have derived 
from Spanish ERP membership. Viñas et al., p. 476 when dealing with this 
same document did not mention the possibility of economic and financial 
liberalisation while they focussed on other minor points. In their desire 
to stress the autharchic nature of the Spanish Government, they canceled any 
possible evidence of the efforts to open the Spanish economy if foreign 
assisted.
**7. FRPS, 1948, III, Madrid, 13 June, p. 1038.
***• Ibid., Memorandum by Achilles of Conversation' with the unofficial 
ambassador in Washington, José Félix de Lequerica, Washington, 25 August, 
p. 1047.
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American Administration of off-ERP aid made economic stabilisation in Spain 
unattainable in tbe short term.
One might have expected that a first point of confrontation between Spaniards and 
Americans would have arisen from the fact that the Import Programme certainly did not 
aim at a restoration of the role of the private initiative but the reinforcement of public 
enterprises and the role of the public sector. The INI was getting an excessively large 
share of the limited foreign exchange available for the import of essentials and the Import 
Programme aimed at extending this situation to American aid. The reduction of State 
interference in private enterprises, especially through the INI, Artajo explained, was a 
"situation [that] could be worked out".2*9 The opinion at that time of the Minister of 
Industry and Commerce and, at the same time. President of INI on the question is 
unknown to me. However, Suanzes declared (before and after these events) that the 
Institute's intention was to supplement and not to suplant private capital and that, where 
appropriate, the State attempted to withdraw from their own industrial creations as soon 
as circumstances would have allowed it to complete its mission in each case.270 There 
seemed to be little problem in reaching an agreement about how assistance might have 
been invested, despite the clear State public priorities of the Spanish Administration, as 
long as the assistance was real.
The only straight negative coming from the Spanish side was political 
liberalisation. The Spanish Administration agreed to collaborate with the United States 
in every way as long as they left the Spanish Government to run their own political 
house. Franco explained to the American Chargé that the Spanish Government resented 
political ostracism but that "they [were] not now going [to] modify politically in order to
***. Ibid.. Memorandum by Culbertson of conversation with Artajo, 2 February, 
p. 1021-22.
*’*. Suanzes: a) Instituto Kacional de Industrie; notas en relaci6n con la 
creaci6n v desenvolvimiento de este Instituto. Madrid [INI] 1941, p. 13, and 
b) The Spanish Commercial and Industrial Policy, cit., pp. 14-67. He was 
considered by the US State Department as the "principal obstacle" for a 
change in economic policy in Spain; FRPS, 1948, III, Memorandum of telephone 
conversation with James Forrestal, U.S. Secretary of National Defense, by 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs and former ambassador 
to Spain (March 1945 to December 1945), Norman Armour, p. 1030. Suanzes is 
qualified unanimously by the majority of scholars as the principal designer 
of Franco Spain's autarchic industrial development.
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obtain these ends."271 The Spanish Government argued that the international community 
had not appreciated previous attempts to provide a more democratic and liberal political 
structure undertaken since the end of the war. The Charter of the Spanish People, 
promulgated in 1945, in principle enumerated the rights and responsibilities of the Spanish 
citizens and their relationship with the State. In July 1945 Franco had reshaped the 
political composition of the cabinet by replacing phalangist leaders with representatives 
of monarchism and Catholicism. The Referendum Act of 1945, conceived as a means to 
allow citizens to collaborate in the governing process, was employed in 1947 to ratify the 
Law of Succession and the lengthy statement of intentions which constituted the Labour 
Charter. 1946 and 1947 opened with Spanish diplomatic representatives protesting that the 
harder Spain worked to liberalise its government the more the Allies complained.272 
Most recently, regardless of the merits of the Law of Succession in filling a constitutional 
lacuna, it did not persuade Anglo-Saxons about future political liberalisation.273
The reality was that Spain gave no grounds for thinking that its regime intended 
to evolve, however gradually, in a more liberal direction. The Spanish Government 
showed no signs whatsoever of envisaging an enlargement of civil and political liberties. 
On the contrary, the whole emphasis in official pronouncements, including those of the 
CaudiUo himself, was laid on the immutability of the order of things in Spain and the 
superiority of its institutions compared to those which existed in other countries. Indeed 
it is evident that, by the very nature of its totalitarian structure, the Franco regime could 
not admit constitutional modifications of a liberal kind without endangering its own
,71. MAE, Leg. 10077, exp. 26: "Short reference of the interview of monday 
March the 8th", presented by Culbertson to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and, FROS. 1946, III, Culbertson to Marshall, Madrid, 24 March, p. 1029.
*w . FROS, 1946, V, the Spanish Ambassador in Washington, Juan F. de 
Cardenas, to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, 5 January 1946, pp. 1027— 
30. The Minister Martin Artajo, whose initial task was precisely to win 
international respectability, complained in January 1947 that the resolution 
on Spain, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 12 
December 1946, had aborted the path towards political liberalisation, FRUS, 
1947, III, Memorandum of Conversation by the Charge in Spain (Bonsai), 
Madrid, 2 January, p. 1053. Bolsal added that "the attitude generally 
prevalent in the Cabinet at present is that nothing which the regime could 
conceivably do internally would be apt to improve Spain's international 
position."
Ache son, in reply to a question at a press conference on 4 April 1947, 
stated that the establishment of a Regency Council in Spain did not change 
the United States Government's attitude concerning Spain at all; FRUS. 1947,
III, Bolsal to Marshall, Madrid, 1 April, pp. 1065-66, note no. 2.
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existence. Any such danger was resisted to the last ditch. Spain could only move toward 
what has subsequently been labelled as the "constitutional cosmetic of authoritarianism" 
where Franco remained as domineering as ever.274
Literature has interpreted the little efforts to adopt democratic institutions as the 
result of Franco’s conviction that the Western bloc needed him and had to accept him as 
he was. This could be supported, here and there, by some internal reports and 
declarations. It would be perhaps more accurate to ask ourselves what could have Franco 
obtained by gestures in the political direction demanded by the western Allies. The 
Spanish Government lacked incentives for political liberalisation. Considering public 
opinion in Western Europe, nothing short of Franco leaving office could bring 
respectability to Spain in time to secure the assistance under the ERP. Moreover, 
liberalising measures that might satisfy the United States might fail to satisfy the British. 
Once the Anglo-Saxons had been convinced, was there any guarantee of equal approval 
from the French side? Regarding the United Nations, what possibilities had Franco’s 
Spain, whatever measure of political liberalisation might have implemented, to become 
a member state in the face of Soviet Union’s opposition in the Security Council?275 As 
Culbertson put it:
"The Regime has no way of knowing, and we have no way of 
telling it, at what point of liberalisation it would become 
acceptable in the eyes of the western nations. "27€
Franco admitted no main political alteration in Spain because the question always 
remained whether the Western bloc would have been satisfied with anything less than 
Franco’s abandonment of power and the complete dismantling of his regime.
The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs had his own way to express iL According
274. For the concept of "constitutional cosmetics'*, meaning window-dressing
in political constitutionalism, see Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua: 
Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy, London [George Allen 4 Unwin] 1979,
chapter three, and Carr, op. cit., pp. 707, 715, and 720.
275. Spain's exclusion from the United Nations never constituted a problem 
linked with its possible participation in the ERP. Five of the sixteen ERP 
members were not in fact members of the United Nations.
2Ti. FRUS, 1948, III, Culbertson to Marshall, Madrid, 29 March, p. 1031.
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to him, the western democracies did not want Spain to progressively reincorpórate in its 
public law liberties compatible with the character of the nation but gestures to allow the 
revolutionary virus. Artajo considered that
"if the Regime were to liberalize in a manner such as [the 
Americans] apparently had in mind revolution and civil strife 
would break out [in Spain] and the credits received by reason 
of their liberalizing action would have to be used to restore 
order.-277
How could it be expected that Franco, who considered himself chosen by God as the 
leader of his country, "Caudillo by the Grace of God", would simply step out of power 
because of world enmity toward Spain?27* Political reforms could not precede economic 
assistance and by making political evolution a pre condition to economic assistance, the 
American Government aborted the possibility of fostering growth in Spain.
There was a mutual miscalculation on both sides which allowed little progress. On 
one side, the Americans (and British) had wrongly considered that eagerness for Marshall 
Aid was such great an inducement that Franco would be forced to implement political 
liberalisation:
"We heartily shared the British feeling that the continued 
exclusion of Spain [from ERP] would serve as an inducement to 
General Franco to bring about substantial political and 
economic changes in order to qualify for inclusion. "27*
On the other, the Spanish Government considered that, in the progressively deteriorating 
international situation, strategic considerations made assistance to Spain inevitable, without 
the latter having to move one inch in the political direction asked by the Allies.210
Ibid.. Memorandum by Culbertson, Madrid, 2 February, p. 1022. "Notre 
conception de la dexnocracie —explained Artajo to the French Delegate in 
Madrid- est moins hypocrite et plus humaine." AD, CE—DE 1945-1960, vol. 371: 
Telegram no. 355 from Hardion, Madrid, 20 April 1948.
í7#. Ramón Garriga: Franco—Serrano Súfter. On drama politico, Barcelona
[Planeta] 1986, p. 167, describes how the Cortes voted, as a reaction to the 
Unite Nations condemnatory resolutions of December 194 6, that the new five- 
peseta coins carried Franco's effigy bordered with the inscription 
"Francisco Franco, Caudillo of Spain by the Grace of God".
*7#. FRUS, 194 8, III, Memorandum by Horsey, Washington, 16 February, p. 1026.
**°. i.e., MAE, Leg. 2418, exp. 33: Most Confidential Note, dated in December
1947, which announced that the State Department had replied to a joint 
memorandum of the Army and Navy that relations with. Spain would have been 
stabilised rapidly without noise; ibid, "Informe reservado a petición del 
señor Martin Artajo. Impresiones de un viaje a Norteamérica, 9 de Marzo-1
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Culbertson informed Marshall that the Spaniards were convinced that due to Spain’s 
strategic importance "we will of necessity, in our own interest, not only accept the regime 
as it is but will extend economic and military aid.”211 The Spaniards argued that 
progress was up to the United States. The State Department thought that progress was 
definitively up to Spain.213 A compromise proposal came from the Spanish Government: 
Spain could not comply with the political requirements of the Americans but this was not 
necessarily the case on the economic side. By insisting on the political front the Truman 
Administration impeded any change. No other course of action could have led to such a 
deadlock.
Many were convinced of the need to cooperate with Franco. On the American 
side, Culbertson recommended that political and economic evolution of the then existing 
conditions from the then existing conditions be fostered.
"On the question of economic policy I feel I've got to stick 
my neck out by saying that the easing up of the present 
economic and financial restrictions (. . . ] will [. • . ] have 
practically no effect on the economic situation of Spain or in 
bringing about evolution [...]. For that reason I suggested 
[...] to consider direct governmental assistance.
This required Spain's ERP membership:
"I had hoped [wrote Culbertson to Marshall] Spain might be 
incorporated into the [ERP] on purely economic grounds. Not 
because Spain would be a major positive contributor to 
European recovery but because assistance would prop up a 
wobbly economy and make it possible for Spain to become more 
self-sufficient, a less drain on world supplies as well as to 
be in a position to export some commodities of some value to
de Abril* [1948], n/s, n/d, mentioning the outstanding differences between 
military and political officials; Leg. 2309, exp. 4: Spanish Charge in
Washington, Antonio Cacho Zabalza, "Plan Marshall y politics exterior", 4 
February 1948. On the other hand, the military attaches to the American 
Embassy in Madrid had been openly gathering information about the state of 
the Spanish armed forces, see their main conclusions in "Memorandum for Mr. 
Myron Taylor”, Madrid, 2 April 1948, published as doc. no. 315, in Di Nolfo, 
op. cit., pp. 560-61.
2,1. FRUS, 1948, III, Madrid, 24 March, p. 1029. A similar view was expressed 
by the Italian and French diplomacies: ASMAE, Amb. Paris, b. 14: Telespresso 
no. 09035/C to all Italian diplomatic delegations in CEEC countries, "La 
Spagna ed il Piano Marshall", 20 March 1948, and AD, DE—CE: Despatch no. 444 
from Hardion, Madrid, 6 April 1948.
JW. FRUS, 1948, III, Memorandum by Achilles of conversation with Lequerica, 
Washington, 25 August, p. 1048.
FRUS# 1947, III, Culbertson to Marshall, Madrid, 30 December, p. 1101.
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E u r o p e . "2ê4
Culbertson asked Marshall to indicate informally to the ERP countries that Spain should 
be included on economic grounds. This partial circumvention of the political question was 
rejected in Washington.2*5 Some American companies had declared their readiness to 
assist the Spanish economy if ERP was provided to Spain.2*6 On the European side, the 
Quai d’Orsay and the Foreign Office were of the opinion that the United States 
Government could find a way in economic terms to efficiently assist the Spanish 
economy, getting round the obvious inconvenience that barred any other possibility to the 
Europeans.2*7 Even Dr Juan Negrin L6pez, who headed the Popular Front government 
of the Second Republic (May 1937-39), Spain's last Prime Minister before the advent of 
Franco and leader in London of a minority' socialist group with a manifest pro-communist 
tendency, opposed economic sanctions against Franco Spain and requested the inclusion 
of Spain into the ERP, which would have involved the relief of the Spanish people and 
economy rather than any political support for Franco.2*8
The Spanish Government had initially wanted to participate in a common 
programme with little cooperation requiring no national sacrifices for the sake of Europe
2#4. FRÜS, 1948, III, Culbertson to Marshall, Madrid, 29 March, p. 1032.
2,\ Ibid., pp. 1033-36.
2#<. i.e. APG, JE, Leg. 13, no. 9.4: The President of the Westinghouse
Electric Corporation, who was willing to collaborate in the railway 
programmes, the industrial and electric installations, to Franco, 5 November
1948.
2.1. ASMAE, Amb. Parigi, b. no. 413: Quaroni's despatch of 19 February 194 8;
and, PRO, FO 371/73338: Confidential Despatch no. 28864/84/41 from Mr
Makins, FO, to Mr Hall Patch, London, 1 November 1948.
2.1. Negrin developed these ideas in a three-part article in the New York 
Herald Tribune (European Edition): "Spain and the Marshall Plan" 1 April 
194 8, "Franco Spain and ERP" 2 April, and "Spain and the Sixteen", 3 April. 
The main opposition leaders also perceived the importance of ERP assistance 
but reserved it for a democratic Spain. The agreement reached in October 
194 8 between the leaders of the Spanish Socialist Party in the exile and the 
monarchist forces, ran in its 6th point the desire to incorporate Spain, 
once freed from Franco, into the ERP,. Brussels Pact as initial nucleus for 
the Western European Federation; Memoria que presenta al 3*r Congreso de la 
Unión General de Trabajadores de España en el exilio la Comisión Ejecutiva. 
Toulouse, 20 al 23 de Enero de 1949, pp. 4 6—47 (consulted at the Francisco 
Largo Caballero Foundation, Madrid), also reproduced in Tusell: La oposición 
democrática al franquismo 1939-1962, Barcelona [Planeta] 1977, pp. 204-205. 
For Dr Negrin's activities in London, see Michael Alpert: "Don Juan Negrin 
en Londres 1940-1956", Bulletin d'histoire contemporaine de l'Espaqne, no. 
8-9, June 1989, pp. 28-40.
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as a whole. On 5 November 1947, Franco declared that the sacrifice of the American 
people should not be addressed to countries as a whole unable in moments of extreme 
division, passions and ambitions, to agree among themselves to profit from such a noble 
offer as Marshall's. It would have been more convenient to the United States "to agree 
directly with each of the countries without forgetting or by-passing any of them”.“ * The 
desire to obtain aid solely on the basis of individual reconstruction programmes was 
nothing particular to Franco Spain. The Conference of Paris, 12 to 15 July 1947, had 
shown how essential it was for the European countries to retain complete freedom in their 
commercial policy, to restrict the power of any future authority as much as possible so 
as to oppose its interference in the domestic affairs of the participating countries and only 
on a temporary basis as long as American aid lasted. The CEEC was unable to present 
a coordinated programme for European reconstruction. Its final report was a joint 
statement of each country's needs with regard to supplies of goods and financial support. 
This so-called "shopping lists" approach was vehemently rejected in American terms.290 
There was no initial intention to create a multilateral system of cooperation but to 
continue bilateral relations with the United States and the remaining European countries. 
The European States agreed to co-operate on economic reconstruction, to consider a 
customs union as a long term goal and to set up a politically impotent common 
organisation with no supranational character because of the over-riding priority of securing 
American aid.291
When it became clear that the ERP was to be a reality without Spain, Artajo 
followed a somewhat different strategy:
"It does not matter much whether the money comes from one 
corner or another, whether it arrives in form of credit or in 
any other form, whether is granted through the Marshall Plan 
or through any other plan.**
2#>. Franco to the Brazilian newspaper 0 Journal as quoted in ASMAE, Amb. 
Paris, b. no. 413: "Dichiarazioni ufficiali".
290. FRUS, 1947, III, Under-Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett to Marshall, 
24 August, p. 372«
291. For a detailed account see Milward's Reconstruction, cit., chapter II, 
pp. 61 ff.
292. Art a jo's declarations to the Logos News Agency on 4 January 1948, and 
repeated to the Paris Press on 11 February, quoted in ASMAE, Amb. Paris, b. 
no. 413: "Dichiarazioni ufficiali".
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As we have seen Culbertson informed Artajo, on 2 February, about the terms of the new 
American policy towards Spain, which considered the extension of indirect assistance to 
Spain in the form of the elimination of political objections to private credits. After 
discussion with Franco and his Cabinet, Artajo replied that the "Marshall Plan was of less 
interest to Spain than an individual deal with the United States."293 A bilateral 
agreement with Spain, outside of but parallel to the ERP, would provide assistance 
without the political inconvenience of ERP membership. This was not necessarily the 
preferred solution. Spain’s ERP membership would have meant obtaining dollar credits 
without the need to directly deal with the United States. It had been feared from the outset 
that the United States could impose a much higher price in the context of bilateral 
dealings than if negotiations took place within a multilateral framework.294 ERP 
membership offered a greater appearance of complete international rehabilitation of the 
Franco regime than any bilateral deal with the United States. Finally, the major 
inconvenience which ERP membership involved -in the Spanish Government’s 
perspective- did not disappear with the bilateral deal: Spain losing some of its freedom 
of action in case of military conflict.295 In sum, Spain’s apparent preference for bilateral 
negotiations was due to necessity having been excluded from the multilateral framework; 
it was the only way to obtain foreign financial assistance.
In a way, given the large needs of the Spanish economy the Spaniards could have 
been more easily forced to give up some of the more extreme features of interventionism 
if in direct dialogue with the Americans, who could even coordinate effective economic 
assistance with political developments, than at the general bargaining process which took 
place within the CEEC or through the bilateral agreements signed with each country 
receiving assistance on the basis of the Economic Cooperation Act. The OEEC members 
had considered the American draft agreement concerning the conditions of Marshall Aid 
to the governments of Western Europe, dated on 12 May 1948, and the initial intention
FRPS, 1948, III, Culbertson to Marshall, Madrid, 9 March.
*M . MAE, Leg. 3159, exp. 26: "Nota para su Excelencia", n/d, n/s, probably 
14 July 1947.
iM. MAE, Leg. 2309, exp. 4: "Condiciones generales dal Plan Marshall y del 
Plan Bevin", n/s, n/d; presented to the Spanish Council of Ministers on 12 
March 1948.
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to use counterpart funds (the result of the sale of US commodities against local currency) 
to influence local economic policy excessively intrusive. It was, consequently and 
efficiently, opposed by the ERP recipient countries.” 6 In the case of Spain, positive 
assistance, if granted at the time of increasing economic jitters, could have worked as 
leverage to obtain effective economic and political liberalisation and have been used to 
encourage democratic evolution.” 7
The State Department refused to see things from this perspective:
"Positive economic assistance for this government should 
await, and serve as an inducement for the taking of concrete 
steps toward liberalisation in Spain."2**
The Spanish Government perceived the United States as holding out a fairly empty hand 
of friendship. The Americans were calling for immediate action in return for which the 
Spaniards may have received nothing because any action the could have implemented 
might have failed to convince the US Administration. A busted economy in Spain was 
certainly neither going to make European recovery easier nor involve to abandoning the 
pressure to achieve political improvement The problem is whether political liberalisation 
was to be a precondition of any further move.299 Had the State Department thrown out 
the ideological and emotional leftovers from the war in their Spanish policy, a means to 
encourage economic stability in Spain could have been found without much public 
announcement In the early 1950s, when the Truman Administration came to accept a 
Spanish contribution to Western European defence, means were found to bring Spain
2M. For an account of the mechanics of the ERP bilateral agreements, see 
H.T. Adam: L'Organisation Européenne de Coopération Economique, Paris
[Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence] 194 9, pp. 67 ff. For the 
European criticisms see FRPS, 1946, III, pp. 446-50 and 457—62; and Brown 
and Opie, op. cit., pp. 157-159 £ 188-190. The most recent account of the 
difficulties of the dialogue between the American and the Western European 
ERP aid recipient countries refers to Denmark, Leor. Dalgas Jensen: "Denmark 
and the Marshall Plan, 1947-4 8: the Decision to Participate**, Scandinavian 
Journal of History, vol. 14, no. 1, 1989, pp. 57-83, in particular pp. 71 
ff.
2r?. FRÜS, 1947, III, Culbertson to Marshall, Madrid, 26 December, p. 1098.
2M. FRÜS, 1948, III, "Policy Statement by the Department of State on Spain", 
Washington, 26 July, p. 1043.
2ff. "In fact, economic stability and liberalization may well bring with it 
political stability and liberalization." Ibid., Culbertson to Marshall, 
Madrid, 29 March, p. 1034.
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within the western security system without the need to Spanish adhesion to either NATO 
or the Western European Union, with the advantage that the Americans imposed their 
terms. When the Americans opted for this solution, economic liberalisation was 
subordinated to the then immediate strategic requirement (see chapter four). In the late 
1950s, when the Spanish economic situation progressively deteriorated, international aid 
for economic stabilisation was not conditional upon parallel political liberalisation. It was 
then naturally assumed that political liberalisation would follow from economic 
liberalisation. Could a similar solution to the one adopted in 1953 or in 1959 have been 
implemented in 1948? Could the economic bonanza that supposedly stemmed from the 
mid-1950s initial American aid and the implementation of the Stabilisation Plan have 
taken already place after 1947/48?
Some of the circumstances which supposedly favoured the implementation of 
economic and financial stabilisation in 1959 were already present a decade earlier.300 
On the one hand, the Spanish Administration was already conscious that an inward- 
looking economy could not promote sustained growth and, on the other hand, foreign 
exchange reserves in the second half of 1947 were as heartbreaking as at the end of the 
1950s. The reserves on 31 December 1957 were $96.8 million, of which $56.4 were not 
accessible by law whilst the reserves in December 1947 were $11 million. If, in July 
1959, the deficit reached $76.3 millions, in July 1947 the pending requests to the IEME 
were $208 million while they were almost $908 million in October 1947.301
To my understanding it is incorrect to state that Franco and his Administration 
took twenty years to recognise that the economic system designed in the immediate post-
,0°. For the circumstances of the so-called Stabilisation Plan of 1959 see 
the accounts written by some of its protagonists: Mariano Navarro Rubio: "La 
batalla de la estabilización”, Anales de la Real Academia de Ciencias 
Morales y Políticas, Madrid, 1976; and Fuentes Quintana: a) "El Plan de 
Estabilización económica de 1959, veinticinco años después", Información 
Comercial Española, nos. 612-13, August-September 1984, pp. 25-40; and, b) 
"Tres decenios de la economía española en perspectiva", in Garcia Delgado 
(ed.): España. Economía, Madrid [Espasa-Calpe] 1988, pp. 1-75. Fuentes was 
a member of the first generation of Spanish economists produced by the 
School of Economics and Political Science set up in Madrid in 1943.
,01. Data for 1957/59 from Juan Sarda Dexeus: "El Qanco de España (1931— 
1962)", in El Banoo de España. Ona Historia Económica, Madrid [Ferreira] 
1970, pp. 419-479, pp. 466 and 470; data for 1947 from table 3.4.
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Civil War was ineffective or that only the new generations of economists from the School 
of Economics criticised the old policies and favoured liberalisation. It is commonly 
maintained that only after July 1951, with the appointment of a new cabinet, did the 
Government attempt a (timorous and halting) liberal economic venture which implied the 
acceptance of the need for international exchange. Under this light, the 1950s appeared 
to be the time when the Spanish Administration would have realised the need to 
progressively open the economy, a period of tension between autarchy and liberalisation, 
between isolation and openess, in sum, between the obscure 1940s and the bright year of 
1959.302 This thesis has shown that whatever ideological commitment towards autarchy 
existed before 1945 it was completely dropped after that date. It emerges from the 
different programmes in place and from the Import Programme, that the Spanish 
Government explicitly recognised the essential role of imports to develop the industrial 
capacity of the nation. The period up to the end of 1947 was considered transitional to 
new policies which would never be implemented due to the lack of financial support, the 
technical équipe was ready in 1947 to re-address the Spanish economy and to end its 
isolation from Western Europe and, as we have seen, the idea of financial and economic 
liberalisation had reached the Council of Ministers.303 An important element taking place 
in 1959 different from 1947 was the fact of granting foreign financial assistance to the
Most representative of this view «re Garcia Delgado's publications 
previously cited and "La industrialización y el desarrollo económico en 
España durante el franquismo", in Nadal et al. (eds.), op. cit., pp. 164-89.
*01. AHBE, IEME, box no. 7: the IEME's annual report for 1947 declared **the 
starting point" of the country's economic aspirations to overcoming the 
period of transition opened after the World War. Culbertson informed 
Marshall to be "relatively sure that economic modification and 
liberalization can be obtained and may in fact develop by itself because of 
such widespread opposition [to economic policies] ." FRUS, 1948, III, Madrid, 
24 March, p. 1029. On the contrary, it is generally affirmed that the 1940s 
Spanish Administration was unaware (or consciously rejected) a supposed 
fundamental of economics; the parallelism between industrial growth and 
economic liberalisation, i.e. Viñas: Guerra, dinero, dictadura. Ayuda
fascista y autarquía en la España de Franco, Barcelona (Critica] 1984, p. 
210; Fusi: Franco, cit., p. 133; and Garcia Delgado: "Estancamiento
industrial e intervencionismo económico durante el primer franquismo", in 
Josep Fontana (ed.): España bajo el franquismo, Barcelona [Critica] 1986, 
pp. 170*91, pp. 188-89, article previously published with a few grammatical 
differences as "Notas sobre el intervencionismo económico del primer 
franquismo", Revista de Historia Económica, no. 1, 1985, pp. 135—45.
"Estancamiento" has been reelaborated as "La industrialización y el 
desarrollo económico de España durante el franquismo", in Nadal, Carreras 
and Caries Sudriá (eds.): La economía española en el Siglo XX. Dna
perspectiva histórica, Barcelona [Ariel] 1987, pp. 164-89, and, most 
recently and with some modification regarding the 1960s, as "Crecimiento 
económico y cambio estructural (1951—1975)", in Martin and Comin (eds), op. 
cit., pp. 137-60.
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Spanish economy despite Franco.30*
The question lies in determining how effective the policy of ostracism toward 
Spain was. This policy, to which the exclusion of Spain from the ERP was a part of, 
failed in achieving its main purpose, namely, encouraging a change in the Spanish 
government which might have led to the disappearance of Franco and his regime. It had 
no deleterious effect on the Franco regime and, if anything, it strengthened the 
dictatorship by providing a cohesive rallying cry for the defence of Spain against foreign 
intervention. The more vituperative the attacks from abroad became, the more convinced 
the Spanish Government seemed to appear of the righteousness of its cause. The point this 
section wants to stress is that this policy prevented any possible move toward economic 
liberalisation. On the contrary, it increased Franco’s resistance to any démocratisation 
under foreign pressure and diminished the possibilities of any further economic 
liberalisation. Even more, as the conglomerate of bottlenecks subsisted and lucrative 
vested interests rooted deeper, this policy rendered economic liberalisation even more 
difficult in the long-term. Without resources to purchase essential equipment, fuel and 
fertilisers and other raw materials and capital goods, the recovery and further 
modernisation of Spain dragged on over many years.
Spain, though showing some recovery after 1939, did not succeed in restoring its 
economy to the level of prosperity of 1929, the peak pre-war year, or even that of 1935, 
the year just before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. The maximum pre Civil War 
level of industrial output (1929), if considered in per capita terms, was only reached two 
years later in 1950, in spite of all the efforts made by the INI after 1941.305 Agricultural
,w. On the main arguments debating the influence of the foreign world on the 
Spanish economy since the late 1920s to the late 1950s, see Juan Velarde 
Fuertes: "La base ideològica de la realidad econòmica española", in España. 
Economia, Madrid lEspasa—Calpe] 1988, pp. 955-1000.
*05. Previous official estimates of industrial output had valued upwards the 
contribution of the public sector to industrial development because they 
referred to those industrial sector with the most rapid increase, 
electricity and industries not producing consumer or equipment goods. In 
1950 the energy sector reached a level of 186.1 (1929*100), while the basic 
industry reached 89.5, the industry of equipment goods 91.1 and that of 
consumer goods 84.2. The official industrial index elaborated by the Council 
for National Economy put the recovery of pre-Civil War levels in 1946. 
Suanzes, affirmed then that reconstruction was completed by 1945, "Franco 
y la economia", in Suanzes: Ocho Discursos, op. cit., p. 142. Other
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production remained below the 1935 level until 1951, with a clear depression between
1947 and 1950.306 The planned output for nitrogenous fertilisers was reached 
permanently only in 1952 (in tons of Nj).307 In 1949 the requirements of nitrogen 
fertilisers for the 1949/50 campaign were three and one half times the quota of 
1948/49.30* The planned target for tractors was only reached between 1957 and 1958. 
Pre-Civil War per capita income levels were surpassed in 1951 (measured in absolute 
terms and at constant 1964 prices).309 It had taken the economic policy of the Franco 
regime more than a decade to attain pre-Civil War levels of output.310
Without calling exceptional the ERP economic contribution to recipient Western 
European economies, either directly to national income or indirectly through the foreign 
sector, it undoubtedly allowed them to continue to maintain high levels of investment and 
imports of capital goods (i.e. machinery, vehicles, iron and steel, and iron and steel 
products) from the United States. The importance of ERP is not seen uniquely in terms 
of the absolute value of ERP-financed imports as a proportion of total imports. The 
commodity composition of these imports was of a greater importance to the importing 
economy. Additionally, the Marshall Plan released important funds for investment through 
the counterpan funds. Countries like France, Italy and the Federal Republic used
estimates elaborated by the official Spanish statistical office situated the 
year of recovery for industrial production in 194 0—42, see Carreras, "La 
producción industrial", art. cit., p. 144.
Carreras: "Indices de la producción agricola", art. cit.
a07. Ministerio de Agricultura: Anuario de Estadística Agraria, Madrid, 1974, 
p. 592.
*M . AHBE, IEME, box no. 2: The General Director of Agriculture at C/A, 11 
October 1949.
,0f. Julio Alcaide, "Una revisión urgente de la serie de renta nacional 
española en el Siglo XX", in Datos básicos para la historia financiera de 
España, 1850-1975, vol. I, Madrid [Instituto de Estudios Fiscales] 1976, pp. 
1127-50. See Carreras, "Estimates of the Real G.D.P. for Spain, 1849-1985", 
paper delivered at the 20th General Conference of the International 
Association for Research in Income and Wealth, Rocca di Papa, Italy, 23 to
29 August 1987, for an account of the different historical estimates of 
Spanish Real GDP, the measurement techniques used and their sources.
no. Franco had declared, short after the result of the O'Konski motion, on
20 April 1948, that the consequences of the exclusion from the Marshall Plan 
were "un ritardo nella ripresa economica del nostro paese, il che esigerá 
agli spagnoli alcuni maggiori sacrifici e sforzi" (sic); ASMAE, Amb. Paris,
b. 413: Telespresso no. 1907/376, "Situazione politica spagnola: Piano
Marshall - Dichiarazioni del Generale Franco al direttore del "Manila 
Chronicle" Sig. Vicente Arias", Italian Embassy in Madrid to Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, 27 April 1948.
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counterpart funds almost exclusively for investment purposes. In general terms, these 
funds served to finance the previous pattern of public investment in infra-structural 
development, such as electricity, gas and power supply (24.7 per cent of the total amount 
of ERP counterpan funds), transport and communications, including shipping (20.2 per 
cent), agriculture (16.1 per cent) and coal mining and mining (11.7 per cent).*11 
Counterpan funds and ERP-financed imports were of relative importance to those sectors 
which bore the main burden of reconstruction and helped governments to widen 
bottlenecks in the recovery process.
The Monnet Plan was originally a mere impon programme to allocate scarce 
resources and French reconstruction was hoped to be largely financed by American 
credits. A first draft of a French reconstruction programme was presented at the bilateral 
negotiations which followed the end of the lend-lease agreement with the United States 
(signed in February 1945) in September 1945. A Commissariat au Plan was set up in 
January 1946. During the so-called Blum-Bymes negotiations, March to May 1946, the 
Monnet Plan obtained $650 million out of the $4,000 million the Commissariat had asked 
for, a scale similar to the previously negotiated British loan.112 Marshall Aid to France 
represented $3,104 million from 3 April 1948 to 30 June 1953. This aid was most 
important because, for a country running large balance of trade deficits, it maintained the 
flow of capital goods imports which sustained the Modernisation Plan.313
Moreover, counterpan funds supported investment in the so-called "basic sectors". 
The Monnet Plan received 77.2 per cent of overall counterpan funds, a further 13.7 per 
cent went to further economic reconstruction outside the plan.3’4 Counterpan funds
311. Percentages from data provided by Brown and Opie, op. cit., p. 237. For
the most recent and detailed approximation of the ERP's economic
contribution see Milward, Reconstruction« cit., pp. 96 ff.
112. Lynch: "French Reconstruction in a European Context", EUI Working Paper
no. 86, Florence, February 1984, p. 5.
m . André Kaspi: "La Francia e il Piano Marshall", in Aga Rossi (ed.), op.
cit., pp. 61-66, p. 65.
1X4. Commissariat du Plan: Rapport Annuel, 1952, tables 29 and 33, pp. 78 and 
84; and Jean Bouvier: "Le Plan Monnet et l'économie française, 1947-1952", 
Florence, EUI Working Papers, no. 83, January 1984, p, 24, taken from Gérard
Bossuat: "Ingérences américaines et dépendance française: la contre-valeur
de l'aide Marshall, 1948-1951", text dactylographie, 1983.
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represented a third of the total investment of the Fonds de Modernisation et d’Equipement 
in 1948, fifty percent in 1949 and thirty per cent in 1950.315 Marshall Aid allowed the 
modernisation plan to insulate investment programmes from short-term political and 
economic circumstances. By the end of 1950 the percentage of realisation in relation to 
the targets established by the November 1946 Plan were the following: coal, 80 per cent; 
electricity and steel, 89 per cent; agricultural machinery 38 per cent; hand-made textiles 
55 per cent; wheat 94 per cent; oil 205 per cent; meat 120 per cent; milk 100 per 
cent316 Most authors agree that, without the intensive support received by the Marshall 
Plan, the Monnet Plan could never have been implemented.317 Marshall Aid had 
provided a solution to the French planners' dilemma of financing the dollar imports of 
equipment at the same time as securing the necessary domestic investment
It is impossible to know what would have happened had the United States not 
provided aid for French reconstruction. One of the existing rare considerations to an 
alternative course of action in France, had the latter’s economy not received substantial 
American economic assistance, could help to reframe the Spanish case. When preparing 
the discussions for the negotiation of the lend-lease, Monnet warned the Americans that 
without a large credit, French reconstruction would take longer and operate within a 
closed economy:
"Il nous faudra alors adopter une ligne politique tendant à 
utiliser au maximum nos propres ressources; à développer la 
production de produits synthétiques quel qu'en soit le prix de 
revient intérieur; à utiliser la puissance de production 
industrielle de l'Allemagne."*1*
Supply was the crucial factor. While in most Western countries the value of
115. Rapport Annuel, 1952, cit., pp. 78 and 84.
,lf. Sauvé: **La politique df investissement de la France depuis la
Libération”, Doctoral Dias., quoted by Bouvier, op. cit., p. 18.
317. See particularly, Cohen: Modem Capitalist Planning, op. cit., 1977 éd., 
pp. 21 ff.; Mil ward: "La Planification française et la reconstruction
européenne**, in Cazes and Mioche: Modernisation, op. cit., pp. 77-115; and 
Pierre Gerbet et al.: Le relèvement, 1944-194 9, Paris [Imprimerie Nationale] 
1991, pp. 309 and 330.
n*. "Brouillon d'une note de synthèse", Jean Monnet, n/d, cit. by Philippe 
Mioche: "The Origins of the Monnet Plan", EUI Working Paper, no. 79, January
1984, p. 7. See also Lynch, op. cit., p. 2.
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imports was much higher than exports and recovered pre-war levels faster than exports, 
this was not the case in Spain. In most Western European countries the deficit bore little 
relation to the size of their resources in gold and foreign exchange but was related to their 
capacity to obtain access to international aid. Most of them were gambling on the 
provision of more American aid. This was a risky game, especially because it was taking 
place when the Americans were insisting on an end to any extraordinary financial aid by 
the end of 1947. Although the structural causes of the dollar deficit were complex and 
could not be solved by the Marshall Plan alone, the Marshall Plan allowed Western 
Europe to continue importing American goods to sustain high levels of capital investment 
in spite of their payment difficulties. The Marshall Plan allowed Western Europe to 
continue its expansionist domestic policies, while it left Spain on the edge of international 
bankruptcy.
3.7. Conclusions
This Chapter, in union with the previous one, has run counter to a set of views 
commonly accepted for the period the main features of which could be summarised as 
following. First, the Franco regime opted voluntarily for economic isolation and it is, thus, 
responsible for the lack of growth, the delay in industrial output between 1936 and 1950 
and the exasperating slowness in recovering pre-Civil War levels of output and welfare. 
Second, foreign trade was hardly considered in terms of economic growth and it was only 
considered as the arena in which to satisfy, through the manipulation of administrative 
requirements (such as licenses and quotas) the regime’s clientele. Third, the Franco regime 
could have followed a similar Western European pattern had it opted to do so.319
i.e. Carreras' publications, most recently, "La industrialización 
española en el marco de la historia económica europea: ritmos y caracteres 
comparados", in España» Economía, op. cit., pp. 79-152, p. 102. See also 
Garcia Delgado's publications previously cited where it is argued that 
economic interventionism was serving the isolationist option of the Franco 
regime and that this interventionism was extreme because autarchy was its 
main goal. Fabián Estapé: Ensayos sobre economía española, Barcelona [Ariel] 
1972, p. 317, argues that "autarchy" aimed to reach economic as well as 
political independence as a result of the epidermic "allergy to any foreign 
relation". In Carr, Spain, op. cit., autarchy is presented as being endemic 
to the Regime, as the only possible and permanent. policy of the Spanish 
State. Javier Tusell: "La autarquía cuartelera. Las ideas económicas de
Franco a partir de un documento inédito", Historia 16, no. 115, November
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Finally, that the Spanish Administration would have made "no positive movement to link 
itself to European reconstruction" (before 1957).310
Both these chapters, from their limited perspective, show how the Spanish 
Administration positively considered linking the Spanish economy with the international 
economy. The Spanish economic authorities had accepted, as early as 1945, the idea that 
in the long-run, prosperity depended on a return to more open economies with a relatively 
free multilateral system of trade and payments. The Spanish Administration studied the 
possibility of joining the Bretton Woods institutions, offered Spanish economic 
participation through UNRRA to the relief of Europe, contributed through a complex 
network of bilateral agreements in the economic reconstruction of Western Europe and 
applied for Marshall Aid to soften the extreme features of intervention and trade 
restriction. The will to join the Marshall Plan shows, by itself, that isolation was not a 
deliberate aim of Francoist economic policy and that the Franco regime had no intention 
whatsoever of remaining outside the post-war boom.
On the other hand, the Administration was perfectly aware that Spain’s weak trade 
position was the major bottleneck to economic growth. It is far from clear whether the 
Spanish Administration could have adopted policy-options similar to the rest of Western 
Europe without the benefits of massive financial assistance. No other means were 
available to absorb the necessary convulsions which any stabilisation and liberalisation 
would have provoked in a traditionally closed economy. However, it is also far from 
being a proven fact that, had it received foreign economic support, the Spanish 
Government would have dispassionately moved toward a liberal economic policy. Nobody 
did so in Western Europe at the time.
1985, pp. 41-49, presents autatchy as the natural and direct consequence of 
the extension of military habits to the economic sphere. Finally, Velasco 
Murviedro: "El «ingenierismo» como directriz básica de la política
económica durante la autarquía (1936-1951) ", Información Comercial Española, 
no. 606, January-February 1984, pp. 97-106, based mostly in texts published 
before 1946, consideres perfectly natural to extend autarchy up to 1951.
M0. Joan Sardá Dexeus's preface to Joan Clavera et al., Capitalismo español: 
de la autarcruia a la estabilización (1939-1959), Madrid [Edicusa] 2nd ed.,
1978, pp. 13-21, p. 15.
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Spain’s main foreign economic problem in the post-1945 period was of a clear-cut
nature:
"In what conditions could it be assured a national supply of 
raw materials and goods necessary for the national economy 
through the export of the national produce and the 
rationalisation of all available financial resources.",21
If during the immediate post-war period economic ostracism did not follow political 
dislike and direct intervention was not implemented, the exclusion of Spain from the ERP 
arrangements deprived the Spanish economy of the necessary margin to accelerate 
recovery and frustrated economic modernisation. While the Franco regime had survived 
isolation and c?me out stronger than ever, ostracism only achieved the delay of Spain’s 
economic recovery.
The solution of the short-term problems of the Spanish economy weighed too 
heavily on the long-term plans for industrialisation and capitalisation and represented an 
obstacle to the reconstructive economic process. Any financial auxilium of certain 
importance would have been of extraordinary value in overcoming bottlenecks and 
releasing the break for growth. Argentina’s aid came at a critical time for Spain and 
helped to ensure the supply of foodstuffs. However, Spain could not find a feasible market 
overseas for its agricultural exports and Argentina could not fulfill its requirements for 
manufactured goods from Spain. Argentina soon ran out of funds, while Spain did not pay 
for its imports from that country. The trade relationship built up between both countries 
was, by necessity, short lived. It took Spain away from p rim u m  v iv e re  but did not 
finance capital equipment, the main hindrance to the creation of a more competitive 
industry.
The Import Programme drafted to be financed by Marshall Aid was a priority plan 
for allocation of scarce supplies, partially for temporary relief and partially for 
modernisation. It wanted to overcome a conglomeration of bottlenecks which hampered 
recovery: the loss of German technical collaboration on which many of the vast industrial
MAE, Leg. 4618, Exp. 2: "Nota relativa a los problemas que se plantean 
en la Subsecretaría llamada de Comercio, Política Arancelaria y Moneda”, San 
Sebastian, 29 July 1946.
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schemes were based, the foreigL exchange shortage, in particular of dollars, the need to 
reinforce its energy and power supply, die transformation of the rail-system with the 
electrification of the network and an increase in coal imports, the obtaining of regular 
supplies of raw materials, such as petroleum and raw cotton, and the purchase of capital 
goods. Meanwhile, die Import Programme was to reduce the country’s dependence on 
food supplies through an increase of productivity in the countryside. Only with Marshall 
Aid could Spain have purchased an appreciable proportion of the extra imports considered 
essential for the full recuperation of the Spanish economy and productive capacity.
It is this aspect of modernisation which transforms the Import Programme into a 
list of polidcal wishes from which needs were deduced. In this sense, the programme for 
national reconstruction was a mixture of economic reality and political desirability, 
conceived in a son of daydream where international economic and political difficulties 
were largely ignored. The Marshall Plan appeared to the Spanish Administration as the 
opportunity' to correct the country’s obsolete economic structures and strengthen the 
Spanish political regime. The United States and their Western partners were most 
concerned about the political implications for their domestic spheres of any Spanish ERP 
connection. The State Department wanted to eliminate a possible obstacle (at domestic as 
well as foreign level) to the new policy and the Western powers were busy enough with 
the many economic and political domestic and foreign implications of the new American 
initiative to complicate things further by bringing in the question of Spain. To benefit 
from Marshall Aid, Spain was requested to totally dismantle the Franco regime. A irick- 
Franco-outoi-power policy preceded any other consideration of economic assistance. 
The needs of the Spanish economy were not considered independently of the country’s 
political circumstances.
Spain’s non-participation in the ERP had cut off the possibility of international 
financial assistance for economic reconstruction purposes and then for economic growth. 
If there was no way to pay for imports other than by exports, imports and exports were 
to be kept in balance. Furthermore, the alternative means to recovery were intervention, 
priorities, rationing, price control, labour allocation, export set-asides, import quotas, on 
the one hand and, budget balancing, credit restriction and high interest rates, on the other.
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While the Marshall Plan partially avoided increasing trade controls as the only other 
response to the 1947 financial crisis, by permitting a level of imports from the United 
States of investment goods appreciably higher than could otherwise have been the case, 
Spain, on the contrary, with no dollars other than those earned from exports, had to have 
recourse to trade controls and an economic policy constrained by the need to maintain a 
constant equilibrium in the country’s balance of payments. In other words, exclusion from 
the ERP meant holding down imports for Spain, keeping the pace with exports, in 
particular dollar imports and dollar imports of capital goods, and the continuation of the 
rationing of domestic consumption. The increased import of valuable investment goods, 
which participation in the Marshall Plan could have made possible, would have created 
some room of manoeuvre for the government’s economic policy.
The interesting aspect of this research is to reveal that the Spanish Administration, 
conscious that involving Spain in the Marshall Plan was not feasible because it would 
have meant a proof of international plenary absolution for the Franco regime, proposed 
that the United States giant aid to their economy outside the ERP framework with a 
commitment to progress toward economic liberalisation. The proposal was permanently 
rejected because it would have reduced the value of the American commitment to a 
coordinated plan for recovery. Washington did not consider the practical implications 
which might have derived from the Spanish proposal: to synchronise economic assistance 
with impulses toward economic liberalisation and, subsequently, to political 
transformation.
The Spanish Administration agreed with the objectives of modernisation and 
liberalisation but rejected the radical political conditions linked to the granting of 
American assistance. The Allies asked too a high price for the Spanish Government to 
consider seriously their proposal. Once the latter had declared itself to be prepared to go 
along with economic and financial springcleaning if backed by foreign assistance, it would 
have been more sensible to provide American assistance to Spain conditioned upon an 
effective commitment to work progressively toward trade liberalisation and the 
dismantling of autarchic industries. Spain could, with difficulty, adopt steps towards freer 
trade, the elimination of some discriminatory aspects of the Spanish economic policy and
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the opening of its industries to international competition, without the previous recover)' 
of basic sectors. Insertion into the international economy could only be the result of 
recovery and modernisation. Political transformation could have been left to be induced 
indirectly by the improvement of the country’s economic conditions and subsequent 
economic growth.
The Truman Administration renounced testing how far it could extract economic 
concessions in return far assistance. It limited itself to demanding political concessions 
without providing any convincing guarantee of economic and financial assistance. The 
promise of Marshall Aid remained so ambiguous, imprecise and conditional upon many 
uncontrolled factors that it did not serve to provide sufficient economic leverage for the 
United States to force through its own politics in Franco Spain. The promise for economic 
stabilisation and liberalisation, was never put to the test The Americans rejected 
transforming their political problems with the Spaniards into technical ones which could 
have been easier to settle and which could have provided at least some returns. The 
exclusion of Spain from the ERP and, more particularly, the American incapacity or 
unwillingness to provide for a substitute mechanism of assistance while demanding 
substantial political and economic changes in Spain, is a good example of how the "gap 
between ambition and feasibility" deprived the American policy of effectiveness to solve 
the Spanish problem.322
The United States continued not to be not interested in what has been called a 
"non-democratic nationalistic modernisation" .32i The Truman Administrations refused 
to admit the Spanish Government’s theory of restricting liberalisation and modernisation 
to the economic sphere without extending it to the country’s social and political life. The 
result of this was equally negative for Spain's economic and political life: a "capitalist 
stagnation without democracy".324
122. Milward uses this same concept for the American policy at the time of
the Marshall Plan in a more general sense, Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 196.
,n. Benny Pollack: The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy. Spain's
International Relations from Franco to Democracy, London [Pinter Publisher] 
1987, p. 131.
M4. José Maria Maravall: El Desarrolo econ6mico v la clase obrera, Barcelona 
[Ariel] 1985, p. 154.
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The notion of Marshall Plan as a political stabiliser forced the Truman 
Administration to maintain a firm attitude on the priority of political change over 
economic development. They conceived economic aid exclusively to support democratic 
political parties in power. There was no room within the Marshall Plan for any action 
aiming at substituting non-democratic governments. Internal as well as external threats 
justified economic aid to governments with questionable democratic credentials, such as 
in Greece and Turkey, while Portugal's dictatorship did never represent a major problem 
in public opinion terms. This was not, evidently, the case of Spain. On the one hand, the 
periodic discussion about Franco Spain in the United Nations and press had distoned the 
question out of proportion, building an emotional issue which frustrated any positive 
international action affecting that country. On the other, Spam's security was not 
threatened except by its own government. Therefore, Spain appeared to the Americans as 
an isolated case to which the rule of political stabilisation could not be applied and for 
which no specific policy could be conceived at the State Department.
It has recently been argued that had Spain been a democratic nation, it would have 
panicipated in the Marshall Plan.325 This is an argument, however, which does not take 
us very far. There is no historical evidence that the transition from Franco into democracy 
would have been a trauma-free process fostering economic growth and which could have 
favoured Spanish economy to follow the Western European pattern. No consideration is 
given to the possibility of further turmoil making the national economy lag even further 
behind. A historical approach to Franco leaving office and Spain turning into a brand-new 
democracy is, thus, limited in debate possibilities.
A point of departure for this thesis has been the position of Spain as a non- 
democratic country. The nature of the political regime and Franco not leaving office is 
considered as a given factor. Therefore, this Chapter has proposed an alternative research 
perspective. Had the Western Allies displayed a less ideological attitude and had Spain 
received ERP financial support, regardless of Franco's political regime, its economic
Catalán, "Loa años cuarenta cit. For a previous debate on thia
point see Buesa: "üna nota sobre la economía española bajo la dictadura
franquista", Investigaciones Económicas, no. 14, January-April 1981, pp. 
163—77, and Biescas: "Réplica", art. cit.
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retardation might have been overcome sooner, making possible in 1948 what the most 
famous Stabilisation Plan made possible a decade later. Spain’s high-policy makers might 
have been stimulated to introduce financial and monetary measures to stabilise its money 
system and exchange rates. They might have been forced to adapt some discipline in trade 
and exchange rate policies to encourage an expanding trade with Western Europe, with 
as extensive free trade as possible.
The task of this chapter has been to analyse the problem-solving capacity of the 
Spanish Administration in foreign economic policy in the crucial penod between the 
summer/autumn of 1947 and the end of 1948. The Spanish Administration perceived then 
that the period of Western European economic recovery, which had been favourable to 
the Spanish economy, had ended. Traditional exports were not performing as expected and 
a change in the pattern of international demand was taking place against Spain’s export 
trade commodity composition. This was when the trade tools used since the end of 1944 
were clearly perceived as less profitable. It was then that foreign economic assistance 
desired to overcome the poor state of the national economy -in particular supply and 
investment shortages- appeared viable and the various plans to increase industrial output 
were gathered into a single plan for the country’s economic reconstruction. It was then, 
in sum, that exclusion from the Marshall Plan forced Spain into the iara avis status 
within Western Europe.
Up to that date, the Spanish Administration had efficiently used the economic and 
administrative resources then available in foreign economic policy. It had become a 
creditor at the time of general scarcity of hard-currencies as a means to promote trade and 
to link the United Kingdom and France to the Spanish economy despite political 
considerations. It had paid off all its financial debts in an attempt to appear as a serious 
commercial partner. It had taken advantage of the post-war world-wide scarcity of supply 
and hard-cuiTencies to place the Spanish export commodities presented as hard-currency- 
savings and make an important contribution to economic recovery and diet improvement. 
It had promoted trade relations through the recreation of the traditional network of 
bilateral trade and payments agreements between Spain and Western Europe. Trade 
relations were presented as mere technical dealings to obtain a non-political supply of
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necessary goods. This specific trade pattern was fully effective and the Spanish economy 
reaped the maximum advantage which its output capacity allowed.
Spain's exports during the immediate post-war years were based not on Spanish 
economic potential but on the dramatic short-term needs of Europe’s relief and 
reconstruction. They certainly served to maintain a level of foreign currency income to 
satisfy the minimal requirements of the Spanish economy. They have served even to 
stabilize Franco’s political regime in the international sphere, but were insufficient to 
accomplish the necessary modernisation of the economic structure for sustained growth. 
Reconstruction of the country’s economy required larger financial resources than those 
provided by bilateral trade channels, or otherwise, as happened, recovery would take 
longer. Recovery of pre-Civil War levels of output and modernisation of economic 
structures were the two sides of the same problem, more so when Marshall Aid searched 
for higher productivity levels in the recipient countries. For instance, the recovery of pre- 
civil war agricultural output still left the problem of keeping up with the increase in 
demand resulting from a steadily growing population and a rising standard of living. 
Marshall Aid appeared as the optimum solution to secure large foreign financial assistance 
and a subsequent increase in trade levels, both of which were permanent objectives of the 
Spanish Administration. The crux of the second half of the 1940s was thus, the limited 
resources of foreign exchange available.
The American financial resources available through the Marshall Plan changed the 
terms of Western European economic reconstruction and, thus, Spain’s relations with 
Western Europe. Before June 1947, the logic of separate, often conflicting, national 
reconstruction plans allowed the obtainment of whatever Spain had to offer. When State 
Secretary Marshall called for a coordinated plan as a precondition to receiving a large 
package of economic assistance from the United States, bringing Franco’s Spain in would 
have provoked most undesirable domestic criticism from all comers. The inclusion of 
Spain was difficult to defend to public opinion in France and Italy and more, particularly, 
to the United States Congress, since what was presented at stake was democracy and the 
highest Western European values. Fruit and vegetables, pyrites, iron ore, cork, tungsten, 
were no longer single commodities after Marshall’s offer, but components of an ambitious
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political programme. Trade became an instrument to achieve major political, economic, 
social and ideological goals. It was no longer a goal in itself.
The point is not that Spain had little to offer to European reconstruction. Neither 
that, if Spain had joined the CEEC, it would have added a new shopping list to the 
sixteen separate estimates of needs drafted in Paris, the maximum cooperative effort the 
Europeans were able to undertake at the time. The point is that Western Europe did not 
consider necessary to obtain the possible contribution from Spain through the ERP. Public 
opinion was strong enough to discourage any attempt in that direction, while bilateral 
trade could fulfil the task of channelling Spanish goods for Western European 
reconstruction without risking domestic and international upheaval. The Franco regime's 
exclusion from the ERP was possible because Western Europe and Spain had developed 
a network of bilateral agreements necessary to obtain what the Spanish economy could 
offer to Western European reconstruction.
Excluding Spain, however, meant for Western Europe to find other means to avoid 
the collapse of the Spanish economy, in particular its foreign sector upon which the 
foreign supply of essentials depended. The appearance of disorder and civil strife at the 
Western comer of Europe, possibly stemming from a drastic deterioration of the country's 
economic conditions, did not appeal to Western policy-makers, especially since the 
Marshall Plan was to save the continent from political and social turmoil. The policy 
adopted by the Western European countries was to avoid canying out further 
discrimination against the country such as to leave the Spanish economy on the edge of 
collapse.
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"Spain wants and needs help but she wants it on a basis of a bilateral 
arrangement with the United States and not under Marshall Plan aid. If 
Spain could receive such aid as to give solidity to her economic structure, 
liberalizing action could and would be taken and Spain would be 
prepared to meet such reasonable conditions as [the U.S.] might be 
prepared to suggest. [...] Could some understanding be reached between 
the two countries, [the U.S.] could, if so desired, have bases in the Canary 
and Balearic Islands and facilities on the Spanish mainland."
José Sebastián de Erice y O’Shea, Director General of Foreign Policy at the 
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs1
"The thinking [in Washington] is that economic assistance will be used to 
support the military program in Spain -whatever that turns out to be. It 
will be directed toward this objective and not toward a general 
rehabilitation of the Spanish economy. Negotiations for economic 
assistance should not precede military negotiations [...] because we still 
lean [...] toward the idea of using the promise of economic assistance as 
a carrot to attain our military objectives."
William B. Dunham, Country Specialist in the Office of Western European 
Affairs of the United States Department of State2
*. Title adopted directly from the film of the Spanish film-maker José Luis 
Garcia Berlanga.
a. FP.US, 1948, III, the American Chargé, Paul T. Culbertson to Secretary of 
State George C. Marshall, Madrid, 17 November, p. 1063. This is the first 
policy declaration regarding the Spanish offer for bases.
*. FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, Dunham to the Counselor of the U.S. Embassy 
in Spain, John Wesley Jones, Washington, 30 January 1952, p. 1793. At that 
time, Dunham chaired the Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee Working Group 
on Spain, in charge of studying the positions of the different departments 
involved in the negotiations with the Spanish Government for the use of 
military bases on Spanish territory and formulating specific negotiation 
proposals. It included high-ranking officials from the Departments of State
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4.1. Introduction
Before examining Spain’s trade relations with Western Europe, an assessment of 
the assistance granted to Spain in the early 1950s is necessary. Such an assessment will 
reveal that the benefits accruing to the Spanish economy frcun foreign financial assistance 
were extremely limited and that, despite their limited expansion, exports earned the only 
foreign currency available at the time to pay for essential imports of foodstuffs to feed the 
increasing population and capital goods and raw materials required by the ongoing 
industrialisation. This chapter will add significance to the matter of Spain's trade relations 
with Western Europe, the subject of the following chapter. Spanish exports to Western 
Europe were the single major source of foreign currency earnings, whereas imports from 
Western Europe were an important means for economic development at the time.
This chapter will deal mainly with the United States Government’s assistance 
programmes, since Argentina had disappeared as a creditor for the Spanish economy. This 
chapter is concerned only with long-term capital Goans with maturities of more than one 
year and repayments actually disbursed) and grants transferred to the Spanish Government 
by other governments and (whenever they could be recorded) by foreign private banks. 
American assistance to Spain came, initially, in the form of credits administered by the 
Export-Import Bank of Washington (henceforth, Eximbank) and, after September 1953, 
in exchange for military facilities on Spanish territory.1 The chapter concludes by 
dismissing the significance of dollar aid in providing major relief to the Spanish economy 
during the period of time covered.
Spain’s export performance determined its ability to earn foreign currency in the 
period between 1949 and 1954. In 1948 and 1949, Argentine credits equalled 47.3 and
and Defense, and the Mutual Security Agency (formerly the Economic 
Cooperation Administration, henceforth £CA).
*. For U.S. direct investments (as opposed to U.S. Government's grants of 
capital and official loans to Spanish companies and to the Government of 
Spain) see Harry J. Robinson and Bruce B. Barber: "The Role of American 
Investments in Spain's Development", included in American Chamber of 
Commerce in Spain: American Investments in Spain, Barcelona, 1972, pp. 1 — 
140, According to this source (tables 2 and 3), the cumulative value of U.S. 
investments in Spain went from $51 million in 1950 to $48 million in 1956, 
i.e., 1.3 per cent of U.S. investments in Western Europe in 1956.
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18.2 per cent of the foreign currency earned by exports in both years, respectively (see 
table 4.1, #). It was not until 1955 that foreign capital again amounted to a significant 
proportion of the foreign currency earned by export trade and could reverse the country’s 
negative trade balance.
TABU 4 .1
FORKXCH CURSINCY EARNXNCS BY EXPORTS JUTO LONG-TERM CAPITAL INVESTMENT, 1948-1955
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
Years Exports Trade Private 3 Public 4 344 Long-Term 5 2f.o.b. Balance Capital % Capital % % Capital B. % •f
(1) (2) (3) 1 (4) 1 1 (5) 1 5
1948 375.1 - 62.5 5.3 1.4 177.4# 47.3 48.7 4 167.7 44.7 4105.21949 407.3 - 15.3 28.7* 7.0 74.2# 18.2 25.3 4  87.9 21.6 472.61950 405.6 4  61.9 13.5** 3.3 - - 3.3 4  8.4 2.1 470.31951 4 98.0 4• 116.8 4.5 0.9 17.9> 3.6 4.5 4  3.0 0.6 4119.6
1952 458.2 - 52.2 6. 9f 1.5 11.5> 2.5 4.0 4  3.5 0.8 -4 8.7
1953 483.1 - 56.5 25.0/ 5.1 13.6> 2.8 8.0 4  30.9 6.4 -25.6
1954 4 64.4 - 91.3 32.2 6.9 60.2{ 13.0 19.9 4 46.8 10.1 -4 4.51955 446.2 -• 112.4 57.9 13.0 106.0$ 23.8 36.7 4  154.6 34.6 442.2
Source: Santiago Chamorro, Ramón Comendador, Juan José Dolado, Rafael
Repullo and Julián Rodriguez: Las balanzas de pagos en el periodo de la 
autarquía, Madrid, 1976, and own elaboration. Chamorro et al.'s export data 
differ from official figures because they adjusted the export values 
declared by exporters to those registered when the exchange took place. For 
(1) & (2), most recently, Albert Carreras accepted Chamorro et al.'s data 
as a reliable source; "La renta y la riqueza", in Estadísticas Históricas 
de España. Siglos XIX y XX, Madrid [Fundación Banco Exterior] 1989, pp. 533- 
88, table 13.26, p. 573. The use of export earnings booked by the Spanish 
Foreign Exchange Institute (henceforth, 1EME), reducing export values with 
respect to customs trade records, increases significantly the percentages 
of columns 3 and 4 over column 1; see Angel Viñas et al. : Política comercial 
exterior en España (1931-1975), 2 vols., Madrid [Banco Exterior de España]
1979, vol. 2, p. 795. Chamorro et al.'s data on private capital have been 
augmented with the part of the credits granted during 194 9 and 1950 by 
private United States banks and effectively delivered in those same years. 
This might inç>ly some overlapping and, consequently, an overvaluation of 
private capital during both years. Public capital has been modified 
regarding the distribution of the credit authorisations for a value of $65.2 
million voted by the United States Congress in August 1950. The long-term 
capital balance includes payments in concept of interests and commissions 
relative to the Argentine and, after 1954, Eximbank credits. It comprises 
equally aid granted under the provisions of the "Defense Support Program" 
(after 1954), the "Public Law no. 480" and the "McCarran Amendment" to the 
Mutual Security Appropriations Act of 1955 (in 1955). At different points 
in this chapter, the various programmes of assistance to Spain will be 
explained in detail. Aid offered by the National Catholic Welfare Conference 
and distributed by Cáritas Española has not been considered. The amounts of 
American economic aid under the Pacts of Madrid have been adjusted according 
to different official United States sources and the OEEC reports on the 
Spanish economy* There are important differences between the figures used 
here and those provided as American aid in other sources. The amounts of 
economic aid quoted here correspond to effective deliveries and 
expenditures, and not, as frequently quoted, obligations, appropriations, 
or end^authorisations, which disregard whether the amounts granted (either 
loans or grants) were effectively delivered. Military assistance is not 
considered because it did not represent a transfer of resources to the
civilian economy and did not affect the external asset and liability
position of the Spanish Government. For the most part, military aid
represented a transfer of military end-items that presumably would not have
been acquired without this aid. Furthermore, the difficulty in measuring the
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net addition of resources to the civilian economy brought by military aid 
(which in the form of end-items did not entered in national accounts) , makes 
it necessary to neglect it altogether. Finally, commercial credits, 
frequently of a short-term nature, are not considered.
(*) It includes $19 million out of the two-year $25 million loan grantee by 
the Chase National Bank of New York and $1.5 million from the Société Banque 
Suisse of Geneva; AHBE, IEME, box no. 164: ”IEME. Balanza General de Pagos 
del año 1949”.
(**) it includes $3 million corresponding to the Chase National Bank of New 
York, $9,867,319 from the National City Bank of New York and $645,039 from 
the Société Banque Suisse of Geneva; AHBE, IEME, box no. 165: ”IEME. Balanza 
General de Pagos del año 1950”.
(f) Including two short-term loans (18 months) totalling $24 million granted 
by the Eximbank (early in January 1952 and in mid-April 1953) for the 
purchase of raw cotton outside the amounts authorised by the Dnited States 
Congress in August 1951; PRO, FO 371/113024: Despatch no. 334 from British 
Ambassador John Balfour to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony 
Eden (October 1951 to April 1955), "Annual Report of Spain for 1953", 
Madrid, 1 January 1954.
(#) According to AHBE, IEME, box no. 164: ”IEME. Balanza General de Pagos” 
for 1948 and 1949, Argentine credits for 1948 and 1949 amounted to 
$177,368,331 and $74,208,995, respectively.
(>) Expenditures corresponding to the $65.2 million loan authorised in 
August 1950.
(I) Distribution of American aid in 1954 and 1955. Year 1954: Eximbank 
credits for a total value of $10.9 million, $24.3 million under the terms 
of "Defense Support Program”, $20 million for the purchase of wheat through 
the Conmodity Credit Corporation, and $5 million under the terms of ”Public 
Law no. 480”; latter two figures from AD, DE-CE 1945-1960, vol. 371: OEEC 
C (56)201, HConseil. Association de l'Espagne aux travaux de l'Organisation. 
Rapport du Groupe de Travail special du Conseil”, Annex A, ”La situation 
économique de l'Espagne”, Paris, 25 July 1956, p. 35.
Year 1955: Eximbank credits for a total value of $3.3 million, which was the 
remainder of the $62.5 million of the congressional appropriations for Spain 
voted in August 1950, $31.2 million and $16.4 million under the terms of the 
”Defense Support Program" and ”Public Law no. 4 80”, respectively, and, 
finally, $55 million provided under the terms of the ”McCarran Amendment”.
When the Franco-Perón Protocol was signed in March 1948, the Spanish 
Government had assumed that the agreement was intended as aid to Spain. The 
Agreement contained certain provisions for supplies of goods by Spain to the Argentine 
which the Spaniards had never seriously regarded as possible to fulfil. Indeed, they had 
tended to regard the agreement, as had the Argentines, more from its propaganda value 
than anything else. The Spaniards had not been particularly worried when the Argentines 
had insisted on writing into the agreement a very high price for the wheat to be supplied 
to Spain. The protocol also stipulated the need to guarantee an exchange rate for the 
counterpart pesetas at the disposal of the Argentine Government to finance a variety of 
projects in Spain. This was not negotiated at the time of signing in the rush to publicize 
the protocol in time to compensate for the unhappy end of Spain's Marshall Aid dreams.4 
According to Luis Saéz de Ibarra, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain, there was a sort
*. See chapter three, pp. 226—27.
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of genielman’s agreement that Spain needed not to worry about payment.3
Because of increasing financial difficulties, Argentina's aid to Spain came to a 
dramatic end.6 Buenos Aires brought in a new economic team to undertake a complete 
financial spring-cleaning. It requested that Spain refunded, at a beneficial exchange rate, 
counterpart pesetas accumulated in Madrid (which accounted for half of Argentina’s 
exchange reserves) and pay pending credits in gold or dollars. It came as a great shock 
to the Spanish economic authorities when the Argentine demanded payment for the wheat. 
Spain’s unwillingness to address this request led to the premature suspension of Argentine 
supply on credit at the end of 1949. Argentina’s Minister of Foreign Affairs 
communicated to his Spanish colleague that it would be impossible to fulfill, from 1 
January 1950, any of the bilateral agreements in force.7 Consequently, Spain’s imports 
from Argentine dropped from 26.8 per cent of overall imports in 1948 to 2.7 per cent in 
1950, and continued to fall until they reached 0.2 per cent in 1955.* The initial threat of 
a suspension of cereal shipment Gate in 1948) and the subsequent disappearance of 
Argentina as the main supplier (after January 1950) forced Spanish authorities to import 
cereals from elsewhere. Because the only other important wheat supplier was the dollar 
area, the IEME registered a deficit in dollar reserves of $2.8 million by February 1949.9
The progressive deterioration of the Spanish-Argentine "special relationship" 
accentuated Spam’s dependence on the United States for financial assistance. Spain’s other
5. PRO, FO 371/79742: "Note of interview with Senor [Luis] Saéz de Ibarra 
[y Saéz de ürabain], Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain, on March 30th, 
1949", Annex to a report on Spain, 11 April 1949.
€. The Spanish authorities had anticipated only some tenç>orary restriction 
of the supply from Argentina when the credit amounts for 194 8 were 
exhausted; AHBE, IEME, box no. 4: S/C, 12 November 1948.
\ MAE, Leg. 4240, exp. 1: letter to the Spanish Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Alberto Martin Artajo (July 1945 to February 1957), Buenos Aires,
27 December 1949. For a direct account of the Hispano-Argentine financial 
difficulties see José Maria de Areilza: Memorias exteriores, 1947-1964, 
Barcelona [Planeta] 1984, pp. 64—66 and 74—75. Areilza was then Spanish 
Ambassador to Argentina and, after November 1954, to the United States.
*. See table 1 on p. 3.
The position of IEME's reserves on 1 February 1949 presented deficits 
with regard to all the main trading currencies except the French and 
Moroccan francs, the Dutch guilder, Swedish kroner, the Uruguayan and 
Chilean dollar, and the Cruzeiro; AHBE, IEME, box no. 2: C/A, 1 February
1949.
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major trading partner, the United Kingdom, was unable to make any substantial 
contribution in terms of economic aid to Spain. Therefore, the Spanish Administra firm’s 
preparation for and the bilateral military-economic agreements with the United States, 
signed in Madrid in September 1953, are unanimously considered the most important 
elements of Spain's foreign policy. My entire research proves that this was not the case 
during die period from 1945 to 1955, the most significant decade for the survival of the 
Franco regime.10
4.2. The Preliminaries nf American Economic Assistance
The impossibility to benefit from the European Recovery Program (henceforth, 
ERP) meant for the Spanish Government to face the only available alternative:
"1/ Espagne nt desire pas bénéficier du Plan Marshall.
L'Espagne préfère négocier directement avec les Etats—Unis un
l0. The most genuine study in the field of bilateral Spain-USA relations is 
Arthur P. Whitaker: Spain and Defense of the West: Ally and Liability, New 
York [Harper and Brothers] 1961. See chapter three, footnote 242, for 
references about the role of the U.S. Congress in bringing about a 
modification of policy towards Spain. Samuel S. Chavkin, Jack Sangster and 
William Susman (eds.): Spain: Implications for United States Foreign Policy, 
Stamford [Greylock Publishers] 1976, is a short unscholarly book. James W. 
Cortada: Two Nations over Time: Spain and the United States, 1976-1977# 
London [Greenwood Press] 1976, pp. 223 ff., provides no new information. 
Most subsequent publications on Spain—U.S. relations in the political, 
economic, and military fields derive from the studies previously cited 
(including those titles from chapter three). This must be noted because the 
original sources were public congressional records, the State Department's 
bulletin, early FRUS volumes, scarce material downgraded under the Freedom 
of Information Act, contemporary articles that appeared in newspapers and 
magazines, and, finally, interviews with officials at different posts in the 
American administration dealing with Spain. Eduardo Chamorro and Ignacio 
Fontes: Las bases norteamericanas en España, Barcelona [Euros) 1976, suffers 
from journalistic style and sensationalism. Viñas: Los pactos secretos de 
Franco con Estados Unidos. Bases, ayuda econòmica, recortes de soberanía, 
Barcelona [Grijalbo] 1961, is valid to show the disequilibrium of the 1953 
bilateral agreements, although with no access to direct documentation for 
the negotiation process between April 1952 and September 1953. The Spanish 
documentation on the economic and military sides of the negotiations is 
either lost or kept secret at the different military archives in Spain. Even 
Luis Suárez Fernández, who benefits from Franco's private papers, must make 
use of Viñas' study for his chapter on the agreements with the United 
States; Francisco Franco y su tiempo, 8 vols., Madrid [Fundación Nacional 
Francisco Franco] 1984, vol. 5, pp. 100-25. The recently published volumes 
of FRUS for the years 1952 to 1957, which to my knowledge have not been used 
in any publication, provide an immediate, although temporary, solution for 
checking the economic aspect of Spain—United States relations presented in 
previous publications: Viñas et al., op. cit, vol. 2, pp. 741 ff; and R. 
Richard Rubottocn and J. Carter Murphy: Spain and the United States since 
World War II, New York [Praeger] 1964.
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accord qui aurait l'avantage de ne pas susciter de discussion 
dans les autres pays, comme cela pourvait être le cas avec la 
gauche travailliste anglaise ou avec les socialistes 
français.-11
The bilateral option meant looking for what it considered an attractive deal for the 
Americans. The exclusion of Spain from the ERP, the barring of any parallel American 
assistance, and the lack of consideration by the Truman Administration of the promises 
given by the Spanish Government for progressive economic liberalisation in exchange for 
assistance, all combined to force Spain to offer, as a last recourse, the use of bases and 
other military facilities on Spanish territory in return for economic help. The initial 
difference, thus, between Spain and the rest of Europe in relation to the installation of 
American military bases in Europe is that Spain offered the bases to the United States 
Government, while in other cases, the United States Government demanded military bases 
and facilities in exchange for military aid.
The Spanish Administration had not renounced obtaining massive aid from the 
United States for general economic rehabilitation. In January 1949, Spanish Minister of 
Industry and Commerce, Juan Antonio Suanzes, announced that if Spain did not receive 
immediate economic aid, an economic collapse would take place within six months.11 
Spain was heavily dependent upon foreign sources for fuel, raw materials and machinery 
to sustain its industries, and basic foodstuffs (cereals) to feed its growing population. All 
crude petroleum was imported and dependence on foreign supplies of coal was reduced, 
though not eliminated, by the utilisation of very low-quality domestic grades. Imports of 
raw cotton were required to maintain the important Catalonian textile industry, and 
Spain’s agriculture was dependent on imports of fertilisers. Without other financial 
resources, Spain imported within the limits marked by foreign currency earnings. While 
gross exports financed 56 per cent of Spain’s expenditure of foreign currency before the 
civil war, this figure has constantly increased since then. During the period from 1940 to 
1945, this figure increased to cover 66.75 per cent, then stepped up to 71.61 per cent in
11. Franco's declarations to an American reporter, as recorded in AO, Z/E 
vol. 71: French Charge d'Affaires Bernard Hardion to Quai d'Orsay,
"Declarations du General Franco", Madrid, 16 November 1948. In this 
interview, Franco urged the United States to lend Spain $200 million.
u . FROS, 1949, IV, Culbertson, to Dean Acheson, United States Secretary of 
State from January 1949 to January 1953, Madrid, 17 February, p. 729.
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1946-1948 and to 89-21 per cent in 1949-1952. The highest dependence of Spain’s 
economy on exports’ capacity to generate foreign exchange took place in 1950 when 
exports financed 99.70 per cent of the nation's expenditure of foreign exchange! 
Economic collapse did not take place, but Spain’s balance of payments difficulties 
increased, i.e., gold resources dwindled from $111.3 million to $61 million between 
February 1949 and June 1950.1J
There was a good deal of optimism in government and economic circles that 
foreign assistance was forthcoming. The Spanish Government was aware that British, 
French, and American military planners were all anxious to include Spain in western 
European security arrangements.14 The Spanish territory was important for strategic 
military operations in the Mediterranean and for keeping open operational lines to the oil- 
processing facilities of the Middle and Near E ast15 The many references made by 
prominent Americans to Spain's virtues as an ally, which received full publicity in the 
officially inspired press, undoubtedly fortified the belief that the official attitude towards 
Spain in Washington was becoming increasingly military. Even though emphasis in 
security issues in Europe was still primarily political instead of military, and despite the 
fact that the West did not desperately need Spain militarily, the Spanish Government 
expected its offer of bases to encourage military planners to override the U.S. Department 
of State’s political and ideological objections to granting aid to Spain. If policy makers 
in the United States could be persuaded that the security of their country involved a 
military interest in Spain, economic assistance would then become necessary to ensure 
general economic stability for the bases' security. Before the country could be expected 
to play any useful part in Western European defence, assistance should be provided long 
in advance of hostilities. Certainly, the Spanish Administration placed more reliance on
**. PRO, FO 371/96195: "Possible entry of Spain into OEEC", report drafted 
by the Economic Intelligence Department of the FO, London, 10 March 1951.
l<. Paola Brundu Olla: L'Anello Mancante. II probleroa della Spa cm«
franchiata e lforqanizzazione della difesa occidentale (1947—1950), Sassari 
(Oniversiti degli Studi] 1990, and Qasim Ahmad: Britain, Franco Spain, and 
the Cold War. 19*5-1950. New York [Garland Publiahing] 19^2, pp. 116 ff.
15. For the importance of the Middle East and the Mediterranean lines see 
Lorenza Sebesta: "The Middle East and European Security in the Fifties: A 
Historical Assessment", EOI Working Paper HEC Mo. 91/10, Florenoe, April 
1991, and the references she provides.
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extraordinary resources from the United States than on their trade relations. The Treaty 
of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation offered in April to assist in the development 
of improved and mutually beneficial economic relations between the two countries did not 
interest the Spanish Government.
The Spanish thought they had finally opened the flow of assistance in April 1949. 
The Department of State had stopped objecting to Spain's application for credits to the 
Eximbank (the international lending agency of the United States Government) on the same 
conditions used for any other country. Uncertain about an economic breakdown. 
Culbertson recommended that Acheson give Spain access to credits from the Eximbank, 
which the latter accepted after some hesitation.14 The special emissary of the Spanish 
Government to Washington for matters related to Eximbank credits, Andrés Moreno, 
Chairman of Banco Hispano-Americano, presented requests totaling $1,276 million, of 
which $600 million were for consumer goods and $676 million for capital goods.17 A 
study undertaken by Spanish financial and economic experts, reported Spain's 
requirements of foreign aid at $500 million for 1949. This was entirely for capital goods - 
a hydro-electric plant, transport, a plant for the production of fertilisers.1* It should be 
recalled that, at the time of the Marshall Plan, the Spanish Government had requested 
from the United States' authorities $676 million for capital goods; and that, early in 1948, 
it added an interim aid request for an additional $600 million to import consumer 
goods.19 In other words, the financial requests Spain presented in the spring of 1949 
were the same as those for which they had received no satisfaction since the summer of 
1947. The complete transformation of the country’s economy, forecast by the Spanish 
Government in the early 1940s as an imminent possibility, was still pending.
The condition of the Spanish economy in 1949 was grave. Drought had severely
l*. FRPS, 1949, IV, Culbertson to Acheson, Madrid, 17 February, and Acheson 
to Culbertson, 13 April, pp. 729 and 735—37.
11 • FRUS, 1949, IV, Acheson to Culbertson, Washington, 20 May 1949, p. 744.
1#. PRO, FO 371/79742: "Note of interview with Senor Saez de Ibarra, Deputy 
Governor of the Bank of Spain, on March 30th, 1949", Annex to a report on 
Spain, 11 April 1949.
lf. See chapter three, pp. 144 and 204-205.
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cut the supply of electric power which had crippled many industries. Modest increases in 
coal production were achieved, but often at the expense of quality and at high costs. Lack 
of foreign exchange delayed the rehabilitation of the railways. The inadequate supply of 
raw cotton hindered the textile industry. The restriction on imports of raw materials and 
capital equipment hampered the development of private and public industrial plans. By 
1949, raw materials, fertilisers, foodstuffs, and petroleum products accounted for 70 per 
cent of the total value of Spanish imports. Relatively little foreign exchange remained for 
imports of capital equipment, whether by private industry or by the Spanish National 
Institute of Industry (INI), the state organisation for industrial development of which the 
Minister of Industry and Commerce was president Despite large peseta investments, only 
a small part of INI’s plans had come to fruition. Generally speaking, the Spanish economy 
maintained the same severe handicaps to healthy development as were explained in the 
previous chapter.20
The non-replacement of Spain's productive plant, internal mismanagement, the 
difficulties which had arisen with the Argentine over the wheat credit, and the effects of 
continued droughts which damaged the crops and emptied the reservoirs on which 
industry depended largely for its power, caused a quick worsening in Spain's foreign 
exchange situation. Spain’s exclusion from Marshall Aid and the continuous absence of 
foreign financial assistance postponed the possibility of economic recovery. Spain had 
tremendous leeway to make up on reconstruction which in many sectors was overdue as 
far back as 1936. The full restoration of the Spanish economy seemed extremely difficult
ls. In this r«sp«ct, it i• useful to compare th* 1948 and 1951 British 
economic surveys on Spain: John Walker: Economic and Commercial Conditions 
in Spain, April 1948, London [HMSO] 1949 and Clinton 6. Pelham: Economic and 
Commercial Conditions in Spain (May 1951), London [HMSO] 1952. See chapter 
three, footnote 42 for bibliographical references on the Spanish economy and 
footnote 42 for references to INI's activities. In addition see •’Cómo y 
cuánto ha crecido la economía española en la década 50-60", Información 
Comercial Española, no. 341, January 1962; Fabián Estapé: Ensayos sobre 
economía española, Madrid [Ariel] 1972; Javier Braña, Mikel Buesa and José 
Molero: "El fin de la etapa nacionalista: industrialización y dependencia 
en España, 1951-59", Investigaciones Económicas, no, 9, May—August 1979, pp. 
151—207; Enrique Fan}ul Martin: **1951-1957: El despegue de la
industrialización en España", in Ministerio de Economía y Comercio: Lecturas 
de economía española e internacional. 50 Aniversario del Cuerpo de Técnicos 
Comerciales del Estado, Madrid [Secretaria General Técnica] 1981, pp. 125- 
49; and José Luis García Delgado: a) "Crecimiento industrial y cambio en la 
política española en el decenio de 1950. Gula para un análisis", Hacienda 
Pública Española, no. 100, 1986, pp. 287-96; and b) other references
provided in the general bibliography.
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without foreign financial aid, and the amount of foreign aid required to put Spain on a 
stable basis progressively increased. An increase in Spain’s production and exports would 
allow the country to import more of its badly needed goods. Without aid. Spain had to 
limit imports entirely to essential goods and impose consumption restrictions on all kinds 
of Spanish products in order to increase exports. The Spanish people had to tighten their 
belts still further. The important question was how long Spain could muddle along in a 
worsening economic situation without major unrest. Without the extraordinary powers 
possessed by the government, extensive labour troubles would have inevitably occurred, 
as they did, under similar conditions in other countries with democratic governments.
The Department of State’s policy to allow Spain to apply for Eximbank credits 
resulted in no economic benefit for Spain. According to the Department of State, credits 
were not granted due to the Eximbank’s reservations as to the Spanish capacity to earn 
dollars that could be applied to the repayment of the credits rather than because of 
political discrimination. After making public the lifting of political objections to an 
Eximbank loan to Spain, Acheson himself affirmed that Spain was "a poor risk as long 
as it did not adjust its balance of payments and make other financial reforms."21 The 
reality was more complex. First, President Harry S. Truman did not favour Eximbank 
loans to Spain.22 Second, any encouragement or succour to Franco by giving loans to 
Spain appeared very disruptive of the Allied common policy towards Franco, especially 
when the British Government was in the process of reviewing its policy to accommodate 
the Americans at the United Nations.23 Finally, the Eximbank authorities rejected the 
Spanish approach altogether. The Eximbank's policy was to provide specific credits for 
specific operations presented by the enterprises directly concerned (preferably not
21. The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested against the 
questioning of the Spanish capacity to pay interest and amortisation on 
whatever firm commitment it acquired; FRUS, 194 9, IV, footnotes 2 and 3, pp. 
745-46.
,2. For Truman's position see "The President's News Conference (s) " of 2 June 
and 14 July, 194 9, reproduced in Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
Onited States. Harry S. Truman. Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, 
and Statements of the President, 8 vols. (hereinafter referred to as Truman, 
followed by the year—volume), 1949, pp. 155 and 271, respectively.
11. PRO, FO 371/79211: "Policy towards Spain", agreed memorandum prepared by 
Sir Ivo Mallet, former British Ambassador to Spain, after meeting with Sir 
Roy Makins, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (until December 
1952) and Sir William Strang, 8 August 1949.
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connected to the INI).24 On their turn, the Spanish persisted in requesting credits for 
reconstruction and general economic development, apart from a few consumer goods. 
Moreno stressed that the Spanish capacity to repay credits depended on a long-range 
investment programme that would lower production costs and render Spain's position as 
a seller on foreign markets increasingly favourable, particularly regarding the United 
States. The Eximbank pointed out that Spain’s inability to earn dollars was the result of 
the implementation of economic practices that were in complete variance with the 
American ideological commitment towards world-wide free trade and payments.
These practices included direct controls over imports and their distribution. INI’s 
activities in competition with private industry, restrictions on foreign investment and, 
especially, the system of multiple exchange rates applying to various categories of imports 
and exports after December 1948.25 The Spanish Government was reluctant to resort to 
outright devaluation, ostensibly because it feared that a rise in the peseta cost of imports 
would increase inflation, have a negative effect on Spain’s already unstable internal 
finances, and hamper the promotion of domestic industrial output. The multiple exchange 
rate system, despite its apparent complexity, was specifically a non-declared progressive 
devaluation piloted from the Government.16 Notwithstanding this, the continued 
overvaluation of the peseta served to discourage export trade by making exportation 
relatively unprofitable and by pricing certain Spanish surpluses out of the world market. 
Furthermore, overvaluation of the peseta made necessary the continuation of very rigid 
controls over imports because of the relatively low peseta prices of imported goods.
,4. That the Eximbank disliked funding INI'a activities might have appeared 
illogical for those in Spain who believed that American credits were the 
result of Spain's increased importance for U.S. defence, since INI had 
basically a military interest. It did not only deal directly with defence 
industries (munitions, navy and aircraft construction) but with strategic 
sectors such as raw materials, steel, and transportation. See Pablo Martin 
Aceña and Francisco Comin: INI 50 años de industrialización en España,
Madrid [Espasa Calpe] 1991, p. 135.
21 • FRPS, 194 9, IV, Memorandum of conversation of State Department officiais 
with Spanish diplomats in Washington, 1 November 1949, pp. 763—66. For the 
increasing future complexity of the mechanism of multiple exchage rates see 
Pelham, op. cit., pp. 18 ff., and Fernando Eguidazu Palacios: Intervención 
monetaria v control de cambios en España (1900-1977) Orígenes y evolución 
del control de cambios en España, Madrid (Héroes] 19^8.
**. José Maria Serrano Sanz: "El tipo de cambio en los años del cambio
múltiple* Una estimación 1948-1959** (forthcoming). Serrano's estimate is 
based on the average rate of exchange obtained from all the exchange 
operations then in action.
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The Spanish might have beleived that France maintained differential exchange 
rates for imports and exports throughout 1949 and was unsanctioned by the International 
Monetary Fund. However, France unified exchange rates in September 1949 when the 
French franc was devalued to meet the British devaluation. After the 30 per cent sterling 
devaluation against the dollar and the subsequent general realignment of the European 
currencies, the ECA was more than ever insistent that all Western European countries 
maintain fixed exchange rates to support the new pound-dollar relationship.27 At that 
time, the Spanish Council of Ministers considered it unnecessary to devalue the peseta, 
arguing that the system of multiple exchange rates permitted the adaptation of export 
prices to the new situation.2*
The Department of State expected to see previous c o n v in c in g  e v id e n c e  to 
satisfy Spain's needs for financial assistance.29 The Spanish Government demanded a 
previous firm commitment for long-term financial assistance that would allow Spain to 
demonstrate its capacity and willingness to proceed on the American-desired path, at least 
economically. Officials of the Chase National Bank indicated that IEME officials were 
"willing to remedy objectionable economic practices and policies in order to qualify [their 
country] for further private or official United States loans."30 Americans blamed Franco’s 
economic policy for Spain's financial difficulties. In Spain, this was considered a hostile 
attitude. In May 1949, Franco declared that he would not disdain foreign aid because it 
would speed up the rhythm of economic reconstruction, but that ”if that help were 
conditioned by blackmail, we should refuse it and pursue our unchanging aims alone.
Alan S. Milward: The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51. London 
[Methuen] 1984 [1967], p. 308.
**. AHBE, IEME, box no. 2: C/A, 11 October 1949; and Pelham, op. cit., p.
19.
Acheson refused to grant aid to Spain until its Government showed 
"convincing concrete evidence" of its intention to move towards less 
intervention; FROS, 1949, IV, Acheson to Culbertson, Washington, 13 April 
and 31 October, pp. 736 and 762.
,0. Ibid.. p. 729, footnote 3, referring to a memorandum of conversation not 
printed. In February 1949, the Chase National Bank granted a $25 million 
fully secured revolving credit to the IEME for the purpose of alleviating 
the Spanish economic position. This loan permitted the importation of 
100,000 tons of wheat and 30,000 tons of maize * (apart from cotton and 
machinery); AHBE, IEME, box no. 2: C/A, 26 July and 11 October 1949.
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although more slowly."31 The Spanish economic authorities declared that the lack of 
financial assistance had forced them to maintain what constituted emergency 
administrative practices concerning trade and payments, to the overall disadvantage of 
their economy. They argued further that the Marshall Plan not only accelerated recovery', 
aided reconstruction, and eased commodity bottlenecks by financing investment and 
imparts, but, more significantly, allowed the receiving countries to ease direct controls.33
Distortions of the administrative trade mechanisms and extreme controls in trade 
and payments were the result of a long-lasting scarcity of supply and financial resources 
rather than a most wanted policy-outcome. Import licensing was unavoidable in a situation 
of scarce foreign currency holdings, while the protection of Spanish industries was less 
relevant. The extreme need for resources allocation caused Spain, with unaided resources, 
to resist changing an economic policy that hindered a sound strategy of reconstruction and 
growth. Despite the fact that imports increased at an uninterrupted rate (which shows the 
effort to attain increases in output), output recovered very slowly. Low output limited 
export trade and, thus, the country’s importing possibilities, which, in turn, further limited 
any increase of output. Exports could not increase without a recovery in output and 
improvement of productivity, which, in turn, required imports. This vicious circle, which 
occurred throughout Western Europe when reconstruction was undertaken with limited 
resources, was eased elsewhere by American relief.
In February 1950, Manuel Arbunia de la Miyar, president of Spain’s Banco 
Exterior at the time and future Minister of Commerce, argued that Spain needed foreign
Eugene K. Keefe, David P. Coffin, Jamas M. Moor*, Jr., Robert Rinehart 
and Susan H. Seurlock: Area Handbook for Spain. Washington D.C. [U.S.
Government Printing Office] 1976, p. 275.
**. A similar argument for the whole of Western Europe is found in Milward, 
op. cit. A more recent rehearsal of Milward's argument is presented by J. 
Bradford De Long and Barry Eichengreen: "The Marshall Plan: History's Most 
Successful Structural Adjustment Program", Working Paper no 3899 of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge (MA), November 1991. A 
shorter version of the previous paper is "The Marshall Plan as a Structural 
Adjustment Program", Discussion Paper no. 1576 of the Harvard Institute of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, November 1991.
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aid, first, to complete economic reconstruction and, second, to diminish intervention.33 
In June, Culbertson informed Acheson that the Spanish authorities had told him- "political 
and economic evolution and liberalization can come only after economic improvement or 
rehabilitation, and that can come only as a result of outside aid.”34 The Spanish argument 
made no impression on the Department of State’s understanding of Spain-U.S. relations. 
In sum, after two years of fruitless conversations, the Spanish-American dialogue was 
exactly where it had been in 1947. The American executive was not yet ready to grant 
any assistance to Spain.
The United States Congress seemed willing to curve the attitude adopted by the 
Truman Administration. The annual process of authorising and appropriating foreign aid 
allowed the Congress to exercise a greater influence over the direction of the United 
States’ foreign policy with respect to Spain, than one might have expected. Some on 
Capitol Hill continued to express the opinion that Spain should be part of the ERP. They 
also claimed that, with their well-placed airfields, their key geographical position, and 
Franco’s record of anti-communism, the Spanish should play an active role in the defence 
of the West. The opportunity for some members of the Congress to allocate funds for 
Spain came with the discussion of the Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) Act of 1949.3i 
The United States’s foreign aid policy was now shifting from economic recovery to 
military security, following the approval of the North Atlantic Treaty (henceforth, NAT). 
When President Truman sent the NAT to the Senate in April 1949, the question arose at 
once concerning the relationship between the NAT and the military assistance programme 
for the Treaty countries that had not yet been submitted. On 21 July, the U.S. Senate 
approved the NAT, and a few days later President Truman submitted his request for 
military aid. The MDAA was enacted on 6 October and actually appropriated on 28
**. "Comentarios económicos a una carta" and "Una política económica" 
published by Arburúa in the Madrid's newspaper Arriba, on 9 and 25 February 
1950, respectively.
,4. FRUS, 1950, III, Culbertson to Acheson, Madrid, 20 June, p. 1565.
” . Still valid and illustrative of the United States military assistance 
and mutual security is William Adams Brown, Jr. and Redvers Opie: American 
Foreign Assistance, Washington [The Brookings Institution] 1953 (see pp. 
214-34 and pp. 455 ff., for the development of the MDA Program).
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October* The communist threat no longer consisted exclusively of the possibility of 
internal coups d’état by national communist parties, but also of a direct war with the 
Soviet Union. Rearmament was emphasised accordingly.
The contrast is obvious in the general terms of reference of the bills of foreign 
aid approved by the Congress of the United States. The "Foreign Assistance Act of 1948" 
enacted on 3 April 1948 (Title I of which was the "Economic Cooperation Act") intended 
to ' promote world peace and the general welfare, national interest, and foreign policy of 
the United States through economic, financial, and other measures necessary to the 
maintenance of conditions abroad in which free institutions may survive and consistent 
with the maintenance of the strength and stability of the United States" /7 The "Mutual 
Defense Assistance Act of 1949" enacted on 6 October 1949 intended "to promote the 
foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by 
furnishing military assistance to foreign nations."**
Senator Patrick McCarran led the various attempts to attach riders to congressional 
bills earmarking funds to Spain at the time of congressional approval of the MDA Act of
1949 and voting annnal appropriations.** This influential senator chaired the Senate 
Judiciary Committee between 1949 and 1953 and the Internal Security Subcommittee 
between 1950 and 1953. He was a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee and 
chairman of the Special Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Mutual Security', the so- 
called "watchdog committee", that reviewed the budget requests of the State Department, 
among others. He was also a member of the Joint Committee on Foreign Economic
**. P.L. 61-430, vol. €3.1, pp. 975 ft. Hereinafter, United States 
legislation bills quoted in this chapter will be cited by providing a public 
law number, preceded by the Congress that enacted the bill, followed by the 
corresponding volume, part, and pages of the United States Statutes at 
Large, Washington D.C. [U.S. Government Printing Office] various years• 
These volumes contain the public and private laws and concurrent resolutions 
enacted by the Congress of the United States, plus proclamations and 
international treaties.
J\ P.L. 80-472, vol. 62.1, p. 137.
Emphasis added. P.L. 81-329, vol. 63.1, p. 714.
*’• Patrick A. McCarran (August 1876-September 1954), Senator (D) from 
Nevada (1933-1954). On 25 August 1953, Mr. McCarran was presented with the 
Grand Cross of the Order of Isabel la Cat61ica for his efforts to improve 
Spanish—American relations. As we shall see, he certainly deserved it!
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Cooperation formed in the 81st Congress. From these different positions. Senator 
McCarran acted efficaciously as an active crusader in favour of Spain. In particular, 
McCarran used the hearings of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee to attack the 
Spanish policy of the Administration. On 5 May 1949, McCarran told Secretary Acheson
"...that so far as I am personally concerned as chairman of 
this subcommittee (Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations] I am 
not in favor of your policy with reference to Spain and until 
that policy is changed I am going to examine your 
appropriations with a fine tooth comb."40
This direct threat to cut the appropriations for the State Department unless the Secretary 
altered his Spanish policy illustrates one of the most powerful weapons available to the 
Congress for working its will on the executive branch. It exemplifies one of the reasons 
for the fascination that the Congress produced on researchers dealing with the formulation 
of the United States’ foreign policy from a bureaucratic point of view.
In July 1949, the Senate Appropriations Committee adopted a motion by Senator 
McCarran to devote $50 million for a loan to Spain in the second year of the ECA 
programme of aid to Europe, through the fiscal year ending 30 June 1950.41 President 
Truman and his Secretary of State announced their opposition on the grounds that Spain 
was not a ERP participating country; the ECA officials stated that to include Spain in the 
recovery programme violated the principle of the European initiative in the ERP 
framework. The motion in favour of Spain was defeated in the Senate on 4 August 
1949.42 In April 1950, in a debate on the third-year authorisation of the programme of 
aid to Europe, the Senate again refused an amendment for an Eximbank loan to Spain for
40. Theodore J. Lowi: "O.S. Bases in Spain”, in Edwin A. Bock and Alan K.
Campbell: Case Studies in American Government, London [Prentice—Hall
International, Inc.] 1962, p. 281. For a further description of McCarran's 
methods see McCarran: "Why Shouldn't the Spanish Fight for Us?" Saturday 
Evening Post, 28 April 1951, pp. 25, 136-38.
41. For congressional manoeuvring on the question of Spain see the excellent 
work by Brent Scowcroft: "Congress and Foreign Policy: An Examination of 
Congressional Attitudes Toward the Foreign Aid Programs to Spain and 
Yugoslavia", Doctoral thesis, Columbia University, New York, 1967.
47. Congressional Quarterly Almanac 81st Congress 1st Session 1949, 
Washington D.C. (Congressional Quarterly News Features] 1949, vol. V, pp. 
199-200.
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a total amount of $100 million.43 Finally, in August 1950, Senator McCarran introduced 
an amendment to the General Appropriation Act of 1951 (a bill providing appropriations 
for the operation of the entire government), earmarking a $100 million loan for Spain out 
of ECA funds. After debate, the Senate accepted the proposal, but with the amendment 
that the United States Treasury was to advance the money which was to be administered 
by the ECA through the Eximbank under the credit terms of the Economic Cooperation 
Act. On 24 August 1950, a joint committee of the House and the Senate authorised a 
long-term loan of $62.5 million to Spain; this was enacted into law in the General 
Appropriation A c t"
President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson opposed the inclusion of Spain 
in the European aid package. In their attempt to abort the Senate's willingness to earmark 
funds directly to Spain, Truman and Acheson both suggested to Congress the possibility 
of considering credits for Spain separately from the rest of Europe. They reminded 
Congress that, on purely economic grounds, Spain was free to apply to the Eximbank for 
credits for specific and economically justifiable projects on the same basis as any other 
country.45 What the Department of State intended was to be able to delay any credit to 
Spain with the observation of a strict economic orthodoxy. In order to apply for Eximbank 
credits, the Spanish Government had to prove first that Spain was a good investment 
target and that there was a reasonable prospect of repayment. Therefore, the poor state of 
the Spanish economy ruled out any loans to be granted on a normal basis. Truman and 
Acheson tried (unsuccessfully) to explain to the Senate that, if Spain had not yet received
4>. Conqr.a» and th« Nation 1945—1964. A Review of Government and Politic» 
in the Postwar Years, Washington D.C. [Congressional Quarterly Service] 
1965. pp. 167 ff.
44. General Appropriations Act of 1951, enacted on 6 September 1950. The
following disposition was included under Chapter XI, Foreign Aid, Title I 
Funds Appropriated to the President, "Economic Cooperation": "[The Secretary
of the Treasury] is hereby authorized and directed to make purchases [during 
the fiscal year ending 30 June 1951] in an amount not exceeding in the 
aggregate $62,500,000 for the purpose of assistance to Spain, to be extended 
upon credit terms as provided in section 111 (c) (2) of the Economic
Cooperation Act of 1946, as amended." P.L. 61-759, vol. 64.1, p. 756.
48. "The President's News Conference of August 3, 1950", in Truman 1950, pp. 
569-70; "Letter from Secretary Acheson to Senator [Tom] Connally [Chairman 
of the Foreign Relations Commission of the U.S. Senate, until January 1953], 
January 18, 1950", in A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents 
1941—1949, New York [Arno Press] 1971, p. 893; and Acheson's criticisms to 
Senate action on 2 August, The New York Times, 3 August 1950, p. 18.
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any credit, this was due to pure economic distrust, rather than political animosity against 
Franco.
When Acheson declared, in January 19S0, his opposition to include Spain in the 
MDA Act, he was running counter to the pressure exercised by the military establishment 
to obtain military bases, in particular, after the Soviet atomic explosion of August 
1949.46 The American Chargé d’Affaires in Madrid, Culbertson, had asked Acheson to 
adjust relations with Spain accordingly.41 Acheson was not impressed by the fact that the 
Spanish offer for bases provided a good chance to improve America’s nuclear presence 
in Europe. Furthermore, air and naval bases in Spain would add depth to the defence of 
Western Europe, provide greater flexibility of movement for military forces and additional 
means for dispersion of bases in the conduct of offensive or defensive operations, permit 
the continuity of effort in the event that other bases become temporarily untenable, 
guarantee control of the western Mediterranean, and, finally, provide additional bases for 
anti-submarine warfare. Opposition to any military understanding with Franco’s Spain 
remained unchanged despite the congressional pilgrimage to Spain in the latter pan of 
1949. Spain received a stream of notable right-wing American visitors -many of whom 
were members of both houses of Congress- all calling for closer western collaboration 
with Franco. Finally, it is worth noticing that, two months after the outbreak of war in 
Korea, Truman opposed the inclusion of Spain in any congressional bill of aid to Europe.
The expansion of Western European domestic defence efforts and military 
assistance from the United States were the two pillars of the NAT Treaty. The 
understanding was that assistance from the United States would complement European 
military expenditure beyond the point in which increasing military expenditure represented 
a burden for economic growth and welfare which provided political and social stability, 
the cement of Western security towards Soviet expansionism. If the MDA Act of 1949, 
approved after knowing that the Soviets possessed nuclear capacity, had shown the
**. Laurine* S. Kaplan: A Community of Interest: NATO and the Military
Assistance Program, 1948-1951, Washington D.C. [United States Government 
Printing Office] 1980, pp. 32, 38 and 139—40.
FRPS. 1949, IV, Madrid, 3 October 1949, p. 761.
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important role of military assistance and domestic rearmament in Europe, it also impeded 
rearmament considerations to overthrow the prior policy of improving living standards to 
contain communist expansion. Europe's military buildup was to be associated with the 
aims of the ERP of political and social stability through economic recovery leading 
towards European Unification.4* The MDA Act intended "to promote the foreign policy" 
of the United States, and its definition remained within the attributions of the Department 
of State and the EC A. Military assistance was presented as an insurance programme to 
build up the confidence necessary for economic growth.49
Military considerations were not to pilot the United States’s foreign assistance 
programmes. That priority was to be given to political objectives was made clear by the 
refusal to accept the demand of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (henceforth, JCS) that 
military assistance be linked to the grant of military facilities and be transferred to the 
ultimate responsibility of the Pentagon.30 Otherwise, it would have no longer been 
possible to neglect the strategic importance of Spain in a possible future war scenario in 
Europe. American strategic plans for the defence of Europe in 1948 and 1949 considered 
Spain the only fortress from which to regain the continent, once it had been overrun by 
the Soviets, with little or no opposition from either European or American defence 
forces.11 The overall control of the Department of State over MDA programmes pushed 
military logic aside.
Congressional attempts to provide financial support for rearming Spain, when it 
had posed so many problems in granting the amounts of aid necessary to fulfil the 
conditions of the NAT Treaty, were very much disliked by the executive branch. The
4*. Lorenza Sebesta: "I programmi di aiuto militar* nella politica americana 
per l'Europa. L'esperienza italiana 1948-1952", Italia contemporanea, no. 
173, December 1988, pp. 43-63.
° . Dean Acheson: Present at the Creation; My Years in the State Department, 
London [Hamilton] 1970, p. 513.
50. Sebesta: "American Military Aid and European Rearmament: The Italian
Case", in Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (eds.): NATO: The
Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, New York 
(St. Martin's Press] 1992, pp. 283-310, p. 284.
51. Sebesta: L'Europa indifesa: Sistema di sicurezza atlantico e caso
Italiano, 1948-1955, Florence [Ponte alle Grazie] 1991, pp. 29 ff.
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attempt to include Spain into the MDA Programme of 1949 was strenuously opposed also 
because the military cooperation that this programme inaugurated constituted a vehicle for 
European integration. In November 1949, the Department of State was looking forward 
to NATO as a new force for political integration in Western Europe in a perfect union of 
economic recovery, national defence, and Atlantic partnership.51 Spain could simply not 
be part of the policy of an integrated military production and defence procurement among 
Western European countries that the United States was seeking on the basis of American 
weapons to reduce overall costs and strengthen the cohesion among Western European 
countries. The inclusion of Spain would only have added to the social upheaval expected 
against many governments facing increased military expenditures.
The Department of State was conscious that any initiative affecting military' affairs 
had to be done very cautiously. It knew that the Spanish question could break the weak 
bargaining position that many governments in western Europe had vis-à-vis domestic 
opposition to increased levels of military expenditure. Any move towards a military’ 
understanding with Franco would disturb the balance in left-center and non-communist 
left-wing opinion, on which the European Union had been built. The MDA Programmes 
meant that the United States had a military commitment to the defence of Western 
Europe; but this was pan of the broader goals set forth by the ERP, for which the 
exclusion of Spain was completely necessary.53
Even at the time of the Korean War, military considerations did not replace the 
wider economic and political objectives which had formed the basis of the ERP. This was 
so, despite the new sense of urgency for a rapid shift from economic to military
**. Milward: "Nate, OEEC, and the Integration of Europe", in Heller and
Gillingham (eds.), op. cit., pp. 241-52, p. 241.
5J. According to Sebesta, L'Europa indifesa, cit., p. 155, the MDA Program 
was conceived in agreement to the ERP principle that economic recovery 
constituted the essential element granting security to Europe. In May 1950, 
Acheson continued to link increased defence efforts to further progress in 
European integration; intervention at the conference of ministers of foreign 
affair», London, "Record of Second Tripartite Ministerial Meeting held in 
Lancaster House on Thursday, 11 May 1950", Documents on British Policy 
Overseas, Series II, vol. II, The London Conferences; Anglo-American 
Relations and Cold War Strategyt January to June 1950, London [HMSO] 1987, 
pp. 315-16.
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assistance, from morale to weapons.34 The Korean War might have been important in 
persuading Congress that hostility against Franco Spain on ideological grounds was a 
luxury no longer affordable. But for the State Department, the Korean War strengthened 
the idea of an integrated defence to build up the military credibility of Western Europe 
and the need for increased economic coordination through NATO. Economic and political 
stability in Western Europe remained goals of U.S. foreign policy towards Europe.”  
European economic, political, and military integration were pan of the United States' 
security policy itself, which necessarily excluded Spain.
The President and the Department of State preferred to reduce the official policy 
of ostracism toward the Franco regime by other means which did not imply any 
mechanism of direct aid, such as the repeal of the operative paragraphs of the December 
1946 Resolution concerning membership of the specialised agencies and the withdrawal 
of Ambassadors. On 4 November 1950, the General Assembly freed member-countries 
from any practical obligation to govern their relations with Spain in any specific manner, 
except in regard to Spain’s admission to the organisation. This new resolution led to the 
quick reappointment of heads of missions in Spain (which a number of South American 
and Middle Eastern countries had already disregarded).*
44. On 10 October 1950, President Truman promulgated the Mutual Security Act
of 1951« This act gathered under one legislative authorisation the various 
programmea of assistance in which the United States was engaged (except for
the operations of the Eximbank) for the main purpose of directing this help 
to strengthen defensive plans in the face of communist aggression. On 30
June 1951, what was left of the ERP was merged with the aid for military 
purposes under the MSA.
58. Till Geiger and Sebesta: "National Defense Policies and the Failure of 
Military Integration in NATO: American Military Assistance and Western
European Rearmament, 1949-1954", paper presented at the colloquium "The 
United States and the Integration of Europe: Legacies of the Postwar Era", 
University of Missouri, St. Louis, September 25, 1992; paper cited with
permission of the authors.
51. For an account of the difference in greetings offered to the Ambassadors 
of France and the United Kingdom with that of the United States, see the 
classic Max Gallo: Histoire de l'Espagne franquista, Paris [Robert Laffont] 
1969 (p, 219 of the Spanish ed.) and Rocio Luca de Tena y Bethencourt: "La 
vuelta a Madrid del Embajador británico (1950-1951)", Bulletin d*histoire 
contemporaine de I'Espaqne, no. 8-9, June 1989, pp. 48-52.
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4.3. Access to Expon-Iinpnn Bank Credits
The $65.2 million loan authorised by the United States Congress in August 1950 
was the only United States aid programme granted and (partially) delivered to Spain 
before the signing of the bilateral agreements for bases in September 1953. It is, therefore, 
of great interest to review this loan carefully, not so much because of the amounts 
authorised, but because it will show clearly the limitations of the American policy of 
assistance towards Spain.
Congressional appropriations for Spain contradicted the views of those who were 
responsible for the formulation of and implementation of foreign policy -the President and 
the Department of State- who felt they were against the interests of the United States. 
Truman obstructed effective congressional authorisations to Spain. He would have loved 
to have rejected the loan to Spain, but he would have had to reject the General 
Appropriations Act of 1951, in which the loan appeared. On promulgating the bill, 
Truman clearly stated that the money was to be granted when mutual arrangements had 
been made with regard to the guaranty, conditions of amortisation, the purposes for which 
the money was to be used and, also, provided that such loans served the interests of the 
United States.57 Apart from Truman’s personal dislike for granting aid to Franco, it was 
necessary to allow enough time to establish rules of procedure in this unusual case of a 
country authorised to deal with the ECA without holding ERP membership.
President Truman himself established the granting conditions on 14 November.58 
In accordance with presidential directives, the funds authorised by the Congress for Spain 
were to be made available only for purposes making a "substantial contribution" to the 
Spanish economy. The State Department, the ECA, and the Eximbank agreed that a 
"substantial contribution" was a "lasting contribution for the benefit of the Spanish people
51. "Statement by the President upon signing the General Appropriations Act, 
September 6, 1950", in Truman 1950, p. €16.
5#. Presidential directives explained in FRUS, 1951, IV, part 1, "Memorandum 
of the International Security Affairs Committee: Spain", 13 April, and
Herbert £• Gaston, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the 
Eximbank, to the Embassy in Spain, Washington, 23 April, pp. 841 and 84 4-48, 
respectively. The following quotation in text corresponds to p. 844.
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as a whole [excluding] therefore expendables." Credits were to be extended generally for 
private enterprises, excluding those favoured or controlled by the Spanish Government. 
It was up to the Spanish Government to finance the public sector with its own resources, 
exchange earnings and credits from Western European partners, or by ending the 
restrictions concerning private capital investment. Eximbank credits were to be granted 
on a project-by-project basis rather than on a commodity basis or for a general programme 
for equipment and long-term investment. This implied the rejection of both the Import 
Programme and the initial requests presented to the Eximbank in the Spring of 1949. 
Finally, credits were not to exceed an aggregate of $25 million except after approval by 
the President, which meant a unilateral reduction of congressional authorisations. In sum, 
Truman’s specific provisions restricted strongly any room for Spanish action.
An ECA press release (issued on 15 November) informed the Spanish 
Government of the general credit policy, but not of any reduction in the amount The 
Spanish Under-Secretary for Foreign Economy and Commerce, Tomás Súñer y Ferrer, 
arrived in Washington on 23 November 1950 with the task of accelerating the urgent 
allocation of the credit with preference given to the purchase of consumer goods.59 The 
initial Spanish proposal exhausted the $62.5 million credit in purchases of five 
commodities: fuel, cereals, fertilisers, tractors, and cotton. The proposal was immediately 
rejected because it contradicted all presidential instructions. It surpassed the $25 million 
limit, it was drafted on a commodity basis, and it left no room for private entrepreneurs. 
The Eximbank authorised a total of $11.2 million for raw materials and capital goods for 
industrial reconstruction, but refused authorisations for cereal and fuel purchases.
The Eximbank proposed to allocate $3.1 million for fertilisers (70,000 tons), $5.1 
million for cotton (5,700 tons) and $3 million for tractors, which was altogether far below
**. MAE, Leg. 10077, exp. 26: Sufter to Suanzes, Washington, 30 November
1950. The Under-Secretariat of Foreign Economy and Commerce dealt, in broad 
terms, with all matters related to the Eximbank credits.
Tomis Sufter y Ferrer (b. 1895), lawyer and diplomat, with an intense 
diplomatic career backing his appointment as Under-Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs in 1945 and of Foreign Economy and Commerce in 1948. After his 
departure from the Under-Secretariat in July 1951, he returned to his 
diplomatic career.
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the Spanish requests.60 With respect to non-consumer goods, the Spanish presented the 
usual ambitious projects and the Eximbank expressed serious doubts about realizing them 
within a reasonable time frame and limited financing. It is unfortunate that access to the 
files concerning the Eximbank credits deposited in the historical archive of the Bank of 
Spain are presently closed behind a forty-year rule for access. This documentation would 
have shown how the Spaniards presented up-dated versions of the different public plans 
incorporated already in the 1947 Import Programme.61
The Spanish found it incomprehensible that the Eximbank favoured the purchase 
of consumer goods less than the ECA.42 After the disappearance of Argentina as a 
supplier, cereal imports from the dollar area constituted a constant drain on dollar 
resources. Fertilisers and fanning machinery were necessary to improve agricultural 
productivity, thereby reducing imports of foodstuffs. The allocation for fertilisers was 
hardly sufficient to purchase 15 per cent of import requirements, while the allocation for 
tractors represented about 30 per cent of the initial 1948 request for 2.000 tractors.63 The 
Spanish textile industries had less than a one month’s stock and worked at half their
<c. MAE, Leg. 10077, exp. 26: Súñer to Artajo and Suanzes, Washington, 19 
December 1950.
41. See Viñas, the only scholar who has had access to these records: "La
primera ayuda econòmica norteamericana a España”, in Lecturas de economia 
española e internacional: 50 Aniversario del Cuerpo de Técnicos Comerciales 
del Estado, Madrid [Secretaria General Técnica del Ministerio de Comercio] 
1901, pp. 49-90.
42. MAE, Leg. 10077, exp. 28: Suanzes to the newly appointed American
Ambassador, Stanton Griffis, Madrid, 14 March 1951. In fact, food, feed,
fertilisers, raw materials, semi-finished products and fuel accounted for
74.9 per cent over the total ECA paid shipments between 13 April 1948 and
30 June 1951? Brown and Opie, op. cit., p. 220.
Stanton Griffis, Wall Street financier and show business manager, who
acted as "diplomatic trouble shooter, accredited to dictatorships" (Poland,
Egypt, Argentina and Spain) . He was appointed to Spain in December 1950 with
the purpose to create stability in a country opposed to Communism. Despite
that his appointment meant the end of a four-year interregnum during which
the United States had been without a diplomatic chief of mission in Madrid,
Truman did not want to give the appearance of running to Spain after the
United Nations General Assembly resolution of November 1950. Griffis was
formally confirmed by the Senate on 1 February 1951 and presented
credentials on 1 March. He terminated service on 28 January 1952, much to
the dismay of the Spanish Government. For a detailed account on the debate
on the return of Ambassadors to Spain, see Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 87 ff. An
excellent insight into Griffis' action in Spain is provided by Griffis
himself: Lying in State, New York [Doubleday and Company, Inc.] 1952, pp.
268 ff. (initial quotation to be found on p. 155).
41. The first national congress of agricultural engineers, held in 1950,
recommended the importation of 37,500 tractors over a period of three years; 
Pelham, op. cit., p. 28—29.
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productive capacity. The shortage of imported coal after the outbreak of war in Korea and 
the subsequent rise in prices of many raw materials aggravated the supply situation and 
threatened to slow further the expansion of production.6* The lack of sufficient good 
quality coal was a main factor hampering the recovery and development of the Spanish 
heavy' industry. It was obvious that Spain's long-term needs were for investment capital, 
but the short-term needs were more pressing. Machine-tools could be purchased when 
dollar reserves increased through exports, or could wait to be purchased with future 
credits.45
The Eximbank appeared intent upon ending the fiscal year by providing Spain 
with the minimum possible amount of credit. The uncommitted balance of congressional 
appropriations for a given fiscal year required special action by the lending authority' to 
carry it over beyond 30 June. Since there was no indication to either side that this would 
occur, the Spanish authorities pressed to cash the corresponding authorisations completely. 
In April 1951, the Eximbank approved five credits totalling $17.2 million out of a total 
amount of $62.5 million, but it refused to consider Spain’s requests for wheat, coarse 
grains, petroleum, and off-shore procurement fertilisers. The Spanish submitted fifteen 
new individual projects (fertiliser, mining, railroad, electricity, and aviation) requiring 
credits for a total value of $32.7 million, plus additional demands for consumer goods 
(wheat, cotton and coal). The Spanish asked for a $5 million increase for wheat purchases 
based on the fact that wheat supplied to Spain was 25 per cent higher priced than the 
market price established by the International Wheat Agreement.46 They also asked to 
increase cotton purchases to 23,000 bales and to obtain from the United States the 
500,000 tons of coal for general consumption that the United Kingdom announced, in a 
bilateral round of trade negotiations that took place early in March 1951, it was unable 
to provide. Nevertheless, the Eximbank rejected new credits for wheat, cotton, and coal. 
It considered the air installations and the fertiliser and mining projects. Railroads, power 
projects, or long-delivay aircraft for the Spanish Airlines received no consideration
M . See chapter five, pp. 420-21.
*s. Th« Spanish authorities considered this to be an open possibility. Slifter 
made reference to an additional $£00 million credit; MAE, Lag. 10077, axp. 
26: Suiter to Suani*«, Washington, 30 November 1950.
**. See chapter seven, p. 540.
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because of the large credits involved and the lack of detailed surveys of these sectors.6* 
Finally, there were some technical problems involved which delayed the process of project 
approval. The Eximbank was very punctilious on the projects presented for financing, so 
Spain could share the responsibility for the delay in the execution of congressional 
authorisations.
As late as April 1951, Washington agreed to permit Spain to have access in fiscal 
year 1952 to the uncommitted balance of the $62.5 million.69 At the end of the month, 
the Eximbank (and the State Department) authorised Spain to purchase wheat, cotton, and 
fertilisers. However, they immediately informed the Spanish Administration that this 
authorisation was an exception that would not be repeated.70 Finally, on 22 May 1951 
the IEME granted the first authorisations. It had taken nine months to initiate the delivery 
of the $65.2 million loan authorised by the Congress of the U.S. in August 1950. The 
largest single post-war loan made by the United States -a $3.75 billion loan made to the 
United Kingdom in 1946- was exhausted entirely within twelve months after its 
approval.71 The contrast could not have been more striking.
Apart from the volume of aid, there is another element that differentiated Spain 
from the rest of Western Europe regarding American assistance between 1949 and 1953. 
Table 4.2 shows that grants constituted the highest proportion of American aid to the 
countries listed; for Spain grants were negligible. The financial terms of the Eximbank's 
loans to Spain constitute further proof of the Truman Administration’s unwillingness to 
assist the Spanish economy. The fust Spanish official to negotiate in Washington, Under­
secretary Suner, wanted the favourable terms of ERP treatment for Spain, i.e., thirty-five
•#. Information in this paragraph is based on FRÜS, 1951, IV, part 1, Gaston 
to the Embassy in Madrid, Washington, 23 April, p. 84 5, and Viñas, "La 
primera ayuda", art. cit.
FRÜS, 1951, IV, part 1, Acheson to Griffis, Washington, 27 April, p. 
848.
70. MAE, Lag. 10077, exp. 16: Aid-mémoire from the United States Embassy to 
Martin Artajo, Madrid, 26 April 1951. This policy was repeated publicly by 
Ambassador Griffis on 8 May at the annual meeting of the American Chamber 
of Commerce in Spain; Lying in State, cit., pp. 292-93.
n . Mervyn L. Weiner and Romeo Dalla—Chiesa : ’’International Movements of
Public Long-Term Capital and Grants, 194 6—50", International Monetary Fund 
Staff Papers, Vol. IV, no. 1, September 1954, pp. 113-78, p. 125. This study 
gives very underestimated amounts of aid for Spain.
287
years at 2.5 percent interest rate and repayment starting after the first five years. 
According to him, this would be the Congress’ reason for having the credit authorisations 
administered by ECA under the European Cooperation Act’s terms. In fact, according to 
the exact provisions of the General Appropriations Act of 1951, the Eximbank should 
have applied the ECA treatment to Spain. For its part, the Eximbank refused to accept this 
interpretation, and offered instead between five and twenty years as the redeemable period 
and an annual interest rate of 3.5 per cent. These conditions fell half way between private 
and Marshall Plan credits.73
TABLE 4.2
TOTAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC AMD MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE TO WESTERN EUROPE, 194»-1952
(US fisc*! years/in millions of $)
France
United Kingdom
Germany
Italy
Greece
The Netherlands
5 900,9 
3 808,5 
2 954,1 
2 366,3 
1 327,1 
1 805,3
Belgium—Luxembourg
Turkey
Yugoslavia
Norway
Denmark
Portugal
1 280,1
778.3 
518,8 
658,2
498.4 
229,0
TOTAL* 22 125 Spain** 52,8
Loans 8.5% 99.8%
Grants 91.5% 0.2%
Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International 
Organizations. Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 - September 
30, 1982 (*) Total without Spain (**) Authorisations. Effective purchasing 
financed by the Eximbank credit resulted in a total amount of $29.4 million 
until December 1952.
The Spanish counterpan furiously opposed these terms and continued to insist that 
Spain be treated as a ERP country; Eximbank officials rejected this. For Suher, "although 
not an official member state [of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, 
OEEC], Spain was collaborating fully [with the ERP] through a network of bilateral trade 
treaties".73 The Council of Ministers in Madrid expected to obtain a clear-cut statement 
from the U.S. Congress to include Spain among the countries benefiting from the ERP.74 
Spain’s trading experience with Western Europe during the immediate post-world war 
period continued to influence the Spanish perception of subsequent cooperation efforts in
T*. MAE, Lag. 10077, axp. 26: Sufiar to Artajo and Suanzaa, Waahingrton, 19 
December 1950.
7\ Ibid.
14. MAE, Leg. 3448, exp. 12: Report on the OEEC, dated 22 December 1950, 
presented to the Spanish Council of Ministers.
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Europe. The Spanish believed that their bilateral trade with western Europe was sufficient 
to deserve special treatment from the United States. After long discussions, they obtained 
an amortisation period of twenty years at a 3.5 percent interest rate, reduced to 3 per cent 
during the five first years. In their minds, the Eximbank had denied them a few years of 
amortisation, a percentage point of interest rate, and the purchase of several commodities 
sent free to countries such as Yugoslavia.
The Spanish tried to show inconsistencies by comparing Yugoslavia with Spain, 
arguing that a communist regime was receiving what a future war ally was denied. 
Already in 1949 credits were provided to Yugoslavia by the International Monetary Fund, 
the Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Eximbank. Wheat shipments 
valued at $16 million were sent to Yugoslavia already in November 1950, while the 
Yugoslav Emergency Relief Act was under congressional discussion (finally signed by 
President Truman on 29 December 1950). From the inception of the programme, the 
United States agreed that financial assistance would have no political preconditions.75 "1 
must confess”, wrote Griffis in his memoirs, "that 1 am completely unable to understand 
this policy myself.”76
It was fallacious and ineffective to draw parallels between these countries. The 
different treatment offered by the United States to Spain and Yugoslavia was based simply 
on Washington’s differences of perception of its "corresponding interests" with the two 
countries.77 Apart from the fact that the former's leader and the majority of its people 
took an active part in the war on the side of the Allies and that Yugoslavia had received 
a rather generous flow of aid through UNRRA, Yugoslavia was tempted with the granting 
of economic assistance to break the Soviet monopoly of power in Eastern Europe.
75. See Novak Jankovic': "The Changing Role of the U.S.A. in Financing
Yugoslav Economic Development Since 1945", in Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich (ed.) : 
Economic and Strategic Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy, New York [Walter de 
Gruyter] 1989, pp. 255-72. This is an excellent contribution to the history 
of the USA-Yugoslav economic relations during the period from 194 8 to the 
Reagan Administration.
Lying in State, cit., p. 286. Brent Scowcrofts "Congress and Foreign 
Policy: An Examination of Congressional Attitudes Toward the Foreign Aid 
Programs to Spain and Yugoslavia", Columbia University, New York, 1969, 
shows that Griffis' attitude was shared by many in Capitol Hill.
11. Quotation corresponding to Jankovic', art. cit., p. 255.
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Yugoslav military and political independence, despite direct threats from the Soviet Union 
after 1948, together with signs of market orientation and a relatively open economy with 
direct assistance from the United States, were presented as weaknesses in Soviet strategy, 
and, hopefully, even as examples for other Eastern European countries. Washington had 
no major political interest in improving relations with Franco's Spain. If Yugoslavia 
represented the Achilles’ heel in the Soviet bloc, Spain was a potential weakness for the 
Western bloc. However, as Scowcroft has shown, both countries were finally linked in the 
foreign aid legislative deliberation by the Administration in an attempt to draw a joint 
deal.
For Spain, aidless negotiations continued in an attempt to make Congress' 
appropriations effective. By the end of November 1951, the ECA had approved 
investment programmes for a total amount of $46,482,000, while the loan agreements 
signed amounted to $34,551,000 and expenditures only to $15,678,000; of which 
$663,000 for electric power plants and $15,015,000 for commodity assistance (i.e., wheat, 
cotton, and fertilisers).7* No immediate allotments, on either a loan or grant basis, were 
made of the $100 million appropriated in October 1951 for economic, technical and 
military assistance to Spain.79 Actual commodity imports financed by the economic aid 
administered by the Eximbank amounted to $57.2 million, distributed between 1951 and 
1955: $17.9 million in 1951, $113 million in 1952, $13.6 million in 1953, $10.9 million 
in 1954 and, finally, $3.3 million in 1955 (see table 4.1).“  Eximbank credits financed 
1.6 per cent of Spain’s total imports in value between 1951 and 1955. The largest 
percentage of imports financed by Eximbank aid was 3.6 per cent of Spain’s total imports 
in 1951. Previous Argentine credits proved to have been more important than the expected 
American aid. The $36.4 million of the funds commined to capital development (60 per 
cent of the total credits approved), compared with the $451.2 million forecast in the 1947
ECA: Spain. Fact Boole. Washington D.C., n/d, tabla 6.
7*. See supra, p. 299.
*®. According to the report drafted by a spacial working party sat up by the 
OEEC Council to assess the Spanish possibilities for association, $5.2 
million still remained to be drawn in July 1956; AO, DE—CE 1945-1960, vol. 
371: OEEC C(56)201, "Conseil. Association de l'Espagne aux travaux de
l'Organisation. Rapport du Groupe de Travail special du Conseil", Annex A, 
"La situation économique de l'Espagne", Paris, 25 July 1956, p. 33.
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Import Programme’s modest draft, represented an extremely limited contribution to 
Spain’s economic development.*1
The Eximbank loan also brought to light the problem of coordination between 
technicians and diplomats. This conflict was a common feature in Spain’s post-1945 
international economic relations, especially when direct negotiations took place after years 
of diplomatic struggle and of monopolistic action by diplomats. Süner’s conflict with José 
Félix de Lequerica y Erquiza, the head of the Spanish Embassy and official Ambassador 
in the United States after January 1951, started immediately. Sliner argued that the 
political phase was over, that it was the time for the technicians to work without political 
interference and plots. Lequerica strongly objected to the differentiation between the 
political and technical aspects of negotiation. The Eximbank loan was a mere token of 
what Spain needed for general economic rehabilitation, Lequerica argued. According to 
him, the loan should be used to prove appreciation for those who had defended the 
Spanish cause in Congress and who could, subsequently, obtain greater aid for Spain as 
a result of its increasing importance to the United States within the progressive 
deterioration in international politics.12 This attitude brings us back to the Spanish offer
. Non—Spanish researchers had always given too much importance to the 
initial granting of American assistance to Spain. Elena de La Souchère 
argued that American credits allowed Franco to be more intransigent once his 
economic problems had been somewhat reduced and his political prestige 
increased, "L'action américaine en Espagne et l'aggravation du franquisme", 
Les Temps Modernes, no- 72, October 1951, pp. 726—45. Rubottom and Murphy, 
op. cit., p. 21, made great pledges for this initial American contribution 
to Spain's economic growth. Joseph Harrison argues that it allowed the 
opening of the economy to liberal and outside forces in the mid-1950s, The 
Spanish Economy in the Twentieth Century, London [Croom Helm] 1985, p. 126. 
Finally, Ahmad, op. cit., finds it "hard to dispute" that this loan was the 
"life-saving operation for the Franco regime." On the other hand, Spanish 
researchers have never made exaggerated claims, Ramón Tamaxnes: La República. 
La era de Franco, Madrid [Alianza Universidad] 6th éd., 1977, p. 522; Joan 
Clavera et al.: Capitalismo español: de la autarquía a la estabilización 
(1939-1959), Madrid [Edicusa] 2nd ed., February 1978, p. 189; Manuel Jesús 
González: La economía política del franquismo (1940-1970). .Diriqismo,
mercado y planificación, Madrid [Tecnos] 1979, pp. 182-87; Viñas et al., op. 
cit., vol. I, p. 557; and Viñas, "La primera ayuda . art. cit.
•2. FRUS, 1950, III, 29 November, p. 1581, footnote no. 2, summary of 
Súñer's conversation with Dunham; MAE, Leg. 10077, exp. 26: Súñer to Suanzes 
and to José Núñez Iglesias, Spanish Director-General of Economic Policy at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Washington, 30 November and 1 December 
1950; and, exp. 18: Telegram from Lequerica, Washington, 11 April 1951. More 
details on Lequerica's position are found in Maria Jesús Cava Mesa: Los 
diplomáticos de Franco. J.F. de Lequerica, temple y tenacidad (1890-1963), 
Bilbao [Universidad de Deusto] 1989, pp. 317-18 and 322-23, and Viñas, "La 
primera ayuda", art. cit., pp. 67 ff. As Minister of Foreign Affairs (August 
194 4-July 1945) Lequerica showed a clear tendency to favour a predominant
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of bases as the main bargaining tool of the Spanish Government to obtain substantial 
economic assistance from die United States Government.
4.4. Dollars-for-Bases Negotiations
The effectiveness of this offer depended on the balance between die United States’ 
political objectives in Western Europe and Spain (according to the State Department and 
the President himself) and their military interests (according to the JCS). An investigation 
of Spain’s possible involvement in Western European defence affairs would reveal the 
progressive weakness of the State Department’s political hesitation in the face of military 
interests. A quick appreciation of this fact comes from the terms of the various National 
Security Council’s documents on Spain, classified as NSC 72 from June 1950 to June 
1951.° President Truman himself admitted that policy toward Spain changed "to some 
extent” as the result of advice from the Department of Defense.*4 However, the military 
and strategic aspects of the negotiations for the use by the United States’ authorities of 
air and naval base facilities in Spain are not elaborated here.*5 Rather, the amounts and 
conditions of economic aid granted to Spain are the exclusive topics of this section.
role for diplomats in their struggle with the technical corps (see chapter 
one, p. 28). As Ambassador in Washington he continuously complained about 
the interference of economic technicians in the Hispano-Axnerican relations; 
i.e., APG, JE, Leg. 19, no. 2.2.: Telegram no. 205, "El diàlogo McCarran- 
Conde de Vallellano. Problemas politicos-econômicos", Washington, 10 
February 1954; and Viftas, Los pactos, cit., p. 179, footnote 37.
NSC 72 "A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of 
State on United States Policy Toward Spain1*, 8 June 1950; NSC 72/1 "Views 
of the Department of State on United States Policy Toward Spain", 3 July 
1950; NSC 72/2 "United States Policy Toward Spain", 15 January 1951; NSC 
72/3 "Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Executive 
Secretary of the National Security Council", 29 January 1951; NSC 72/4 
"Statement of Policy by the National Security Council", 1 February 1951; NSC 
72/6, "Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council", 27 
June 1951. Each one of these memoranda was designed to reconcile previous 
conflicting views between the State Department and the military men.
•4. "The President's News Conference of July 19, 1951", in Truman, 1951, p. 
403.
"*• For the military aspect of the bilateral Spain-U.S. negotiations see 
Antonio Marquina Barrio: Espafta en la politica de seqruridad occidental
(1939—1986), Madrid (Servicio de Publicaciones del Estado Mayor del 
EjércitoJ 1986, pp. 493-574.
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4.4.1. Fundamentals
In January 1951, State Department officials informed the British Ambassador in 
the United States that it was "impossible any longer to ignore the strategic importance of 
Spain and its military potential for the defence of Western Europe". They added the 
"conviction” that any Spanish contribution was to be "within the general framework of 
Western European defence and could not be a matter of bilateral negotiation" between the 
United States and Spain.“  How could the change of position adopted by the Department 
of State be explained?
The normal solution to this dilemma has been to create a c re s c e n d o  in the 
relevance of military affairs in Europe and, consequently, of the role that Spain could play 
in case of Soviet attack. This explanation leads "naturally" to the opening of the bilateral 
negotiations for die granting of Spanish military facilities to the Americans. This line of 
argument is unable to provide a satisfactory answer to an essential question: What caused 
the modification of the U.S. policy towards Spain in January 1951, when the same 
external conditions had existed since the autumn of 1949? If the news that the Russians 
had successfully exploded their own atomic bomb (September 1949) and the outbreak of 
war in Korea (June 1950) did not change the nature of U.S.-Spain relations, what was the 
catalyst for the sudden interest in negotiations for military bases in Spain in February 
1951?
A provisional answer might be articulated around European attitudes towards 
rearmament.*7 The Korean War produced the integration of some U.S. military forces 
with NATO to show a clear commitment to defend the continent and brought more 
pressure upon the Western European allies, not only for the immediate implementation 
and expansion of defence efforts agreed within NATO, but for an increased multilateral 
coordination. The change in American attitudes towards Spain might have emerged
PRO, FO 371/96181: Telegram no. 453, Sir Oliver S. Franks (British
Ambassador in the Onited States from June 1946 to February 1953) to FO, 
Washington, 13 February 1951.
I in presently undertaking specific research that, I hope, will be able 
to provide a more complete answer to the question.
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gradually from American impatience towards the weak European efforts to increase 
military expenditures and the low chances of any real integration through military 
production. The reluctance of the European governments to disturb their pattern of growth 
due to the burden of rearmament meant that, despite the formal rearmament programmes 
presented by the NATO members in August 1950, Europeans unwillingly committed 
themselves to increased defence expenditures. They did so without additional American 
financial aid for the sake of preserving their consumer spending, taxation levels, and 
social welfare programmes.** French opposition to German rearmament meant that, 
without German industry' and resources working for the European defence, NATO’s plans 
for increased military forces could endanger economic recovery and NATO itself.
Once the United States authorities realised they could not persuade their NATO 
allies to increase their defence efforts in coordination, or to foster military integration 
within NATO, once they became aware that their views were not shared by their 
European partners, and once they recognised that their unitary model of integrated military 
production was diluted before independent domestic defence industries and forces 
(although partially financed with American military and economic assistance), the State 
Department finally considered the Spanish military contribution to the American effort to 
defend Western Europe.*9 At this point the President and the Department of State 
accepted the fact that Spain could play a role in the American strategy for the defence of 
Western Europe as a source for military bases to keep U.S. forces in Europe. Truman told 
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, former Commander of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean 
and Chief of the United States Naval Operations after the fall of 1949, "I don’t like
**. Thi» was an American perception which did not totally match reality in 
the cast of Franc« and Britain, although it did so in the case of Italy* For 
the British see Till Geiger: "«The next war is bound to coroe»: Defence 
Production Policy, the Ministry of Supply and Defence Contractors, 1945- 
1957**, in Anthony Gorst, Lewis Johnman and W. Scott Lucas (eds.): 
Contemporary British History 1931-1961: Politics and the Limits of Policy, 
London [Pinter) 1990, pp. 95-118. For France see Frances M.B. Lynch: "The 
Economic Effects of the Korean War in France 1950-1952", EUI WP. no. 86/253, 
December 1986, Florence. For Italy see Sebesta: "I programme di aiuto", art. 
cit. For a comparative British—French approach see Geiger: "Korean War
Rearmament and Economic Development in Britain and France, 194 9-1960", 
Historians of Contemporary Europe Newsletter, vol. 6, June 1991, no. 1-2, 
pp. 71—81« For a comparative approach involving the three countries 
mentioned, see Geiger and Sebesta, art. cit.
••. For the main points of this assertion (excluding its connection with 
Spain) see Geiger and Sebesta, art. cit.
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Franco, and I never will, but I won’t let my personal feeling override the convictions of 
your military men."90 The lack of consensus among those involved in European security 
exempted the United States Government from the need to coordinate an allied policy 
towards Spain and precluded any proper consultation with the British or French (at the 
military or political levels), which would have produced endless problems and led to 
stalemate. In order to obtain operative results in the short-run, the American policy on 
Spain was separated from the attitudes of the Western European governments on the 
matter.
Only this set of circumstances could explain satisfactorily how the Department of 
State implemented a policy towards Spain independently from Europe, thus changing 
decisively the attitude towards Spain adopted at the time of the Marshall Plan. Using the 
issue of national security, the Department of State now admitted the need for Spain to 
make a military contribution to the defence of the W est Neither the political nature of the 
regime nor the strong and decisive opposition shown by the United Kingdom and France 
impeded the process of finding a way to acquire military bases in Spain. However, since 
a commitment for European unity still remained strong during the Truman Administration, 
any Spanish contribution towards European defence should be as undisruptive as possible, 
and thus, a bilateral pattern was selected. For the Department of State, a bilateral approach 
seemed potentially less disruptive to the political unity of NATO and the stability of the 
British and French Governments than opening the question of Spain’s incorporation into 
NATO. No one in Western Europe was willing to add the politically very contentious 
issue of Spain to the troublesome question of German rearmament and participation in the 
integrated defence forces, which the Americans demanded as indispensable for the defence 
of the west91
#0. Cit. in Benjamin Welles: Spain, The Gentle Anarchy, New York [Praeger] 
1965, p. 287.
11. For the British and French, the political damage that would be inflicted 
on the western community outweighed the strategic advantages that would be
accrued from associating Spain with western defence; i.e., PRO, FO
371/96181: Answer by Ernest Davies, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, to a Parliamentary Question, 1? January 1951. A summary 
of the French position is found in ibid., telegram no. 638 from FO to
Washington, 16 February 1951.
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The attitude of the Department of State officials pressing for the collective 
approach was a deliberate distortion of the position agreed to in Washington. The report 
sent by the Secretary of State to the NSC in mid-January 1951 (NSC 72/2) and the 
conclusions reached by the conference of American ambassadors in European countries, 
held early in February, recognised as politically impracticable Spanish participation in 
NATO, and agreed to move bilaterally to obtain military facilities in Spain.92 The 
stratagem worked out as planned. The British and French argued that some assistance to 
improve the effectiveness of the Spanish defence could be supplied outside NATO, and 
welcomed (with natural relief) a unilateral side-deal between Spain and the United States 
as a second-best alternative to Spain joining NATO.*3 They remained opposed Spain’s 
entry into NATO, a diversion of supplies from more deserving NATO countries and 
Germany, and they always considered that strengthening the military possibilities behind 
the Pyrenees meant that the United States had some thoughts concerning the abandonment 
of the NATO strategy of West European defence on the Rhine, as if the United States 
contemplated abandoning the rest of Western Europe in the event of a Soviet attack and 
using Spain as the last fortress to which the allied forces could retreat and from which a 
liberating attack could be launched. Why the interest in a country that would become 
useful only if Europe were lost to the West? In very simple terms, Europe had to be 
defended at all costs, not liberated from Spain.
This was exactly what the Americans were looking for to deal directly with the 
Spanish authorities. By providing guarantees that the United States Government would 
reject the admission of Spain into NATO, that it would not deter the assistance being 
given to NATO countries, and that supplies would not be diverted from more deserving 
NATO countries closer to the scene of possible attack, the Americans were free to
K . FROS ■ 1951, IV, part 1, "R*port of th* waittrn European Ambassador»
Conference at Frankfurt. Summary Record of Meeting Held at 2.00 p.m.”, 5 
February, p. 157.
,J. PRO, FO 371/96181: Despatch no. 637, FO to Washington, London, 16
February 1951. In June 1951, under pressure from the British Chiefs of 
Staff, the Foreign Office considered incorporating Britain into the United 
States' plan for a bilateral agreement with Spain once the French elections 
were over; the Americans rejected this; PRO, FO 371/96192: Telegram no. 
3514, Sir Franks to FO, and top Secret "United States-Spanish Negotiations" 
signed by G.P. Young, Head of the Western Department at the FO, London, 5 
and 9 November 1951, respectively.
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establish the Spanish contribution on their terms without political interferences other than 
those logically presented at the negotiations with the Spanish.
For the Spanish Government, a direct accord of collaboration with the United 
States appeared "less complicated and more satisfactory” than facing direct Norwegian. 
Danish, Belgian, and French opposition on the question of Spain's incorporation into 
NATO.*4 At their first official meeting on 14 March 1951, Franco confirmed to 
Ambassador Griffis his willingness to work out a "bilateral pact" for the joint use of naval 
and ground bases for a common defence of the W est95 However, as Franco made 
explicit to Admiral Sherman, who represented the U.S. Department of Defense and the 
JCS in exploratory conversations on the military level with Franco, there was a direct link- 
between economic assistance and the use of military facilities.46 The form and terms of 
economic assistance had to be resolved simultaneously with or previous to the military 
questions. Franco lectured Sherman that, apart from general economic support, the 
immediate improvement of the Spanish transport network as well as harbour and airport 
installations were required in order to make any military assistance or future military base 
programme worthwhile.
On 18 July 1951, Acheson confirmed in an official press statement that "tentative
M . PRO, FO 371/96181: Dispatch from Madrid, ”A Hearst Interview with
General Franco11, 31 January 1951. At the beginning of the summer of 1950, 
Martin Artajo had told the American Charge that Spain, if invited, would not 
join NATO (quoted in NSC 72/1) . For Spain's attitude to NATO see Marquina, 
op. cit., pp. 221 ff.; and Aldo Albònico: "Negoziati tra «impotenze»
Spagna e Portogallo tra Patto Iberico e Alleanza Atlantica (1948—1949)", 
Nuova Rivista Storica, May-August 1990, no. 3—4, pp. 333-48*
*5. MAE, Leg. 3599, exp. 38: Report on the interview drafted by the Director 
of the American Section of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1949-
1952), Pedro de Prat y Soutzo, Marquis of Prat de Nantouillet and Count of 
Pradère, aristocrat and polyglot who acted as interpreter, Madrid, 14 March
1951. Griffis' version is found in FRUS, 1951, IV, part 1, despatch to 
Acheson, Madrid, 15 March, pp. 807-9, and in Lying in State, cit., pp. 287- 
86.
M . MAE, Leg. 3599, exp. 38: Note on the terms of the discussion between 
Franco and Sherman concerning rights to stage aircraft through Spanish 
fields, overfly Spain, and generally make use of Spanish air facilities, as 
well as to anchorage rights for naval vessels, which took place on 16 July 
in Madrid, by Marquis of Prat, 16 July 1951. Sherman's version found in 
FRUS, 1951, IV, pp. 832-34; and Griffis' version in Lying in State, cit., 
pp. 294-95. Prat, Sherman and Griffis' accounts always coincide on linking 
economic aid to the granting of military facilities on Spanish territory.
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and exploratory conversations" were under way for a security agreement with Spain.97 
It was difficult for the Americans to formulate an economic aid programme specifically 
far Spain without clear knowledge of their own military requirements, from which to draw 
the desirable amounts and purposes of economic and military assistance. Moreover, there 
was no need to mention Spain in any official programme until the desired military 
arrangements were reached, for there were other means of providing military and 
economic assistance to Spain without attracting opposition from all comers. In anticipation 
of a variety of possible contingencies in Europe (including the possibility that non-NATO 
and non-OEEC countries might require assistance during a given fiscal year), the 
executive branch recommended in die draft of the Mutual Security Act (June 1951) that 
the Congress authorise the President to dispose of specific funds for military assistance 
without prior consultation with the NATO countries themselves. The MDAA of 1949 and 
its amendment in 1950 established that the President should consult with NATO before 
adding any country to the aid programme for Europe.9* The Mutual Security Act of
1951, enacted on 10 October 1951, authorised the President to transfer military assistance 
up to 10 per cent of the aggregate of the funds made available from each of the three 
titles of the MSA bill to any unspecified non-NATO countries (i.e., Spain and 
Yugoslavia).99 If it had been necessary, the Mutual Security Act draft bill for fiscal year
1952 would have permitted immediate military and economic assistance of approximately 
$400 million to Spain, if transfer provisions were used to the maximum extent.100
The United States Congress strongly disapproved these stockpile funds for two 
essential reasons. Generally, the Congress rejected the "unprecedented discretionary
,1. Department of State bulletin, vol. XXV, no. €31, 30 July 1951, p. 170.
M . Brown and Opie, op. cit., pp. 508—11; and Harry Bayard Price: The
Marshall Plan and its Meaning. New York [Cornell University Press] 1955, p. 
165.
*». P.L. 82-165, vol. 65, p. 374.
>so. FROS, 1951, IV, part 1, the Acting Secretary of State, James E. Webb 
(Onder Secretary of State between January 1949 and February 1952), to the 
Embassy 1a  Spain, Washington, 16 September, p. 852. A member of the Senate 
Committee on Assignments indicated that Spain could receive part of these 
fluids; José Silva Aramburu (ed.): Historic Informative Memorandum of the 
Agreement» between Spain and the Pnited States. 2 vols., Madrid [Ediciones 
Oromi] 1953—54, vol. 1, p. 2B. The latter book was published under the 
patronage of the American Chamber of Commerce in Spain. It represents the 
official story of the bilateral negotiations, and presents interesting 
details and observations.
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authority" given to the President to grant military assistance to any country without 
previous congressional approval.101 In the case of Spain, the Congress wanted to grant 
specific authorisations. Despite the fact that the executive branch tried to forestall any 
congressional action to provide aid to Spain, Senator McCarran managed to include in the 
Mutual Security Appropriations Act of 1952, promulgated by President Truman on 31 
October 1951, appropriations of $100 million available until June 1952 for military, 
economic and technical assistance to Spain as part of the Mutual Security Act.102 In a 
repetition of 1950, assistance was granted for Spain without having been previously 
requested by the Administration, against the wishes of policy makers, and with no 
investment programme in mind.
Initially, the State ¡Department and the President had not wanted to appropriate a 
specific amount of assistance to Spain. However, when the Congress authorised it, the 
President and the Secretary of State both relieved. The Congress’ insistence on 
economising on foreign aid severely limited the amount of aid at the disposal of the 
President. The lack of adequate funds to meet Spain’s possible requests for economic 
assistance could jeopardize the success of military negotiations. In addition, the Spanish 
authorities had explained that no military facilities would be available without definite 
economic and military aid.103
The experience under the Marshall Plan, when the Americans had offered only 
an empty hand while demanding significant political and economic reforms, and the 
difficulties encountered to cash credits through the Eximbank were not to be repeated. The 
official justification for the delay in the delivery of the aid was that the Department of
101. Robert. A. Pastor: Congress and the Politic» of D.S. Foreign Economic 
Policy 1929-1976. Berkeley [University of California Press] 1980, p. 265.
"Assistance to Spain: For economic, technical, and military assistance, 
in the discretion of the President tinder the general objectives set forth 
in the declaration of policy contained in the titles of the Economic 
Cooperation Act of 1946 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, for Spain, 
$100,000,000.” P.L. 82—249, vol. 65, pp. 731. There had been a unsuccessful 
attempt to amend the bill in the House of Representatives to make $200 
million available to Spain; Scowcroft, op. cit., p. Bl.
l0*. FROS. 1951, IV, part 1, Acheson to the Embassy in Madrid, and Griffis 
to Acheson, 23 and 25 June, respectively, p. 849.
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State was waiting for reports from the military and economic missions sent to Spain.10* 
The publicity granted to the execution of a limited share of the pending Eximbank loan 
and the arrival of the corresponding goods served partially to offset criticism by the 
Spanish Government and business people of the extreme slowness in extending Eximbank 
credits and the lack of information about the intentions of the Americans about starting 
the new aid programme offered under the terms of the Mutual Security A c t105 
Nevertheless, the Spanish Government maintained its firm position that, before granting 
base rights, the United States' authorities must reiterate their determination to provide 
long-term economic assistance to Spain.
The different interpretations of the interdependence between the granting of base 
facilities and the commitment to assist in the improvement of Spain's economic and 
military situation delayed an agreement until September 1953. The Spanish Government 
wanted to receive assurances that Spain would be considered eligible, in principle, for aid 
over a period of years on an equal basis with other nations. The American team 
hammered continuously that the United States Government could not commit itself to 
specific long-term amounts and types of aid beyond the extent of the provisions of 
congressional appropriations. This clash between the American and Spanish positions 
explains better than other political, economic, or diplomatic factors the timing of the 
negotiations and the nature of the agreements.
4.42. The Bargaininp Process
Economic aid was the United States’ chief bargaining weapon in the negotiations
1M. Following Admiral Sherman'« visit to Franco, the Department of State 
announced that it was sending military and economic missions to Madrid to 
assess the degree of Spanish economic and military needs, in order to make 
the corresponding proposals in exchange for base-rights. The exploratory 
military mission (Joint Military Survey Team, hereinafter JMST) led by Air 
Force Major-General James W. Spry, and the economic mission (Temporary 
Economic Cooperation Administration Survey Group, hereinafter TESG) headed 
by Professor of Economics at Syracuse University, Sidney C. Sufrin, 
representing the ECA and the Eximbank, arrived in Madrid in August 1951 and 
left before the end of the year.
109• FRUS, 1951, IV, part 1, Webb to the Embassy in Spain, Washington, 12 
December, p. 857«
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with the Spanish Government to obtain the concession of precise militaiy requirements. 
The President, at whose discretion the Congress had placed the appropriations for Spain, 
blocked them until the American negotiators obtained the desired military facilities. Since 
military negotiations had not yet even begun, Truman’s position implied that the amount 
authorised for Spain had become the American economic subscription for an economic- 
military agreement with Spain. Initially, at least, the Americans had no intention of going 
beyond an ’’economic aid for bases" deal; the granting of any militaiy’ aid required first 
raising the matter in the NATO.
The group assigned by the ECA to prepare an official survey of the requirements 
of the Spanish economy proposed a one-year aid programme amounting to $130 million 
worth of imports. Additional aid of $195 million was to be spread over four subsequent 
years in the following sequence: 79-66-37-13, in order for the Spanish economy to bear 
the complex burden of military activity. According to Sufrin, this aid programme would 
increase industrial production by 6 to 8 per cent and agricultural production by 12 to 20 
per cent after the first year.106 The report stated that American aid was directed towards 
supporting and assisting future U.S. military activities in Spain. However, only about $35 
million of the commodity composition of the first-year import programme related to 
possible military activity. The rest of the import programme consisted of $80 million for 
petroleum, coke, steel, scrap, rubber, automobiles, trucks and buses, mining equipment, 
equipment for the production of chemicals, mules, tractors and agricultural machinery, 
hybrid seed com, fertiliser and insecticides. The remaining $15 million were for machine 
tools. When the military agreements had been signed, Sufrin proposed to make available 
to the Spanish Government ample funds to import comestibles in order to maintain the 
natural inflationary tendency of the assistance programme under control. It was not clear 
whether these were funds in addition to the total assistance programme mentioned above 
or part of it.
The American Embassy believed it was necessary to move ahead on the economic
l0€. TESG (ECA) Madrid: Report on the Spanish Economy, 2 vols., Madrid, 20 
December 1951.
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aid issue simultaneously with negotiations on the military.107 The lack of clear 
knowledge of the United States’ military requirements in Spain blocked any action. The 
JCS’ first proposal went beyond the development of a base programme to the 
"development of the Spanish military potentialities to the maximum degree possible within 
the existing United States limitations, in order to [...] aid in the defense of Western 
Europe."10* This proposal neglected completely the basis upon which the existing 
consensus with the NAT allies was obtained. Anything over and above the use and 
development of Spanish ports and bases by American forces, over-flight rights for 
American aircraft, the exchange of military information with Spain and the provision of 
military advice, some training equipment and obsolete equipment, was to be at the 
expense of NATO and in disagreement with the NAT allies.109
In addition to introducing uncomfortable political implications, the estimated cost 
of the military requirements set forth by the JCS were much higher than expected. The 
Department of Defense declared that it had no budgetary provisions for use in Spain.110 
After all the conversations, publicity and surveys that were carried out in Spain in 1951, 
it was hard to believe that the only money that the Department of Defense had to play 
with was not the result of its own planning, but of the foresight of one Senator expressed 
in a last-minute amendment. The previously-mentioned stockpile amounts were a possible 
source of funds, and the base programme for Spain was surely the kind of activity 
envisaged in the Military and Naval Installations Construction Act, which authorised a
101. "Regardless of whether the Spaniards will grant us military facilities 
without economic concessions, I think thst most of us here are in agreement 
with Sufrin's thesis that a thoughtful economic aid program is essential in 
support of our military objectives and that this support should be 
simultaneous with and not subsequent to initiation of the military program.” 
FRUS, 1952*1954, VI, part 2, Jones to Dunham, Madrid, 9 January 1952, p. 
1783.
1M. Ibid., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (until January
1953), George W. Perkins, to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (until 
September 1953), H. Freeman Mathews: "Defense Department Recommendations 
regarding Spain”, 24 January 1952, p. 1786. This document contains the 
recommendations of the Department of Defense on Spain, the JCSr comments and 
recommendations in terms of tentative military requirements in Spain, and 
the draft terms of reference for the military negotiators.
10*. PRO, FO 371/96192: Top Secret "United States-Spanish Negotiations", by 
Young, London, 9 November 1951.
110. FRUS, 1952—1954, VI, part 2, Perkins' memorandum to Mathews, and Dunham 
to Jones, 26 and 30 January 1952, pp. 1791 and 1793, respectively.
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world-wide base-building programme of a magnitude of approximately $5,000 
million.111 It must have been shocking to contemplate that the Department of Defense 
was dependent upon the $100 million of congressional appropriations for its extensive 
programme in Spain*
Military megalomania failed (momentarily). Any implication of Spanish 
involvement in the defence of Western Europe disappeared from the list of military’ 
requirements. Returning to the original policy approved by the President and cleared 
through with the United States* main NATO allies (as expressed in NSC 72/6 of June 
1951), the negotiation position called for the development and use of the m inimum 
necessary air, naval, and related logistic facilities required by the United States in 
Spain.112 In compensation, Spain was to receive the strict assistance necessary for the 
development and protection of the desired base facilities, token training equipment and 
possible aid to Spanish munitions industries.113 In order to check excessive military 
requests, the Department of State considered the negotiations for the conditions of 
granting economic assistance intrinsically linked with the negotiations for military 
facilities.
The absolute priority presiding over the distribution of congressional 
appropriations for Spain that was proposed as a working basis for negotiation was support 
for the United States* military requirements rather than for general economic development. 
The only direct military assistance presented in the breakdown of the funds was material
1X1. P.L. 82-155, enacted on 28 September 1951, vol. €5, pp. 336 ff.
1U. The estimated cost of the bases—construction programme totalled 
approximately $405 million: $15 million for railroad equipment and,
approximately, $390 million for construction costs of the Navy ($60 million) 
and Air Force requirements ($330 million) to be phased evenly over a three- 
yea r period at the rate of approximately $130 million per year. Previous 
experiences indicated that 40 per cent of the total cost required in each 
of the three years of the construction period would be in dollars (i.e., $52 
million during the first year) and 60 per cent in pesetas (i.e., $78 million 
during the first year). The Department of Defense concurred to provide $52 
million per year to pay the dollar cost of the construction work during the 
first year of a three—year programme of air and naval bases construction and 
related logistic facilities; Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett 
(September 1951 to December 1956) to Acheson, 4 March 1952, summarised in 
FRPS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, p. 1803, footnote 7.
1X1. Ibid., "U.S. Military Requirements in Spain'. Paper prepared in the
Department of State", Acheson to Lovett, 11 February 1952, p. 1801.
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for training purposes. However, the reader should be aware that economic aid covered 
items directly related to military needs (transportation equipment, industrial items for the 
munitions industry, other items related to the needs of the Spanish defence establishment) 
and agricultural commodities. "Economic aid" or "defense support" was merely a question 
of terminology.114 "Defense support" was MSA’s new cold-war label for what the old 
ECA referred to as "economic aid".
The rehabilitation of the Spanish transportation system was to be carried on 
exclusively to the extent that it met the U.S. Army requirements for transportation 
support The specific economic projects to be financed were for the development of 
industries closely related to the support of military objectives, such as the Spanish 
munitions industry and strategic materials production (i.e., copper, tungsten and pyrites). 
The import programme worth $50 million in dollar commodities was calculated 
exclusively to offset the internal inflationary impact of $100 million equivalent in future 
peseta investment, rather than in consideration of the Spanish import needs. The so-called 
"defense support assistance" meant the strengthening of those sectors of the Spanish 
economy necessary to support new military commitments (see table 4.3).
A certain amount of economic aid was necessary to create sufficient spendable 
counterpart funds to meet the peseta costs which the United States would incur (the most 
important of which was the base construction programme). All dollars advanced for 
economic and technical assistance on a grant basis (excluding military aid, but including 
economic assistance allocated to projects supporting military goals), required the deposit 
of the equivalent amounts of local currency by aid-receiving governments into specially 
designated and blocked central banks accounts. These deposits were known as 
counterpart funds. Their use was a matter of bilateral negotiation with the United 
States’ authorities. In this case, since the amount of disposable counterpart pesetas was 
inferior to the total peseta investment forecast through fiscal year 1953, the future use of 
these funds became a matter of hard bargaining.
114. Brown and Opi«, op. cit., p. 505.
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TABLE 4 .3
PROGRAMME FOR EXPENDITURE OF MSA CONGRESSIONAL 
APPROPRIATIONS TOR SPAIN THROUGH FISCAL YZAR 1953
(in millions of dollars)
Dollar Pts. Counterpart
Financed Inv. Deposit
Imports Generated
Naval and Air Force base requirements 52* 78 —
Import commodities programme 50 — 50
Investment for economic development, 
including strategic materials production 17 17 17
Transport rehabilitation programme 15 — 15
Military end-items for training purposes 12 — —
Development of munitions industry 5 5 5
Technical assistance 1 — 1
TOTALS 152* 100 86
Source: FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, "Program for the expenditure of 5100 
million MSA appropriation for Spain". Report by the Interdepartmental 
Working Group on Spain to the Chairman of the Mutual Assistance Advisory 
Committee (henceforth, MAAC), Lincoln Gordon, Washington, 26 February 1952, 
p. 1814. The MAAC was created in November 1951 as an interdepartmental 
coordinating agency for mutual security programmes, with representation of 
the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, the Office of Defense 
Mobilization, and the MSA. (*) The direct dollar and peseta costs of base 
requirements in Spain were to be financed from sources other that the $100 
million from MSA appropriations.
The distribution proposed would not have pleased the Spanish Government. It 
disregarded the need to provide assistance for general economic purposes and for 
strengthening the military potential in connection with the new military responsibilities. 
It was true that official Spanish declarations assured that Spain’s most urgent needs for 
economic assistance were in those fields related to both, military plans and the civilian 
economy.ni However, the overall funds allocated were too limited. Artajo informed the 
newly appointed Ambassador Lincoln Mac Veagh that the existing congressional 
appropriations of $100 million were "a mere drop in the bucket compared with actual 
needs".116 According to Minister Arbunia, the stabilisation of the Spanish economy 
required no less than $500 million; the total aid figure the Spanish authorities hinted at
115. FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, "Memorandum of Conversation" between 
Foreign Minister Martin Artajo and Perkins who was visiting Madrid after a 
North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, 29 February 1952, p. 1823.
ll4. Ibid., "Conversation with Spanish Foreign Minister on forthcoming 
negotiations, March 31, 1952", Mac Veagh to the Department of State, Madrid,
1 April, p. 1831. Mac Veagh had negotiated for American military bases in 
the Azores while acting as Ambassador to Portugal. He served shortly for one 
year after March 1952 as Ambassador to Spain.
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in the spring of 1952 was approximately $1,000 million.117 Negotiations with the 
Spanish Government would be difficult unless the United States offered considerably 
higher sums than the already existing congressional appropriations.
In April 1952, the Joint United States Military Group (henceforth, JUSMG). under 
the leadership of Major General August W. Kissner, USAF, and the Mutual Security 
Agency Economic Group, with George F. Train as chief, arrived in Madrid initiating talks 
of a preliminary nature, under the authority of the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador in 
Spain, Lincoln Mac Veagh, who had previously shown in Greece and Portugal his 
expertise for this kind of negotiations.1,1 Preliminary talks were directed toward eliciting 
from the Spanish a sense of what the United States would have to pay in military’, 
economic, and political terms in order to acquire base rights. The Spanish negotiation 
team was composed of General Juan Vigbn Suerodiaz, Chief of the Spanish General Staff 
(« A lto  Estado M ayor»), for the military aspects and a team of officials for the 
economic side: Under-Secretary of Economic Affairs Jaime Argiielles y Armada, Director 
General of Economic Policy at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mariano de 
Yturralde y Orbegoso, and Juan Bircenas y de la Huerta, the new Director of the 
American Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. General Vig6n responded to the 
« Ju n ta  de Defensa N acional», die top military policy-making body in Spain, which was 
chaired by Franco and included the three defence ministers, the three chiefs of staff, and 
the chief of the high general staff."’
The two sides began their talks almost poles apart in their interpretation of a quid 
pro quo. The official instructions for the MSA negotiating team during the first months 
of negotiations were utter nonsense. They demanded that the Spanish Government 
advance the peseta counterpart to finance the peseta cost of the military construction
u’. According to ViAaa at *1., op. cit., p. 760, with tha benefit of the 
documentation from IEME barred to me under a 45-year rule.
llf. Ambassador Mac Veagh presented credentials in March 1952 and terminated 
service exactly one year later.
11#. For the «Alto Estado Mayor» and the «Junta de Defensa Nacional» see 
José Maria Comas and Lucien Mandevilles Les militaires et le pouvoir dans 
l'Espagne contemporaine. De Franco à Felipe González, Toulouse [Presses de 
l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques] 1986, pp. 62 ff.
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requirements before 30 June 1953.120 In other words, the Spanish Government should 
provide base facilities and the counterpart funds for their construction before the United 
States’ authorities bad committed themselves to any long-term programme of assistance 
for Spain, before the actual delivery of any commodity had taken place, and with no 
improvement in the country’s own defence effort.
Under these circumstances, any further congressional appropriations became signs 
of the seriousness of the American commitment to help the Spanish economy if 
satisfaction regarding the military facilities were granted. A new appropriation of $25 
million for economic, military, and technical aid during fiscal year 1953 was added to the 
$100 million already authorised but not used in the previous fiscal year. In fact, this act 
established that "not less than $25,000,000 of the funds made available [...] shall be used 
for economic, technical, and military assistance to Spain".121 The American negotiators 
reduced the new amounts available for Spain to the minimnm This amount was allocated 
for military aid over and above the $12 million listed in the original breakdown of $100 
million, thus making a total of $37 million for military aid in fiscal year 1953. The 
American negotiators insisted that $125 million was all the assistance they were prepared 
to offer $37 million for military equipment and $88 million for purchases of an economic 
nature. It was obvious that there was no assessment of any reasonable quid pro quo, 
since the amounts that the Congress happened to vote for aid became the offering price 
for bases.
Dissatisfaction with the small amounts offered led the Spanish Cabinet, on 4 July
1952, to bring the negotiations to the first important standstill. The Spanish Government 
confirmed that it would be impossible to obtain a base agreement in the form then being 
proposed, no matter how the Americans sliced the actual aid figure. Arbunia, who was 
anxious to sign the economic part of the agreement, felt that the amounts proposed for
“#. FRPS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, "Interdepartmental Policy Statement on 
Spanish Aid Negotiations", adopted at MAAC, Washington, 20 March 1952, p. 
1827.
m . Mutual Security Act of 1952, enacted on 20 June 1952; P.L. 82—400, 
section 101 (c), vol. 66, pp. 141-42. The provision continued by making
available the balances of previous appropriations until 30 June 1953.
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economic assistance were too low to permit the development of concrete programmes for 
several years. For General Vig6n, the sums offered as military assistance would not 
provide adequately for the defense of the national territory in light of the increased 
vulnerability of Spain which would result from an agreement permitting the United States 
to construct and utilize bases. What the Americans called "mutually satisfactory provision 
for the use of military facilities" meant, in reality, that the United States was free to use 
the bases unlimitedly during times of peace and war. If the United States’ position was 
such that a total of $125 million was all that was available in fiscal year 1954, the 
Spanish Government felt that the use of the bases in the event of an emergency should 
be the subject of an agreement negotiated "au fur et & mesure" as Spain’s economic and 
military capability developed as the result of the implementation of the mutual defence 
and economic agreements.122
The Spanish Government was inclined to sign the economic cooperation 
agreement and the so-called "mutual defense agreement" at the very moment the first 
congressional appropriation concerning Spain occurred. However, the agreement for the 
bases should be postponed until the amounts voted by the Congress for assistance became 
available and an adequate readjustment of the economic offers had taken place. It further 
requested the use of the peseta counterpart for its own investment plans, rather than for 
the construction of bases. This position represented a tour d e  fo rce that the Spanish 
Government could not take very far. It was intended to call attention to the disproportion 
between the amounts offered and the obligations arising for Spain from an eventual 
agreement
The Spanish position was not unreasonable. The $125 million voted by the United
w . Paragraph baaed on FRPS. 1952—1954, VI, part 2: a) "Record of a Meeting 
Betw««n United States and Spanish Representatives, Madrid, July 5, 1952**,
pp. 860—62, where Jaime Arguelies and Francisco Javier Elorza y Echaniz, 
Marquis of Nerva, informed their American colleagues of the official 
position adopted at the Council of Ministers and of the individual positions 
of some ministers involved; and b) Mac Veagh to the Department of State, 
Madrid, 12 July 1952, pp. 1862-65, enclosing the English translation of a 
text handed to him by the Spanish authorities stating the differences 
between the two governments. Unfortunately, the Spanish position was greatly 
weakened because Foreign Minister Artajo confirmed to Ambassador Mac Veagh 
that "no Spanish intention exists to terminate the negotiations if the 
suggestions of our memo are found unacceptable." Ibid., 25 July 1952, p. 
1667.
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States Congress for economic and technical assistance to Spain were not subject to 
conditions or reserves related to the conclusion of any defence agreement for the granting 
of military facilities. The application of congressional appropriations required only the 
signing of agreements under the Economic Cooperation Act of April 1948 and the Mutual 
Security Act of October 1951 to assist the Spanish economy and military’ preparation. 
Neither the texts of the laws cited nor the authorisations of assistance linked economic 
assistance to Spain to the granting of base facilities. It was the American executive that 
conditioned the granting of assistance upon the conclusion of a military bases agreement. 
This was the agreement that encountered the main difficulties and made it possible for the 
United States Government to leave the delivery of any congressional funds in suspense. 
The Spanish requests illuminated the difficulties in hammering out the final details of the 
agreement; a basic understanding of the nature and scope of the arrangements between the 
two governments was missing. The Spanish Government believed that the U.S. 
Government was making new requests that had no legal basis according to the obligations 
in the congressional authorisations. If this were case, the Americans should increase the 
amount of assistance.
The Spanish Government and the general military staffs disapproved of an 
agreement that would deny them the basic essentials necessary to organise the national 
defence that would be jeopardised by the military commitments involved in the agreement 
under negotiation. The dissatisfaction of the military men was considered very seriously 
because, as Argtielles made clear, the Spanish position depended on the support of the 
army. The armed services constituted an important support of the Spanish Government 
and, therefore, there was a major desire to satisfy them with any agreement affecting 
them.m The granting of military facilities to the United States would mean a step 
towards belligerence against the Soviet Union; this could not possibly be undertaken 
without assurance of continued assistance for several years for economic rehabilitation and 
military build-up. In case of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, Spain was ideologically 
committed to the West and might not have been able to remain neutral, as the Americans
1JJ. Franco confessed to his cousin and military adviser that the army was 
essential for political stability; Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo: Mis
conversaciones privadaa con Franco. Barcelona [Planeta] 1976, p. 203.
309
hammered relentlessly. But, if bases were granted and used for offensive operations, 
immediate Soviet retaliatory action should be expected against Spain.
The agreement under negotiation should, thus, provide assistance not limited 
merely to the construction of bases and the training of base personnel, but to provide 
sufficient equipment to permit the Spanish armed forces to become actively operational. 
For the Spanish military men. die American aid should equip 22 ground forces divisions 
necessary for an adequate defence of the country, provide sufficient planes and anti­
aircraft material for the protection of the national territory against air attacks, and 
accomplish the modernisation of certain units for coastal defence.124 In sum, according 
to the Spanish Government, the importance of the military and political commitments to 
be assumed required, as quid pro quo, a basis of equality with other nations with 
similar arrangements and a commitment for long-term economic assistance, which could 
justify its entry into detailed agreements affecting sovereignty.
Ambassador Mac Veagh suggested that Washington make explicit a commitment 
for assisting Spain as long as Spain cooperated in the defence of the West.125 According 
to him, there was no need to give specific amounts of aid, but only to mention that there 
was no distinction between Spain and other countries collaborating in Western defence. 
This added nothing to the intentions of the United States. It only made explicit what the 
Spanish Government sought: to present these negotiations as the initiation a long-term 
cooperative enterprise rather than the making a deal. In other words, Spain should be 
presented as "a partner in the defense effort rather than as an untouchable pariah 
possessed of facilities for sale".126
The Department of State refused to modify the American negotiation position. 
Concerning any long-term commitment, no firm assurance about amounts and types of
l*4. Vig6n's statement to Kisaner recordad in telegram no. 1372, dated 21 
June 1952, sunnarised in FRDS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, Webb to the Embaajy 
in Spain, Washington, 13 August 1952, p. 1871.
115. Mae Veagh's telegrama nos. 46 and 93, 14 and 30 July 1952, quoted in 
footnotes 4 and 13, ibid.. pp. 1665 and 1876, respectively.
1,4. Ibid.. Mac Veagh to Acheson, Madrid, 2 August 1952, p. 1870.
310
United States aid in future years could be given to the Spanish Government (or any other 
government). American overseas assistance was subject to the limitations imposed by 
congressional appropriations, NATO priorities, the status of supply, and the exigencies of 
the Korean and international situation. The Spanish proposal for a deferred base agreement 
was also rejected. According to the Department of State, the demand for the joint 
conclusion of all the agreements made by the American negotiators had not contradicted 
congressional appropriations.127 On the contrary, the Congress had left to the discretion 
of the President the granting of assistance to Spain, under the general policy set forth by 
the MSA of 1951, enacted on 10 October 1951. According to this bill, the purpose of any 
future military, economic, and technical assistance granted by the United States to any
foreign country was the strengthening of the common defence against Communist
128aggression.
The reality was that blocking all funds until the conclusion of the base agreement 
increased the American bargaining power enormously. However, the U.S. military men 
did not ease the negotiation process, but rather created confusion at home. When General 
Kissner screened Spanish military estimates to discover how much was really essential to 
reach a base agreement in terms satisfactory to the United States, he came up with such 
a high figure that, in order to justify it, he recommended that the JCS consider planning 
"certain tasks and obligations in Western defense" for Spain, such as the use of a Spanish 
corps outside the Iberian Peninsula in the event of hostilities.129 This was the logical 
climax of the military approach given to the negotiations with Spain.
**’• Ibid.. "The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain", 
Washington, 13 August 1952, p. 1872; and Mac Veagh to the Department of 
State, Madrid, 16 August, pp. 1876-77.
iaie "The Congress declares it to be the purpose of this Act [...] to 
strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the 
free world." Under the title of Europe, assistance was destined to NAT 
countries and for any other country in Europe which the President determined 
to be "of direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area and 
whose increased ability to defend itself [---] is important to the 
preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area and to the 
security of the United States." P.L. 82—165, vol. 65, p. 373.
1,1. Rissner's report was forwarded to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air force, 
on 20 August 1952. A brief description of the report to be found in FRUS, 
1952-1954, VI, part 2, James C.H. Bonbright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Affairs (from June 1950 to April 1954), to Matthews, 
Washington, 5 September 1952, pp. 1979-81.
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The cost of the military items that the Spanish military authorities listed as 
"indispensable” for the defence of their territory was approximately of $1,360,610,962 (an 
enormous amount of money by all means of comparison). One of the American 
participants in the previously mentioned meeting with ArgfieUes and Elorza estimated that 
the Spanish army could be satisfied and a base agreement on the desired terms could be 
signed with equipment to be delivered at some future date costing approximately $150 
million over a period of three years, or $50 million annually, in addition to the military 
component of the $125 million then already authorised. Kissner’s estimated cost of 
military assistance was about $440,754,692 phased over a five-year period.130 Beyond- 
the-Pyrennes action provided some additional justification to what appeared an extremely 
high price to pay for bases only, particularly when General Vig6n had indicated that the 
Spanish troops stationed at the ends of the Pyrenees could be projected north to interdict 
enemy columns. Whether it was supposed that mission would have been integrated with 
the thinking of NATO commanders with respect to NATO areas, was not clear. Kissner's 
recommendations were accepted by the JCS and the Department of Defense.131
The development of the Spanish armed forces based on their eventual relationship 
to NATO required a review of the American military requirements in Spain, the 
availability and allocation of military end-items, and the United States’ relations with 
NATO countries. How could any equipment be immobilised far from what was then 
perceived as the future front line, when prior commitments to NATO countries for scarce 
equipment would go unfilled in the following few years? Because NATO strategy 
involved holding as far to the north and east as possible, it made little sense to provide 
military end-items and dollars to military forces that would engage in battle only when 
the continent had been overrun by enemy forces to the Pyrenees, rather than providing 
them to those forces engaged in the opening days of battle. A military aid programme 
based on requiring Spain to make military assignments outside its territory constituted an 
entirely new concept in military aid and a major policy turning-point adopted unilaterally
1>0. Ibid., Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Regional 
Affairs, Ben T. Moore, to Bonbright, Washington, 6 September 1952, p. 1883. 
Moore questioned Bonbright's affirmation that no military assignment outside 
Spanish territory should be asked.
1,1. Ibid.. Lovett to Acheson, 8 December 1952, pp. 1902-3.
312
by U.S. military men.
The Department of State felt that the primary purposes of the military programme 
in Spain were, exclusively, to assist in the development and protection of the bases and 
to develop and improve those Spanish military facilities that had a direct impact on the 
efficiency of the military collaboration programme. Spain was to be regarded exclusively 
in terms of a logistic support base for the main central European battlefield. Any other 
interpretation would revoke the assurances repeatedly given to the NATO members before 
the negotiations began regarding the nature and scope of the military programme 
contemplated for Spain. This limited interpretation avoided a negative political impact on 
the United States' relations with the NATO members and made the JCS’s price for the 
acquisition of base rights unnecessarily high. The Department of State’s view prevailed.
An expression of friendship and joint purpose in the defence of the West were the 
responses to the Spanish request for clarification of the continuing nature of U.S. 
assistance. The support for the Spanish defence efforts was made explicit by the provision 
of assistance to the Spanish economy and army over a period of several years, subject, 
as was true for the United States' relations with most countries, to the limitations imposed 
by congressional appropriations and other international commitments in light of their 
world-wide security obligations. Congressional appropriations for $125 million were all 
that was available during the current fiscal year. However, in the event that mutually 
satisfactory agreements were concluded, the U.S. Government was ready to include 
suitable provisions for assistance in the following fiscal years. Although no specific 
amounts of supplies appeared, the American memorandum stated that there was no 
distinction between Spain and any other country collaborating in western defence.132 
Spain welcomed the provisions of equal footing, although they were not enough to break 
the standstill. The Spanish Government continued to be willing to sign the aid agreements.
1K. American memorandum dated 6 October 1952 in response to the Spanish 
position as indicated on the Argiielles' memorandum of 9 July and in Vigbn's 
statement to Rissner on 29 July; ibid., Mac Veagh to Martin Artajo, who had 
been placed by Franco in personal charge of negotiations, Madrid, 7 October, 
pp. 1887-92.
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but without the base agreement, which the American negotiators rejected.133
The formalisation of the base agreement was to be delayed until the effective 
granting of aid to Spain. That the remaining obstacle in die bilateral negotiations was the 
actual amount of assistance was emphasised by the fact that the fundamental question 
concerning the use of the bases had been overcome already.134 Total assistance to Spain 
in fiscal year 1954 was the test of the American Administration’s real intentions to give 
aid to Spain on an equal basis with other nations, especially when a new administration 
was due in a few months. No new allocations would signify an overt action against the 
assurances that the United States’ authorities intended to do all they could to render the 
joint enterprise viable, and would cause grave doubt in Spain, if not suspicion, as to their 
validity.135
Could the divergence between the United States and Spain’s positions be bridged 
by relatively small amounts of additional dollar aid in fiscal year 1954? The Spanish 
hoped to increase the minimum $25 million in fiscal year 1953 to a sum equal to $100 
million.136 Although several proposals for aid to Spain existed, the Spanish Government 
was told of no budgetary provisions and received only verbal assurances that the fiscal 
year 1954 budget took into account aid to Spain. With these vague notions, the Spanish 
Government was pressed to conclude the base agreement in time to make new requests 
for additional funds. Consequently, the Spanish proposed an agenda for the construction
1U. On 1 November, the Spanish High General Staff and the Minister of 
Commerce had sent to the respective American missions the texts of the 
agreements for mutual defence assistance and economic aid. See summary of 
the discussions between Arburúa and Arguelles with Train, and Vig6n with 
Kissner, on 3 November 1952, in ibid», Mac Veagh to State Department, 
Madrid, 4 November, pp. 1899-1902.
1M. "When Kissner asked whether Spanish memo intends to state or iirqply that 
in principle we have now been granted base rights in peacetime as well as 
wartime, he [Vig6n] said yes, except for details regarding construction and 
personnel utilization, the latter to be restricted to an absolute minimum." 
Ibid., p. 1900.
1,s. "To try to convince the Spaniards that we mean what we say about helping 
them if they sign our proposed agreements, while at the same time we 
conspicuously make no advance provision for doing so, may well prove 
impossible." Ibid., Mac Veagh to the Department of State, Madrid, 30 October
1952, p. 1893.
1M. Spanish Government's response to the memorandum of 6 October sent to the 
D.S. Embassy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, 31 October 1952, 
ibid., pp. 1898-99.
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of bases that paralleled the furnishing of military equipment. Furthermore, in the event of 
Communist aggression, the "timing and the manner of combat utilization" of the bases 
was to be subject to "prior consultations" between both governments.137 Both provisions, 
deemed initially unacceptable by the American side, produced the expected effects: the 
American negotiators were authorised to sign the military aid and economic aid 
agreements prior to the completion of the base agreement.u* An initial explanation 
could be that the Americans considered it essential to obtain satisfaction from the Spanish 
Government on their two main requests.
Franco anticipated the advent of a new Republican Administration in January 
1953 under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, by announcing that he was ready to permit 
Spanish volunteers to take part in the war in Korea.139 Spain was presented before the 
United States’ public opinion as a more trustworthy ally than the British and the French 
who were depicted as pursing policies disruptive of western unity against Communism. 
This propaganda campaign was addressed particularly to Eisenhower who, after all, was 
a General of the Army and had been Supreme Allied Commander in Europe between 
April 1951 and May 1952. The appointment of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State 
must have been warmly appreciated by the Spanish Government. Dulles was well known 
to the Spanish authorities because, after 1938, as a lawyer, he represented before the 
American courts the interests of the Bank of Spain in Burgos against the legal banking 
authorities of Spain.140 Furthermore, he represented a new type of cold war warrior; one
1,1. Draft of the defence pact which the Spanish presented to Kissner on 23 
December 1952 and which was intended to serve as a cover agreement to the 
secret technical schedules; texts quoted in ibid., p. 1904.
1M. Provided that the "basic minimum essentials of our military 
requirements” had been met in the provisions of the base agreement; telegram 
dated 22 December 1952, summarised in ibid., p. 1911r footnote no. 5.
x,f. PRO, FO 371/107685: Ambassador Balfour's despatch no. 452 to FO, Madrid, 
23 December 1952.
l40. John Foster Dulles (1888-1959), lawyer and secretary of state in the 
Eisenhower Administration, January 1953-April 1959. As partner at «Sullivan 
6 Cromwell» Dulles was involved in many well-known international cases. 
Late in 1938, Bank of Spain officials brought suit against the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York for inappropriate conduct concerning $15 million 
in silver from their resources shipped to the United States by the 
Republican Government. Dulles lost the case and was accused of undertaking 
legal work for the fascist Franco regime. For. details see Ronald W. 
Pruessens John Foster Dulles. The Road to Power« New York [The Free Press] 
1982, pp. 122—23.
315
not satisfied with merely containing the Red threat, but eager to roll back the Communist 
tide.'41
There is no evidence that the Franco Government could get on better with the 
Republican Administration than with Truman and Ache son, or that Eisenhower was 
anxious to conclude the lengthy negotiations with Spain on any terms. The Eisenhower 
Administration pulled the negotiations back to the point of departure of the Truman 
Administration. For them, even more than for the last period of the Democratic 
Administration, economic aid and the military bases were tied intrinsically together. The 
delivery of these funds were subject to the signature of the agreements under negotiation; 
the Spanish were given neither mention of amounts nor assurances of any definitive 
intention to provide assistance to strengthen military and economic conditions. In fact, the 
American negotiation team was instructed not to inform the Spanish of any specific 
military assistance planned by the United Stated beyond the $37 million of fiscal year 
1953.'*
The fact that the Administration was devoted to economic cuts in aid abroad 
seems to have had little impact on the decision. Congress favoured granting more funds 
to Spain than the Administration itself was willing to request based on strong 
congressional feelings about the Spanish question.143 In fact, as we shall see, it became 
routine for the Congress to earmark specifically for Spain, with almost no debate, sums 
in excess of the Administration's proposals. In its turn, the Administration normally spent 
in excess of congressional allocations by making use of the funds reserved for the 
President. The cold shower on the Spanish-American relations might have come from the 
renewed force of «E uropean ism » , most particularly, in the Department of State.’44
141. Dull««' statement of 26 January 1953, fiv« days after assuming office, 
recorded in Deane Heller and David Hellers John Foster Dulles. Soldier for 
Peace, 1st ed., New York [Holt, Rinehart and Winston] 1960, p. 159.
142. Ibid., Mac Veagh to the Department of State, Madrid, 24 January 1953, 
p. 1905.
14J. Scowcroft, op. cit.f pp. 81 ff.
144. Pascaline Win and: "Jean Monnet, John Foster Dulles, Ike and the Uniting 
of Europe: Friendships and Associations**, in Douglas Brinkley (ed.) : Monnet 
and the Americans (forthcoming); and Presidents, Advisers and the Dnitinq 
of Europe; From Eisenhower to Kennedy (forthcoming).
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When the Eisenhower Administration assumed office, it decided to commit its own vast 
prestige in support of the European Defence Community and of "effective unity”. Only 
the non-ratification of the EDC would have made it necessary to give "a little rethinking 
to America’s own foreign policy in respect to Western Europe.”145 Bases on Spanish 
territory continued to be on the agenda, but there was no rush.
When President Eisenhower did not speed the negotiations, Madrid lost hope for 
any improvement in the economic conditions. To overcome opposition from the Spanish 
army about signing an agreement which provided extremely limited assistance for military 
purposes. Franco authorised Arburúa to mediate with General Vigón and Army Minister 
Agustín Muñoz Grandes (after July 1951). Franco suggested the transfer of between $8 
to $12 million of the $88 million then authorised for economic aid to military' 
assistance.’46 This was a clear indication that the Spanish Government was about to 
agree to conclude the base agreement if assured of a military equipment programme 
considerably less than the money value of the items they listed.
Secretary of State Dulles supported a maximum of $50 million for military' aid 
and recommended new authorisations for $35 million in military aid. This way, economic 
aid was reduced to a total value of $75 million and military aid increased to $85 
million.147 Dulles' programme not only contained no provisions for economic aid for 
fiscal year 1954, but reduced the total amount available for economic assistance because 
$75 million was considered sufficient to generate enough counterpart for the peseta costs 
of the base construction programme.14* Only because Ambassador Mac Veagh 
considered additional amounts indispensable for negotiating purposes were new 
appropriations worth $25 million added for economic aid, which totalled $100 in fiscal
145. Both quotations correspond to Dulles' declarations in early February 
1953, shortly before leaving on his first official trip to Europe as 
Secretary of State, taken from Albert Joseph Dorley, Jr.: "The Role of
Congress in the Establishment of Bases in Spain", doctoral dissertation, St. 
John's University, New York, 1969, p- 35.
Ibid.
l41m FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, Dulles to Mac Veagh, Washington, 17 
February 1953, p. 1912.
14i. Ibid., Dulles to Mac Veagh, Washington, 26 February 1953, p. 1915.
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year 1954.149 However, the final draft of the fiscal year 1954 foreign aid budget carried 
over $125 million with a new distribution ($75 million for economic aid and $50 million 
far military aid). It also proposed between $25 to $50 million as additional appropriations 
for military aid.150
The Spanish Government was informed that the United States was willing to make 
"substantial expenditures of both money and equipment” provided that their use of bases 
was assured in peacetime as well as wartime.151 The Spanish Government did not find 
it difficult to conclude a base agreement satisfactory to the United States, provided the 
American negotiators guaranteed a programme of continuing military and economic aid 
over a period of several years.132 Nevertheless, no agreement seemed possible unless the 
Spanish Government understood that the aid funds for fiscal year 1954 initiated an 
assistance programme to be completed over a period of several years.
A partial break-through in the negotiations came on 7 August 1953, when 
President Eisenhower signed the Mutual Security Appropriations Act of 1954 to carry on 
the Mutual Security ProgTam during the fiscal year ending 30 June 1954.153 Under its 
provisions, the $125 million previously allocated to Spain for economic, technical, and 
military assistance appropriated in 1951 and 1952 were specifically reappropriated. New 
aid received specific appropriations of no less than $75 million, which were increased to 
a total amount of $101 million ($91 million for military assistance and $10 for economic 
aid). The total far the combined economic and military assistance programmes was 
established at $226 million for fiscal year 1954. Military assistance to purchase military 
end-items to provide training equipment and military material (the so-called "military end- 
item assistance”) received the largest share, $141 million. The economic aid portion was
**'. Ibid., Mac Veagh to Dulles, Madrid, 27 February 1953, p. 1916; and 
telegram no. 378 of 11 November 1952, p. 1917, footnote no. 4.
15e. Ibid., Dulles to Ambassador Dunn, Washington, 20 April 1953, p. 1923.
James Clement Dunn, former ambassador to Italy and to France, was 
appointed to Spain by President Eisenhower on 27 February 1953. He presented 
his credentials to Franco on 9 April and resigned in February 1955.
151. Ibid., Eisenhower to Dunn, Washington, 24 March 1953, pp. 1922-23.
152. Ibid., Memoranda of Conversation with Martin Artajo and Franco by Dunn, 
Madrid, 8 and 9 April 1953, pp. 1927 and 1931.
153. P.L. 83—218, vole 67, p. 478, This bill was enacted on 7 August 1953.
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$85 million to strengthen the economic foundations for the support of the programme of 
military cooperation (the so-called "defense support assistance”). This was the only 
effective economic assistance to finance Spanish imports of raw materials and capital 
goods.154
It is commonly believed that the Spanish authorities slowed negotiations with the 
Americans during 19S2 and 1953 in order to concentrate on the new Concordat with the 
Vatican, which was signed in August 1953.Ui This assumption implies that the Spanish 
Government had already accepted the terms of the agreement, which was absolutely not 
the case.1*6 Not even the funds approved for Spain in the Mutual Security 
Appropriations Act of 1954 were sufficient to clear the way for an agreement, since they 
did not offer to the Spanish Government the long-term commitment it had been seeking 
since the base negotiations started. Furthermore, none of the funds approved by the 
Congress had been allotted or obligated to Spain, subject to the conclusion of a 
satisfactory bilateral agreement granting extensive base rights. On 17 August 1953, 
Eisenhower told the House of Representatives that the funds allocated to Spain would not 
be liberalised until the agreement had been signed.157 In response, a few days later. 
Franco announced to Eisenhower that "the whole structure of the agreements will not be 
completed until, at the proper moment, there is added to it the appropriate annex 
concerning the details of American aid".15* The detailed stipulations about what the 
Spanish Government would be required to do contrasted strongly with the unwillingness 
of the U.S. Government to specify what they would do to assist the Spanish armed forces 
and economy.
>M. MAE, Leg. 5790, exp. 1: Dunn to Artajo, 24 September 1953. These amounts 
did not include the construction costs of the bases.
XM. For details about the Concordat issue see Javier Tusell: Franco y los 
católicos. La política interior española entre 1945 y 1957, Madrid {Alianza] 
1984, pp. 227 ff.
154. I.e., Herbert L. Matthews: The Yoke and the Arrows. A Report on Spain, 
New York [George Braziller Inc.] 1957, p. 127; Cortada, op. cit., pp. 228-
30; Viñas, Los Pactos, cit., p. 180; Juan Pablo Fusi: Franco. A Biography, 
New York [Harper & Row Publishers] 1987, p. 76; and Stanley G. Payne: The 
Franco Regime 1936-1975, Madison [The University of Wisconsin Press] 1987, 
p. 418.
1S\  Viñas Los pactos, cit., pp. 180—81.
1M. FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, Franco to Eisenhower, Madrid, 22 August 
1953, p. 1951.
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The final break-through in the negotiations is not clear. My hypothesis is that the 
firm position adopted by the Spanish Government forced the Americans to inform the 
Spanish of their intentions to provide aid to Spain totalling approximately $465 million 
(exclusive of the military bases construction dollar costs) though fiscal years 1954 to 1957 
(of which $226 million were authorised for fiscal year 1954).1W At that point, Martin 
Artajo informed Dunn that Franco was willing to leave technical discussions to a later 
time, provided that the agreements could be signed promptly.160 In response, Dunn 
confirmed the total figure of aid previously mentioned and left its distribution between 
economic and military aid to be mutually agreed upon after the formal signing of the 
agreements. The total amount for aid was kept secret because the Americans could make 
no commitments for future aid prior to congressional approval, something which had 
served as scape clause vis-à-vis the Spaniards for several years. The package of aid of 
$465 million was not only an intrinsic pan of the Spanish-American deal, but what 
allowed it to materialise.161
The governments of Spain and the United States concluded and signed on 26 
September 1953 three bilateral agreements: the "Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement",
1>*. These amounts had been agreed to much earlier, but the Spanish were 
never Informed of them; ibid, "Memorandum by the Planning Board of the NSC 
to the NSC", Washington, 11 May 1953, p. 1937; and, "Memorandum of 
Discussion at the 114th Meeting of the NSC, Wednesday, May 13, 1953”, p. 
1944.
lé0. Ibid., Memorandum of conversation with Martin Artajo by Dunn, 31 August
1953, p. 1953*
1<l. MAE, Leg. 5790, exp. 1: Dunn to Artajo, Madrid, 24 September 1953 
(English version in FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, pp. 1957-58). Most 
researchers think that the $226 million booked as support to be provided to 
Spain under the terms of the Mutual Security Act during fiscal year 1954 was 
the economic aid counterpart to the agreement; i.e., Cortada, op. cit., p. 
230; Juan Carlos Pereira: Introducción al estudio de la política exterior 
de España (Siglos XIX y XX) , Madrid [Akal] 1983, p. 189; Manuel Espadas 
Burgos: Franquismo y política exterior, Madrid [Rialp] 1988, p. 197; Fusi, 
Franco, cite, p. 79. Others authors give different figures: Whitaker, op. 
cit., pp. 47—4 8, mentioned $350 million as the ceiling of the American 
commitment to programme aid to Spain; and Simon Duke: United States Military 
Forces and Installations in Europe, Oxford [Oxford University Press] 1989, 
pp. 251-72, p. 253, totally misinformed, mentions $50 million. Viñas et al. 
(op. cit., p. 767) mention $226 million as the amount of aid agreed, and, 
that if the programme of aid reached $4 65 million, it was the result of 
American generosity. The lower the aid figure was put, the more their main 
thesis that the Franco regime compromised the Spaniards' security for a few 
beams was reinforced. In Los pactos, cit., p. 204, Viñas mentions the secret 
agreement of $465 millions, showing no great surprise for contradicting 
himself. Only Marquina, op. cit., p. 568, has taken the American economic 
commitment for $465 million out of the oblivion into which it had fallen.
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the "Defense Agreement” and the "Economic Aid Agreement" which altogether came to 
be known as the Pact of Madrid. The three agreements were of an executive nature, 
requiring neither U.S. Senate nor Spanish Cortes approval. They remained in force for ten 
years and were extended for two successive periods of five years. The Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement placed Spain within the Mutual Security Program under the 
provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 
1949, which implied that the United States was committed to providing economic, 
technical and military assistance to Spain. Under the terms of the Defense Agreement, the 
United States was authorised to develop, build, maintain, and use (jointly with the Spanish 
Government) certain military facilities in Spain, mainly air and naval bases. This 
agreement also set forth the conditions governing the military assistance the United States 
would furnish Spanish armed forces. Finally, the Economic Aid Agreement established 
the ground rules for economic assistance from the United States.162
Franco’s Spain has been singled out as a unique case within Western Europe: 
while the western nations were moving towards a collective approach to defense through 
NATO, the Spanish Administration went for bilateral arrangements with the United States. 
By 1953, there were approximately 450 American base sites in Western Europe. Many 
Western European governments -despite their NATO membership and full participation 
in the collective defense system- accepted American bases on their territory.163 All
1,2. Texts of the agreements between the United States and Spain signed in 
September 1953, are found in United States Treaties and Other International 
Agreements, vol. 4, Part 2, 1953, pp. 1903-27. The Technical Agreement Annex 
to the Defense Agreement, the four Technical Schedules and the "Note 
Pursuant to the Second Paragraph of Article III of the Defense Agreement" 
remained secret. The latter, which was abrogated in 1970, allowed the 
Americans to use the military installations in an emergency with no more 
than prior communication, not consultation, with the Spanish Government; 
Viñas et al., op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 769-70; Viñas: a) Los pactos, cit., and, 
b) "Spain, the US and NATO", in Christopher Abel and Nissa Torrents: Spain: 
Conditional Democracy, London [Croom Helm] 1984, pp. 40-58. For the long­
term implications of the question for Spain's security debate see 
contributions to Joyce Lasky Shub and Raymond Carr (eds.): Spain: Studies 
in Political Security, New Youk [Praeger] 1985; Gregory F. Treverton: Spain: 
Domestic Politics and Security Policy, London [International Institute for 
Strategic Studies] 1966; and John W. McDonald Jr. and Diane Bendahmane 
(eds.): U.S. Bases Overseas: Negotiations with Spain, Greece, and the
Philippines, Boulder [Westview Press] 1990.
xi,e See James R. Blaker: United States Overseas Basing. An Anatomy of the 
Dilemma, New York [Praeger] 1990, p. 40 (p. 4 for a definition of "base
site" and pp. 10 ff* for a brief description of the origins of the U.S. 
overseas basing system).
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agreements on bases were bilateral. Nor was the fact of being an executive agreement 
uniquely Spanish since all agreements on military bases in Europe were executive for 
security measures.1*  An executive agreement was not only comfortable to the receiving 
country, but it avoided public debate in the United States and allowed the executive to 
concentrate enormous power in its own hands and to exercise it without political checks 
and constraints. The additional secret agreement of activation of the bases in an 
emergency had a parallel with the U.S.-British base agreement of 1952 between Prime 
Minister Winston S. Churchill and President Truman "in which the wording is vague and 
latitude of interpretation ample".165 Bilateral US-Spain relations were part of the United 
States’ security strategy for the western Mediterranean that was based both on a collective 
treaty and on bilateral agreements for bases and military' aid in the 1950s.166 That is, 
Spain was a part of a system and not a system itself.
4.4.3. Defence Support Assistance
The Spanish anticipated several years of major United States assistance, paitly 
because of the special measure of support that Spain enjoyed in the U.S. Congress and 
partly because the United States had aided other European countries for several years. 
Initially, however, none of the three agreements specified any amount of aid. A State 
Department press release on 26 September 1953 announced exclusively the already known 
amounts of congressional appropriations.167 The fresh financial efforts by the United 
States to assist the Spanish economy had been greatly reduced. The American 
commitment to support the programme of military cooperation was limited to extending 
an additional $239 million for economic and military end-item assistance to the amounts
144. See particularly the Italian 1954 agreement, Sebesta: L'Europa indifesa, 
cit., 1991, where she further develops the arguments presented in previous 
articles cited in this chapter.
1U. Duke, op* cit., p. 254, and O.S. Defence Bases in the United Kingdom. 
A Matter of Joint Decision?, London [MacMillan Press] 1987.
144. Sebesta: "Politica di sicurezza italiana e innovazioni strategiche
nell'Europa degli anni cinquanta", Italia Contemporanea, no. 179, June 1990, 
pp. 283-306.
147. The Department of State bulletin, vol. 29, no. 745, 5 October 1953, pp. 
435—36.
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already appropriated by Congress for fiscal year 1954 under the terms of the Mutual 
Security Act The Spanish Government was then informally given to understand that 
approximately $350 million were to be allocated for military aid, leaving $115 million for 
economic and technical assistance.16*
Paradoxically the first year of American aid to Spain witnessed a deterioration of 
Spain’s economic position. The unusually severe drought in the spring and summer of
1953 had a disastrous effect on the wheat crop and the electric power supply (which 
imposed power cutoffs throughout the country). Allocations of economic assistance during 
fiscal year 1954 (see table 4.4) emphasised electrical power production to overcome a 
critical shortage; to improve rails and roads; to increase output of basic industries such 
as iron, steel, coal, and cement: and, finally, to expand agricultural productivity and the 
supply of essentia] raw materials. The programme tried to encourage the expansion of 
internal production of basic consumer goods to counter the inflationary impact of 
American aid.
TABU 4.4
ALLOCATION OF DEFENCE SUPPORT ASSISTANCE, D.S. FY 1954
(in millions of dollars)
TOTAL CAPITAL INVESTMENT 53.1 TOTAL RAN MATERIALS 31.3
Electricity equipment 12.5 Raw cotton 13.6
Railway equipment 11 Iron and steel scrap 3.6
Agricultural and irrigation Copper and aluminium 3.5
machinery and parts 10.5 Special steels 3
Steel industry 8 Coal and coke 1.5
Road building equipment 3 Tinplate 1.2
Munitions factory equipment 2.4 Other 4.9
Coal mining equipment 2
Cement production equipment 2 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE* 0.6
Locomotive/lorry factories 1
Civil Aviation 0.7 OVERALL TOTAL 85
Sources: AGA, C/36955: OEEC, C/WP 11/W(56)2, "Council. Association of Spain 
in the Work of the Organisation. Economic Structure of Spain", October 1955, 
p. 27, and C/36622, folder 2: OEEC, C/WP 11/W(56>17, WP no. 11 of the 
Council, "Association of Spain in the Work of the Organisation. Economic 
Structure of Spain. Comments of the Spanish Delegation on the document C/WP 
11/W(56)2 Annex", Paris, 18 June 1956. The table refers to economic aid, 
including sums covered by the MSA for 1951—52 and 1952—53 and blocked until 
the agreements were signed. The Onited States' aid programme to Spain during 
fiscal year 1954 amounted to $226 million, made up of $85 million for 
economic aid and $141 million for military aid. (*) This sum covered the 
exchange of technicians between the two countries.
x‘#. Cit. in FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, "Statement of Policy by the NSC", 
NSC 5418/1 "U.S. Policy Towards Spain", Washington, 10 June 1954, p. 1981.
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That the initial defence support programme contributed to improve Spain’s capital 
stock, dollar position, and imports of dollar goods is unquestionable. Any aid, like a drop 
in the desert, would have had a positive effect. The important point is, however, that the 
limited aid could have only a minor effect, because it could not ease industrial bottlenecks 
to the level necessary to produce a multiplying effect on Spain’s over-all level of 
production. The total amount allotted to imports was minimal compared with Spain’s total 
imports (5 per cent) and the overall needs of the Spanish economy. Emergency 
expenditures for wheat alone during fiscal year 1954 exceeded, in terms of financial 
resources, the total amount of American economic aid to Spain for the same period, until 
June 1954.1®
It was totally unnecessary that raw cotton receive the highest individual allocation, 
since, in the absence of aid, Spain would have continued procuring dollars to buy the 
greater pan of the cotton either by borrowing or by the exchange of pesetas for dollars 
in free money markets, or by both methods.170 Cotton allocations, which amounted to 
16 per cent of the total programme, impeded greater imports of other goods payable in 
dollars (investment goods and other raw materials) with greater difficulties of acquisition 
than cotton. The high allocation of aid for cotton was intended to reduce textile prices and 
lower export prices. This, in turn, would have increased foreign sales and foreign 
exchange earnings, with an overall benefit to Spain’s foreign payments position. It is my 
believe that this allocation hid lobby pressures in Washington. It certainly did not address 
to the fact that Spain's textile exports (and Europe’s, in general) decreased after 1952 as 
Spanish industry found it more and more difficult to meet foreign competition by low-cost 
producers. In fact, any other of the items listed would have had more long-term impact 
than raw cotton by leading to increases in output and production of capital plant. The
Betwaan S90 to $100 million against $85 million. For tha calculation of 
Spain's import, wheat programme during fiscal year 1954 see chapter six, pp. 
355—57. Even other snore modest estimates of Spain's wheat purchases exceeded 
the total economic U.S. aid for the period. For instance, the U.S. Embassy 
in Spain estimated that foreign exchange outlays for wheat imports were $52 
million in dollars, $14 million in other foreign exchange, and $20 million 
in pesetas; PRO, FO 371/113033: U.S. Department of State1 Office of
Intelligence Research, "Spain's probable role in Western Europe", Secret 
Intelligence Report no. IR-6634, 28 July 1954, p. €9.
17°. This opinion was, at the time, shared by the U.S. Department of State' 
Office of Intelligence Research; PRO, FO 371/113033: Report no. IR-6634, 
cit., p. 62.
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allocation for cotton did not increase cotton textile exports at all.
Allocations for raw cotton equalled all forms of aid to Spam's transportation 
system which were likely to pay off better in the long-term. Since the poor conditions of 
the railways were a major hindrance to Spain's economic development, any improvement 
in Spain's transportation system would have resulted in an increase in output. The 
allocation of $14 million worth of railway and road equipment was very limited to modify 
even slightly the transport situation in Spain. Plans for railway modernisation involved an 
investment of approximately $4,070 million in the works and requirements then declared 
to be urgent in the state railways broad gauge system. Half this figure was considered by 
the French military services in Spain to be necessary to place Spain’s road network in a 
state of minimum efficiency.171
The case of electric power-producing equipment was similar. Arbunia pointed out 
to Harold E. Stassen, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration after August
1953. that, after considering funds from fiscal year 1954 aid allotted for electric power, 
plus the maximum amount available out of Spain’s free dollar and other currency 
holdings, its earnings from tourism, plus the credits available through the National City 
Bank and the Chase National Bank and other sources open to Spain, there were still 
approximately between $40 to $50 million dollar lacking to meet Spain’s necessities in 
the power field.172 The amounts allocated for coal-mining machinery, coal, and coke, 
could do little to overcome the bottleneck produced by the lack of essential supplies of 
proper quality coal and coke. The same could be said about the allocations for the 
purchase of metals and other raw materials to meet Spain’s industrial needs. In sum, the 
American funds to be invested in electricity, transportation, agricultural development, 
steel, coal and cement industries, munitions factories, and civil aviation, were too limited 
to produce any major changes.
17J. See chapter seven, p. 520.
111. FRPS. 1952-1954, VI, part 2, Memorandum of Conversation, by Stassen, 
Madrid, 12 November 1954, p. 1995. Arburúa was then President of the 
Interministerial Coordinating Committee -set up in October 1953 under the 
aegis of the Presidency of the Government- for the distribution of funds
available from the Economic Aid Agreement.
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Furthermore, the reduced exports expected to result from the loss of a substantial 
portion of the citrus fruit crop (Spain’s most important non-dollar foreign exchange 
earner) reinforced the Spanish requests for additional aid from the United States. The 
severe frosts during the 1953-54 winter were expected to result in foreign exchange losses 
of a minimum of $30 million (according to the American Embassy in Madrid, and $60 
million, according to the Spanish Government).173 These unanticipated factors 
aggravated the chronic weakness of the Spanish economy, which was marked by a low 
level of monetary reserves and chronic shortages in almost all categories of industrial raw 
materials, equipment, and facilities:
"The Spanish Government's earlier hopes that [American] 
economic aid would provide prerequisites essential to the 
introduction of some flexibility and resilience in the economy 
were seriously dashed by the necessity to use a large part of 
aid ($30 million in raw materials) not to increasing 
production but rather to maintaining production rates of last 
year."114
The American Embassy in Spain tried to accelerate the granting of the $239 
million balance of total aid of $465 million. For fiscal year 1955 the Embassy suggested 
allocating to Spain aid amounting to $170 million, of which $140 million were for 
military assistance and the remaining for economic aid, while allocations for fiscal year 
1956 were to remain exclusively for military expenditure. The American Embassy and the 
Foreign Operations Mission in Spain believed that $30 million were sufficient "to 
maintain the friendly cooperation necessary to the construction and operation of the joint 
military facilities.”175 This way, the Embassy’s proposal left for economic assistance 
only 12.5 per cent of the only existing assistance the Americans had compromised to 
grant. The foreign aid programme finally established for fiscal year 1955 reduced aid for 
Spain to $104 million. It maintained $30 million as economic aid, of which $10 million 
was to be used for the purchase of industrial raw materials and $20 million for the
PRO, FO 371/113033: Report no. IR-6634, cit.
114. FROS. 1952-1954, VI, part 2, Edward L. Williams, Director of the U.S. 
Operations Mission in Spain (after October 1953), to the FOA, Madrid, 23 
March 1954, p. 1968.
in. Ibid.. Dunn to Dulles, 22 October 1953, and Williams to FOA, 23 March
1954, pp. 1961 and 1969.
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purchase of capital goods.176 Accordingly, Dunn informed Martin Artajo of the reduced 
amounts of aid available for Spain in fiscal year 1955. The Spanish Government had been 
previously informed that, in case the United States Congress appropriated in fiscal year 
1955 disproportionate amounts, the total amount should not exceed the $465 million total 
for the four-year period.177
That aid figure during fiscal year 1955 was inferior to the amount for fiscal year 
1954; the disparity between the suggested aid figure and the aid the Spanish economy 
required to reach a minimum level of recuperation did not pass unnoticed by the Spanish 
Government. The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that it was "indispensable 
to establish the national economic potential on the level corresponding to the defense 
objectives" in order to be fully effective in the defensive organisation of the West.17® 
Moreover, the amounts for economic aid were established before the full effect of the 
previous year’s drought was known and the freeze occurred. For the Spanish Government, 
the special circumstances required special consideration by the U.S. authorities. By 
contrast, far the Americans, $465 million remained the ceiling of aid to which they were 
committed until fiscal year 1957.
Other programmes of assistance to Spain were for the most pan of congressional 
origin and were not, technically speaking, "defense support assistance". These programmes 
provided for the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities. An amendment prepared 
by Senator McCarran to the Mutual Security Appropriations Act of 1955 authorised $55 
million to purchase surplus agricultural commodities with pesetas.179 The final text of
a,i. Ibid., Dulles to Dunn, Washington, 19 March 1954, p. 1966. For the final 
distribution of the $30 million for fiscal year 1955 see Dirección General 
de Cooperación Económica (DGCE): Informe sobre el desarrollo de la ayuda 
económica, no. 8, Madrid, 1956, pp. 10-11. The DGCE was set up in October
1953 within the Under-Secretary for Foreign Economy for the implementation 
of the U.S. economic aid programme to Spain.
irt. FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, Memorandum of Conversation by Robert W. 
Barnett of the Office of Western European Affairs, Washington, 12 November
1953, p. 1963.
l,#. Ibid., Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' verbal note to Dunn, Madrid,
2 April 1954, p. 1971.
17#. P.L. 83-778, signed into law on 3 September 1954, contained as sec. 109 
the following clause introduced by McCarran: **$55,000,000 of the unobligated 
balances continued available under the Act shall be available only for the 
procurement and sale, in accordance with provisions of section 402 of the
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the so-called McCarran Amendment further stipulated that 80 per cent of the pesetas 
generated as counterpart funds "be used to strengthen and improve the civilian economy 
of Spain".1(0 The Spanish (and the American Embassy in Madrid) viewed the McCarran 
funds as an addition to previous allocations in the form of grants." 1
The expending of the McCarran Amendment’s funds, however, was further proof 
of the U.S. Government’s opposition to or delaying of aid to Spain legislated by the 
Congress. Once the Spanish Government had already imported commodities under the 
McCarran provisions, it was informed that an undetermined portion of the credit was to 
be repaid at an unfavourable exchange rate and that the McCarran funds included the $30 
million earlier sought for economic aid for fiscal year 1955 under the terms of the 
September 1953 agreements. The Spanish Government was also informed that, in order 
to repay with pesetas, the McCarran funds granted on a loan basis required the United 
States’ approval for making advances from existing counterpart funds against Spain's local 
currency needs that were to be repaid from the proceeds of the sales of McCarran’s 
commodities. To have the full availability of the $30 million granted to Spain during 
fiscal year 1955 it would be necessary to take a substantial part of the McCarran funds 
as a loan. Stas sen offered an alternative for the implementation of the funds allocated for 
fiscal year 1955: to programme $20 million defence support aid for fiscal year 1955 and 
$10 million for fiscal year 1956, without further funds for fiscal year 1956. A third 
alternative was to import as much coal as possible from the United States in consideration 
for receiving the full $30 million in fiscal year 1955, with the coal to be financed out of
Mutual Security Act of 1954, of surplus agricultural commodities as 
assistance to Spain.* Vol. 68.I, p. 1224. Furthermore, under the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (commonly known 
as P.L. 460 of 10 July 1954), Spain was allowed to purchase U.S. 
agricultural commodities in pesetas. In reality, the proposal was originated 
in the Senate Committee on Appropriations and Senator McCarran limited to 
offer an ammendment to the committee decision in the sense of granting the 
aid as part of Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act and not of PL 4 80, 
which stressed the military character of the funds.
1#c. In reality, the Senate Committee and McCarran had proposed 95 per cent 
of counterpart pesetas to devote to the Spanish civilian economy.
1,1. See telegram summarised in FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, p. 1992, 
footnote no. 2; and Dunn to the Department of State, Madrid, 13 October
1954, p. 1992.
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aid funds or with free dollars.1*2 The complexity of these proposals revealed the 
American unwillingness to make life easy for Spain. Although procurement authorisations 
for the full amount of the McCarran amendment of S5S million were promptly issued ($49 
million in cotton and $6 million in cottonseed oil), the agreement was signed reluctantly 
by the Spanish in April 1955 because of the conditions of the loan: a ratio of $20 million 
loan to $24 million grant was finally agreed on for the 80 per cent of sales proceeds for 
the Spanish civilian economy.1*3
There is no reason to conclude that the agreements of September 1953 provided 
any immediate and significant relief to the Spanish economy. Including the fiscal year 
1955 funds appropriated by the Congress, die total amount of defence support assistance 
programmed for Spain amounted to $115 million. The initial commitment for economic 
assistance, announced when the agreements were signed, had been reached. However, only 
$24.7 were disbursed, and $10 million more in procurement authorisations were issued 
through 1 April 1955.1*4 A study totally biased in favour of the importance of American 
aid to the Spanish economy reported that, by the end of February 1955, while the 
procurement authorisations amounted to $113.3 million, arrivals of commodities and 
services financed with assistance furnished by the Government of the United States to the 
Government of Spain amounted to $31.5 million.1*5 It should also be pointed out that 
70 per cent of the counterpart of these funds was returned to the U.S. Government for its 
peseta expenses in Spain.
The counterpart pesetas fund financed essentially the peseta cost of the military 
facilities construction programme through fiscal year 1957. The agreements specified that 
10 per cent of the deposits of counterpart funds should remain at the disposal of the
193 • PROS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, "Memorandum of Conversations [with Arburua] 
on 28 and 29 October", by Stassen, Madrid, 12 November 1954, p. 1995.
1M. FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVII, "Progress Report on NSC 5418/1 United States 
Policy Toward Spain", by the Operations Coordinating Board, Washington, 27 
April 1955, pp. 533-37. The period of report was from 9 June 1954 through 
27 April 1955.
114. Ibid.
115. U.S. Operations Mission to Spain: "Activity to date under procurement
authorisations issued February 28, 1955", reproduced in Silva (ed.), op.
cit.r vol. 1, p. 427-28.
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Government of the United States to cover administrative expenses, and an additional 60 
per cent was to be available for tbe local expenses of the construction and maintenance 
of military bases. Only 30 per cent of counterpan funds generated by economic aid was 
reserved for domestic economic purposes as aid to Spain itself. This percentage was raised 
to 90 per cent only after 1958. Furthermore, the counterpan funds reserved for domestic 
economic programmes were subject to a previous mutual agreement, which was granted 
mostly to "defense support projects” in fields such as transportation, munitions, and 
military material production. All receipts in pesetas for sales of raw conon to Spain 
(amounting to $13.6 million) were to be used also to finance tbe construction of military 
bases. For wheat sales, when the Spanish agreed to purchase up to $20 million of surplus 
United States wheat and other grains (in addition to fiscal year 1954 economic aid), they 
agreed that the entire peseta proceeds were to finance the construction of the bases and 
the possible telecommunications system supporting the bases. This could be imposed upon 
the Spanish negotiators because of die pressing wheat shortage.116 A substantial 
proportion of the McCanan Amendment and P.L. 480 programmes arrived on a loan 
rather than on a grant basis.1*7 The Spanish complaints came from the feeling that they 
were not treated like the rest of former ERP countries. In fact, under the Marshall Plan. 
90 per cent of tbe counterpan funds were reserved by the aid-receiving governments for 
the economic development of their countries. The United States' policy toward other 
European countries had been to grant relative freedom in tbe application of counterpan 
funds to the rehabilitation of various aspects of their national economic plans.1“
The specific definition of counterpan funds in the Spanish case was based on 
several factors. Early indications from the Spanish Government in order to conclude a 
military agreement convinced the Americans that the Spaniards would be reluctant to
1,4. See chapter seven, pp. 556-57.
1,1. The counterpart pesetas produced by the purchase of American surplus 
agricultural commodities were initially distributed in an equal proportion 
between Spain and the United States (during 1955). They were modified 
progressively until they reached a 30/70 ratio in favour of Spain (during 
1956/57), but modified again, the following year, to a 55/45 ratio in favour 
of the United States peseta expenditure in Spain; see Gabriel Fernánde2 de 
Valderrama: "España—OSA, 1953—1964", Economía Financiera Española, no. 6, 
1964; and Viñas et al., op. cit., p. 779.
>M. See chapter three, pp. 246 ff.
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insist on financial arrangements that would prejudice the successful conclusion of the 
negotiations. Another important factor was the lack of adequate funds from the 
Department of Defense to meet the initial estimated peseta costs of the military 
construction programme planned for fiscal year 1953 ($78 million peseta equivalent). The 
amount of disposable counterpart funds was insufficient to cover completely the peseta 
cost element of the construction programme. Nevertheless, it was enough to cover a major 
pan of these costs and, thus, contribute greatly to the United States’ military objectives. 
This was the main reason some amounts were allocated as economic aid, instead of all 
as military assistance. Without the counterpart funds generated by the economic aid, the 
Department of Defense would have had to obtain larger appropriations than those then 
contemplated for the bases construction to purchase Spanish currency to pay local costs. 
Any reduction in commodity imports (the economic aid programme) would have 
correspondingly reduced the amount of counterpart pesetas necessary for the bases 
construction. This would have to be made up by additional direct military expenditures 
by the United States."9 It should not be forgotten also that the weak negotiation position 
of the Spanish Government meant that any major change in the negotiation tactics, such 
as the use of counterpart hinds for general economic rehabilitation, would have meant a 
delay sine die the agreement, and this was undesirable for the Spanish Government.
Finally, Spain was not extended a ERP treatment for the same reason that it had 
succeeded in opening the negotiations for military bases: the ERP goals and methods had 
disappeared from American minds. The aid programme for Spain had been subjugated, 
like military assistance elsewhere in Western Europe, to the conditions set forth by the 
Mutual Security Program, no longer the ERP. The use of counterpart pesetas for the 
benefit of European civilian economies was an integral part of the ERP; the MSA of 
October 1951 related economic assistance specifically to the defence effort. The objective 
of the MSA programme was to make maximum use of counterpart funds to support the 
defence capacity of aid-receiving countries.
In April 1953, when Dulles proposed to reappropriate for fiscal year
1954 only the military aid portion of the previous allocations carried over 
from fiscal year 1953, Dunn countered with this same argument; see FRDS, 
1952-1954, VI, part 2, pp. 1933-34.
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Spanish officials frequently referred to the nature and amounts of previous aid to 
Europe and the comparative restricted use of counterpart pesetas to argue against the 
American obsession with attaining strict military objectives, rather than supporting 
military objectives by building up the Spanish economy and domestic defence. For the 
United States' authorities "the economic phase, [was] part of, but incident to the military 
package and not a program of economic development in the normal sense.”190 The 
Spaniards proposed to increase the appropriation for economic aid and to use the 
counterpart funds generated for direct support of the economy, rather than for bases 
construction. American officials in Spain believed that the relaxation of the then 
counterpart provisions was a convenient way to ease the expected adverse Spanish 
reaction and to help the recovery of their economy. An increased level of economic aid 
could also be essential to push the Spanish Government towards economic liberalisation. 
Ambassador Dunn believed that
"such a program might strengthen the hand within the Spanish 
Government of the supporter» of the liberalization of economic 
policies which, over the long run, is the best avenue to 
increase foreign private investment and trade so vitally 
necessary here. Unless this element is encouraged, it is 
possible that the forces which desire more government control 
may emerge even stronger.1,1,1
In April 1954, the Spanish Minister of Commerce announced to the Americans 
that the Spanish Government's intention to liberalise import trade was not feasible while 
Spain maintained a structural balance of payments deficit, which could only be controlled 
by exercising direct licensing controls. Reductions were necessary in Spanish imports from 
France, Germany, and other countries to which oranges were Spain's main export 
commodity. Increased wheat imports and decreased exchange earnings, caused by severe 
frosts during the 1953*54 winter, had more than offset the availability of American 
economic assistance and greatly limited Spain’s ability to proceed with its development 
programmes. Unfavourable crop conditions aggravated inflationary dangers, which further 
limited Spain’s ability to finance internal expenditures by credit expansion. Therefore, 
Minister of Commerce Arbunia hoped that the United States would increase aid for
>M. Ibid., "Memorandum by the Assistant Regional Director of the Office of 
European Operations of the FOA to the Deputy Director for Operations of the 
FOA", Washington, 13 November 1953, pp. 591-93, p. 592.
1M. Ibid.. Dunn to the Department of State, 9 April 1954, p. 1972.
332
general economic stabilisation and liberalisation, make available additional counterpart 
funds for general economic development purposes, and finance the support transportation 
and defence production facilities from military aid rather than from economic aid 
funds.192
The Americans rejected the Spanish proposals, and limited themselves to the 
possibility of speaking to third countries concerning the granting of easier terms for the 
recipients of their credit193 The possibility of private credits or direct Eximbank credits 
to Spain was mentioned also in compensation, which, in turn, Arburua disliked. Spain's 
foreign exchange commitments at short term (between three to six months credits) 
amounted already to $100-$ 120 million, and its longer term commitments (from six 
months to three or four years) to approximately $130-$150 million. The NSC recognised 
that the programme of aid could make no substantial progress toward remedying Spain's 
basic economic weakness. President Eisenhower recognised that in Spain, the defence 
programme could be successful only with a further strengthening of its economic 
base.194 Further unsuccessful attempts to compensate what the Spanish authorities 
perceived as an economically non-beneficial bilateral agreement continued during 
1956.195 This was not surprising!
The remedy of Spain’s basic economic weaknesses was neither the United States’ 
main objective nor part of their planned course of action. The economic aid, military’ aid, 
and base development programmes were implemented to best support the United States' 
military objectives in Spain, "insofar as practicable, avoiding adversely affecting Spain's 
economy."196 There was no mention of contributing towards Spain’s economic recovery
lw. Ibid.f Record of meeting between Arburua and certain United States 
representative», Washington, April 1954, pp. 1974-75; and "Memorandum of 
Conversation" by Stassen, Washington, 20 April 1954, pp. 1976-77.
1M. FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, Records of meetings between Arburua and 
United States representatives, Washington, April 1954, pp. 1974-77.
194, "Special message on the Mutual Security Program, April 20, 1955", in
Public Papers of the United States Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, 
Washington D.C. [U.S. Government Printing Office] 1959, p. 76.
1#5. See chapter seven, pp. 612 ff.
lM. FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 1, "Statement of Policy by the NSC", NSC 
5418/1 "U.S. Policy Towards Spain", Washington, 10 June 1954, p. 1982.
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and development. The U.S. Government’s economic objectives were limited to grant 
Spain that minimum amount of additional economic aid "necessary to insure internal 
stability in Spain so that the use of our bases there would not be jeopardized by civil 
disorders".197 By April 1955, it was agreed that only " if  the general economic 
conditions in Spain threatened the accomplishment of their objectives, would it be 
necessary to take "remedial steps such as urging appropriate adjustments in Spanish 
Government programs and policies, possibly revising the uses and amounts of U.S. 
assistance.”19* For fiscal year 1956, the American Administration requested a $28 
million defence support programme for Spain, and the Congress authorised to reserve at 
least $50 million on a grant basis for exclusive application to the Spanish programme.194 
The severe frosts in February 1956, which had damaged Spain’s principal foreign 
exchange earnings crop, led the executive branch to increase the aid programme to Spain 
by $10 million from funds at the disposal of the President.100
After February 1956, at least, the NSC considered the continuance of economic 
aid to Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, desirable "to assist them in achieving stability' and 
growth while maintaining necessary military forces."201 With such a broad goad in mind, 
the Administration requested $45 million in defence support aid, the Congress authorised 
$48 million, and the executive spent $59 million. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, C. 
Burke Elbrick, explained to the Foreign Relations Committee that economic aid to Spain
ir>. FRPS, 1955-1957, XXVII, Memorandum of Discussion at the 24 8th meeting 
of the NSCf Washington, 12 May 1955.
1M. Ibid., "Progress Report on NSC 5418/1 United States Policy Toward
Spain", report prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board, Washington, 
27 April 1955. Period of Report 9 June 1954 through 27 April 1955.
1,f. The specific mention of Spain aroused the ire of the President; 
"Approval of Appropriation Act for Mutual Security Program. Statement by the 
President", 2 August, The Department of State bulletin, vol. 33, no. 844, 
29 August 1955, pp. 362—63. The earmarking of specific sums for specific 
countries handicapped the bargaining power of the Administration, apart from 
having a injurious effect on other countries scheduled to receive lesser 
amounts, which then wished to be treated in similar fashion.
20°. Congress and the Nation, op., p. 175; and Report to Congress on the 
Mutual Security Program for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1956, Washington 
D.C. (U.S. Government Printing Office] 19^6, pp. 28-29.
291 • FRPS, 1955-1957, XXVII, "Memorandum of Discussion at the 27th meeting 
of the NSC", 27 February 1956, pp. 201-18, p. 214. See also NSC Report
5602/1, "Basic National Security Policy. Note by the Executive Secretary to
the NSC", ibid., 15 March 1956, pp. 244-68, p. 250.
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was designed only to make viable the construction and operation of the U.S. bases.202 
Economic aid was not designed to develop the Spanish economy, but simply to maintain 
an economic environment within which the bases could be properly operated.
For the Spanish economic authorities, the idea of requesting aid from the United 
States Government for liberalisation purposes fitted perfectly the logic of the bilateral 
USA-Spain bilateral relations and of the Pact itself. The original Spanish proposal 
consisted in exchanging the use of military facilities for economic assistance, which was 
to be subordinated to the implementation of a reasonable programme of economic 
liberalisation (independently from political changes), for the general rehabilitation of the 
Spanish economy.203 When the opening of the bilateral negotiations was announced, 
some in London thought that the United States would force the Spanish Government to 
undertake modifications of its current political and economic practices, which were the 
target of American ire. The liberalisation of the regime was considered to be the only 
quid pro quo to economic aid and military assistance by the United States.20*
During the course of the bilateral negotiations for the establishment of bases in 
Spain, the Americans had suggested that Spain join the main international organisations 
in Western Europe.205 In May 1953, Ambassador Dunn told the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee in executive session that this bilateral arrangement with Spain "may be the 
opening phase of getting Spain back into international cooperation and is certainly our 
purpose."106 Under the terms of the Economic Aid Agreement, the Spanish Government 
was asked to stabilise its currency, establish a realistic rate of exchange, balance the
203. United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Mutual 
Security Act of 1956. Hearings, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956, pp. 926-28.
,0i. See the opening citation in this chapter.
PRO, FO 371/96195: R.M. Saner to R.P. Heppel, 1st Secretary of the
British Embassy in Madrid after January, 28 May 1951.
205. PRO, FO 371/106047: Note of an interview with Arguelles, by Sir Hugh 
Ellis—Rees, British Permanent Delegate to and Chairman of the OEEC, Paris,
11 September 1953.
104. United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, European 
Problems: Selected Executive Session Hearing of the Committee, 1951-1956, 
Washington D.C. [U.S. Government Printing Office] 1980, vol. XV, p. 376.
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budget, stimulate competition in the domestic economy, and encourage international 
trade.*”
The amount of aid granted under the bilateral agreement, however, did not permit 
the implementation of such a programme, and the negotiations after the Pacts of Madrid 
showed the American unwillingness to provide any substantial aid to support any Spanish 
move towards trade liberalisation or payments multilateralisation. Unfortunately, the 
military considerations put forward by the United States Government modified 
substantially the terms and nature of die U.S.-Spain bilateral debate. Economic assistance 
was allocated exclusively for military purposes, and pressure for economic and/or political 
liberalisation, which represented a potential danger for achieving the U.S. military goals, 
was put aside.
For the Spanish, any stabilisation and liberalisation programme should be 
accompanied by substantia] financial assistance. For instance, when in the autumn of
1954, the idea of joining the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 
and the European Payments Union (EPU) was debated with passion within the Spanish 
Administration, a key element for many of the Spanish officials involved was the role to 
be played by the United States. American financial assistance to support those Spanish 
officials arguing in favour of closer Spanish association with those economic bodies on 
a European scale was naturally expected for several reasons. First, because the United 
States Government had helped other Western European countries to move along the road 
to multilateral free trade. Secondly, because Spain’s OEEC/EPU membership - 
independently of the final terms established- meant a strong revision of its economic 
practices, those same practices that the United States’ authorities had bitterly criticised 
since 1945. Finally, because OEEC/EPU membership represented the best move that the 
Spanish Government could have possibly attempted to fulfil the general undertakings 
assumed in the Economic Aid Agreement signed with the United States a few months
,0?. Article 2.1. b, •, g, and • of the Economic Aid Agreement; United State» 
Treaties, cit., pp. 1908-9.
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earlier.208 Notwithstanding these three reasons, American financial assistance was never 
provided to support the efforts of those within the Spanish Government and 
Administration who were working for a closer association of Spain with those 
organisations that the Americans, paradoxically, considered moving towards a world-wide 
non-discriminatory trade system!
It was not until the end of 1957 that the idea of helping the Spanish authorities 
to liberalise the economy appeared in the United States’ policy toward Spain:
"We will continue to keep Spanish economic and political 
developments under close scrutiny to evaluate realistic 
minimum aid programs for Spain, and seek to obtain positive 
action by the Spanish Government towards stabilizing the 
economy.
The immediate reason might have been that the economic turbulence, which was forecast 
if the necessary measures were not adopted, would have rendered utilisation of the bases 
difficult if not impossible.
American support for the set of initiatives announced in July 1959, which came 
be known as the Spanish Stabilisation Plan, proves that, even at the end of the 1950s, the 
American commitment to back economic liberalisation and stabilisation in Spain signified 
a weak additional effort (see table 4.5). Total international assistance granted to back 
the stabilisation measures was inserted into a single aid package amounting to $543 
million. American financial assistance was significant, but it implied no specific 
commitment beyond the strict terms of the 1953 bilateral agreements with the Spanish 
Government, except the amounts offered as counterpan funds. The U.S. Government had 
raised the percentage for domestic economic purposes to 90 per cent instead of the 
previous 30 per cent, allowing the Spanish Government to dispose of the corresponding 
$123 million mentioned in table 4.5. This was the result of almost six years of Spanish 
efforts to redress the terms of the original agreement and not due to the desire of the
20i. MAE, Leg. 10078, exp. 21: Report entitled "Posibilidad de ingreso de 
España en la Üni6n Europea de Pagos" for Arguelles, Madrid, 11 October 1954.
,w. Ibid., "Progress Report on Spain (NSC 5710/1, Approved by the President, 
May 14, 1957)", report prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board,
covering the period from 27 March 1957 through 8 October 1957, Washington,
3 October 1957, p. 586.
337
United States to provide more funds for general stabilisation. Proof that there was little 
of this attitude on the other side of the Atlantic comes from the very reduced amount ($40 
million) granted as defence support assistance -less than the economic assistance offered 
in 1952 after the approval of the Mutual Security Act of 1952.
TABLE 4.5
rOStXIGH SUPPORT TOR THE SPAKI8H STABILISATION PROGRAMS 
(in nil liona of dollars)
IMF drawings 75
OEEC credits 100
Funding of indebtedness owed to
OEEC member countries 45
Credits from U.S. Commercial banks* 70
Eximbank loans 30
P .L. 460 60
Grants under Defense Support Program 40
Counterpart Funds 123.3
TOTAL 543
Source: Joan Sarda Dexeus: "El Banco de España (1931-1962)", in El Banco de 
España. Dna historia econòmica, Madrid [Ferreira] 1970, pp. 421-79, p. 4 73; 
and the Department of State bulletin, vol. XLI, no. 1050, 10 August 1959, 
pp. 210-11. (*) Chase Manhattan Bank and the First National City Bank.
Beyond the terms of the 1953 bilateral agreements, $60 million were available for 
the purchase of surplus agricultural commodities through P I.. 480, and the Eximbank 
offered $30 million as loans. The Eximbank had been only a little more generous than in 
1952 and 1953 when it had offered two short-term loans for a total amount of $24 million 
for the purchase of raw cotton. The argument, used in the early 1950s, that Spain was a 
country offering poor attraction to investment, could no longer explain why the Eximbank 
acted more miserly than U.S. commercial banks. The explanation might one day come 
from the little interest paid by the State Department to the measures announced by the 
Spanish Government. PX. 480 funds supported economic stabilisation in the sense that 
they saved the expenditure of dollars and other foreign currencies concerning agricultural 
imports, but, on the other side, they forced the purchase of U.S. surplus agricultural 
products when harvests in 1958 and 1959 were abundant in all crops and allowed the
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highest wheat export figures from 1940 to 1964!210 One might have expected the 
Americans to transfer these funds to priority fields.
The International Monetary Fund, to which Spain had been admitted in July 1958, 
offered drawing rights for a total amount of $75 million. The European Monetary Fund, 
which was created by the European Monetary Agreement of 1955, but was brought into 
operation at the end of the life of the EPU, granted a credit of $75 million (available 
between August 1959 to February 1961), plus additional $25 million available until 
February 1962. To extend abundant credit from the resources of the European Fund was 
the second decision adopted by the OEEC concerning Spain; the first had been to 
announce Spain's full membership after January 1, 1960. The difference between the 
European and the American commitment to back Spanish stabilisation is that the Spanish 
loan was the largest amount granted since the inauguration of the European fund. While 
the IMF stabilisation loans represented 3.75 per cent of loans granted world-widely at the 
time by the IME ($2,000 million), the Spanish OEEC loans represented 50.4 per cent of 
those granted by the European Monetary Fund.211 In other words, specific and great 
attention was paid by the OEEC countries and their financial intruments to the economic 
stabilisation in Spain, while the United States maintained a « c o r d ia l»  policy. The 
financial support offered by the United States Government was extremely low when one 
considers that the economic reforms which the Spanish authorities were about to 
undertake had been urged for years by United States officials!
During the congressional debate for the Mutual Security Program in 1959, a gTeat 
deal of attention was devoted to the Spanish question. The problems addressed were 
continued utilisation of the bases and satisfactory operation of the base agreem ent. Aid 
to Spain was justified as a commercial transaction, as a quid pro quo for continued use
210. Carlo» Barciela: "El sector agrario desde 1936", in Estadísticas
históricas, op. cit., pp. 131-67, table 4.13, p. 150.
2U. Between 1956 and 1962 the European Monetary Fund granted $100 million 
to Spain, $71 million to Turkey, $15 million to Greece, and $12 million to 
Iceland; Graham L. Rees: Britain and the Postwar European Payments Systems, 
Cardiff (University of Wales Press) 1963. p. 264.
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of military facilities.212 The specific difficulties of the Spanish economy were ignored 
at the congressional hearings. It was not by chance that die so-called Stabilisation Plan 
was presented by the Spanish Government to the IMF and the OEEC for their approval 
and financial support.213
By the time Spain acceded to American economic assistance, the politics of 
productivity were historical memory. Industrial modernisation and stabilisation were 
substituted by strategic requirements. The American pressure for economic liberalisation 
was more a gesture to international public opinion than a policy commitment. During the 
bilateral negotiation process, pressure to modify’ the Spanish economic practices (i.e., 
multiple exchange rates, trade controls, and legislation on foreign investment limitations) 
was disregarded completely. This might have been due to the Americans' previous lack 
of success in imposing their views on these matters on other European countries. The 
well-known article X of the draft agreement presented to the European governments at the 
time of the Marshall Plan referred to a discussion at the International Monetary Fund in 
which specific exchange rate measures were to be adopted by the European countries 
whenever the United States so desired. After two months of negotiations with the United 
Kingdom, France, Denmark, and Sweden, on behalf of the OEEC, the clause in the draft 
agreement relating to exchange rates was supplanted by a statement that receiving 
countries would try to stabilise their currencies, maintain realistic rates of exchange, 
balance their budgets, oppose monopolies, attack bilateral trade agreements, and 
government import controls.214
As a mere administrative formality, this clause was transferred to the text of the 
agreement with Spain. If the American negotiators refrained from details of this nature, 
it was mainly because their energy was destined to Spain’s granting authorisation to
D.S. Congr.ss, Comnútt** on Appropriations: Mutual Sccurity
Appropriations for 1960 (and Relatad Agencies). Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operationa Appropriations, 86th Cong., lat Seas., 
1959.
311. Secretaria General Técnica de la Presidencia del Gobierno: Memorándum 
gue el Gobierno español dirige al F.M.I. y a la O.E.C.E., 30 de Junio de
1959, Madrid, 1965, reproducid in Viñas et al., opl c£t. # 2nd vol., pp. 
1431-42.
214. Brown and Opie, op. cit-, p. 158.
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construct and use military bases. United States’ aid was a quid pro quo for military 
facilities and not a means of stabilisation. Military considerations, which predominated 
over the negotiation process, emphasised the regime’s stability and continuity and not its 
modification. In sum, the complete subordination of official American aid programmes 
to military interests avoided any action directed at the progressive transformation of the 
political regime ruling Spain. More than ever, the Franco regime’s complete stability and 
immobility were useful for the United States’ military strategy in Western Europe.
Even today, "folk wisdom" still assigns an extraordinary importance to the 
American aid for the survival of the Franco regime. The future importance of American 
aid in easing commodity bottlenecks and industrial investment is irrelevant for the 
argument of this chapter. What matters to the argument of this research is that American 
economic assistance came too late, in too small quantities, and under too unfavourable 
terms to have provided for the salvation of the regime before 1955. Some researchers have 
presented the American aid as enabling "Spain to overcome the many bottlenecks in 
production resulting from the pursuit of autarky", and as helping Spain "to sustain the 
industrial boom of the fifties".215 This chapter has shown that this was not the case, at 
least, during the first half of the decade.
Economic assistance from the United States was the only foreign aid the Spanish 
economy received between 1950 and 1955. The total economic aid effectively delivered 
to Spain (as defence support assistance) until 16 May 1956 amounted to between $122.6 
million, according to Spanish officials, and $154 according to official American 
sources.216 Table 4.1 indicates that the effective economic aid to the Spanish economy 
on the basis of the agreements consisted of $127.1 millions during 1954 and 1955: $24.4 
under the concept of Defense Support Program, in 1954, and $31.3 million in 1955, plus
Quotation» are from Joseph Harrison: An Economic History of Modem
Spain. Manchester [Manchester University Press] 197B, p. 154, and Stephen 
Clissold: Spain, London [Thames and Hudson] 1969, p. 131, respectively.
AGA, C/36622, folder 2: OEEC, C/WP 11/W(56)17, WP no. 11 of the Council, 
"Association of Spain in the Work of the Organisation. Economic Structure 
of Spain. Comments of the Spanish Delegation on the document C/WP 11/W(56)2 
Annex", Paris, 18 June 1956; and AD, DE—CE 1945—1960, vol. 371: OEEC
C (56)201, "Conseil. Association de l'Espagne aux travaux de l'Organisation. 
Rapport du Groupe de Travail Special du Conseil", Annex A, "La situation 
économique de l'Espagne", Paria, 26 July 1956, p. 35.
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$55 million from the McCarran amendment and $16.4 million as Public Law no. 480 for 
agricultural surpluses. Despite the discrepancy in totals, economic aid effectively 
delivered to Spain by the above date was much lower than the total amount of 
authorised aid, i.e., $230 million (although, eventually, all aid authorised and obligated 
was delivered even if many years later).
The Spanish Government expressed "keen disappointment concerning the terms 
of the United States aid to Spain."217 Before 1955, American aid provided very little of 
the equipment necessary for Spanish economic development, and it did not ease the strain 
placed on the country’s foreign exchange resources by import needs under the 
development programmes. In November 1955, on the occasion of the first official visit 
of Secretary of State Dulles to Spain, Franco raised the question of economic aid, showing 
his and his Government’s dissatisfaction with the aid programme.21* According to 
Martin Artajo, 44 per cent of the economic aid authorised by the Congress of the United 
States after the signature of the Madrid Pact in September 1953 had been assigned to 
purchase agricultural surpluses. The percentage would increase to 63.5 per cent when P.L. 
480 funds were added. This was a proportion which appeared "excessive by any 
yardstick".21* The Spanish Government requested continuously a much larger supply of 
raw materials and consumer and capital goods.220
The amount of aid was considered totally insufficient "to satisfy the Spanish needs 
after years of difficulties."221 On 16 May 1955, Franco declared to the Cortes that the
1X\  FRÜS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, "Memorandum of Conversation" with José 
Maria de Areilza Ambassador in Washington after 6 November 1954, by the 
Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs, Washington, 16 November 1954, 
p. 2000.
21#. FRÜS, 1957-1959, XXVII, Memoranda of Conversation with General Franco, 
Madrid, 5 November 1955, p. 552. Secretary Dulles visited Madrid from the 
Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers in Paris.
219• MAE, Leg. 7741, exp. 3: Artajo to U.S. Ambassador John Lodge (March 
1955—April 1961), Madrid, 21 June 1956 (English version in FRUS, 1955-1957, 
XXVTI, p. 575).
220. I.e., ibid., Memorandum of conversation between the Secretary of State 
and the Ambassador to Spain and the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Ambassador to the United States, with their respective teams, Department of 
State, Washington, 10 April 1956, p. 566.
221. Minister of Commerce Arburüa: Cinco aftos al frente del Ministerio de 
Comercio (Piscursos y Declaraciones: 1951-1956), Madrid, 1956, p. 196.
342
effect of U.S. aid on the Spanish economy was not yet visible.”  In October 1956, the 
French Ambassador in Madrid stated that, three years after the signing of the bilateral 
agreements, none of the original plans had been finished.223 This was in significant 
contrast to what Franco, in submitting the agreement to the Cortes for approval, called "a 
mile-stone in contemporary Spanish foreign policy."224 If one could suggest that 
American military intervention in Europe when Marshall Aid was running out had saved 
European resources which could then be used for economic recovery and that American 
military intervention had facilitated capital investment in Western Europe, this was 
certainly not the case in Spain between 1950 and 1955.
After 1947, the Spanish Government continuously requested approximately $1.300 
million (in addition to normal imports) in the form of a short-term import programme for 
the modernisation and stabilisation of the Spanish economy.225 More modestly, the 
British Embassy in Madrid reported in March 1950 that "to bring Spain to an economic 
level consonant with a partnership position with the Western nations" would require the 
expenditure of about $1,000 million in assistance from abroad.226 The Banco Urquijo 
put the special imports required over the period from 1950 to 1955 to place the Spanish 
economy "on a sound footing” at nearly $500 million, divided into roughly $300 million 
for machinery and industrial equipment, $90 million for raw materials, and something 
over $100 million for other manufactured goods and agricultural equipment.227 The 
Banco Urquijo’s import programme was not expected to bring about the major 
development of the Spanish economy, but rather to entail an annual increase in imports 
of 25 to 30 per cent above the 1949 level. On average, American economic assistance 
(including private U.S. banks loans) represented approximately $49 million per year
J. Le* Shneidman: Spain and Franco. 1949-1959. Quest for International 
Acceptance. New ïork [Facts on File] 1973, p. 124.
,I*. AD, DE-CE 1945-1960, vol. 371: Georges de la Tournelle to Christian 
Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs February 1956 to May 1956, "A.S. du
troisième anniversaire de la signature des accords hispano-américains”, 
Madrid, 3 October 1956.
” 4. PRO, FO 371/113033: Report IR-6634, cit.
” 5. See chapter three, section three, and infra pp. 269—70.
***. Estimate given in PRO, FO 371/96195: "Possible entry of Spain into
OEEC", 10 March 1951.
**’. Ibid.
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between 1950 and 1955 (accounted for primarily by expenditures for foodstuffs and cotton 
imports from the United States). This amount was far from the most modest estimates of 
Spanish import requirements in assistance from abroad. On a year-basis, only in 1955 did 
the Spanish economy receive the annual amount of assistance that the Banco Urquijo had 
demanded half a decade earlier.
4.5. Conclusions
The physical resources for the import programmes needed to place the Spanish 
economy on a "sound footing" were no longer available from the United States. The total 
economic assistance from the United States to Spain between 1950 and 1955 was a mere 
drop in the ocean of Spam’s needs. Most of the weaknesses of the Spanish economy were 
structural, impossible to overcome in the short run. The vulnerability of the Spanish 
economy to drought; the low productivity of agriculture and industry due to lack of 
resources, investment, replacement of obsolete plant and equipment; the uneven 
development of interdependent economic sectors causing major bottlenecks that prevented 
the full and stable utilisation of existing productive capacity; and the weakness of the 
foreign trade position extremely dependent on agricultural exports which, in mm, 
depended on weather and foreign markets conditions beyond the control of the Spanish 
authorities required more than a few years of limited American aid!
The defence support programme for Spain certainly did not make Spain 
economically dependent upon the United States. This might have occurred with the 
implementation of an extensive economic assistance programme over several years. 
However, the large-scale development of the Spanish economy was not necessary for the 
United States to gain its strategic objectives. An immediate cessation of United States’ 
assistance would certainly have worsened Spain’s dollar position, but not irreparably since 
the Government would have offset it by reimposing rigid import controls on dollar goods. 
The small amount of dollar aid had a very limited effect on the Spanish productive 
capacity, which would have continued its slow transformation and modernisation even 
without dollar assistance. The Spanish economy would have probably adjusted to a sudden
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termination of United States aid, just as it had adjusted to the loss of other transitory' 
advantages such as the Argentine aid and the stock-piling programmes following the 
outbreak of hostilities in Korea.
In a way, American credits made a difference. It was not that American economic 
assistance represented a major force driving Spain back to the international organisations, 
but rather that the lack of assistance postponed Spain’s full incorporation into those of a 
European scope despite the Spanish Government’s intention to move towards freer and 
multilateral trade. This chapter has provided the first such example: in April 1954 when 
the Spanish Government requested American assistance in order to implement import 
liberalisation, the Americans rejected the proposal. Additional examples will be provided 
in chapters five and seven. If an American offer of aid to support the initial debit position 
of Spain within EPU had come at the end of 1954, it would have eased the OEEC’s 
acceptance of Spanish membership because a higher degree of compliance with the 
OEEC/EPU rules could have been imposed upon Spain with lesser disruptive effects on 
the OEEC trade liberalisation programme. It would have also eased the Spanish 
Government’s final decision in favour of joining OEEC/EPU, because the economic 
impact of import liberalisation would have been at least softened by adding American 
financial assistance to EPU credits. With a minimum American commitment in terms of 
a d  hoc dollar assistance, the Spanish Government could have joined OEEC when the 
European agricultural conference was transferred to it; without it Spain joined the OEEC 
when this body was no more than a statistical office and the EPU had disappeared.
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"Any question of recognising Franco would arouse 
tremendous resentment in all parties. So long as we 
were only dealing with trade and similar questions 
that were not political, there was no difficulty.” 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman and 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin to the U.S. Secretary 
of State George C. Marshall, October 19481
"Spain considers herself a part of everything that 
affects Western Europe."
Francisco Franco, November 19482
5.1. Introduction
Bilateral agreements were the basic instrument for channelling and financing trade 
among most of the countries of the non-dollar world and of the OEEC before the
1. PRO, FO 371/73337: Extract from "Record of Meeting at the Quai d'Orsay 
on 4th October 1948".
2. Franco to the New York Times, 12 November 1948, cit. in Manuel Sassot 
Cañadas: "Actitud española ante la integración eutopea", Revista de Estudios 
Politicos, no. 158, March-April 1968, pp. 5-25, p. 7.
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establishment of the European Payments Union (henceforth, EPU).5 At the time of 
Marshall's speech in Harvard, the number of trade and payments agreements in force was 
about two hundred.4 Even the Marshall Plan, which was launched as the definitive step 
towards European unification, was implemented through executive bilateral agreements 
between the United States and each of the receiving countries. Intra-European trade 
remained at an almost barter stage based on discrimination, quantitative restrictions, direct 
controls over foreign exchange, and other trade barriers until trade liberalisation, backed 
by an effective mechanism for setting off balances multilaterally, was fully effective. Even 
then, bilateralism subsisted. By October 1954, there were approximately ninety bilateral 
agreements and similar agreements in force between EPU members; in general, there were 
about 235 agreements between pairs of European countries.9
Spain had been an efficient pan of the network of bilateral agreements that 
allowed the resumption of intra-European trade among soft-currency countries without 
waiting for the solution of the chronic hard-currency shortage. However, contrary to what 
became the future European pattern, Spanish trade remained conducted exclusively on a 
bilateral basis during the entire period under consideration. Spain's main trading features 
were quantitative restrictions, a narrow licencing system, the administrative concession of 
foreign exchange at a multiplicity of exchange rates, and several practices directed to the 
promotion of exports (i.e.. compensation, combined accounts for exports and imports, and 
import surcharges combined with export subsidies), all of which were conducted through 
bilateral agreements for trade and payments.
3. For the degree of protectionism and trade discrimination of the years
after 1945 and the differences between this period and the 1930s see Gardner 
Patterson and Judd Polk: "The Emerging Pattern of Bilateralism** The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. €2, no. 1, November 1947, pp. 118—43; 
William Diebold Jr.: Trade and Payments in Western Europe. A Study in
Economic Cooperation 1947-51, New York {Harper £ Brothers] 1952, pp. 15 ff.; 
Johan H.C. de Looper: "Current Usage of Payments Agreements and Trade
Agreements'*, International Monetary Fund Papers, vol. 4, 1955, pp. 339-98; 
Alan S. Milward: The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, London
[Methuen] 1987, pp. 216 ff.; and Richard T. Griffiths: "The Stranglehold of 
Bilateralism**, in Griffiths (ed.) : The Netherlands and the Integration of 
Europe 1945—1957, Amsterdam [NEHA] 1990, pp. 1—26.
4. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, Economic Commission for
Europe (henceforth, ECE): A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects
of Europe, Geneva, 1948. A Spanish reduced version was published in Revista
de Economla Politics, vol. 3, nos. 1-2, May-September 1951, pp. 90-143.
9. de Looper, art. cit., p. 340.
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Whether Spanish bilateralism was an option consciously adopted by the Francoist 
State as a function of domestic interest groups or part of its ideology, is of no interest 
here.6 Juan Antonio Suanzes, Spanish Minister of Industry and Commerce and known as 
the most autharchic of all the Spanish officials, explained the importance of trading in 
very simple terms:
"The serious limitations on the required imports from abroad 
provoke disturbances out of proportion and superior to the 
value of imports not purchased. The impossibility of importing 
them affects to the entire industrial circle and to finished 
products of a value many times higher and, in occasions, of 
difficult or impossible substitution, with an impact on 
essential aspects of production and labour".’
For the purpose of this chapter, the basic choice was between autarchy and maintaining 
the existing bilateral system and trying to make it more flexible and beneficial. Between
1948 and 1955, Spanish participation in the organisations promoting trade liberalisation 
and multilateral settlements of outstanding balances was barred from consideration in the 
western capitals. However, bilateral agreements represented the first step away from 
national autarchy and toward the resumption of international trade and payments. The 
absence of a bilateral agreement with a non-dollar country frequently meant that trade 
with this country took place only under rigidly balanced barter arrangements (the so-called 
"compensations"), if at all. In such case, bilateralism loses part of its "evil” nature and 
becomes a trade-creating device.
*. Some authors explain that bilateral and restrictive trade practices were 
an essential part of the Franco regime's philosophy and were, thus, 
difficult to renounce. See Juan Carlos Jiménez: "Las consecuencias
económicas de la guerra civil (una nota sobre los artículos publicados en 
el núm. 21 de la revista Economistas, bajo el titulo «Economía española, 
1936>>)", Revista de Historia Económica, no. 1, 1961, pp. 121—30, in
particular pp. 124-25; and Raymond Carr: Modern Spain 1875-1980, Oxford 
(Oxford University Press] 1980, p. 739, repeated in Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi 
Aizpurúa: Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy, London [George Allen & Unwin] 
1979, pp. 50-51. It is important to notice, however, that the maintenance 
of trade through bilateral channels were felt to provide no advantage, i.e., 
Manuel de Torres: Preface to Albert 0. Hirschman: La potencia económica y 
la estructura del comercio exterior (published originally as Nation Power 
and the Structure of Foreign Trade], Madrid (Aguilar] 1950; and Antonio de 
Torres Espinosa, Spanish Under-Secretary of Commerce: La industrialización 
del pals y sus interrelaciones con el comercio exterior. Problema de un 
futuro próximo, Madrid (Oficina de Estudios Económicos del Ministerio de 
Comercio] T55T, text of a speech on 23 June.
\  Speech in April 1951 quoted in "La exportación en la economía española", 
Información Comercial Española, no. 348, August 1962, pp. 75—85, p. 80.
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i6 After 1949, export trade maintained the responsibility for financing imports of 
' '^ f te h in e ry  and raw materials necessary’ for reconstruction plans. The Spanish 
Administration's appeals for foreign assistance, which could have provided imports with 
no drain on reserves, went mainly unheard. Although confronted by perennial shortages 
of basic foodstuffs and blockages in industrial production, borrowing from abroad to 
finance imports was not a feasible option. Spain’s non-participation in the financial aid 
arrangements for European countries (i.e., the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation (henceforth, OEEC) distributing United States' financial aid and the EPU's 
automatic credits) ruled out the possibility of international financial assistance for 
purposes of economic reconstruction and growth. With no access to Marshall Aid, with 
few remittances from emigrants, and reduced income from tourism, Spain was obliged to 
keep imports strictly within the available means of payment derived from visible expons.
When foreign currency earnings must rely on exports, especially agricultural 
exports, specific attention should be paid to Western Europe in order to understand 
Spain’s foreign economic policy during the final years of the 1940s and the early 1950s. 
The OEEC countries occupied a large proportion in Spain’s trade: 56.3 per cent of total 
exports and 46.6 per cent of total imports in the period from 1949 to 1955 (see tables 1 
and 2). They were natural markets for Spain's main export items and suppliers of 
manufactured goods. While Spain's exports to Western Europe suffered the variability of 
agricultural crops and measures for domestic protection, imports from OEEC countries 
constantly increased their proportion in Spain’s total imports; from 19.79 per cent in 1947 
to 69.5 per cent in 1955 (see tables 1 and 2). Trade with Western Europe, thus, appeared 
to be strategic for overcoming some of the bottlenecks to sustained economic 
development The EPU, mainly the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, constituted 
the leading customer for as well as taker from the Spanish Monetary Area throughout the 
early 1950s (see table 5.1).
It is worth noticing that Spain’s total exports expanded very weakly; exports 
augmented 19.8 per cent between 1948 and 1955 (see tables 2 and 4.1). This was an 
extremely low performance if one considers that world's exports increased 56.2 per cent 
in that same period, and continental western Europe's total exports (excluding Yugoslavia
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TABLE 5 . 1
DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN TRADE OF THE SPANISH MONETARY AREA 
BY MAIN MONETARY AREAS AND MAIN PARTNERS, 1950-1955
(in percentage*)
EXPORTS IMPORTS
Monetary Areas 1950 1953 1954 1955 1950 1953 1954 1955
EPU Area 55 64 61 64 52 63 61 59of which:-Sterling area 24 19 21 19 15 14 14 15-Germany 3 13 11 15 4 12 11 10-France 7 8 7 6 8 11 9 11Dollar Area 21 15 15 17 24 21 23 24of which:-OSA 15 11 10 10 15 12 18 19Latin American countries
outside the dollar area 7 4 4 7 11 5 5 6Rest of the world 17 17 20 12 13 11 11 11
Source: AD, DE-CE, vol. 371: OEEC, Conseil, Doc. C (56)201: "Association de l'Espagne aux travaux de 
l'organisation. Rapport du groupe de travail spécial du conseil. Appendice à lfAnnexe A", Paris, 25 
July 1956, Annex A, Pans, 17 July 1956.
and Finland) increased 145.7 per cent* Nevertheless, the argument here is one of quality. 
Spain’s trade relations did not allow rapid trade expansion or economic transformation, 
but kept the Spanish economy away from collapse. During the period from 1948 to 1955, 
Spain’s imports increased 28 per cent (continental western Europe’s imports increased 
72.6 per cent) and helped the Spanish economy to proceed to an important rate of 
expansion in the 1950s, which represented Spain’s first post-1945 period of economic 
growth.
Between 1946 and 1949 Spain’s GDP multiplied 1.4 times; it multiplied 2.5 times 
between 1949 and 1956.’ The increase of GDP during the five first years of the 1950s 
was 129 per cent higher, in per capita terms, than the increase between 1945 and 1950.10 
The sectoral composition of Spain’s GDP varied accordingly to the industrial growth rate 
attained in the early 1950s. Industrial production increased at a rate of 6.6 per cent of 
annual growth from 1951 to 1955, while it had been of 1 per cent between 1946 and
*. United Nations: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1957, vol.
I, New York, 1956.
*. Julio Alcaide: "üna revisión urgente de la aerie de renta nacional
española en el siglo XX", Datos básicos para la historia financiera de 
España, 1850-1975, vol. I, Madrid (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales] 1976, pp. 
1127-50, reproduced in Albert Carreras: "La renta y la riqueza", in Carreras 
(ed) : Estadísticas Históricas de España. Siglos XIX y XX, Madrid [Fundación 
Banco Exterior] 1989 (henceforth referred to as Estadísticas históricas), 
pp. 533-88, table 13.5, p. 553.
10. At constant pesetas of 1970; ibid, table 13.13, p. 562.
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1950.” At the same time, an increase in the volume of imports of capital goods, in 
absolute as well as in relative terms, took place.12 Fifty per cent of the capital 
investments in place in 1963 corresponded to acquisition of equipment in the first half of 
the 1950s.u
The fact that Spanish bilateralism did not collapse within the context of countries 
moving toward multilateral cooperation in trade and payments requires an explanation. 
This chapter aims to show the effect of the early institutional forms of European economic 
cooperation on Spain’s trade performance. It will determine how effectively Spain was 
excluded from the benefits deriving from the proscription of non-tariff forms of 
discrimination between OEEC members, as well as the consequences of its exclusion from 
the benefits of the EPU’s multilateral settlements mechanisms. This case-study is 
particularly interesting because Spain was the only western European country’ excluded 
from the OEEC and the EPU.
Records of bilateral trade talks proved to be an important source, because, as will 
be shown, concessions from individual countries in terms of extending a similar OEEC 
treatment to Spain on specific commodities was an important subject when negotiating the 
signing or renewal of trade and payments agreements during the 1950s. Future research 
should try to systematise this set of records, at present spread over the different 
adm inistrative archives. An attempt should be made to create entire series -either by 
commodities or by countries- in order to derive more precise conclusions than the ones 
obtained from the study of Spain's trade relations with the United Kingdom, France, and 
Western Germany. Altogether these three markets passed from accounting for 31 per cent 
of Spain’s export trade in value in 1948 to 39 per cent in 1955. On average, for the period 
from 1948 to 1955, all three countries accounted for 35 per cent of Spain's export trade. 
France accounted for 8.8 per cent, Germany for 7.5 per cent, and the lion’s share
n . Carrcrtj; "La industri«", in Estadlsticas hiatòricaa. pp. 169-247, table 
5.14, pp. 192-93.
lJ. Banco da Orquijo: a) La economia eapaflola tn 1952-53, Madrid, 1954; b) 
Tha Spaniah Economv. 1954—56. Madrid, 1957.
11. Miniaterio da Industria: "Eatudio aobre laa invaraionaa industriale» an
algrunoa aaetores induatrialaa an al periodo 1925-1962", in Economia
Industriai, no. 1, January 1964.
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corresponded to the United Kingdom (18.5 per cent).14
The fact that the United Kingdom and France were Spain’s leading customers and 
suppliers in Europe becomes more important when one considers that the outspoken 
political dislike of both countries for the Franco regime was intense during the period 
under consideration. The attitude of the Spanish authorities towards them was influenced 
by a number of real and imagined grievances used as safety-valves for popular discontent. 
The Spanish Government resented the British and French because it considered they were 
the primary instigators of the evils the Spaniards were suffering and that they were 
responsible for Spain’s exclusion from Western European regional arrangements. 
Notwithstanding the declared political hostility against Spain, this chapter will show that 
bilateral trade continued to be uninfluenced by political differences.
5.2. Trade as the Alternative Course of Action
Spanish Foreign Minister Alberto Martin Artajo declared that, after the signing 
of the Pact of Madrid in September 1953, the Spanish Government was finally "free to 
act and can concentrate the whole of its attention to the theatre of European 
diplomacy."15 This sentiment, which has been widely accepted ever since, was mere 
propaganda. Although Western Europe was not on the list of declared priorities of Spanish 
foreign policy, it constituted the essential element of Spanish foreign economic policy 
since the end of World War n. USA-Spain relations have captured researchers’ 
imagination because they have been placed within the so-called high politics, Western 
Europe, on the other hand, has been perceived as a scattered bloc dealing with such low  
politics as trade and technical matters. In this case, regardless of labels, high politics 
were ineffective, and trade, payments, and other technical matters were rather more
14. United Nations: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (various
years). It includes gold and excludes trade with the Canary Islands, Spanish 
Morocco, Guinea, and Spanish territories in North Africa.
15. MAE, Leg. 3503, exp. 23: "Las consecuencias de los acuerdos de Madrid", 
November 1953, cit. in Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares and Antonio Moreno 
Juste: "La España franquista en el proceso de construcción europea (1945- 
1970)", Storia delle relazioni internazionali (forthcoming).
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effective in providing relief to the Spanish economic and political system.
Most countries in Western Europe considered bilateral trade with Spain 
independently from political considerations. This attitude had been temporary’ shadowed 
by the strong ideological commitments made at the time of launching and securing the 
Marshall Plan. Once the European Recovery Plan (henceforth, ERP) was a reality’, most 
West European governments had taken the line that they continued to disapprove of the 
Franco regime as a political system, but that they were willing, in the interest of Europe, 
to cooperate economically, as they did with other countries whose system of government 
they did not approve.
How could Spain be excluded from the programme of viability, i.e.. the return of 
the European economies to a state which would allow them, without requiring continued 
dollar assistance, to move towards a world-wide non-discriminatory trade system and to 
the general convertibility of currencies by 1952/53? This question bad been asked more 
than once by national delegates to the OEEC, although always outside of the Council 
room. As the OEEC’s primary purpose was to increase the resources of food and raw 
materials outside the dollar area, some thought was inevitably given to a country which 
was geographically inseparable from the group and had rich deposits of high grade iron 
ores, potash and pyrites, as well as zinc, lead, mercury, wolfram, cork, rosin, and many 
other raw materials. In April 1948, Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees, from the British Treasury and a 
member of the British delegation to the OEEC. informed the Foreign Office that the 
"Spanish products are more in demand in this country than ever before; that many of them 
would be irreplaceable except against dollar expenditure and that to take an objective view 
Spain must be regarded as an indispensable unit in the Western European econom y."16 
Sir Edmund Hall-Patch, leader of the British delegation to the OEEC and Chairman of its 
Executive Committee, bluntly stated that if Spain’s productive capacity could be brought 
into the scope of the ERP, "the participating countries would gain much greater 
advantages than at present, when each of them tries to make, without much publicity, a
PRO, FO 371/73350: £lli*-R»«» to FO, "Spain", 22 April 1948.
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separate bargain on a bilateral basis."17 It was then clear that European competition 
continued unaltered to obtain whatever Spain had to sell of any material interest.
In a meeting early in October 1948 with his French and British counterparts, 
Robert Schuman and Ernest Bevin, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, confessed that 
he ignored how to obtain any change in the political as well as economic situations in 
Spain. The Spanish economy had received no assistance, but Franco was strengthened not 
weakened by a policy of foreign ostracism. The allied policy represented a difficult 
compromise between complete isolation and economic boycott, on the one hand, and an 
attempt to get close to and influence the Spanish Government, on the other. It had the 
disadvantages of both and the effectiveness of neither. Bevin and Schuman agreed 
immediately with Marshall, but objected that any step that could be interpreted as 
recognition of the Franco government would involve serious political complications for 
their respective governments.1* Based on public opinion in Western Europe, the Spanish 
problem had only one definitive solution: the removal of Franco and his regime and their 
replacement by a democratic government. A temporary solution, however, could be 
instrumented through trade and technical cooperation.
Most governments in Western Europe seemed to share the sentiment that assisting 
Spain’s economic recovery was necessary and maybe even a step toward advancing its 
return to the democratic fold, but that to join hands with Franco compromised their 
political and moral positions. This would have caused difficulties with democratic 
populaces and even within West European governments themselves. They agreed with the 
idea of readmitting Spain into various technical organisations (leaving aside military 
organisations) where Spain's absence was detrimental to their work. This process could 
always be explained on an a d  h o c  basis for individual agencies and the effect could be
PRO, FO 371/79710: Hall-Patch to Roy Makins, British Deputy Under­
secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (until December 1952), Paris, 21 
October 1948.
l*. FRUS, 1946, III, Memorandum by Marshall of conversation with Schuman and 
Bevin, Paris, 4 October, p. 1054, Schuman and Bevin persuaded Marshall to 
very cautious about Spain, according to the record of Marshall's 
conversation with James Forrestal, United States Secretary of Defense 
(September 1947-March 1949); Walter Millis (ed.): The Forrestal Diaries, New 
York [The Viking Press] 1951, p. 502, corresponding to a meeting with 
Marshall on 10 October 1948.
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distributed over a long period of time.19
The Spanish question at the United Nations received initial attention by foreign 
ministers because periodic discussions in the General Assembly had made the Franco 
regime an emotional issue that frustrated any possible change of direction. The United 
States led the movement to render ineffective the operative parts of the 1946 Resolution. 
The United Nations* General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1946 had 
recommended the recall from Madrid of the ambassadors of member states, and declared 
Franco's Spain unworthy of membership in international agencies established by or related 
to the United Nations. The Europeans did not want to consider the abolition of the moral 
questioning of the Franco regime and the immediate return of ambassadors to Madrid. All 
Western European countries maintained that they could not place themselves in the 
position whereby the Communists could exploit the Franco issue against parties in power 
and the non-communist left The decision adopted then was to avoid any further 
retaliatory policy, because it had indeed strengthened franco's dictatorship.20 The 
European consensus did not imply, however, to move very quickly in the direction of the 
American intentions. Schuman expressed the view that repealing totally the 1946 
Resolution could cause die fall of his government31 The United Nations debate, at this 
stage, revealed that the western bloc was unable to agree on a common solution to the 
question. The East-West ideological conflict and the fear of providing grain for the 
communist mill made impossible any positive steps towards the adoption of a common 
policy to eliminate the Franco regime from the list of international problems. The debate 
at the United Nations showed further that relations with Spain should be dealt with as a 
technical matter, leaving aside political issues.
**. Bevin and Schuman were joined in this opinion by the Minister* of 
Foreign Affairs of the Benelux countries, Messrs. Paul-Henri Spaak, Dirk U. 
Stikker and Joseph Bech; PRO, FO 371/73338: Extract from the "Record of a 
meeting of the Consultative Council [of the Brussels Treaty countries] held 
at the Quai d'Orsay at 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. on October 26th, 1948".
,c. Ibid., "Extract from Meeting held at the Quai d'Orsay", 27 October 1948.
21. FRUS, 194 9, IV, Memorandum by G, Hayden Raynor, the Special Assistant to 
the Director of the Office of European Affairs (John D. Hickerson), 
Washington, 19 January 1949, p. 721. Even the possibility for Spain to 
accede to the harmless 1928 International Convention on economic statistics 
(discussed in November 1948) had provoked strong reaction in some Western 
countries; ibid., foonote 7 on p. 723.
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There was no need to remind the Americans that Franco was a problem mainly 
governed by politics, and very difficult politics too. For Europeans, trade contributed to 
the relief of the Spanish economy and escaped public criticisms. When the Scandinavian 
foreign ministers, meeting in conference on 23-24 February 1948, agreed to normalise 
trade relations with Spain, they clarified that it did not imply any change in diplomatic 
relations with the Spanish Government.22 On the one hand, bilateral trade would take 
place outside the popular ERP and, thus, it could hardly be perceived as strengthening 
Franco’s authoritarian regime. On the other hand, bilateral trade would channel what the 
Spanish economy could offer to the economies of Western Europe, and foreign exchange 
so earned would prevent the collapse of the Spanish economy. Aside from some 
reservations of a political nature against Franco’s regime, the need to help Spain in its 
economic rehabilitation and, after June 1950, to obtain from that country some strategic 
raw materials for rearmament programmes seemed obvious.
In general, trade between Spain and the Western European countries was 
conducted on the basis of precisely defined goods, mostly so-called "essentials'’ 
accompanied by "non” or "less essentials" as counterpart to which each partner agreed to 
issue licences up to a quota (specified either in quantity or value) during the period 
covered by the agreement (usually one year). "Essential” imports were those commodities 
considered necessary to feed the population and to implement the Spanish Government's 
plans for general economic rehabilitation. Consequently, import licences were generally 
granted only for the more essential needs to prevent the drain of the country’s scarce 
reserves of convertible currencies and gold. As a general rule, the Spanish authorities 
reserved foreign exchange for import foodstuffs and tobacco, industrial raw materials (in 
particular petroleum products, cotton, wool, rubber, wood pulp, phosphate, copper), 
machinery (particularly hydro-electric plant, mining machinery, industrial equipment, 
public works machinery, motor vehicles -mainly lorries-, tractors and agricultural 
machinery, railway material, and scientific and precision instruments), chemicals, and, 
lastly, a limited number of drugs. Licences were generally not issued for goods which 
could be manufactured in Spain regardless price and quality. Imports of competitive goods
,J. FRPS. 1948, III, th« U.S. Ambassador in Norway to Marshall, Oslo, 25 
February, pp. 31—32.
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were allowed in only when Spanish production was outstandingly inadequate to meet 
domestic demand. Less essentials were goods of a range of consumer and capital goods, 
which varied from country to country and in time. Their common characteristic was that 
they were of secondary importance in the use of the always limited foreign exchange 
resources. Licences were granted for less essentials when they were demanded by the 
partner in order to secure export and import quotas for essentials. Without some form of 
restraint, Spain probably would have spent nothing on imports of less essential goods, 
since it was chronically short of foreign exchange.
Bilateral trade agreements were complemented by payments agreements which 
defined the method of financing trade. The system by which outstanding balances (after 
the two central banks had offset their mutual claims and debts) required settlement in gold 
and/or hard currencies at relatively brief intervals was replaced by one providing for 
longer periods. The new system also provided for toe introduction of the so-called 
"swings", whereby exporters in the creditor country received payment without having to 
wait for importers in the debtor country to make full payment into the corresponding 
account so as to save the debtor the need of paying in dollars and/or gold. The swings or 
"mutual credit margins" established the amounts of inconvertible credit within which 
Spain and its partner limited their respective debtor and creditor positions to avoid 
settlements in either gold or hard currency. Frequently, swings were not paid at the end 
of a bilateral agreement’s life, and thus acted as long-term reciprocal commercial credits, 
instead of financing temporary swings in bilateral balances of trade. Spain maintained 
swing credits with all continental OEEC countries except Austria.
Reciprocal swing credits provided limited flexibility in trade. On the one hand, 
Spain could import from the partner without the need to maintain a strict bilateral trade 
balance until the deficit in the clearing account reached the authorised limit. On the other 
hand, most European countries did not have to limit their sales to the value of Spanish 
purchases of their goods. Increases in the credit margins favourable to Spain were difficult 
to obtain because the Spaniards could not provide any satisfactory exchange guarantee, 
and commercial partners found it very difficult to obtain settlement of any substantial 
Spanish deficit. Contrary to the EPU agreements, where the credit element was provided
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by the clearing union mechanism independently of the amounts and number of 
transactions involved, or the sterling agreements which did not require a bilateral balance 
of trade between any two particular countries, the Spanish Monetary Area benefited only 
from limited credit lines established on the basis of a routine anticipation of time-to-time 
fluctuations in the bilateral balance of trade.
Within this framework, a bilateral balancing of trade was compulsory, once all 
quotas were utilised and credit swings allowed by the partner exhausted. When the 
bilateral balance exceeded the agreed credit provisions, the debtor country was committed 
to settle the difference in gold or dollars (the so-called "gold point"). The credit margins 
authorised were normally respected by Spain, which tried to conserve its dollar holdings 
for imports from the dollar area. Frequently, however, the balances in excess of permitted 
swings were usually not adhered to in practice. As we shall see, in the desire to maintain 
trade with Spain, Europeans expanded the swings, provided additional short-term 
commercial credits, and improved the conditions under which certain commodities were 
exported by Spain.
There was no country in Western Europe that rejected trade with Spain. The 
Netherlands and Denmark renewed their previous commercial arrangements with Spain 
in March 1948, and again in May and July 1950, respectively. Sweden signed a bilateral 
trade agreement in July 1948, which was complemented with a protocol in November
1948 and January 1951. Iceland did so in December 1948. In March 1949 a trade 
agreement with the Belgium-Luxembourg Union took place to import locomotives, and 
a proper trade and payments agreement was signed in April 1949 and renewed in June 
1950; again in December 1952 -with a credit of 700 million Belgian francs for the 
purchase of equipment goods and iron and steel products; and again in February 1954 up 
to 31 January 1955. Switzerland signed a bilateral trade and payments agreement in May
1949 that was complemented with a protocol in December. Italy traded with Spain on the 
basis of the bilateral trade and payments agreement signed in August 1947 that was 
renewed in November 1949 and again (with a protocol) in October and November 1950. 
Norway signed a trade and payments agreement in January 1950. Greece signed a bilateral 
trade agreement in February 1950 and again in February 1954. Portugal continued to
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renewed periodically its commercial arrangements and entered into an Economic 
Cooperation Agreement with Spain in July 1949. For those countries lacking a trade 
agreement with Spain (i.e.. Austria), bilateral trade was carried on global compensation 
accounts.23
The recovery of trade with Germany, formerly an important market for Spanish 
exports, was slow. The first agreement providing for commercial transactions between 
Spain and the western zones under allied control was a mere quota list signed in 
December 1948, which was renewed in April and in November 1949.34 The recovery of 
Germany's economy and the end of the Allies’ physical control over its resources created 
great expectations about the future capacity of the Federal Republic markets to absorb 
Spanish export products.
The French Government, which had previously adopted extreme retaliatory 
measures, decided to reopen its frontier with Spain. Official French quarters had come to 
the realisation that a policy of open hostility towards Spain was not in the best interests 
of France itself. Since bilateral trade had been at a standstill for two years after February 
1946, the French decided to link the reopening of the border to adopting the necessary 
steps to recover the commercial ground lost.“  A few weeks after the agreement to open 
the border progressively, negotiations had been concluded and a bilateral trade and 
payments agreement was signed on 8 May 1948. This replaced a barter system installed 
immediately after the reopening of the common border, whereby, for example, 160,000 
tons of pyrites were exchanged for 100,000 tons of North African phosphates.26
2*. Information based on the list of bilateral treaties published by the 
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Secretaria General Técnica, Servicio de 
Información: Censo de Tratados Internacionales suscritos por España desde 
16 de Septiembre de 1125 a 21 de Octubre de 1975, Vol. I Bilaterales, Madrid 
[Imprenta de la Oficina de Información Diplomática] 1976. For precedents 
about Spain's bilateral trade network with European countries see chapter 
two, pp. 58 ff., and chapter three, p. 214.
34. "Commercial Post-War Relations between Spain and Germany", by the 
Spanish Commercial Attaché in Bonn, Información Comercial Española 
(henceforth, ICE), no. 209, January 1951, pp. 85—86.
15. Vincent Auriol (President of the French Republic between January 194 7
and January 1954): Journal du Septennant 1947-1954, vol. II, 1948, Paris
[Librairie Armand Colin] 1974, pp. 73, 165, 620, and 63¿.
3*. ASMAE, Amb. Paris, b. no. 413: Despatch from Pietro Quaroni, Italy's 
Ambassador to France, 19 February 1948.
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The reopening of the frontier and the new commercial agreement enabled Spain 
to get vital supplies of phosphates as well as some coal, a wide range of chemicals, 
electrical goods, motor vehicles, and other transport equipment, and to renew exports on 
a considerable scale to a traditional market for minerals and agricultural products. The 
recovery of trade was absolutely spectacular. Imports from Spain grew from French francs 
20 million in 1947 to French francs 4.209 million in 1948, while exports went from 
French francs 3 to French francs 863 million.27 France became a major consumer of 
Spanish exports immediately in 1948 (see table 2). This occurred despite the facts that all 
bilateral trade was nil in January, that the border progressively opened only after mid- 
February, and that the bilateral trade agreement was not signed until May.
Once political obstacles had been overcome, economic difficulties came to the 
forefront. They explain the slow growth of French exports to Spain until 1950. Among 
these difficulties was a levy introduced on 30 June 1948. Spanish importers of non- 
essential goods in Class V of the Spanish tariff had to pay the levy to subsidize exports 
of essentials (such as iron ore, cork, resin, fruit pulp, sardines, tuna, sweet oranges, 
lemons, onions, almonds, raisins, and Barcelona kernels), when the peseta price convened 
at the official rate of exchange was higher than the world market price. Exceptions to the 
special levy were coal, petroleum products, fertilisers, and a number of raw materials (i.e., 
cotton, rubber, scrap, pitch, jute, sisal, copper, and copper sulphate). The levy was 
imposed on a discriminatory country basis (i.e., 20 per cent of the peseta value for French 
goods, 30 per cent for British, and 40 per cent for Swiss).28
The continued rise in Spanish export prices during 1948, as a result of the over­
valued peseta, made its trading situation with all countries increasingly serious. The list 
of goods that required subsidizing for export to the European markets progressively 
increased. Spanish prices for its most important export goods (iron ore, pyrites, potash, 
and oranges) were generally not higher than world prices, but Spanish prices for desirable
21. Direction générale des douanes et droits indirects: Tableau général du 
commerce extérieure, vols. Commerce de la France avec la France d'Outre—Mer 
et les pays étrangers.
2i. For as detailed explanation see John Walker (British commercial 
counsellor at the embassy in Madrid): Economic and Commercial Conditions in 
Spain (April 1948), London [HMSO] 1949.
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but less-essential goods were, in many cases, SO per cent or more higher than world 
prices.29 As early as October 1948, the French-Spanish agreement failed to work because 
the margin to be covered by the subsidy proved too great. At the time of renewal, in June 
1949, only 65 per cent of the volume of trade forecast during the April-May 1948 
negotiations was accomplished. Spanish trade with Italy and Switzerland was virtually in 
a state of suspense because the surcharge bad proven too high also, and exports to the 
United States fell to 50 per cent of the 1946 level. As Bernard Hardi on, the French 
Chargé d’Affaires in Madrid, perfectly explained, "la balance est équilibrée au post le plus 
bas".30
The United Kingdom was the only country with which Spain was able to maintain 
any substantia] volume of trade at the time. The absence of a British ambassador in Spain 
had not impeded Anglo-Spanish trade. Despite the fact that Franco and the Falange had 
little difficulty in popularising the belief that Socialist Britain aimed to plunge Spain back 
into civil war, it had always been in the British interest to encourage trade with Spain. 
Britain had avoided political considerations that might interfere with a realistic economic 
policy of working agreements with Spain on trade and payments.31 As far as possible, 
the British tried "to keep questions of politics and trade apart, and to conduct the latter 
on purely business principles."32 For his part, the Spanish Minister of Industry and 
Commerce, Juan Antonio Suanzes, streesed that bilateral trade should "always be 
conducted on a plane of mutual understanding and advantage entirely divorced from the 
political scene."33 If politics presented no major problems, economics did.
**. PRO, FO 371/73353: "Not* by Treasury [Board of Trade and Miniatry of 
Food]: Spain**, n/d, n/s.
Hardion to Auriol; Auriol, op. cit., vol. Ill, 1949, p. 142.
11. The Monetary Agreement of 26 March 1947 and the Supplementary Monetary 
Agreement of 26 June 1947 (concerning free convertibility of sterling) , 
which should have governed payments between the Spanish Monetary Area and 
the Sterling Area up to April 194 9 were abrogated by the bilateral trade 
agreement of June 194 8 and the payments agreement of December 1948, when 
Spain instituted the multiple exchange rate system. The trade agreement was 
extended until 30 June 194 9, when a new trade agreement was signed and 
complemented with a payments agreement dated on 15 December 1949; a new 
bilateral trade agreement was signed on 22 June 1950.
,a. PRO, FO 371/89548: "Note on Trade with Spain**, 17 June 1950.
PRO, FO 371/89547: Minutes of a meeting of officials from the Treasury, 
the Bank of England, and the Foreign Office, dated 17 May 1950.
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The Anglo-Spanish Consultative Committee, set up to keep under review the 
course of bilateral trade, faced the same problems as other Europeans: trade did not reach 
the level which was expected to result from the agreements concluded. It soon became 
clear that the gap between the peseta subsidy fund and the import programme's cost could 
not be covered except by increasing the existing 30 per cent surcharge to a staggering 
amount. Such step might simply have stopped trading. Alternative mechanisms, such as 
combined accounts, failed to promote Spanish exports. No real change in the price 
situation could be expected in normal circumstances until the peseta was devalued. 
Nevertheless, keeping imports from Spain within the limits of the subsidy fund on Spanish 
imports, implied the restriction of Spanish purchasing power which would have resulted, 
in turn, in a lower level of Spanish imports. In London, as we shall see, the solution to 
increase Spain's sterling holdings was to grant additional credits and swings, to purchase 
additional useful Spanish commodities which did not require subsidies, and. more 
importantly, to implement a non-discriminatory policy with regard to Spanish main export 
commodities.
The conciliatory British attitude was not insignificant. Spanish-British trade was 
an essential part of Spain's economic and financial machineiy. According to official trade 
statistics, Spanish trade with Britain was higher than trade Spain maintained with any 
other country in the world. This fact alone would justify the special attention granted here 
to the significance of the British market for the Spanish economy and to its fluctuations. 
To this should be added the very important feature that Spain, by virtue of its payments 
agreement with the United Kingdom and in accordance with the British regulations, could 
automatically and freely transfer its sterling earnings for purposes of direct current 
transactions, not only on the British Isles, but in the whole Sterling Area (from which 
most of Spanish purchases of petroleum products, rubber, cotton, wool, wheat, and jute 
came) and in the so-called "transferable accounts area”, that is, in the majority of the soft 
currency countries.
The Sterling Area comprised those countries inside and outside the British 
Commonwealth of nations that linked their currencies to sterling, were prepared to pool 
their foreign exchange reserves (particularly of United States dollars) under the
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management of the Bank of England, and conducted their transactions with each other in 
sterling using London as a financial clearing center.34 At the end of 1949, the Sterling 
Area comprised the following territories: United Kingdom with British Colonies and 
Protectorates, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, and the Union of South Africa. Countries classified within the transferable 
accounts area were the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Chile, Czechoslovakia. Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Finland, Iran. Italy, the Dutch Monetary Area, Norway, Poland, the Soviet Union, 
Sweden, and Thailand Austria, Greece, and Denmark were included within the 
transferable accounts area once the EPU began operations. Payments could be freely made 
to those countries classified as "residual group" with respect to direct current transactions: 
Afghanistan, Albania, Cyrenaica, Eritrea, Liberia, Saudi Arabia, and Tripolitania.
Spain could benefit from "administrative transferability" (i.e., transfers of sterling 
not freely allowed made with the specific consent of the Bank of England) on the 
understanding that Spain continued to make adequate provision for financial transfers to 
the United Kingdom and for imports from the United Kingdom and the Sterling Area as 
a whole.35 Administrative transferability referred to the following countries, some of 
them hard currency areas: Argentina, Austria, the Belgian and Portuguese monetary areas, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, Formosa, the French franc area, French Somaliland, 
Greece, Hashemite Jordan, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Paraguay, Peru, Rumania, 
Switzerland, Syria, Tangier, Turkey, Uruguay, Vatican City, Western Germany, and 
Yugoslavia. Because the British wanted to reestablish sterling as a medium for 
international settlements, transferability of sterling for current transactions expanded 
consistently either by an expansion of the transferable accounts area or by the 
administrative action of the Bank of England. Countries within the dollar area were the 
only ones almost permanently excluded from sterling transferability. In addition to 
Canada, the United States and its possessions, the "american accounts" included the 
Philippine Republic and the following thirteen Central and South American countries:
**. Hugh Gaitskell: "Th* Starling Ar*a", International Affair», vol. 28, no.
2, April 1952, pp. 170-76; and J.R. Sargent: "Convertibility", Oxford
Economic Paper», vol. 6, February 1954, no. 1, pp. 55-68.
>s. PRO, FO 371/89547: "Record of diacussiona between representatives of the 
Government of Spain and of the Government of the United Kingdom in Madrid 
from 30 November to 3 December 1949", Madrid, 3 December 194 9.
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Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, and Venezuela. In sum, if Spain were 
to improve its sterling position, it would extend purchases to the biggest multilateral 
trading area in the world.36 The pound sterling was as important as the dollar, and was 
treated as a currency almost as hard. But from a structural economic point of view, there 
were more possibilities for increasing the country’s sterling earnings through export trade 
than in directing a considerable part of Spanish exports to the dollar area. Spain’s use of 
sterling, as the British commercial counsellor in Madrid expressed it, was "called to play 
a crucial rdle in filling the important gaps created by Spain’s shortage of dollars and the 
obvious limitations of narow bilateral trading with other countries."37
Under these circumstances, it is important to notice that the British gave Spanish 
exports, in particular agricultural commodities, a rather liberal treatment even before trade 
liberalisation as promoted by the OEEC applied. The expansion of Spanish exports in the 
British market before 1950 (see table 5.2) was due exclusively to the promotion of 
agricultural commodities. Spanish agricultural products imported by the State (i.e.. 
Ministries of Food and Supply) had little restrictions because of the need to meet 
minimum consumption requirements. Private importers needed no specific permission to 
import the major Spanish goods, i.e., in British licencing system terms. Open General 
Licence (henceforth, OGL).3' The Board of Trade offered OGL’s to a wide range of 
consumer goods supplied by those countries where there was no risk of hard currency loss 
(Le., the Sterling Area, most OEEC countries -except the Federal Republic, Switzerland, 
Belgium, and Luxembourg- and certain other non-dollar countries, including Spain). This 
was done as an initial move before a multilateral European payments system came into 
operation. Imports not under OGL’s (such as mandarins, grapes, lemons, onions, plums, 
apricots, melons, and peaches) were subject to Open Individual Licence (henceforth, OIL),
M . Membership of the different areas at the end of 194 9 comes from 
International Monetary Fund: First Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions 
March 1, 1950, Washington D.C., pp. 4 8-51. For subsequent modifications see 
the succeeding IMF's annual reports.
Clinton G. Pelham: Economic and Commercial Conditions in Spain (May
1951), London [HMSO] 1952, p. 109.
A useful outline of the development of import licensing techniques in 
Britain is provided by A.M. Leyshon: "Import Restrictions in Post-War
Britain", Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol. 4, 1957, pp. 177-93.
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that is, licences issued to individual importers on a source-discriminatory basis. For the 
first four commodities mentioned, individual licences for imports from Spain were freely 
granted, and Spanish exports were placed at no disadvantage in the British market. This 
was due to the fact that they did not compete with domestic horticultural production. 
Otherwise, licences would have been withdrawn during the season of peak home 
production (block licencing) in the interest of domestic crops.
ZABLE 5.2
BRITISH TRAT* WITH SPATS, 1947-1949 
(value in 000' Sterling)
IMPORTS EXPORTS
1947 % 1948 % 1949 % 1947 % 1948 % 1949 %
TOTAL 25,571 100 30,966 100 33,639 100 7,388 100 13,644 100 11,924 100
Class I 18,316 71.6 24,138 77.9 26,677 79.3 154 2.1 229 1.7 185 1.5
Class II 5,042 19.7 4,543 15.1 3,703 14.4 692 9.4 3,293 24.1 4,270 35.8
Class III 2,212 8.6 2,272 7.3 2,743 8.4 6,498 87.9 10,068 73.8 7,419 62.2
Source: Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with
Commonwealth countries and Foreign Countries. It includes Canary Islands and 
Spanish ports in North Africa. Value of total imports, not of articles 
retained in the United Kingdom. Class I: foodstuffs, drink and tobacco;
class II: raw materials, minerals, fuels and lubricants; class III:
manufactured goods.
The low performance of British imports of manufactured goods from Spain was 
related to the low economic interest offered by Spain’s goods. It was not a result of the 
non-inclusion of Spain in the token import scheme for manufactured imports, "the only 
major relaxation in the strict licencing arrangements for manufactured imports" before the 
OEEC’s trade liberalisation programme.39 Although not formally admitted (which could 
not be justified on political grounds), Spain benefited from the token import scheme 
through a d  h o c  arrangements. The Spaniards had been anxious for the United Kingdom 
to grant import quotas on a number of less-essential products: pottery and porcelain, 
plywood, tiles, leather gloves, boots, shoe and corset laces, stockings, leather shoes, 
buttons, jars, bottles, and capsules. In order to satisfy the Spaniards, the United Kingdom
**. Ibid., p. 181. The exporters from the countries under the scheme were 
allowed to send a fixed percentage by value of their pre-war exports 
(between 20 and 40 per cent) for an agreed list of products (about two 
hundred commodities), mainly consumer goods, but including also some goods 
for industry.
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should have granted quotas on a scale likely to give them better treatment than a number 
of OEEC countries that faced British domestic protection, particularly on high quality 
pottery and textile goods. However, had the United Kingdom refused every concession, 
it would have obtained no quotas for essentials from Spain: iron ore, potash, pyrites, zinc 
concentrates* rosin, mercury, and wolfram. The Board of Trade suggested that, since 
Spain’s interests were confined to a few items, some of which received import quotas 
already, by granting token import quotas to a few goods -i.e., cotton textiles, chemicals, 
textiles, porcelain, toys, shoes, and tobacco- they covered the Spanish list without great 
economic effort. This was finally agreed upon by the Foreign Office and Treasury* 
officials.40
Spain’s exports of raw materials to the United Kingdom did not increase because 
of low output.41 Although the world supply of raw materials had improved from previous 
years, the dominant rule was to obtain as much non-dollar supply from the greatest 
possible diversion of sources. Potash provides a good example of the logic of this attitude. 
A worldwide shortage of potash was reduced in 1947 when Palestine potash appeared on 
the world markets and the Soviet zone of Germany reappeared as a potash supplier. 
However, the United States’ pressure, after November 1947, on an embargo policy as part 
of a general containment strategy against the Soviet Union and its satellites posed an 
uncertain threat to the latter source of potash.42 In fact, Spanish potash was left as the 
only substitute when a shortage of potash was accentuated in 1948 by the interruption of 
supplies of high grade Palestine potash. That year Spain traded large quantities of potash 
in exchange for ammonium sulphate from Belgium, potatoes from the Netherlands, and
40. PRO, FO 371/73350: "Amendment to instructions to Delegation”, Board of 
Trade to G.M. Wilson, Cabinet Office, 24 April 1948.
41. The British agreed that if Spain had more equipment, more railway wagons
and locomotives, and attended harbours, its production and exports of 
potash, iron ores, and other supplies then withheld from the world could be 
greatly increased; PRO, FO 371/79710: Hall—Patch to Makins, Paris, 21
October 1948.
42. Vibeke Sorensen: ’Defense without Tears: U.S. Embargo Policy and
Economic Security in Western Europe, 1947—1951", in Francis H. Heller and 
John R. Gillingham: NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the 
Integration of Europe, New York [St. Martin's Press] 1992, pp. 253—81, pp. 
257 and 276. The latter with Sorensen: ’’Economic Recovery versus
Containment: The Anglo-American Controversy over East-West Trade, 1947-
1951", Cooperation and Conflict, no. 24, 1989, pp. 69—97, present the Anglo- 
British disagreement over the embargo policy.
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pulp from Scandinavia. The United States was also knocking at the door for supplies 
against payments in dollars at exceptionally attractive prices.
The British main concern regarding Spain was to obtain a fair share of its exports 
of raw materials. For Hall-Patch, Spain’s resources were necessary for the reconstruction 
and defence of Europe.43 The Franco regime could not change the value of Spanish 
products to the British economy, where Spain maintained a privileged position as a 
supplier of raw materials to the United Kingdom:
TABLS 5.3
BRITISH IMPORTS OF SOME U R  KJUnERXAU, 1 9 4 9 -1 9 5 0
YEAR 1949 1950
Pyrites (tons) 
from Spain
230,323
227,342
195,829 
179,901
Iron ore (tons) 
from Sweden 
from Algeria 
from Spain 
from Spanish 
North Africa 
from Tunisia 
from France
8,692,897 
3,103,819 
1,585,947 
807,297
491,176
453,567
368,611
8,412,876
3,441,802
1,481,057
750,239
433,526 
468,590 
373,021
Mercury (lb.) 
from Spain 
from Italy 
from Yugoslavia
1,430,586
874,505
104,352
98,110
4,119,097
3,532,807
526,822
Potash (tons) 
from France 
from Spain
394,193 
160,638 
53,4 94
397,982 
157,614 
56,419
Source: PRO, BT 11/4722: Notes on estimates of essential supplies.
While the total volume of exports to the United Kingdom, especially of 
agricultural produce, continuously expanded, direct imports into Spain from the United 
Kingdom increased less, and, many of the less-essential manufactured goods diminished. 
This situation differed from the great expectations created by the British commercial 
counsellors in Madrid, according to whom, the greater exchange difficulties experienced 
by the main competitors on the Spanish market offered British producers the opportunity
PRO, F0 371/73363: Pari» to FO, 22 October 1946.
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to get well-established there.44 Spain's main trading problem with European countries 
was its inability (or unwillingness) to purchase a greater amount of less essentials. In 
general, bilateral agreements were based on the assumption that essentials (i.e., capital 
goods and certain raw materials) were generally supplied by commercial partners based 
upon a certain level of purchase of less essentials. Although the problem caused by a low 
level of imports of less-essential manufactured goods was not exclusively Spain’s, it was 
an important factor in Anglo-Spanish commercial negotiations, deserving historical 
attention.
The system of quota lists in the Spanish-British Trade Agreement of June 1948 
was a first attempt to increase the rate of Spanish purchases of less essentials. A first set 
of lists enumerated the commodities that each government wanted to import from the 
other, and the maximum allocations allowed by each country in case of a scarcity.45 A 
second set of lists referred to less-essential goods, on which the importing authorities were 
bound to issue import licences. List drafting revealed the conflict-prone nature of 
bilateralism; the foreign country was anxious to obtain Spanish raw materials and Spain 
was anxious to press the sales of articles of secondary' importance to foreign importers, 
and vice-versa. The lists established approximate quantities and values, but they did not 
commit either government to the prices to be paid.
Since the first revision of the bilateral trade agreements in November 1948, the 
Spanish import authorities complied badly in licencing quotas of British less-essentials as 
prescribed in the trade agreements:
"The Spanish tendency was to spoil every trade agreement by 
buying all the essentials and pleading poverty when they were 
asked to take less essentials. When goods offered had no 
interest for them they had no money but they could suddenly 
produce money if copper or iron and steel were offered to
44. Walker, op. cit., and "Post-war Import Licensing Policy in Spain”, The 
Board of Trade Journal, 28 August 1948, pp. 411-12.
45. The British list of essential imports from Spain referred to raw 
materials (i.e., iron ore, potash, pyrites, cork, zinc concentrates, rosin, 
salt, mercury, and wolfram) and foodstuffs (i.e., citrus fruit, tomatoes, 
bananas, sherry, onions, potatoes, olives, nuts, and fish). The Spanish list 
of essentials from the United Kingdom referred, basically, to raw materials 
and semi-manufactured goods for Spanish coal, iron, and steel industries, 
plus cotton, petroleum products, chemical and pharmaceutical components, 
heavy electrical plant, and transport equipment.
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t h e m .
The Spanish tried, as did all west European countries, to use their currency holdings for 
imports of essentials to the near exclusion of other goods of a less-essential nature, but 
which trade partners were anxious to export. Since Spain's sterling holdings to pay for 
essentials (raw materials from Sterling Area countries, oil supplied by British companies, 
and heavy equipment from the United Kingdom) were low, the Spanish authorities 
reluctantly granted licences for less essentials. To attribute the problem to Spain’s inability 
to earn "enough" sterling was redundant, because Spain would always be chronically short 
of sterling.
Part of the sterling shortage was attributed to the smuggling of export earnings 
not ceded to the Spanish Institute for Foreign Exchange by exporters of oranges and 
tomatoes due to unfavourable rates of exchange. It was estimated that not less than £2.5 
million were retained in the United Kingdom by exporters of Canary Islands tomatoes 
during the season of 1947-1948.47 Initially, smugglers asked authorisation to import 
goods in the Canary Islands with the money they had not declared; this was rejected by 
Minister Suanzes.4* In the spring of 1949, they declared to the IEME earnings valued 
at £1.5 million. It was estimated that they retained £3 million. In order to assist the 
Spanish authorities, the British authorities decided to hand over the importers' customs 
declarations.49
During 1949, most countries adopted a fixed percentage of purchases of essentials 
because the lists previously mentioned had become mere catalogues of what the different 
countries had to offer. Each year agreements were reached, following an estimation of 
how much Spain was likely to earn and what proportion was set aside for purchase of less 
essentials. The first agreement signed on this line was the Spanish-Belgian one of April
PRO, FO 371/79710: British Embassy in Madrid to the Treasury, 4 May
1949.
4\  PRO, FO 371/73353: "Note by Treasury [Board of Trade and Ministry of 
Food]: Spain", n/d, n/s.
**. AHBE, IEME, box no. 4: S/C, 13 and 20 July 1946.
*». AHBE, IEME, box no. 2: Suanzes at the C/A, 1 March 1949.
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1949. It was agreed that eight per cent of Spam's export proceeds would be reserved for 
the settlement of outstanding financial claims (including a substantial volume of pre-Civil 
War debts); fifteen per cent would be for Spanish purchases of commodities stipulated in 
the trade agreement as non-essentials; the remaining seventy-seven per cent would go for 
purchases of Belgian goods enumerated in the quota list.50 This procedure failed to work 
because the exact percentage figure was not known until the end of the trade year, and 
because, independently of the agreements, when Spain’s earnings fell below expectation, 
the proportion corresponding to less essentials continued to be the first to suffer.
The fact that Spain did not purchase the quota amounts of less essentials created 
some disagreement among the British. Merchants in Madrid, fearing French and Belgian 
competition in the fields of machinery and transport equipment, criticised their 
government "for not taking more Spanish produce and for not insisting that Spain shall 
only buy manufactured goods in exchange.”51 Some in London were of a different view. 
The Board of Trade was being "increasingly pressed" by British industrialists of less- 
essential manufactured goods by the lack of Spanish licences over a wide range of 
goods.52 They drew special attention to these export goods because these were 
commodities that had difficulties on all markets, especially in more competitive markets 
in the United States and Europe. The Board of Trade presented for consideration some 
sanctions to force the Spanish to fulfil their undertakings for less essentials in the agreed 
minutes of the trade agreement, although it recognised that the "armoury of threats" was 
limited.53
The most important bargaining tool at the British disposal was to remove sterling 
transferability benefits from Spain, that is, to deny Spain the use of its sterling earnings 
to make payments to third countries for current transactions. The British Treasury and the
The Spanish-Belgian agreement is a classic exairple of its type used in 
textbooks; i.e., Merlyn Nelson Trued and Raymond F. Mikesell: Postwar
Bilateral Payments Agreements, Princeton [Princeton University] 1955, p. 32.
SJ. PRO, FO 371/79710: Douglas Howard, British Charge d'Affaires in Madrid 
(after December 1946) to FO, 10 May 1949.
” . PRO, FO 371/89547: BT to FO, 27 January 1950.
Ibid.
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Bank of England maintained that they could not use a financial sanction of this magnitude 
in countering short-comings in commercial practices. In the first place, sterling 
transferability sanctions were inconvenient at the time when British policy was to make 
sterling more rather than less convertible. Any administrative modification such as the one 
proposed could not be done "without upsetting the overall world implications” of the use 
of sterling as an international currency. Secondly, third-country transfers by Spain, after 
the previous approval by the Bank of England had been granted, amounted to very little 
(i.e., £380,000). The amounts involved did not seem to indicate any wild wish to 
discriminate against British products. "As far as the rules of sterling were concerned Spain 
had behaved in an exemplary manner."54 The largest part of Spain's sterling earnings 
were automatically absorbed by its essential and traditional sterling imports, which 
included coal, capital equipment, and certain other products from the United Kingdom, 
petroleum products supplied by British companies, and imports of essential raw materials 
such as wool, cotton, and rubber from Commonwealth countries.
The Spanish authorities argued that they were short of sterling and wanted to use 
their reserves to the best advantage, that is to say for the import of raw materials and 
capital goods.35 The fulfillment of less-essential purchases depended directly on how well 
they could obtain their basic needs and still earn a surplus of the necessary currency for 
less essentials.56 From a commercial point of view, although Spain failed to admit more 
less-essential goods, it imported increasingly greater quantities of raw materials and capital 
goods from the United Kingdom, during the period of concern (see tables 5.2 and 5.8).
14. Paragraph based on and quotations corresponding to ibid., "Minutes on 
Anglo-Spanish Trade Negotiations", meeting of officials representing the 
Board of Trade, the Bank of England, the Treasury, and the Foreign Office, 
London, 8 May 1950.
” . MAE, Leg. 6285, exp. 2: "Informe solicitando normas de tipo general en 
materia de negociación para los próximos acuerdos comerciales", Madrid, 9 
March 1950.
54. The Spanish Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy and Commerce, Tomás Súñer
Ferrer, promised that, in return for the understanding attitude of the 
British, who had allowed extensive use of sterling to buy large quantities
of essential goods at the time of food difficulties, the Spanish Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce would issue licences for a considerable number of 
contracts relating to less essentials; PRO, FO 371/8 9547: C.Clinton Pelham, 
British Embassy in Madrid, to A.R. Bruce, official at the Export Department 
of the Board of Trade, 3 April 1950. Licences were granted for railway 
materials, machines, machine tools, electrical machinery, but only a few for 
less essentials (i.e., motor cars and commercial vehicles)PRO, FO 371/89548: 
British Embassy in Madrid to BT, 30 October 1950.
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Any overall reduction of trade due to discriminatory action would have been felt most in 
Spanish imports of less-essential goods. No discriminatory action could improve Spain’s 
sterling holdings, which was exactly what the discussion was all about. Finally it is 
important to notice that the Board of Trade did not consider excluding Spain from OGL. 
This was not surprising, because the British policy towards Spain was in strict accordance 
with the general tendency to extend quota removal to non-OEEC soft-currency countries 
when it did not lead to balance-of-payments difficulties involving loss of gold and 
dollars.57
In sum, the British decided to expand imports from Spain, including less-essential 
goods on a unilateral basis, provided they obtained what they considered a reasonable 
share of essential Spanish raw materials. Coal remained by far the most important item 
from the Spanish point of view, followed by tin-plate, copper, fertilisers and supplies of 
petroleum products. It is important to bare in mind for the rest of this chapter that Spain 
hard-bargained its essential raw materials in strong European competition against British 
coal, sterling transferability rights, and a non-discriminatory treatment when the OEEC 
moved towards new forms of multilateral economic cooperation.
5.3. The OEEC Trade Liberalisation
The OEEC’s foundational convention was signed in Paris on 16 April 1948 as the 
first stone on the path towards European Unity.5* The OEEC's tasks were to promote a
466 H.C. DEB. 5.*., 1 July 1949, pp. 2313-14; and announcement by the 
President of the Board of Trade on 29 September, cit. in International 
Monetary Fund: Second Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions April 1951, 
Washington D.C., p. 28.
5#. Convention for European Economic Co-operation, April 16, 1948, Paris.
The Convention can also be found in European Yearbook, vol. I, The Hague 
[Martinus Nijhoff] 1955* pp. 230—57. The members of the OEEC were Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Trieste was an OEEC member 
until the absorption of its territory by Italy and Yugoslavia. For a 
detailed study of the structure, functions and juridical aspects of this 
organisation and the initial obligations of its member-states, see H.T. 
Adam: L'Organisation européenne de coopération économique, Paris [Librairie 
Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence] 1949; for à much lighter introduction 
to this institution see Donald Mallet: "The History and Structure of
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common reconstruction programme, to take steps to remove trade restrictions between the 
participating countries, and to ease financial barriers (art 2). From April to August 1948, 
the negotiation and signing of the several bilateral agreements with the United States 
Government took place establishing the conditions for granting aid. When the OEEC 
began to screen the national requests for Marshall Aid and deal with payments problems, 
the divisions between its member-countries were such that its strategy changed. The 
OEEC moved from the allocation of aid to the implementation of trade liberalisation 
through the removal of quantitative restrictions.59 The concept of "liberalisation" used 
by the OEEC meant the absence of import controls, either because licencing did not exist 
or by granting automatically import licences accompanied by the automatic allocation of 
foreign exchange provisions required for importation.
Emphasis was now placed on freeing trade from quantitative restrictions. These 
were believed to be a far greater potential impediment to free trade than tariffs which had 
lost most of their protective incidence due to widespread changes in international 
p ices .60 Moreover, there was a specific institution to deal with tariffs as limitations to 
trade (the General Agreement for Trade and Tariffs, instituted in Geneva in 1947). This 
organisation and the deep disagreement among the members of the European Customs 
Union Study Group in 1949 indicated that if progress was to be achieved at the OEEC 
level efforts had to be concentrated on removing quantitative restrictions.61
O.E.E.C." in European Yearbook, vol. I, cit., pp. 62-69.
” . For a detailed account of this transformation see Milward, op. cit., 
chapters five and six. To keep it brief, the European economy was to be 
"reconstructed but without integration"; Pierre Gerbet: "The Origins: Early 
Attempts and the Emergence of the Six (1945—52) ", in Roy Pryce (ed<): The 
Dynamics of European Dnion, London [Croom Helm] 1987, pp. 35—48, p. 36.
*c. Marc Ocrin (Head of the Trade Division in OEEC) : "A Single Market in 
Europe”, in European Yearbook, vol. I, cit., pp. 71-80, p. 72.
fl. Wendy Aabeek firusse: "West European Tariff Plans, 1947-1957. From Study 
Group to Common Market", doctoral thesis, EU1, Florence, May 1991, pp. 47 
ff. The European Customs Dnion Study Group was set up in September 1947 by 
the national delegates to the Paris ERP Conference. For a detailed 
consideration of the American expectations of the Study Group see Diebold, 
op. cit., pp. 303—18; for the Europeans' own interests and goals, see 
Milward: a) "The Committee of European Economic Cooperation and the advent 
of the Customs Onion", in Walter Lipgens: A History of European Integration 
194 5-1947. The Formation of the European Unity Movements, Oxford (Clarendon 
Press] 1962, pp. 507—68; and b) "L'integrazione dell'Europs occidentale 
negli anni dell'ERP: l'esperienza del Grupo di Studio Europeo per l'Unione 
Dogonale", in Elena Agga Rossi (ed.): II Piano Marshall e I'Europa, Rome 
[Enciclopedia Italiana] 1983, pp. 109-18.
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5.3.1. The Mechanics of Trade Liberalisation
Trade was conceived as a means for integration and, thus, it was necessary to stop 
the proliferation of trade barriers and discriminatory practices. A programme for trade 
liberalisation was the OEEC's main working tool, although the adoption of the non­
discrimination principle caused considerable difficulty as long as European currencies 
remained non transferable among themselves. Before the setting up of the EPU, several 
payments mechanisms -mutual credit provisions, limited transferability of sterling and of 
other currencies, and drawing rights (i.e., the United States making dollars available for 
the specific purpose of offsetting net debt balances accruing in bilateral trade)- attempted 
to free intra-European trade from the rigidity of bilateralism between inconvertible 
currency monetary areas. However, the several intra-European payments and 
compensations agreements in force until June 1950 did not back adequately the potential 
growth of intra-European trade.62
Initially, the OEEC tried to abolish restrictions on the trade of certain commodities 
on non-govemmental account. The OEEC Council adopted a decision on 13 August 1949 
for its members to indicate a list of products on which to proceed with a removal of 
import restrictions. The countries should indicate the commodities for which liberalisation 
was to be extended to all the OEEC member states without knowing the counterpoints 
offered by the others, and those commodities to be liberalised unilaterally for one single 
country or a restricted group of countries upon satisfactory reciprocal concessions. By 
October 1949, the OEEC member countries reported the unilateral removal of quotas on 
some 30 per cent on their trade on private account with the OEEC area (i.e., the 
metropolitan countries of Europe that were members of OEEC and their dependent
•2. For a detailed discussion of the nature and limitations of intra- 
European payments agreements before the establishment of the EPU see Robert 
W. Bean: "European Multilateral Clearing", The Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 56, no. 5, October 1948, pp. 403-15; Diebold, op. cit., pp. 21-86; 
Robert Triffin: Europe and the Money Muddle. From Bilateralism to Near- 
Convertibility, 1947-1956, New Haven [Yale University Press] 1957, pp. 147- 
60; Graham L. Rees: Britain and the Postwar European Payments Systems,
Cardiff [University of Wales Press] 1963, pp. 67 ff.; and Milward, 
Reconstruction, cit., pp. 258 ff.
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overseas territories) on the basis of 1948 trade levels.63 It was soon discovered that d o 
commodity could be freed easily by all the countries concerned, because the efforts 
required were considerably different from one country to another and discriminatory 
practices were prevalent. In France, for instance, the threat of trade liberalisation provided 
internal conflict between representatives of agriculture and industry not necessarily 
because of its immediate effects, but because of the perceived future damage for domestic 
industries, the determination of inter-sectoral compensations to reach future overall 
liberalisation percentages, and the selection of the countries that should be officially 
discriminated.64
The limitations of the initial payments system under which European trade was 
then conducted contributed to making trade liberalisation more painful. The small credit 
facilities granted between pair of countries, and the requirement to settle bilateral deficits 
with payments in gold or hard currencies constituted a natural barrier to trade expansion. 
For the liberalisation of trade to be established on a non-discriminatory basis, a fully 
multilateral payments system was necessary to provide for an automatic offsetting of 
monthly surpluses and deficits and for access to short-term credit facilities. Once the 
experts had initiated work in this direction, commodity liberalisation was substituted by 
fixed percentages of trade.
The idea was to abolish quantitative restrictions on imports up to a certain 
percentage of the total amount imported on private account by a given country from the 
OEEC area during the year 1948. Early in November, the OEEC Council decided to 
proceed before IS December with the removal of quantitative restrictions on at least SO 
per cent of imports on private account from other OEEC countries using the year 1948 
as basis, in each of the three major categories of goods into which trade was divided, i.e.,
Had the conditional lists bean fully liberalised, the proportion of 
liberalised trad* would have risan to naarly half tha 1946 trada among tha 
OEEC countries; Diebold, op. cit., p. 162. The year 1946 was chosen as the 
datum year for calculating the liberalisation percentages, except for 
Germany and Austria for which the base years were 1949 and 1952, 
respect ively.
‘4. Griffiths and Guirao: "The Pflimlin and Mansholt Plans”, in Griffiths 
(ed.): The Green Pool (1950-1955): The First Attempt to Create a European 
Common Agricultural Policy (forthcoming).
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raw materials, manufactured goods, agricultural products and foodstuffs. At the end of 
January 1950, the OEEC Council decided to raise the liberalisation target to 60 per cent. 
This would be instituted as soon as the EPU could reach a stage of consensus (expected 
in June).
The EPU became, in proper terms, the first multilateral European financial system. 
It lasted until the full convertibility of all European currencies to the dollar in 1958. The 
main feature of the hard-eight-month-negotiated EPU was its full multilateral clearing 
system for OEEC countries and their dependent territories. The system made European 
currencies transferable, in effect, inter-convertible on current account transactions, while 
offering protection against the dollar.45 The American Administration accepted a 
payments union which would discriminate against American exports because the EPU 
signified a positive step on the road to European integration and the general convertibility’ 
of currencies.66
A Code of Liberalisation of Trade, approved in Paris on 18 August, in which the 
rules of merchandise trade between the OEEC member countries appeared, came into 
force simultaneously with the signing of the EPU Agreement in September. This was a 
code of behaviour prescribing principles of equal treatment on liberalised as well as non­
liberalised trade and the exceptions to the rules; those countries with difficult economic 
and financial situations were exempted from immediate implementation of the 60 per cent 
liberalisation, and not obliged to take all of the measures for the liberalisation of trade
45. Agreement for the Establishment of a European Payments Onion (with 
Annexes and Protocol of Provisional Application), London [HMSO] 1950 
(henceforth, referred to as HMSO, Cxnd. 6064). The terms of the EPU were 
agreed by the OEEC Council on 16 August 1950, and the agreement establishing 
EPU was signed on 19 September 1950. Until very recently, the EPU received 
little attention; i.e., Diebold, op. cit., pp. 87-14 9, who, due to the early 
date of his book, did not consider the interesting evolution of the EPU 
after its first year; Triffin, op. cit., pp. 161-208; and Rees, op. cit., 
pp. 89 ff. The most complete and detailed account of the origins and 
internal mechanism of EPU is Jacob J. Kaplan and Gunter Schleiminger: The 
European Payments Union. Financial Diplomacy in the 1950s, Oxford (Clarendon 
Press] 1989. For a brief discussion of the EPU's initial problems see Sally 
Dore: "The European Payments Union", EUI Colloquium Papers, DOC IUE 144/8 9 
(Col. 19), Florence, to be published in Griffiths (ed.) : 1992 and the
Heritage of History (forthcoming).
See Milward, Reconstruction, chapter X. I believe he will develop this 
argument in his forthcoming book on the Eurbpean National States and 
European Integration during the 1950s.
376
(Turkey, Iceland, and Austria until December 1953, Greece for the entire period covered 
here). The Code urged the OEEC members to remove quantitative restrictions on private 
trade on the 1948 basis "as fully as their economic and financial position will permit'’.67 
The transferability of European currencies provided by the EPU diminished substantially 
the pressure to discriminate against any specific European partner for payments reasons. 
Therefore, in October 1950, the OEEC Council agreed to raise the liberalisation 
percentage to 75 per cent of all non-governmental imports from participats regardless the 
categories by February 1951. By December 31, 1951, the measures were to be applied 
without discrimination in respect of non-liberalised commodities originating in other 
OEEC country.6*
5.3.2. An Obstacle tn Spain’s Export Trade?
In order to understand the significance of this section, it seems important to 
acquaint the reader with Spain’s balance-of-payments situation with regard to the OEEC 
area when the trade liberalisation programme was in operation. In 1949, the OEEC 
countries and their dependent overseas territories accounted for 45 per cent of Spanish 
imports (equivalent to a total value of $1612 million) and 69 per cent of Spanish exports 
($199.8 million). Spain had a trade surplus with the OEEC countries and a trade deficit 
with the OEEC countries’ dependent overseas territories, but showed a surplus of roughly 
$33 million with the group as a whole. It represented Spain’s only major trading surplus 
with any area, which could partially compensate for the overall deficit with the rest of the 
world ($64.6 million). Spain’s largest adverse balances were with South America ($92 
million) and the United States and Canada ($18 million). Among the OEEC countries, 
Spain had a large trading surplus with the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. In the
MAE, L.g. 7122, «xp. 1: "Cidigo da Libaralizaci6n da 16 da Ago*to da 
1950", Art. 1. As a "code of behaviour" this document was subsequently 
altered several times.
**. For a detailed account of the OEEC trade liberalisation mechanisms until 
November 1954, in particular the "Code of Liberalisation of Trade", see 
Frederic Boyer and J.P. Sail*: "The Liberalization of Intra-European Trade 
in the Framework of OEEC", International Monetary Fund. Staff Papers, vol.
4, no. 2, February 1955, pp. 179-216. For a chronology of OEEC-related 
events see European Yearbook, vol. 1, cit., pp. 215—30.
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latter case, Spain’s deficit with French overseas territories canceled out the surplus with 
metropolitan France.*9
Initially, the official position adopted by the Spanish Government regarding the 
OEEC was a combination of resignation for the dollars not received, a declared lack of 
interest, and an affirmation of political independence. What could be considered a normal 
pattern of public behaviour by an ostracised country came, on this occasion, with 
authentic relief: "Spain could not logically adhere by now to these systems implying more 
liberty".70 Notwithstanding this, the Spanish Administration watched with great concern 
the removal of quantitative restrictions on trade among OEEC countries.
First, as a matter of principle, it was necessary to watch the negative implications 
of any external event affecting major export markets and suppliers. Second, in this 
specific case, Spain’s non-participation in European trade liberalisation would render it 
even more difficult to maintain the already unsatisfactory level of exports, which was of 
an extreme importance for the nation’s economic development and political stability. 
Finally, it was worthless to hide a reality: some countries proposed that the Spanish 
authorities suppressed lists and gave greater freedom to bilateral trade.71 The Spanish 
position was that any decision to free a given commodity from controls was to remain 
necessarily on the bilateral level and not be extended to all partners. Nevertheless, the 
Spanish economic authorities learned immediately that bilateral negotiations with Spain’s 
main Western European partners were intrinsically linked with the on-going process of 
trade liberalisation.
At the time of the renewal of the June 1948 trade agreement with Spain, the 
British authorities suppressed HL’s for a long list of products, extending OGL’s to the 
bulk of agricultural commodities subject to bilateral trade (including tomatoes, oranges,
AHBE, IEME, box no. 163: IEME's general balance of payments for 1949.
70. MAE, Leg. 6285, exp. 2, carp. 3: The Director-General of Economic Policy 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mariano Yturralde y Orbegoso, to Súñer, 
"Informe solicitando normas de tipo general en materia de negociación para 
los próximos acuerdos comerciales", Madrid, 9 March 1950.
Ibid., Yturralde to Súñer, Madrid, 15 April 1950.
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sherry, table wines, oils, and dried fruits). By May 1950, the British declared that "all the 
items which we import from Spain are on OGL’s" (except sardines, tunny, bananas, and 
raisins).72 The Spanish Attaché of Foreign Economy interpreted this as a "result of the 
trade liberalisation policy undertaken by the United Kingdom together with the rest of the 
OEEC member states".73 The effects of this important measure of liberalisation were 
visible in the increase in agricultural exports taking place in the 1950-51 exporting season 
(see tables 5.7 and 5.8).
Encouraged by the British liberal attitude, the Spanish tried to obtain similar 
treatment from France, the second largest consumer of Spain’s agricultural produce. The 
French Government had already answered to the difficulties in Franco-Spanish bilateral 
trade by increasing imports of citrus fruit to allow the Spanish to import French motor 
vehicles and railway material.74 However, it was impossible to obtain from the French 
any formal compromise to treat Spain as an OEEC country. There is hardly any record 
of Spanish-French bilateral trade meetings that did not include a request from the Spanish 
delegation for a more favourable import-licencing treatment In France, contrary to the 
United Kingdom, there was strong domestic opposition to the liberalisation of imports 
from Spain. French continental and North African territories produced a range of products 
which competed directly with Spanish exports, especially fruit. Their natural response to 
the seasonal nature of supply and price markets was the establishment of a highly 
sophisticated system of protection, the so-called calendriers, which constituted the first 
target of the Spanish negotiation team, since it was very prejudicial to exports of fresh 
fruits and vegetables.75
72. PRO, FO 371/89547: "Minutes on Anglo-Spanish Trade Negotiations", cit., 
London, 8 May 1950; and PRO, FO 371/89546: "Agreed Minute of Discussions 
between the United Kingdom and Spanish Delegations held in Madrid in June 
1950" and joint press statement of 23th, at the end of the Anglo-Spanish 
bilateral negotiations.
7*. "Relaciones Comerciales de España con el Reino Unido", ICE, no. 209,
January 1951, pp. 35-38.
74• AD, Z/EE vol. 96: Note by the Directorate of Economic and Financial
Affairs, "Commission mixte franco-espagnole", Paris, 13 October 194 9.
75. MAE, Leg. 4228, exp. 10: Report to Súñer, "Comisión Mixta hispano­
francesa celebrada en Paris del 15 al 23 de Marzo de 1950", Madrid, 15 April
1950.
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Calendriers consisted of an import timetable which took into account the timing 
of domestic and North African fruit production. Since countries entered international trade 
to meet requirements at different times of the season, they stopped imports when domestic 
harvests reached the market. This seasonal protection took the form of either seasonal 
modifications in tariff levels, quota volume and licencing, or the halt of imports when the 
domestic authorities perceived possible damage for the market conditions of domestic 
crops. The latter implied an immediate and unilateral action to stop imports of a given 
commodity when the minimum price was reached or the domestic crop harvested. The 
former could be perfectly spelled out in bilateral trade agreements using the hypothetical 
timing of local crops. Since the estimates were done much in advance, they took account 
of similar conditions of supply and demand within the importing country in the previous 
years, but not those of the actual campaign. If there was no exact coincidence between 
the calendrier’s dates and the offspring of domestic production, there could either be 
a massive supply shortage or massive importation at the end of the fixed dates, with 
consequent price distortions. Pressure from French and North African agricultural 
organisations made it tremendously difficult, thus, to increase imports from Spain.
It is not surprising that under these circumstances, the Spanish commercial 
authorities expected that the OEEC discipline would break up the pressure from French 
agricultural organisations, thus opening the market to Spain, among others. As a matter 
of fact, import liberalisation was perceived by the French organised fanning community 
as a threat to its bargaining position vis-à-vis industrialists and as a direct threat to their 
mechanisms for domestic protection.76 For the Spanish Government, the OEEC could 
help Spain indirectly in those cases, such as France, where Spain’s bargaining power was 
nil due to the strength of agricultural pressure groups.
The French industry was aware that the Spanish capacity to import capital goods 
was subordinated to the French volume of imports from Spain. In this way the Spanish 
earned the necessary amount of francs to import essentials from France. Due to the 
pressure exercised by some sectors of the French industry during the negotiations for
Griffith« and Guirao, op. cit.
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bilateral trade and payments agreement of October 1950, the French delegation agreed to 
extend to Spain the liberalisation measures implemented by France in the framework of 
the OEEC.77 The agreement signed for the period November 1951 to October 1952 
represented an increase of 50 per cent in the value of the trade flows between the two 
countries from the previous agreement; oranges accounted for 53 per cent of Spain's 
exports to France. As a counterpart, Spain had to spend a fixed quota of its earnings in 
francs to purchase manufactured commodities classified under a special list. It contained 
agricultural machinery, medical instruments, automobiles, trucks, trolley-buses, railway 
wagons, equipment for railway-trueks and other material for railways, and, finally, 
books.7* In real terms, however, caiendiieis stood in the way of the promise to extend 
liberalisation, especially for fruits and early crops.
Trade with Germany was still recovering when the OEEC liberalisation 
programme was being elaborated. The Spanish authorities had expected that the transfer 
of trade negotiations from the occupying military authorities to new agencies after the 
birth of the Federal Republic would lead automatically to a proper trade agreement. 
However, the administrative complexity involved in setting up the Federal Government 
after September 1949 caused the last quarter of die year to elapse before the list of 
commodities to be included in the following year's agreement were decided. Despite the 
existence of the Federal Government, the exhaustion of most quotas led to negotiating an 
additional agreement with the Allied High Commission. It was signed in November 1949. 
Negotiations for a proper bilateral trade agreement took place in March, and further 
administrative difficulties postponed the signature of the agreement until 19 June 1950. 
The German import list of commodities amounted to $43 million whereas the Spanish list 
totaled $48 million. In spite of the efforts made to make the two lists even, it was not 
possible to do so because the Germans advanced a number of insuperable objections to 
fixing quotas of a certain extent for such products as have always constituted the chief 
percentage of Spanish exports. French and Italian agricultural exports obtained preference
71. MAE, Leg. €265, exp. 2, carp. 1: "Informe para el Señor Ministro sobre 
negociaciones comerciales”, by the Director-General of Economic Policy, 
Annex no. 2, Madrid, 9 November 1950.
AC, Z/EE, vol. 96: Direction des Affaires économiques et financières, 
"S. Relations économiques franco-espagnoles", Paris, 18 February 1952.
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in the restricted and high-priced German market. To give but one example during the 
1949-51 seasons, while orange exports from Argelia and Morocco could be imported 
freely as the export season started, Spanish oranges did not receive a quota until 
January.75 As the Spanish Commercial Attaché in Bonn expressed it, "the so-called 
liberalization policy of the German Government [...] has operated against Spanish exports, 
which have been treated in, to our way of thinking, an unjust way".*0
During the first six months of 1950, Spanish exporters operated within the 1949 
small quota allocations. The interpretation given by the Germans was that the new 
agreement could not begin operating until it had been definitively signed. By contrast, the 
Spanish authorities, with a pent-up absorption capacity for German products, authorised 
imports to the maximum swing allowed ($5 million), which caused the radical alteration 
of the position regarding reciprocal payments during the following months. From a 
balance of approximately $2 million in favor of Spain at the end of February’ 1950, an 
unfavorable $5 million deficit was reached in September.*1
The initial measures of trade liberalisation implied a deterioration in Spain's 
balance of payments with the EPU monetary area (see table 5.4). Earnings in all the 
currencies mentioned except Belgian francs, Danish kroners, and, significantly, in dollars 
from trade with Western Germany, decreased. Export earnings in these currencies 
decreased from 80 per cent to 68 per cent over total export warnings. Expenditures in all 
these currencies decreased except in the case of the Belgian franc, escudo, and, again most 
significantly, dollar payments to Germany. The result was to pass from a surplus in 
balance of payments with the EPU area of aproximately $7.9 million in 1949, to a $15.4 
million deficit in 1950; from a trade balance surplus of $14.3 million to a deficit of $6.6 
million.
MAE, Leg. 5919, exp. Is Despatch no. 11/51 from Jaime Alba Delibes, 
Counsellor of Foreign Economy at the Spanish Embassy in London, to Súñer, 
"La Unión Europea de Pagos y España", 17 January 1951, attached no* 1 to the 
despatch no. B6 from the Spanish Embassy of 23 January 1951.
,0. "Commercial Post-War Relations between Spain and Germany", cit., pp. 85- 
86.
,l. Ibid.
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TABLE 5 .4
SPAIN'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WITH THE OEEC MONETARY AREAS IM 1M9 AND 1950
(in pesetas)
CREDITS DEBITS
1949 1950 1949 1950
TOTAL 4,680,157,700* 3,602,841,587 4,529,789,6300 3,969,844,129
TRADE BALANCE 2,974,486,591 2,909,877,364 3,681,538,512 3,228,194,662
Pound Sterling 1,302,658,159 1,022,965,152 1,172,836,986 1,095,740,480
French franc 485,971,217 402,289,028 539,142,228 412,610,366
Belgian franc 129,204,522 130,546,384 131,691,951 144,343,089
Swiss franc 167,310,883 109,298,993 157,272,583 99,416,003
Dutch guilder 170,650,490 122,592,376 170,373,346 143,072,202
Swedish kroner 134,820,306 124,647,944 131,316,504 127,805,438
Danish kroner 90,262,170 122,973,100 95,222,066 91,557,722
Norwegian kroner 60,920,759 49,853,940 57,098,800 48,164,413
Lira 58,205,594 3,965,731 76,295,549 11,620,522
Escudo 38,733,641 36,005,477 31,264,588 35,774,114
Dollar Germany 87,533,238 124,610,168 75,836,863 218,812,218
Dollar Italy 595,339 — 4,241,953 —
TOTAL OEEC 2,725,026,031 2,259,748,293 2,638,575,622 2,428,916,567
as % of General Total 56.2 62.7 58.2 61.2
TRADE BALANCE in all
curr. mentioned 2,384,287,785 1,970,589,954 2,227,628,554 2,043,340,733
as % of
total trade balance 80.2 67.7 60.5 63.3
Source: AHBE, IE ME, box no. 163 and 164: lEME's general balance of payments 
for 1949 and 1950. (*) Pts 1,037,063,504 of which were credits granted by
Argentina, U.S. and Swiss private banks; (O) Pts 147,960,331 of which were 
credits granted by U.S. and Swiss banks.
Fortunately for Spain, although the liberalisation percentages fixed by the OEEC 
Council increased progressively (50 per cent in December 1949,60 per cent in September
1950, and 75 per cent in February 1951), trade liberalisation was reversible because 
countries facing balance-of-payments difficulties and other serious economic disturbances 
were allowed to suspend ("temporarily") the application of the liberalisation measures. 
When the deadline of February 1951 appeared, the process of liberalisation stagnated and 
was soon followed by widespread deliberalisation under the deterioration of balance of 
payments produced by stockpiling and price increases following the outbreak of war in 
Korea. The balance-of-payments difficulties, which the Code itself considered a reason 
for suspending liberalisation measures, became the scape clause to avoid any radical 
removal of non-tariff restrictions. Major importers in Europe invoked the Code and re­
established import licences for OEEC exports: Germany in February 1951, the United 
Kingdom after November 1951, and France after February 1952. The retreat towards
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protectionism was particularly disturbing in the German case because it was only in 1951 
that Germany’s total exports to the OEEC countries surpassed their prewar level causing 
increasing payments difficulties to its European partners. By the end of 1951, import 
restrictions in the FRG ended and the country reached a liberalisation percentage of 60 
per cent In April 1952 it met the 75 per cent required by the Liberalisation Code.
TABLE 5.5
GERMANY'S TOTAL AND AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS FROM ITALY AND SPAIN, 1950-1952
(in millions of Deutsche Marks)
TOTAL TRADE
YEAR 1950* 1951* 1952c 1953d d*c
ITALY
SPAIN
507
46
549
145
643
229
743
319
108.2
305.6
117.1
157.7
115.6
139.3
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE
ITALY 268 273 354 422 101.8 129.7 119.3
SPAIN 17 65 126 209 372.2 192.9 166.8
Source: Der Au&enhandel des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes nr, Jahre 1949« 
Der Spezialhandel nach waren (Statistische Nummern) and Der Außenhandel der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1950 onwards.
Spanish exports to the German market increased in 1951 because Spanish trade 
was insulated from the increasing German difficulties within the EPU. The German case 
shows how bilateralism worked, especially during a period of import restrictions. The 
desire to expand German exports to Spain required the importation to produce the 
necessary earnings, which, incremented with short-term credits, could pay for the value 
of German exports to Spain. Exports and imports were interlinked tightly. In 1951, the 
reciprocal credit swing was increased from 63 million ($15 million) to 84 millions ($20 
million) of Deutsche Marks. This was not due to the need to cover a temporary debit in 
the trade balance, but primarily to extend an additional unilateral loan to Spain.*2 At the 
same time, Germany’s structural tendency to move towards an export surplus in trade with 
Spain induced the German economic authorities to grant "substantial liberalisation, 
particularly for the import of citrus fruit".*3 This early German interest in treating 
Spanish agricultural export trade liberally was intended to improve Spain’s export
•2. Trued and Mikesell, op. cit.r p. 40.
,J. Ludwig Erhard (Minister for Economics in the German Federal Republic): 
Germany's comeback in the world market. New York [MacMillan] 1954, p. 132.
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performance. The capacity of the Spanish market depended on this to absorb larger 
quantitites of goods from Germany. The dynamic partem of Spain’s export trade toward 
Germany (compared to Italy’s) after 1951, might have been linked to an official policy 
designed to encourage imports from Spain in order to attain overall trade increases 
without altering substantially the credit swing originally established. After 1951, the 
Federal Republic of Germany completely liberalised a long list of Spanish agricultural 
export commodities, including citrus fruit, while the 1951/1952 bilateral trade agreement 
lasted in accordance with the liberalisation lists presented to the OEEC Council.*4 This 
represented unilateral liberalisation towards Spain, because the latter did not adopt any 
impart liberalisation measures in return.
Spain could not import most of the agreed amounts of the different commodities, 
and some of them at all, in spite of the fact that it had consumed the total amount of the 
credit; Germany suspended the agreement The reduction of Spanish imports from the 
Federal Republic was due to the delays of fruits and vegetables exporters to Germany in 
returning the foreign currency earnings to the IEME and other financial operations during 
the last months of 1952. The acquisition of Brazilian cotton was part of the financial 
difficulties. Brazil owed many millions of Deutsche Marks to German manufacturers for 
heavy machinery, while Spain was in the market for large surplus of Brazilian cotton for 
which no other market had been found. With no sterling to pay the conon, following a 
tripartite agreement authorised by the German Government in October 1952, Spain got 
the cotton and paid up to $12 millions in Deutsche Marks for it directly to the German 
manufacturers of the heavy machinery earlier delivered to Brazil. Those suffering from 
the deal were the German manufacturers of goods traditionally exported to Spain since 
the money Spain would have ordinary used to finance such exports was diverted to other
“ . Germany had completely liberalised the following Spanish agricultural 
export commodities: dried fruits, saffron, olives, apricots' pips, dried 
salt sausages, lemons, grapefruits, hazel-nuts, almonds and other dried 
fruits, bananas, oranges and mandarins, cacao, semi-prepared rice. Germany 
had only partially liberalised the following commodities: citrus fruits' 
peels, fruit pulp, mashed potatoes, canned tomatoes, ground pepper and 
canned capsicum, capers, canned fish, olive oil, canned artichokes, green 
beans, mushrooms, and truffles; MA£, Leg. 3238, exp. 6: Yturralde, acting 
as president of the trade delegation, to the Minister of Commerce, Manuel 
Arburúa de la Miyar, "Propuesta de instrucción para las negociaciones 
comerciales hispano—alemanas, al objeto de renovar el acuerdo comercial", 
20 September 1952.
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manufacturers in Germany.*5
In mid-October 1952, at the negotiations for a renewal of the trade agreement, the 
Spanish asked for an extension of all the liberalised lists submitted to the OEEC since 
January’ 1952. Again, the Federal Government partially acceded by extending to Spain the 
liberalisation in agricultural products that Germany had conceded to OEEC member states. 
Spain was allowed to export a range of products which included the most important 
commodity items in bilateral trade and most of the products partially liberalised already, 
without the need for import licences and with no limit other than the demand capacity of 
the German market. The commodity list gathered twenty-nine products including oranges, 
mandarins, lemons, grapefruit, nuts, bananas, olives, fruit flesh, mashed and canned 
tomatoes. There were still quotas on the importation of those commodities competing 
directly with domestic production (i.e., wines, fresh tomatoes, potatoes, table grapes, 
cacao, concentrated citrus fruit juice, canned peppers, seeds, plants, tuna, canned beans 
and mushrooms, spirits, brandy, onions, lettuce, flowers, apricots, strawberries, cherries, 
plums, melons, and rye). Whenever Spanish products competed with domestic production, 
temporal prohibitions were raised, but these, in general, affected all exporters -OEEC 
members included- of a given product (except grapes which were totally liberalised for 
OEEC countries). The report presented to the Spanish Council of Ministers on the 
negotiations stated that the extension of liberalisation benefits to Spain was an "important 
concession" from the Federal Government.*6
Although the Germans had extended OEEC liberalisation measures to most of the
#s. This operation was used by the Spanish Ambassador in London as a case of 
straight convertibility of the Deutsche Mark, against the British 
authorities who were thought to deplore the fact that Spain spent part of 
her sterling outside the United Kingdom; PRO, FO 371/107698: Letter by F.H. 
Whitaker, Board of Trade, to Cotton, giving an account of the Spanish 
Ambassador's address at the annual meeting of the Spanish Chamber of 
Commerce.
APG, JE, sources from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Leg. 14, no. 8.5, 
(519): General-Directorate of Economic Policy at the Spanish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, "Nota sobre los convenios comercial y de pagos entre España 
y Alemania firmados en la mañana de hoy", Madrid, 14 October 1952. Two other 
improvements marked the October 1952 payments agreement: the possibility for 
private banks to hold individual accounts . from the IEME and that 
countability was no longer in dollars, which freed bilateral trade from the 
constrain imposed by Spain's chronic dollar shortages.
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Spanish agricultural exports, increased export quotas for non-liberaiised goods, included 
new products in the quota list, and increased the swing to $20 million at the time of the 
trade agreement of October 1952 in order to assist Spain on its debtor position, the 
expansion of reciprocal trade did not result as it was expected. Spain had limited the 
purchasing to what the Spanish authorities considered essentials (materials for the coal and 
steel industry). Although creditor countries were anxious not to curtail exports or to bring 
pressure on Spain to balance trade in a downward direction, they were forced to put an 
end to bilateral trade when the amount on non-transferable pesetas had been excessively 
accumulated in the German clearings accounts. The Spanish formula to increase bilateral 
trade was the automatic extension of liberalisation to Spanish trade and an increase of the 
financial swing, which altogether would increase Spain’s payment capacity.*7 The 
Germans thought of a working arrangement with EPU, although they never specified how 
to do it without joining the OEEC. Spanish EPU membership would have fulfilled the 
Germans’s desire to import from Spain regardless of Spanish exports to Germany and the 
state of the Spanish reserves.”  The impossibility to apply to Spain the benefits of the 
EPU mechanism, and inasmuch as free dollar settlements were not forthcoming, forced 
to reduce the German commercial discrimination against Spanish exports via the unilateral 
extension of the OEEC liberalisation measures.
At the end of March 1953, the liberalisation percentage in relation to goods 
imported from OEEC countries increased to 90 per cent. Accordingly, the instructions to 
the Spanish delegation to the bilateral trade talks to be held immediately included the 
demand to extend to Spanish exports the current OEEC liberalisation measures "since the
The Spanish Minister of Agriculture, Rafael Cavestany y Anduaga, to his 
German partner, cit. in MAE, Leg. 4613, «xp. 1: Jaime Arguelles Armada,
Spanish Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy and Commerce after July 1952, to 
Artajo on the increase of Spanish exports, Madrid, 31 July 1954.
A*. MAE, Leg. 5915, exp. 1: Telegram from the Attaché of Foreign Economy at 
the Spanish Embassy in Bonn, Carlos Gamir, to Arguelles, 9 February 1953, 
informing that the German Director-General of Foreign Trade von Maltzan and 
the President of the EPU Hans Rari von Mangoldt offered their collaboration 
to initiate a Spanish move towards EPU, if there was a proposal coming from 
Madrid. The advisers to the German Director-General of Foreign Trade adopted 
1950 as the base year which resulted in an EPU quota for Spain of $64.5 
million; Spain would have to pay off 40 per cent in gold and/or dollars, 
i.e., $13.2 million, receiving credits for 60 per cent of the quota value,
i.e., $19.8 million; MAE, Leg. 3238, exp. 5: Despatch no. 105, Gamir to 
Arguelles, "Propuesta alemana de acercamiento de España a la Uni6n Europea 
de Pagos", Bonn, 18 February 1953.
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one [...] applying to Spain [was] a little more restrictive".*9 Half a year later, as a result 
of an increased bargaining power that Spain acquired through its participation at the 
European conference of ministers of agriculture, the Spanish trade negotiators asked the 
Germans to extend to them trade liberalisation measures in terms similar to the OEEC 
members and to increase the quotas on products not subject to liberalisation.90 An 
increase in the list of liberalised products for Spain was difficult to produce in clear-cut 
terms, for obvious political reasons. Nevertheless, Spain obtained immediate increases in 
the quotas of juices and concentrates of citrus fruit, table grapes, melons, and artichokes 
from the level set by the trade agreement then in force. By these means, by 1953, Western 
Germany became the first supplier to the Spanish economy (11.6 per cent of total imports) 
and the second largest (after the United Kingdom) consumer of Spanish exports (13 per 
cent of total exports).91 The excitement was so high that the Spanish Minister of 
Agriculture suggested the formation of a Bonn-Madrid axis!92
This liberal treatment changed, temporarily, in 1954, showing the Spanish that 
reverses in trade liberalisation also affected them. In February 1954, Germany published 
a liberalised list covering 92 per cent of its private trade with OEEC countries on the base 
year 1949 which did not automatically extend to Spain. On the new liberalised list not 
extended to Spain, there were some products for which Spain had no possibility or 
willingness to increase exports (i.e., cacao, wolfram, mercury, rosin, turpentine, colonial 
woods, glassware, tiles, sewing machines, and imitation jewellery). On the contrary, other 
products under specific quota restrictions were of great interest to Spanish exporters: citrus 
juices and concentrates, canned tunny, olives and capers, cognac, spirits, garlic, table
**• MAE, Leg. 3238, exp. 4: The President of the Spanish trade delegation to 
Germany to the Minister of Commerce, Manuel Arburúa, Instructions to the 
mixed Spanish-German Commission, Madrid, March 1953.
*°. Ibid., "Réplica enviada por la Cámara Oficial de España en Alemania a la 
Handelssiatt de Dusseldorf”, 7 October 1953, Annex 1 to despatch no. 54 9 
from the Commercial Office of Spain in Bonn, 7 October 1953.
91. See tables 1 and 2 on p. 3.
92. Antonio Marquina Barrio: "La primera aproximación a las comunidades
europeas", in Jean-Pierre Étienvre and José Ramón ürquijo Goitia: España, 
Francia y la Comunidad Europea. Actas del segundo Coloquio hispano—francés 
de historia contemporánea celebrado en Aix—en—Provence los dias 16, 17 y 18 
de junio de 1986, Madrid (Centro Superior de Investigaciones 
Cientificas/Casa de Velázquez] 1989, pp. 135—43, p. 138.
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grapes, melons, plywood, cork, tops and various types of cork manufactured items.93 In 
August 1954, Germany made extensive trade liberalisation concessions and, after April 
1955, it finally included wine and citrus fruit.9* The result of the liberal attitude of the 
German Government towards Spain's agricultural export trade was a spectacular increase 
in Spanish exports to the Federal Republic from 1949 to 1956. In that period, the value 
of exports to Germany multiplied 9 times and agricultural exports 9.8 times in the case 
of Spain, while German imports from Italy three-fold and agricultural imports multiplied 
by 4.3.95
Trade restrictions were also imposed by the Conservative Government under 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill in November 1951 on the grounds of balance-of- 
payments difficulties. After only ten days in office, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
announced in the House of Commons wholesale emergency actions to reduce imports, 
taking effect from November 8th.9* The measures adopted in November 1951 and March 
1952 were directed in particular against the EPU liberalised trade. As a result of these 
restrictions the liberalisation percentage dropped from 90 per cent of the United 
Kingdom’s 1948 private trade with OEEC in November 1951, to 61 per cent in 
December, and to 44 per cent a year later. Minister Arbunia presented import restrictions
MAE, Leg. 5915, exp. 1: Garnir to Arguelles, despatch no. 109, "Aumento 
de la liberalización para importar productos de los paises de la OECE. 
Comparación de ella con la concedida a España", Bonn, 26 February 1954; and 
despatch no. 132, "Liberalización para importar ciertos productos de los 
paises del área del dólar. Comparación de ella con la concedida a España", 
Bonn, 10 March 1954.
M . ACA, C/36622, folder no. 2: OECE, C/WP11/W(56)26, Working Party no. 11 
of the Council, "Association de l'Espagne aux Travaux de l'Organisation. 
Difficultés rencontrées par les exportations espagnoles sur les marchés 
européens", as provided by the OEEC Spanish Delegation, Paris, 23 June 1956.
fS. Data elaborated from Der Außenhandel des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes 
im Jahre 194 9. Der Spezialhandel nach waren (Statistische Nummern) and 
Foreign Trade of the Federal Republic of Germany and Berlin (West) . Part 5, 
Special Trade according to the Standard International Trade Classification 
(STIC) and by Countries of Production and Consumption December and Year 
1956. I would like to thank Inze Alkema for his collaboration concerning the 
localisation of this statistical material.
M . 493 H.C. DEB. 5 .s., 7 November 1951, p. 196. For British import
restrictions, see contributions to George David Norman Worswick and Peter 
Honorine Ady: The British Economy in the Nineteen-Fifties, Oxford [Clarendon 
Press] 1962; M.F.W. Hemming, C.M. Miles and G.F. Ray: "A Statistical Summary 
of the Extent of Import Control in the Onited Kingdom since the War", The 
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 26, nos* 69-71, 1956-59, pp. 75-109; and 
William M. Corden: "The control of imports: A Case Study. The Onited Kingdom 
Import Restrictions of 1951-2", Journal of the Manchester School, vol. 26, 
no. 3, September 1956.
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as proof of the failure, inefficiency, and bad service given to dollar assistance whose main 
political objective was to promote trade not to restrict i t97 His implication was that, had 
Spain received dollar aid, it would have used it better.
TABLE 5.6
COMPARISON OF QUOTAS AND IMPORTS FROM THE RELAXATION AREA 
OF THE ITEMS AFFECTED BY THE NOVEMBER 1951 AND MARCH 1952 CUTS 
(in '000 Sterling, c.i.f.)
Imp.'51 
(A)
Quo.'52 
(B)
Imp.'52 
(C)
B%A C%A
FOOD
Biscuits (1)# 14 305 2 040 10 602 14.26 74 .11Fondant (2)# 8 257 800 2 657 9.69 32,.18Cocoa products # 2 241 732 1 675 32. 66 74 .74
Preserved fruit £ veg. # 2 715 1 077 1 703 39. 67 62,.73Tomato (3)# 23 851 10 415 13 720 43. 67 57 .52Canned meat # 57 924 26 723 29 198 46. 13 50,.41Nuts & natural oils # 15 4 71 6 350 6 590 41. 04 42 .60
Sugar fat mixtures # 8 546 2 570 3 609 30. 07 42 .23Fresh fruit ♦ 15 948 4 791 3 090 30. 04 19,.37
Un-rationed Cheese * 8 868 4 500 9 666 50. 74 109,.00
Other foods 6 738 3 095 4 683 45. 93 69,.50
Total food 164 864 63 093 87 193 38. 27 52,.89
NON-FOOD
Carpets # 7 522 2 345 907 31. 17 12,.06
Apparel & dressed furs # 5 350 2 413 5 026 45. 10 93..94
Office machinery # 1 456 480 672 32. 97 46,.15
Sport & leather goods # 1 828 920 840 50. 33 45..95
Imitation Jewellery # 1 770 775 1 252 43. 78 70..73
Furniture & glassware # 4 014 1 510 2 305 37. 62 57.,42
Paper doods & Stationery# 4 012 1 720 1 369 42. 87 34 .12
Textile Yarns (4)* 73 150 12 566 40 846 17. 18 55..64
Matches * 1 384 685 1 180 49. 49 85..26
Building mat. & glass* 1 849 845 1 376 45. 70 74,>42
Other manufactures 4 319 1 572 2 206 36. 40 51.,08
Rape seed & oil * 1 223 810 2 106 66.23 172.,20
Total non-food 107 877 26 641 60 085 24. 70 55,,70
TOTAL 272 741 89 734 147 278 32. 90 54 .,00
Source: Values of quotas and import values of restricted items compiled from 
basic figures supplied by William M. Corden: "The control of imports: A Case 
Study. The United Kingdom Import Restrictions of 1951-2", Journal of the 
Manchester School, vol. 26, no. 3, September 1958, p. 190. Original values 
of quotas from Board of Trade Journal, 24 November 1951, p. 1070; 19 April 
1952f p. 787; and 31 May 1952, p. 1092. Excluding items for which no
comparable import figures are available. (#) Items affected by November 1951 
cuts. (*) Items affected by March 1952 cuts. (1) Biscuits, chocolate 
confectionery and coverture, raw cocoa; no quotas published for these items 
for the second half of 1952. (2) Fondant and cake mixtures; no quotas
published for these items for the first half of 1952. (3) Tomato and fruit 
juice, pulp and purée and vegetables in brine; quotas for these items were 
issued for 12 months to June 1953; import figures are therefore given for 
the same period. (4) Textile yarns, piece-goods and manufactures.
,7. Arburúa: Cinco años al frente del Ministerio de Comercio (Discursos y 
Declaraciones: 1951-1956), Madrid [Imprenta Nacional] 1956, speech to Cortes 
on 18 Decesnber 1951, p. 55.
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Table 5.6 presents the severity of the cuts for the different commodities. The measures 
put forward to face the balance of payments problem were planned to restrict imports on 
a larger scale than that which actualh took place. The quotas announced would have 
reduced imports to 38 per cent of the equivalent 1951 imports, but. in fact, total imports 
in 1952 amounted to 54 per cent of the 1951 import level of the items under restriction. 
The strategic stockpiling programme instituted by Labourites had slowed down, but 
reduction in the import of raw materials was not very great. On average, import 
restrictions were thought to affect more strongly non-foodstuffs than foodstuffs, but the 
effect was more strongly felt in the latter group. The commercial performance during 
1952 was disastrous for fresh fruit, imports of which dropped to a level of 19.4 per cent 
of the 1951 level. Without this category, total 1952 private imports of the restricted food 
items from all sources would have amounted to 56.5 per cent of food imports of the same 
items in 1951.
Spain tried unsuccessfully to avoid the British restrictions, arguing that trade with 
Spain would not involve the United Kingdom in any loss of either dollars or gold. The 
Spanish economic authorities urged the British authorities to encourage rather than restrict 
imports from Spain, since they had not contributed to the difficulties in the second half 
of the year which had forced the extensive trade controls. Furthermore, the Spaniards 
believe that the British Conservative Government's announcement soon after assuming 
office in November 1951, that its policy towards Spain was to maintain correct and, 
hopefully, friendly relations, should now be maintained. Again, during the trade talks held 
in Madrid in December 1952 the Spaniards had a new opportunity to point this out, after 
the renewal of dispositions for import restriction was adopted in March 1952.** Despite 
the unsuccessful results of the Spanish demands, Spain came out of the experience more 
advantageously than the average (see table 5.7).
The Spanish behaviour in relation to import restrictions in the British market 
differed from the general pattern, with respect to both the importance and distribution of 
the effects. On the one band, while the value of British imports of restricted items from
**. PRO, PO 371/102036: Agreed minute» of discussions between Spanish and 
the United Kingdom delegations held in Madrid in December 1952.
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Spain in 1952 was 80.57 per cent of the value of these same items in 1951, in the general 
pattern the relation was less favourable: 54 per cent on average of the 1951 level.
TABLE 5.7
BRITISH IMPORTS FROM SPAIN, 1950-1953
(in sterling)
YEAR 1950 (a) 1951 (b) 1952 (c) 1953 (d) c%b d%b
TOTAL 33,753,685 50,712,714 41,243,761 36,431,568 81.3 71.8
Class I 25,106,390 34,948,007 29,805,243 28,316,571 85.3 81.0
Fruit 10,765,012 17,742,104 13,308,382 13,258,457 75.0 74.7
Bananas 545,696 1,449,899 1,313,780 879,159
Grapes 1,368,266 1,295,577 697,990 1,101,439
Oranges 4,848,730 8,845,268 7,996,269 7,505,449
Almonds 1,552,008 2,182,464 993,172 949,363
DfcP fruit* 857,851 1,625,176 866,815 713,542
Nuts* 297,980 414,287 49,701 119,401
Vegeta. 11,494,632 13,614,880 13,840,006 11,579,879 101.6 85.0
Wine 2,501,274 3,460,109 2,447,963 3,105,153 70.7 89.7
All other 345,472 164,914 208,892 373,082 126.7 226.2
Class II 3,703,450 7,071,316 7,752,992 4,740,400 109.6 67.0
Class III 4,939,599 8,631,635 3, 682,494 3,368,517 42.7 39.0
Chemicals 881,508 3,313,469 1,392,119 1,439,260
Textiles 2,481,718 3,297,782 917,693 214,635
Clothing ---- 104,908 24,252 53,189
Vehicles 211,546 217,500 274,000 2,943
Wood/Cork 167,862 1,100,293 670,845 567,090
Pig Iron ---- ---- 89,467 637,664
All other 1,196,965 572,829 190,787 370,781
Miscellaneous 4,246 27,756 3,032 6,080
Source: Annual Statement of the Trade of the Onited Kingdom with the
Commonwealth countries and Foreign Countries. Including the Canary Islands. 
Value of imports, not of articles retained in the Onited Kingdom; # dried 
and preserved fruit; + Barcelona and hazel nuts.
Therefore, a first conclusion is that Spain suffered less than the average country' from 
import restrictions. On the other hand, the disparity between foodstuff and non-foodstuff 
commodities was much more striking in the Spanish case. While, on average, both 
categories suffered the restrictive effect to a similar extent, in the Spanish case, non-food 
items (mainly textile manufactures) suffered much more strongly the effects from 
restrictions. Particularly in March 1952, import restrictions on the non-food sector were 
directed against the textile sector (deserving 68 per cent of total quotas) in which 
protectionist interests were at the forefront In 1953, in spite of restrictions, Spanish food
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exporters managed to sell in the British market 86.71 per cent of the value of produce 
exported in 1951 (with a drop of about £5 millions), while Spain’s exports of non- 
foodstuffs strongly dropped to a value level of 24 per cent that of 1951. In 1952, total 
British imports of the same items from the liberalised area affected by the November 1951 
and March 1952 cuts amounted to an average of 53 per cent and 56 per cent of the 1951 
import level in the items under restriction, respectively. Exports of raw materials were 
normal as it constituted the general pattern.
A further decrease in the level of Spam’s exports to the United Kingdom during 
the period of restriction had been intentionally avoided. British authorities guaranteed 
import licences for contracted shipments of mandarins and other Spanish products affected 
by the restrictions which were covered by confirmed credits opened before restrictions 
were announced. Furthermore, Spanish exports of wine and liquors, citrus fruit, fish, fresh 
horticultural products, and even tomatoes were still kept under OGL’s after the main 
restrictions of November 1951 and March 1952." The liberal treatment given by the 
British to Spanish main export commodities at the time of general restrictions was so 
obvious that, in December 1952, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed 
publicly his appreciation.100
After 1952, the level of Spam's agricultural exports continued to fall for another 
year, slightly and though considerably less than those of Italy (see table 5.8). Italy’s 
position on the British market suffered more than the general pattern in agricultural trade. 
The different pattern in relation to Italy happened despite the fact that the OEEC Steering 
Board for Trade pressed the British to reconsider their quantitative restrictions on imports 
from OEEC countries and especially from Italy. While maintaining a policy of virtually 
complete liberalisation, Italy was recognised to be in serious balance of payments
PRO, FO 371/101997: The "Spain: Annual Report for 1951" reported that 
import, restrictions imposed by the United Kingdom in November Hfortunately" 
did not affect oranges and tomatoes. For March restrictions, see MAE, Leg. 
4 612, exp. 16: Note by the Under-Secretariat of Foreign Economy and Commerce 
to Arburua, "Negociaciones en curso", Madrid, 20 March 1952.
10°. PRO, FO 371/102036: British Embassy to Sir Anthony Eden, foreign
secretary after October 1951, Madrid, 17 December 1952.
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difficulties, which they attributed largely to the United Kingdom’s import restrictions.101
TABLE 5.8
BRITISH TOTAL AND AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS FROM ITALY AMD SPAIN, 194»-1953
(in '000 sterling)
YEAR 1949 1950 1951* 1952* 1953c ht • c%.
TOTAL IMPORTS
Italy
Spain
37,466 
16,698
51,072
33,754
83,148
50,713
45,481
41,244
42,963
36,432
54.7
81.3
51.7
71.8
AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS
Italy
Spain
22,196
26,677
25,433 
25,106
31,372 
34,948
14,990 
29,805
19,114
28,317
47.8
85.3
69.3
81.0
Source: Annurl Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with the
Commonwealth Countries and Foreign Countries. Including the Canary Islands. 
Value of imports, not of articles retained in the United Kingdom.
Still more interesting is the fact that Spain used bilateral trade to export essentials 
without fulfilling the import of less essentials that the British were interested in selling 
because they were generally products with difficulties in other markets. Spain did not 
fulfil the import of agreed quotas on less essentials. Still it went its own way, obtaining 
unilateral liberalisation for its exports of fruit and vegetables and maintained the benefit 
of sterling transferability, which was a particularly important feature in Anglo-Spanish 
relations. When the British extended to Spain the liberalisation of general licencing, the 
Spanish complaints about the lack of sterling for the purpose of importing less essentials 
were temporarily countered. However, the high sterling prices which Spain had to pay for 
raw materials after June 1950 and British import restrictions after November 1951 added 
to its difficulties, and made retaliatory policies on this account useless. In 1951, when not 
even licences for coal were issued, the British decided to provide the Spanish Embassy 
with duplicates of importers’ account sales in order to help the Spanish authorities to 
increase control over sterling earnings not provided to the DEME.102
101. PRO, CAB 134/847: E.A.(53)3 "Bilateral Trade Agreements. Report by a 
group of senior official«", Annex to "Review of Current Trade Agreements.
Northern and Western Europe", Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
12 December 1952; and PRO, FO 371/107701: Board of Trade to J.R. Cotton, 
British Embassy in Madrid, 10 March 1953. I thank Wendy Asbeek Brusse for 
providing me the first document.
103. Control arrangement with Great Britain over the tomato exporters allowed 
the IEME's to cash around two million pounds more; PRO, BT 11/5037: Spain, 
Note by H.H. Eggers of the British Treasury, 1 June 1953.
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Arburua explained that British import restrictions on Spanish products had 
compelled Spain to defer payments for many types of goods and to suspend imports for 
lack of sterling for others.103 On the basis of British trade and navigation accounts, the 
value of Spanish exports to the United Kingdom declined during 1952 by £9.5 million. 
When the value of invisibles had been deducted, the final figure for sterling earnings 
showed a divergence between 1951 and 1952 of £6 million.10* There was, thus, some 
justification for Arburua’s contention that British import cuts damaged Spanish sterling 
earnings to an extent that they had real difficulty in fulfilling their undertakings for less 
essentials during 1952. Until the end of import restrictions, the British authorities accepted 
the Spanish premise that they were using sterling to the best advantages in their economic 
need to overcome pan of their very great supply difficulties, and that they had no sterling 
to spare.1®
In 1953, the problem of less essentials had become the second major objective in 
trade negotiations with the Spaniards after ensuring an adequate supply of iron ore and 
pyrites.106 While the British requested the implementation by the Spanish authorities of 
the agreed minutes of December 1952 (Spanish imports of less essentials amounting to 
£6 million grouped into 62 categories), die accumulation of licences issued by the Spanish 
Ministry of Commerce and waiting for the IEME to make sterling available against the 
peseta counterparts paid by importers was far greater than at any other comparable time 
in years.107 The Spanish import authorities argued difficulties in finding sterling when
10J. PRO, FO 371/107701: Arburua to Sir John Balfour, British Ambassador to 
Spain, Madrid, 16 February 1953.
John Balfour had been (in 1928) the first Secretary at the British 
Embassy in Madrid; during the 1940s, he was British Chargé d'Affaires in a 
number of British missions including those in Lisbon, Moscow and Washington; 
appointed Ambassador to Argentina in 1948, where he coincided for the first 
time with Stanton Griffis. Eventually presented credentials to Franco on 15 
March 1951. For a detailed account of the British debate about the 
appointment of ambassadors to Spain, see Qasim Ahmad: Britain, Franco Spain, 
and the Cold War, 1945-1950, New York [Garland Publishing] 1992, pp. 197 ff.
104. PRO, FO 371/107701: Balfour to BT, Madrid, 24 February 1953.
1M. Ibid.
10*. PRO, CAB 134/847: Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, cit., 
8 January 1953.
For the first time, the Minister of Commerce and other top economic 
officials declared openly the impossibility of making sterling available for 
less—essential goods; PRO, FO 371/107701: Cotton to FO, 12 March 1953.
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import trade in essentials from the United Kingdom had increased and it had been only 
in March 1953 that the British Government gradually began to increase its share of 
officially liberalised imports. They demanded an increase of British imports from Spain 
and an increase of the swing credit facilities. The Spanish Ministry of Commerce granted 
licences to United Kingdom’s main competitors in the continent, something that the 
British did not appreciate:
"We had given Spain transferable account facilities and as 
favorable trading terms as OEEC countries, but the agreements 
were not being honored and other countries which had bilateral 
agreements with Spain had the advantage over us in the sale of 
less essential goods."10'
In May 1953, the acute shortage of sterling was revealed by the fact that no more than 
five days of coal supplies were available to the State railway company (RENFE), and that 
only hurried imports from Belgium and Germany increased stocks to fifteen days of coal 
supplies.109 If there was exchange for the purchase of British coal, particularly of high 
grade, there could be none for less essentials.
The Board of Trade insisted that a drastic action was necessary in order to get the 
Spaniards to honour their commitments. The Bank of England ruled out sterling 
transferability sanctions as counter to British-sterling interests and the Treasury opposed 
granting a loan as part of the credit restriction policy. Thus, the only course of action 
available was implementing economic sanctions: either cutting off essential supplies of 
oil and coal, or cutting down imports of fruit -Spain’s principal exports to the United 
Kingdom- by taking them out of the OGL arrangements. When the desirability and 
practicability of sanctions were discussed, the disparity of interests among the different 
departments involved prevented the United Kingdom from taking any retaliatory action. 
Again, as in 1950, the Ministry of Food opposed any discriminatory action against 
Spanish exports on the grounds of supply and administrative difficulties. A restriction of 
British imports of oranges and tomatoes would drive up prices in the British domestic 
market and result in reducing Spain's sterling earnings further. The Ministries of Supply
l0*. PRO, BT 11/5037: ON (53) 26th Meeting, 11 June 1953.
le*. PRO, FO 371/10771B: British Embassy in Madrid to FO, despatch no. 
186(E), 14 July 1953.
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and Materials resented risking Spanish retaliatory action against British "still vital" 
supplies of pyrites and iron ore. The Treasury and the Bank of England saw nothing 
wrong in the Spanish use of sterling. Spain spent nearly all its sterling earnings in the 
sterling area, only some £3 million were transferred each year to other countries in the 
transferable accounts area (much of it to Brazil), which was spent ultimately on British 
exports:
I U L I  5 .»
SPAIN'S OS* o r  STERLING KARNINCS
<in millions of sterling p«r year)
Raw materials from:
Rest of the Sterling Area 10
Transferable Account Area 3
Essentials from the U.K. 20
U.K. invisibles 11
Financial remittances 1.2
U.K. less essentials 3.5
Black sterling * 4
TOTAL 52e7
Source: PRO, BT 11/5037: ON (53) 26th Meeting, 11 June 1953. (*) Sterling
earnings not declared by Spanish exporters to the Spanish Foreign Exchange 
Office.
Spain could be made a precedent, and pressure for quantitative restrictions could be put 
on countries like Finland, Brazil, and Argentina for purposes other than the safe-guarding 
of the balance of payments. A supplementary difficulty arose from the fact that the 
selection of commodities to be withdrawn from OGL’s would be extremely difficult. It 
would give rise to domestic pressures to include further items for protective reasons and 
would complicate their restoration. The Foreign Office line on this was to allow the 
economic departments a free hand to try and determine where British economic advantage 
lay. It did not wish to oppose sanctions if the economic departments finally decided in 
favour of them, nor to press for them if they did not. The British limited themselves to 
presenting the Spaniards with a short list of goods in which they took particular interest. 
They tried to convince the Spaniards that if they did not make substantial improvement 
in the level of licencing of less essential goods, and so help them to counter the increasing 
pressure from numerous critics, the British authorities should probably, "much against 
their will”, be unable to continue the liberal treatment so far accorded to Spanish exporters
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to the United Kingdom.110
The President of the Board of Trade insisted on removing Spain from the list of 
countries eligible for OGL’s on oranges and/or tomatoes. The opening and size of bilateral 
quotas for these products was to be based on the treatment offered to imports of British 
less essentials.111 When the Cabinet was consulted, the Ministry of Food proposed 
onions as a product for import restrictions. Although less effective than the products 
mentioned above, this would have, nevertheless, alarmed the Spaniards. Finally, the threat 
could be extended to other liberalisation measures planned for the end of the year (i.e., 
textiles, apricots, mandarines, nuts, and grapes). All of these measures were presented, not 
as an immediate attempt to reduce Spanish sterling earnings, but as providing the 
Spaniards time to rethink their attitude until November to secure the implementation of 
future agreed minutes.112 Spanish exports were concentrated largely over the period from 
November to April when the bulk of the exports of fruit and vegetables took place, with 
a big falling off in Spain’s sterling receipts during the summer months. In the meantime, 
the British were willing to call to the attention of the British colonies any cases where 
they had imposed on Spanish exports a less favourable treatment than expons from the 
OEEC countries.113
Paragraph baaed on PRO, FO 371/107701: FO to Balfour, 31 March 1953, 
reporting about a meeting of Board of Trade, Treasury, and Foreign Office 
officials with Cotton; and BT 11/5037: ONC (53) 26th Meeting, 11 June 1953.
111. PRO, FO 371/107702: Minutes corresponding to 19 June 1953.
112. PRO, BT 11/5037: Minutes by E.A. Cohen, 17 June 1953. Meeting held in 
the Board of Trade with representatives from the Board of Trade, Treasury, 
Secretary for Overseas Trade, and the Foreign Office (represented by a 
member of the Embassy in Madrid). Sanctions were studied at this meeting. 
The British commercial counsellor Cotton was the one who most strongly 
proposed the adoption of retaliatory measures against the Spanish: "I have 
no doubt that it may endanger the prospects of British firms in securing 
valuable contracts for industrial machinery during the next few months, 
especially where an element of foreign competition is involved. [...] What 
is, however, important is that the Spanish authorities should be taught that 
there comes a time when H.M.G. can no longer tolerate breaches of solemn 
undertakings. [...) If I may say so, I venture to suggest that the time has 
also come when British exporters should be shown that H.M.G. are prepared 
to go to extreme lengths to protect their traditional foreign markets.*1 PRO, 
FO 371/107702: Cotton's secret note dated 24 June 1953.
111. PRO, FO 371/107703: "Restrictions in Onited Kingdom Colonies on Imports 
from Non-sterling, Non-dollar Countries, with particular reference to 
Spain'*, London, 17 June 1953.
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Sanctions would do more harm than good. This was the essence of the final 
decision adopted in London. It was recognised that Spain was in genuine economic 
difficulties as a result of a poor harvest, and that there had been a substantial shortfall in 
its sterling earnings. It seemed unwise to discriminate against Spain and further reduce 
its sterling earnings at a time when it was particularly short of sterling and faced grave 
economic difficulties. Everyone also agreed that a reduction in British essential exports 
to Spain would have played into Germany’s hands."4 Furthermore, sanctions were 
rejected as contrary to Britain’s main interests. Despite the fall in sterling earnings in 1952 
and 1953, Spain maintained and further increased the level of imports as a whole from 
the United Kingdom It seemed difficult to apply sanctions to a country’ with which the 
overall balance of trade was improving so markedly. By forcing Spain to buy less 
essentials, the Spaniards would have gotten the necessary sterling by cutting down on 
other goods or by falling still further behind on financial remittances. There was no reason 
for sanctions. They would have the effect of decreasing over-all bilateral trade instead of 
increasing Spain's purchases of British less essentials.113
The alternative was to increase Spain’s sterling earnings and to link them to its 
imports of less-essential manufactured goods through a “slipping scheme". This scale- 
scheme would automatically adjust the less-essential import proportion to whatever level 
of total sterling earnings Spain actually reached. Sterling earnings would increase by 
extending to Spanish products the same liberalisation measures given to the OEEC. The 
United Kingdom had restored its liberalisation measure to the 75 per cent commitment by 
October 1953. Also, the peseta swap facilities were maintained at £4 million in 1954 
(instead of reducing them to £3 million as had been announced), but the dollar swap 
facilities were increased to a limit of £2 million, on conditions that they were partly used 
for purchases of British less-essential exports.116 This was accompanied by a nominal 
threat to impose sterling transferability sanctions if the terms proposed by the United 
Kingdom were refused, or having accepted them, they defaulted. This was a very limited 
threaL It was recognised that in case the general right to transfer sterling to third countries
114. PRO, FO 371/107702: FO to Balfour, London, 22 July 1953.
m . Ibid., talagraoi no. 225, from FO to Madrid, 31 July 1953.
1,4. Ibid., Traaaury Propoaal, EA(53)96, 21 July 1953.
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was suspended, the United Kingdom was prepared to consider granting administrative 
transfer facilities for any ad hoc operation the Spaniards wished to make which was 
justified by the progress they had by then made on remittances and less essentials.1’7 
Finally, it is interesting to bring to the reader’s attention that the possibility for relaxing 
British existing restrictions to Spain without extending liberalisation to other countries, 
particularly in the OEEC, was given some thought. The total cost appeared greater than 
the United Kingdom could afford at the time.11*
By mid-October, when London was about to make final decisions on the British 
import arrangements for 1954, the Foreign Office thought it "likely" to treat imports from 
Spain "as heretofore on the same footing as those from OEEC countries."119 A 
compromise on the question of less essentials never arrived from Spain and, as 
recommended by the Board of Trade, Spain was excluded from the proposed new OGL’s 
for grapes and nuts, putting them on bilateral quotas running to mid 1954. This formula 
was more of a face-saving nature than retaliatory:
"The fact that Spain was for the first time excluded from new 
OGL's and that the bi-lateral quotas for the second half of 
1954 would need to be negotiated during next December's talks 
should give us sufficient bargaining power, while the generous 
level of the first bi—lateral quotas should enable Spain to 
increase her sterling earnings and be unlikely therefore to 
encourage her to discriminate against our supplies of pyrites 
or exports of capital goods. "12C
Excluding Spanish grapes and nuts from OGL’s had no impact on Spanish exports, since 
bilateral quotas were sufficiently generous to allow all commercially possible trade.111
ll\ Ibid., FO to Balfour, London, 22 July 1953? PRO, FO 371/107703: Board 
of Trade to Cotton, 29 July 1953; and Foreign Office to Madrid, 14 August 
1953, as agreed between the Board of Trade and the Treasury.
lx#. PRO, FO 371/107702: FO to Madrid, 31 July 1953.
Xl#. PRO, FO 371/107703: FO to Madrid, telegram no. 287, London, 17 October
1953.
12°. Ibid., telegram no. 290, FO to Madrid, 20 October 1953.
121. MAE, Leg. 5919, exp. 1: Argüelles to the Spanish Ambassador in Bonn,
"Información sobre trato que España recibe de los paises de la OECE en lo 
que respecta a la liberalización de sus importaciones", Madrid, 30 July
1954. In 1954, the United Kingdom increased the import value of both 
commodities from Spain in relation to 1953: grapes by 21 percent and nuts 
by 37 per cent; Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with 
Commonwealth Countries and Foreign Countries, 1954, vol. IV.
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From July 1954 on, when Spain appeared to meet and even to exceed its obligations on 
less-essentials, Spanish products were completely freed from quantitative restrictions on 
imports into the United Kingdom and were on an equal footing with any OEEC member- 
country.
Spain did not suffer much either from early liberalisation or from import 
restrictions regarding its main export commodities in the British market. Anglo-Spanish 
commercial relations at the time of restrictions show that the British authorities did not 
want to deprive Spain of sterling earnings in order to maintain mutually beneficial trade 
relations. The basic choices for the British were to provide flexibility to a bilateral system 
which was characterised by a lack of it, to proceed through compensation operations, or 
to do without bilateral relations with Spain. The answer to this dilemma was the rapid 
bilateral trade recovery which took place in 1954. This year is significant because Spanish 
exports of citrus fruits were down by some £2 million as a result of frosts. By 1955, 
Spain had already recovered to pre-1952 export levels. This was important because the 
United Kingdom was the largest consumer of Spanish agricultural exports and. also, 
because sterling transferability provided a little oxygen for Spain’s asphyxiating bilateral 
system of international payments.
Similarly, in the French market, the OEEC’s liberalisation worked to the 
advantage of Italy only during 1950. This was not the case in 1951, nor in February 1952 
when France suspended previous liberalisation measures and imposed import restrictions 
(see table 5.10). Unlike the British and German cases, import restrictions in France lasted 
several years because of balance-of-payments difficulties.1“  At the end of 1953, the
123. That balance-of-payments considerations provided the perfect excuse for 
imposing restrictions of a protectionist nature comes from the warning that 
Maurice Petsche, then Minister of Finances and President of the Council of 
Ministers, made to the ministers of his cabinet: these measures were **truly 
temporary measures that could not be used to extend protectionism"; AD, DE- 
CE vol. 353: Petsche to Jean-Marie Louve1, Minister of Industry and Energy 
(August 1951-March 1952), "Suspension de la liberalisation des échanges", 
Paris, 16 February 1952. A further proof that restrictions served to protect 
French domestic interests comes from the fact that France took more than two 
years to re-liberalise partially and only after rising tariffs; MAE, Leg. 
10078, exp. 21: "Quinto informe del Consejo de Europa para la Organización 
de Cooperación Económica (Septiembre de 1953)"; and, AD, DE-CE 1945-1960, 
vol. 353: French delegation to the OEEC, to Robert Marjolin, Secretary 
General of the OEEC, Paris, 15 April 1954.
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French Government increased its liberalisation effort to a mere 8 per cent.123 By January 
1955, the French brought the percentage of liberalisation back to the level of February’ 
1952 (72 per cent).
TABLE 5.10
FRANCS'S TOTAL AND AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS FROM ITALY AND SPAIN, 1949-1953
(in millions of French francs)
YEAR 194 9* 1950b 1951e 1952* 1953* b%. *%e #%c
TOTAL IMPORTS
Italy
Spain
17,653 
12,900
38,071 
9, 850
49,571 35,077 22,815 215.7 
13,548 18,099 16,833 76.4
130.2 70.8 
137.5 133.6
46.0
124.2
AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS
Italy
Spain
3, 934 
11,229
9,763 
7, 983
9,786 7,274 6,214 248.2 
9,384 12,997 14,282 71.1
100.2 73.3 
117.5 138.5
63.5
152.2
Source : Direction générale des douanes et droits indirects: Tableau oénéral
du commerce extérieure, vols. Commerce de la France avec la France d'Outre-
Mer et les pays étrangers, Paris [Imprimerie National] various years; the 
figures refer to commerce général d'importation.
In 1951, the Spanish export performance in France was already more dynamic 
than the Italian one. In 1952 and 1953, Italian exports to France had suffered significant 
set backs compared to 1951 as a result of French imports restrictions. In contrast. Spanish 
agricultural exports experienced important increases in 1951 and especially in 1952 and 
1953, despite restrictions, while French imports from Italy continued to drop. In 1953, 
French total imports from Italy dropped 35 per cent from the 1952 level and Italian 
agricultural exports dropped 14.6 per cent. On the contrary, French imports from Spain 
decreased by 7 per cent whereas agricultural exports increased by 10 per cent.
These figures show that France offered different treatment to its agricultural 
imports from Spain and Italy during the period from 1949 to 1953. The result was that, 
while Italy multiplied by 0.8 its agricultural exports to France between 1949 and 1953, 
the figure for Spain was 1.3. On the other hand, while agricultural commodities accounted 
for a very high percentage of Spain’s total exports to France throughout the period, Italy’s 
remained low. During the period of restrictions, despite the opposition shown by French 
organised agricultural producers, Spain enlarged its agricultural export trade, while Italy,
u>. MAE, Lag. 3056, exp. 7: "Información Comercial G«neral sobra Francia en 
1953".
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theoretically favoured by common OEEC and EPU membership, did not. On the other 
hand, in 1952, Spain became France’s major food and agricultural supplier. The 
Netherlands had held this position up to 1951, but lost it in favour of Spain. At the time 
of restrictions, trade between France and Spain continued to expand. This was in contrast 
to France’s experience with many OEEC countries. This point is important, because 
France did not officially grant Spain any of the liberalisation measures adopted in line 
with the OEEC.
The price information available does not give any advantage to Spain's 
agricultural exports over Italy’s. By comparing Spain’s wholesale prices with those for 
the major producing and trading countries in two important export commodities, oranges 
and wine, it can be concluded that lower prices do not explain Spain’s success in 
competing with Italy. Between 1949 and 1952, the price of the common orange found in 
Italy, Israel, and the United States decreased between 10 per cent and 15 per cent, while 
the Spanish orange price increased by 24 per cent At that same period, the Spanish local 
price of common red wine increased by 29 per cent The Portuguese wine price increased 
by only 10 per cent; it decreased between 3 per cent and 19 per cent in Italy and France, 
respectively -the main competitors in wine exports.124 The plethora of price distortions 
that domestic agricultural commodities and trade prices suffered at that time should make 
the historian extremely careful when considering this information in terms of trade 
competition. Notwithstanding this, there seems to be evidence that the advantage that 
Spain’s agricultural exports enjoyed over Italy’s during the period under discussion was 
due basically to a political desire to reduce discrimination against Spain’s main trading 
commodities.
1,4. The Onited Nations' agricultural agency próvidas one of the rare 
examples of price information which includes Spain in comparative terms; 
Food and Agriculture Organisation: Yearbook of Food and Agricultural
Statistics. Production. 1956, vol. X, part 1, pp. 278 and 280. It refers to 
average wholesale prices to producers of «bionda», «Jaffa», «Florida» 
and «blanca común» orange types, and of common red wine, calculated in 
local currencies. According to the Spanish Minister of Agriculture acting 
as President of the Spanish delegation at the ministerial conference on 
agricultural markets, Paris, March 1953, Spanish export prices, on average, 
were lower than in any OEEC country; MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 23: Speech on 19 
March, attached to despatch no. 760 from the Embassy in Paris, "Pool Verde", 
20 March 1953.
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At this point the reader might wonder what was happening with the traditional 
French dislike for the Franco regime. The attempts to regain the Spanish market after 
March 1948 required a decisive political course of action that implied several concessions 
to the Spanish authorities, and not exclusively of an economic character. The French 
Government decided to respond constructively to the complaints by the Spanish 
Government about the pseudo-clandestine broadcasting stations run by Spanish émigrés 
and about the political meetings of Spanish refugees in the French departments contiguous 
to the Pyrenees, which the Spanish Government considered subversive. In September
19S0, the French Government, with Socialist participation, prohibited the Spanish 
Communists from exercising political activity; they were soon either deported to Algeria 
or expelled from the country for their international subverting role.125 The Spanish and 
French diplomatic delegations in Madrid and Paris were elevated to the rank of embassy 
after the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 3 November 1950 revoking 
sanctions against Spain was adopted.126
Nevertheless, the reduction of trade discriminatory practices towards Spain by the 
French was far from complete. The bilateral trade agreement signed between France and 
Spain on 30 October 1953, which ran until 31 October 1954, spelled out import and 
export commodities with quota indications (set either on a value or volume basis). 
Specifically, in the case of oranges, calendriers referred not only to the timing of the 
Spanish exports, but quantities were specified according to transportation means and 
French ports of entrance.127 A new temporary levy of 10 per cent ad valorem was 
imposed on liberalised commodities coming from OEEC countries. This was extended to 
Spain, and, in the case of oranges, was added to the actual levy of 35 percent ad 
valorem.121 During the long negotiations for the new bilateral trade agreement (finally
125. Valentina Fernández Vargas: La resistencia interior en la España de
Franco, Madrid [Istroo] 1981, p. 33.
1,4. See a summary of the entire process in AD, 2/EE, vol. 4 9: "Note rapports 
franco—espagnoles", Paris, 12 November 1951.
127. "Accord commercial franco-espagnol du 30 octobre 1953, valable du 1er 
novembre 1953 au 31 octobre 1954", in Chambre du Commerce Franco-Espagnole: 
Guide du Commerce avec 1*Espagne, Paris, December 1953.
1X9 » MAE, Leg. 4613, exp. 1: Argüelles to Arta jo, Madrid, 6 July 1954; and 
Max Liniger: L'orange d*Espagne sur les marchés européens, Geneva [Editions 
du Temps] 1962, p. 155.
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concluded in November 1954), North-African producers pressed for a quota on Spanish 
oranges of a maximum of 170,000 tons. The final arrangement was fixed at the previous 
level of 200,000 tons, while maintaining the 35 percent a d  valorem levy.119 The 
Spanish delegation had succeeded, at least, in obtaining the suppression of the 
compensatory tax of 10 per cent applied to orange imports of any provenance since the 
spring.
In terms of trade liberalisation regarding Spanish exports to other countries, the 
situation was as follows.130 Norway's OEEC free lists applied fully to Spain as of 
January 1951.131 The Spanish-Norwegian agreement of 26 June 1955 expressed 
explicitly the extension of the OEEC free lists to Spain. Ireland extended the benefits of 
the OEEC measures to Spain as early as December 1951.132 After May 1953, during the 
annual period of application for a trade agreement, Sweden authorised imports from Spain 
without quantitative restrictions.133 However, it was always clearly specified that, in case 
of difficulties, quotas were to be reimposed. A similar attitude was adopted by the Dutch 
after June 1953.134 Denmark did so by means of its bilateral agreement signed with 
Spain on 2 July 1953. Spanish imports into Greece were authorised without quantitative
u ’. AD, 2/EE vol. 97: Directorate—General of Economic and Financial Affairs 
at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Note pour la Direction d'Europe. 
A.S. Accord commercial franco—espagnol paraphé le 19—11—1954", Paris, 8 
December 1954.
1K. For the following cases where a specific source is not provided, the 
reader should refer to MAE, Leg. 5919, exp. 1: "Clausulas de los acuerdos 
bilaterales en vigor entre España y paises miembros de la OECE concediendo 
la liberalización de ciertos productos españoles cuando son importados en 
dichos paises", n/s, n/d. Austria, Portugal, and Turkey are excluded from 
the following analysis; Spain had no commercial agreement with Austria, 
obtained special treatment from Portugal, and traded on a compensation basis 
with Turkey.
1,1. Trued and Mikesell, op. cit., p. 92.
xw. ACA, C/36622, folder no. 2s OECE, C/WPU/W(56) 26, Working Party no. 11 
of the Council, "Association de l'Espagne aux Travaux de l'Organisation. 
Difficultés rencontrées par les exportations espagnoles sur les marchés 
européens", as provided by the OEEC Spanish Delegation, Paris, 23 June 1956.
1M. "Protocolo anual sobre el intercambio comercial y de pagos entre España 
y Suecia de 13 de Agosto de 1954", in ICE. Boletín Mensual, no. 387, 2
September 1954, p. 14 67.
1M. Spanish-Dutch agreement of 11 June 1953, mentioned in MAE, Leg. 5919, 
exp. 1: "Clausulas de los acuerdos comerciales", cit.
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limits following the OEEC rules (at least) after July 1954 (and possibly a year 
earlier).135
Belgium imposed a calendiier system for those products competing directly with 
its domestic production, as it did with OEEC countries, and, following commoD Benelux 
agreements imposed customs duties on oranges and other commodities.136 However, the 
Belgian trade delegation frequently offered to its Spanish counterpart delegation to drop 
some of these measures provided Spain increased accordingly its purchases of less 
essentials from Belgium. By July 1954, Belgium and Luxembourg granted Spain an 
OEEC import treatment.137 Switzerland followed the Belgian example by imposing a 
calendrier system for those foodstuffs competing directly with its domestic production, 
and imposed additionally maximum quotas for wines and olive oil in a clear concession 
to Italy. In retaliation, the Spanish-Swiss bilateral agreement of November 1954 kept 
important raw materials under quota restrictions (i.e., pyrites, iron ore, wolfram, lead).13" 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy did not put Spain on an equal footing with the other 
OEEC countries, but conceded the importation of those agricultural commodities 
liberalised within the OEEC without quantitative limits.139 The United Kingdom 
extended a d e  facto OEEC treatment to Spain, though it was never formally stated.
By the summer of 1956 (judging from a report on Spain's official complaints to 
the OEEC), the level of discrimination against Spanish exports was low particularly for
1,5. MAE, Leg. 5915, exp. Is Arguelles to the Spanish Ambassador in Bonn,
"Información sobre trato que España recibe de los paises de la OECE en lo
que respecta a la liberalización de sus importaciones”, Madrid, 30 July 
1954.
1,*# Spanish—Belgian agreement of 8 February 1954, mentioned in MAE, Leg. 
5919, exp. 1: "Clausulas de los acuerdos bilaterales", cit.
ll\ MAE, Leg. 5915, exp. Is "Información sobre trato que España recibe de
los paises de la OECE en lo que respecta a la liberalización de sus 
importaciones", cit.
Ibid., Gamir to Fernando Carderera, Attache for Foreign Economy, Madrid, 
8 May 1956.
111. Spanish bilateral agreements with the Netherlands of 11 June 1953, the 
Federal Republic of 21 April 1955, and Italy 13 April 1956; in MAE, Leg. 
5919, exp. Is "Clausulas de los acuerdos bilaterales", cit.
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agricultural exports.140 At that rime. Denmark, Greece, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom extended to 
Spain the liberalisation measures implemented within the OEEC. The others, conceded 
OEEC treatment to Spanish agricultural exports. Nevertheless, these concessions were 
never complete and were always subject to unilateral modification. France was the major 
exception, maintaining a strong discriminatory policy towards Spain, in particular in the 
agricultural field. The negotiators for Spanish membership into the European Economic 
Community during the 1980s continued to suffer under this discrimination by France.
5.3.3. Explaining a Paradox
Spain’s bilateralism was not the liability that an impartial observer might have 
assumed in a world supposedly moving towards multilateral trade and payments. In 
general, bilateralism for Spain’s main exports was rather successful against trade 
liberalisation. On the one hand, it was in the field of agricultural and food products that 
the OEEC trade liberalisation scheme failed most spectacularly to remove the barriers to 
free trade; on the other hand, the OEEC liberalisation did not produce any major change 
in trade of raw materials. When the OEEC trade liberalisation hit the wall of 
protectionism, the return to bilateralism was immediate, and it became a normal practice 
for which Spain was well equipped. When bilateralism flourished during the period of 
restrictions and, in particular, during the rearmament boom, Spain benefited most because 
it had kept intact all the instruments of bilateral bargaining.
A complex set of economic and political circumstances, whereby agriculture was 
considered a sector deserving special protection, resulted in the lack of discipline imposed 
by the OEEC trade liberalisation programme. The war time experience was the stimulus 
for a reduced dependence on foreign supplies as part of the concept of national security
l". AGA, C/36622, fold«r no. 2: OECE, C/WP11/W<56)26, Working Party no. 11 
of the Council, "Association de l'Espagne aux Travaux de l'Organisation. 
Difficultés rencontrées par les exportations espagnoles sur les marchés 
européens*, as provided by the Spanish delegation to the OEEC, Paris, 23 
June 1956.
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pursued after World War n .141 All western European countries promoted important 
increases in agricultural production aiming for the maximum possible degree of self- 
sufficiency.142 Population increases and the resulting higher rate of food consumption, 
the worldwide shortage of foodstuffs, balance-of-payments difficulties during the 
reconstruction period, an extended import substitution rationale, and the need to save hard 
currencies for industrial reconstruction first and then for rearmament all served to promote 
domestic production at any cost.143 In political terms, the maintenance of high-cost 
agricultural production that was protected from external competition behind tariff and non- 
tariff barriers and dependent upon government subsidies and guarantees of selling prices, 
was necessary to gain farmers’ political support for stable democratic reconstruction. This 
was especially true where coalition governments applied and in those countries where the 
countryside had played a significant role in bringing about the collapse of liberal 
governments and the rise of fascism and totalitarism. By the time of the first 
implementation of the OEEC trade liberalisation clauses, agricultural protection was part 
of the welfare state being built at the time. Most countries were unwilling to abandon the 
system despite relatively inefficient and high-cost production.144
Freer trade was more easily promoted when domestic protection and increases in 
output were compatible with more liberal trade policies. But agricultural output per capita 
in western Europe reached prewar levels by 1950/51. Then, trade liberalisation faced the
m . See contributions to Bernd Martin and Milward (eds.): Agriculture and 
Food Supply in the Second World War/ Landwirtschaft und Versorgunq im 
Zweiten Weltkrieq, Ostfildern [Scripta Mercaturae Verlag] 1985.
142. The long-term programmes for agriculture drafted by the State-members 
of the Committee for European Economic Cooperation and Germany aimed at 
reaching prewar levels of output by 1950-1951 or earlier; AN, F/10/5668: 
Comité de Coopération Économique Européenne, vol. 2, Rapports Techniques, 
Juillet-Septembre 1947, Paris [Imprimerie Nationale] 194 7, also published 
by HMSO, London, 1947.
14ï. For post-1945 agricultural situation see chapter two, pp. 63 ff.
144. For the extent of public intervention in agriculture see OEEC: First 
Report on Agricultural Policies in Europe and North America, Paris, 1956. 
For agricultural trade problems see "Europe's Trade in Agricultural 
Products", in Dnited Nations: Economic Bulletin for Europe. Fourth Quarter,
1953, vol. 6, no. 1, Geneva, May 1954, pp. 22-54, supplement to the Economic 
Commission for Europe and Food and Agriculture Organization: European
Agriculture. A Statement of Problems, Geneva, 1954. For a general approach 
to European domestic agricultural policies see Michael Tracy: Government and 
Agriculture in Western Europe 1880-1988, 3rd ed., London [Harvester 
Wheatsheafj 198 9, pp. 215-48.
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full force of the devices set up to provide protection for domestic agriculture. The 
extremely seasonal nature of production, the wide fluctuations in crops from year-to-year, 
and the perishable nature of the product made it difficult to liberalise further certain limits. 
Not only did all importing countries suspend imports of fresh vegetables and fruits for 
specific periods, but made these products the first items for de-liberalisation as soon as 
balance-of-payments difficulties required it. Under these conditions, it was not surprising 
that (except for 1950) the liberalisation percentages for agricultural commodities were 
consistently the lowest of the three categories and lower than the targets set for 
liberalisation percentages:
TABLE 5.11
TRADÏ LIBERALISATION PERCENTAGES ACHIEVED BY THE 0EEC WTTH RESPECT 
TO PRTVATE TRADE XN THE THREE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES, JDNE 1950-APRXL 1954
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Jun Dec Jun Dec Jun Dec Jun Dec Apr
Private Trade 55.3 67.5 65.6 62.1 63.4 65.8 71.4 76.6 76.7
Raw Materials 59.5 77.4 76.3 74.8 72.8 67.8 74.9 84.9 83.0
Manufactured Goods 49.5 59.1 60.0 58.9 59.9 61.8 71.9 74.0 73.6
Agricultural 
and Food Products 57.4 67.4 58.9 50.8 55.0 55.6 60.9 66.6 71.6
Source: Frederic Boyer and J.P. Salle: "The Liberalization of Intra-European
Trade in the Framework of OEEC", International Monetary Fund. Staff Papers, vol. 
4, no. 2, February 1955, pp. 179—216, tables 1, 3—6. Position recorded on the 
last day of the month, except 1st April 1954.
Most European partners could meet the first 50 percent liberalisation target without 
difficulty because it did not materially affect levels of protection. Most of the quantitative 
restrictions removed were obsolete as means of protection. The first target consolidated those 
situations in which restrictions were no longer necessary or effective, such as non-competitive 
raw materials and other essential supplies.’4* Nevertheless, six countries had already failed to 
meet the requirements for liberalisation (Iceland and Turkey, completely, and Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, and Norway deficient in some category).146 Further targets were reached less
***. AM, F/10/5700: OEEC, Food and Agriculture Committee, AG(50)17: "The
liberalisation of trad* in food and agricultural product« and its relation 
to general agricultural objectives", Paris, 12 June 1950; United Nations, 
Department of Economic Affairs, Economic Commission for Europe, Research and 
Planning Division: Economic Survey of Europe in 1949. Geneva, 1950, p. 102.
M*. Diebold, op. cit., pp. 163-67.
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promptly, because they affected products effectively protected by non-tariff means.147
By June 1950, the OEEC countries had removed quotas on a higher proportion of their 
1948 private trade in foodstuffs than in manufactured goods. This was because the OEEC 
programme did not affect trade on government account, which was widely practiced in 
agricultural trade. While the liberalisation scheme referred exclusively to private trade, 54 per 
cent of total intra-European trade in agricultural commodities in 1950/51 was purchased by 
governments, state agencies, or state-controlled enterprises; this figure was 39 per cent for raw 
materials.144 Those countries with extensive state purchasing programmes diverted a 
considerable portion of trade from liberalisation. By using the Ministry of Food’s long-term 
contracts and purchases, Great Britain, the largest importer of European agricultural products (36 
per cent of total intra-European trade of agricultural commodities in 1948), excluded 39 per cent 
of its total trade from the threat of liberalisation. Moreover, the participating countries could 
transfer any import from private to government trade, as long as the commodity had not been 
the subject of consolidated liberalisation. For instance, by the target date of October 1950, the 
Federal Republic of Germany could reach the 65 percent private trade liberalisation for 
foodstuffs and agricultural products by transferring several agricultural commodities from private 
to state trade and removing them from the calculations.149 Between 1950 and the end of 1951, 
no much progress was accomplished despite the reduction of government purchasing as several 
major materials were handed over to private traders.
The initial percentages of liberalisation referred altogether to imports in the three 
categories: raw materials, manufactured goods, and agricultural products. This allowed industrial 
lobbies to preserve their own protection by pushing up the levels in raw materials and 
agricultural goods to compensate in average. When the trade liberalisation percentage increased 
and member countries were committed to free equal percentages in each of the three broad 
categories, restrictions on trade in agricultural products hardened and the liberalisation of farm
141. AN, F/10/5207: "OECE, Groupe de Travail mixte num. 2 du Comité des
échanges et du Comité de l'alimentation et de l'agriculture. Les effets d'un 
accroissement de la liberation des échanges sur l'expansion agricole", 
Paris, 26 November 1951.
léi. Heming, Miles and Ray, art. cit., p. 63.
10. Asbeefc Brusse's doctoral thesis, cit., p. 79.
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products lagged. When in October 1950 the OEEC Council agreed to raise the liberalisation 
percentage to 75 per cent by February 1951, it referred to total imports in direct concession to 
widespread agricultural protectionism. The liberalisation percentage, corresponding to agricultural 
trade, for the OEEC area as a whole as of December 1953 was lower than that reached in 
December 1950. The percentage was raised in April 1954 as a result of British liberalisation 
measures which increased the United Kingdom's liberalisation performance in this category from 
58 to 86.7 per cent. However, the over-all liberalisation percentage for agricultural products 
remained the lowest of the three categories.
Finally, the fact that the OEEC and its liberalisation programme were not connected with 
tariff problems accentuated the loss of effectiveness and credibility of this institution. By the 
time the OEEC was prepared to motivate trade liberalisation by the removal of quantitative 
restrictions, tariffs were once again effective instruments for domestic protection and trade 
bargaining in Western Europe. Some countries (i.e, France and Italy) increased their tariff levels 
in anticipation of the OEEC’s trade liberalisation measures and GATT rounds. The immediate 
effect of trade liberalisation was frequently compensated for by reactivating tariffs to levels that, 
in many cases, surpassed prewar levels. This was true for many commodities in the United 
Kingdom and Germany.130 Low tariff countries, in particular Denmark and the Netherlands 
with large exports of agricultural commodities, complained. They had to undergo great efforts 
in the industrial sector obtaining no compensation in agricultural trade from their partners.,S1 
Liberalisation in this commodity group remained confined basically to bilateral bargaining.
These deficiencies or limitations in the OEEC’s trade-liberalisation scheme were most 
relevant in agricultural trade. This was of particular importance for Spain, in whose export trade 
agricultural produce had the largest share. The situation described above affected Spain also in 
the long term, because it was excluded from future initiatives at agricultural integration that 
resulted from the perception of the threats and failures of the OEEC trade liberalisation
li0. Ibid., pp. 80 ff.
151. That the deficiencies in the OEEC's programme for trade liberalisation 
affected particularly agricultural trade has been already pointed out by 
Boyer and Sail*, art. cit.r p. 205; Diebold, op. cit., pp. 186-215 and 258- 
79; Milward, Reconstruction, cit., pp. 422—61; and Griffiths, "The Green 
Pool Negotiations", EUI Colloquium Papers, 313/90 (Col 47), Florence, 
November 1990, to be published in Griffiths (ed.): The Green Pool, cit.
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programme for individual countries. The fear that trade liberalisation could expose French 
agricultural surpluses to foreign competition, ended in a plan for protected foreign markets for 
the high priced French agricultural export products. On the other hand, traditional European 
exporters found that the OEEC was unable to open traditional food markets. Increased domestic 
output without productivity improvements had caused closed markets and decreased outlets. This 
led to a Dutch proposal (the Stikker Plan of Action) for the complete removal of all trade 
barriers (including state trade a n d  tariffs) from which a sectoral initiative for agricultural 
integration developed.1S: The inability of the OEEC to secure a freer intra-European flow of 
agricultural products when in almost all countries agricultural surpluses appeared, stimulated the 
movement for agricultural markets integration, which became a real threat to Spam’s main 
exports.133
Spain’s behaviour when liberalisation was most ineffective resulted from its bilateral 
trade and payments with Western Europe. In a basically barter system of exchange, Spain 
imposed upon its commercial partners the need to preserve a certain level of imports if the trade 
flows were to be maintained. Most of the Spanish exports consisted of only a small range of 
commodities; any discriminatory measures adopted against them would end trade relations 
because of Spain’s consequent lack of means of payment. Bilateralism, paradoxically, protected 
Spain when commercial partners imposed import restrictions due to balance-of-payments 
difficulties.
Spain's specific commodity mix of agricultural exports allowed it to escape to some 
extent from controls and discrimination. From 1949 to 1952, oranges alone accounted for 53 per 
cent of the value of all French imports from Spain, while, during 1953 and 1954, fruit accounted 
for 71 per cent of total Spanish exports to France. In the case of the United Kingdom, only two
In July 1950, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dirk U. Stikker, 
presented to the OEEC Council a plan for sectoral integration, to which 
Spain paid direct attention, see chapter six, pp. 455 ff. Tariffs were a 
main area of concern in Dutch foreign economic policy either within the 
OEEC, the Six, or the GATT; Griffiths: "The Abortive Dutch Assault on
European Tariffs, 1950-1952", in Michael J. Hintle (ed.): Modern Dutch
Studies. Essays in Honour of Peter King, Professor of Modern Dutch Studies 
at the University of Hull on the Occasion of his Retirement, London [The 
Athlone Press] 19S8, pp. 166-208.
151. See chapter seven for the different initiatives at agricultural 
integration and the Spanish reaction.
412
products, tomatoes and oranges, accounted for 56 per cent of the value of British imports of 
foodstuffs from Spain from 1949 to 1953. Spain’s main export commodity -oranges- and the 
early timing of some of its horticultural crops, did not compete directly with other importing 
countries’ production. Trade in these commodities was therefore either liberalised or subjected 
to seasonal restrictions. In the latter case (except in France), by the time the domestic season 
started and imports became more restrictive, the bulk of Spanish production was already placed.
Italian agricultural export trade was more varied than Spanish export trade. It included 
a larger variety of fruit and vegetable commodities grown in most European countries for which 
liberalisation had made much less headway. These products attracted a large share of the 
protectionist measures by which individual countries sought to build up their own production: 
they constituted a sector ready for de-liberalisation as soon as an excuse allowed for it. 
Furthermore, the possible damage caused to the Italian balance of payments could be 
compensated for partially by better performance in the manufactured goods sector or by the 
contribution of emigrants’ remittances.154
Spain did not benefit from any of these factors. Aside from agricultural commodities, 
there was not much left to import from Spain as a means of expanding trade. The important 
contribution of raw materials to exports during the World War period (31 per cent of total value 
of exports in the period from 1940 to 1944) and the demand boom following the outbreak of 
war in Korea (20 per cent of total exports in 1950-1953) were considered temporary situations 
outside the normal contribution to exports (approximately a proportion similar to the period from 
1946 to 1950, i.e., 14 per cent).133 Spanish industrial policies protected an inefficient industry 
with high costs and out-of-date equipment
Imposing restrictions or discriminatory measures on Spain’s main export commodities 
would have immediately entailed a reduction in the Spanish import bill. That automatically 
implied that less-essential imports were the first items to be put into quarantine with a
1M. AD, DE-CE, vol. 353: Petsche to Louvel, "Suspension de la liberalisation 
des échenge*", Paris, 16 February 1952.
155. Percentages from Antonio Tena Junguito: "Comercio exterior", in
Estadísticas históricas, pp. 329-361, table 8.5, p. 350.
413
diminution of Spain’s earnings of foreign currency, regardless of the provision made to spend 
a fixed percentage of exchange earnings. British and French manufacturers were anxious to sell 
to Spain items such as road vehicles and other transport, communications, and electrical 
equipment, for which Western demand was not increasing as fast as other commodities. They 
forced their respective governments to maintain the maximum possible level of trade with Spain 
in spite of other political or economic considerations. Otherwise, their market share in Spain 
would have been lost to the advantage of their European competitors.
French industry had progressively increased its share in Spain’s imports of capital goods 
(especially in the electrical and railways industry). This required compensation since export- 
import quotas were intrinsically linked (i.e., some of the capital goods were purchased against 
orange quotas above the established limits). As such, French diplomats recognised the "effort 
soutenu pour acheter en Espagne le tonnage maximum d’agnunes", in spite opposition from 
French continental and North African producers, in order to maintain the Spanish market for 
some semi-manufactured goods in crisis.156 When the Spanish diplomats presented a long list 
of complaints against the French policy towards Spain, the French Government tried to 
demonstrate its previous good-will by arguing that the "French market had been open to Spanish 
export products despite the complaints of North African interests."157 At the beginning of 
December 1952, bilateral economic talks took place in Paris between the National Confederation 
of French Producers and a delegation of Spanish business men. They agreed to the creation of 
technical committees in matters such as transport and electricity to promote an expansion of 
bilateral trade. A third committee on agriculture was set up with the intention of supporting 
Spanish participation in the European conference of ministers of agriculture, in order to increase 
agricultural exports.151 In sum, French industry had no second thoughts about an immediate 
promotion of Spain's agricultural exports to provide the necessary financial means to promote 
the export of manufactured goods to Spain.
15i. AD, 2/EE vol. 97: Directorate-General of Economic and Financial Affairs 
at the Quai d'Orsay, "Note pour Monsieur [Georges] De la Tournelle (French 
Ambassador to Spain]. Relations économiques franco-espagnoles", Paris, n/d.
157. MAE, Leg. 344 5, exp. 16: Memorandum of the French Government to the 
Spanish Government, Paris, 20 November 1952.
1M, AN, F/10/5553: Press cutting without reference to source or date.
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The pattern of bilateral trade indicates that France opted not to offer Italy the market 
share left by French imports from North Africa, as might have been expected. The advantages 
of bilateralism and concentrated export trade were that any discriminatory treatment of, for 
instance, Spanish oranges, would collapse the entire bilateral trade, including trade in essentials. 
Therefore, France, although respectful of North African pressure, had to offer the French market 
to Spanish agricultural products. The financial protocol of 7 April 1953 granted Ff 15,000 
million credit to cover purchases from the French industry of certain equipment material by the 
companies of the Spanish Institute of Industry, RENFE, municipal authorities, and private 
concerns. The protocol was announced together with the French acceptance of Spanish 
participation to the conference of European ministers of agriculture.139 This "continuous effort" 
to satisfy at least some of the Spanish agricultural export requests plus the credits granted by the 
Bank of France (S10 million at the end of 1953, increased to S12 million before 30 June 1955) 
allowed an increase in French exports to Spain; from Ff 7,000 million in 1949 to Ff 24,000 
million in 1953. Spain moved from the sixteenth largest recipient of French exports to the tenth.
Discriminatory actions or sanctions against Spain’s exports to the United Kingdom 
encountered immense difficulty in the British Cabinet. The Board of Trade had been forced to 
consider them under the pressure of an influential lobby built around less-essential exports to 
Spain. From June 1952 to June 1953, the British Cabinet considered that forcing Spain to import 
less essentials (which amounted, on average, to only 10 per cent of total British exports to 
Spain) should not be done at the risk of causing a serious contraction in overall trade that would 
affect all of the British industry. The British could not restrict the import of Spanish goods, 
especially agricultural produce, beyond a certain point because of the immediate impact this 
would have on the capacity of the Spanish market to absorb larger quantities of goods from the 
United Kingdom and the Sterling Area.
No economy in western Europe could afford to obstruct the trade of raw materials from 
non-dollar sources. The tendency for the production of manufactured goods to increase faster 
than the output of raw materials is a general postwar phenomenon. Because the limitations of 
local resources of raw materials relative to manufacturing capacity was acute, trade of raw
1” . PRO, PO 371/107718: Cotton to tha Marqua»» of Salisbury, FO, Madrid, 14 
Auguat 1953; and BT 11/5011: Praaa not«, n/d.
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materials was relatively free. The initial impact of the liberalisation scheme on trade in raw 
materials from off-OEEC sources was rather modest because member countries, before the 
inauguration of the scheme, had already been importing about as much as could be obtained 
from the sources of the area. It is thus natural that, throughout the period during which the 
scheme was in force, the liberalisation percentages corresponding to raw materials were 
consistently higher than the percentages for the two other categories and permanently higher than 
the targets set by the OEEC Council decisions. Had it not been for balance of payments reasons 
that led some countries (France, Turkey, and Iceland) to maintain a substantial portion of their 
imports of raw materials under quota, a practically complete liberalisation of trade on private 
account would have been achieved in this sector by the end of 1953.160
Neither the OEEC liberalisation programme nor import restrictions had an effect on 
Spain’s exports of strategic raw materials. The dominant rule remained to secure a proper share 
of Spain's raw materials. Spain had the largest known mineral reserves of southern Europe, 
including iron ore, hard coal, lead, zinc, copper, pyrites, fluorspar, tungsten, mercury, potash, 
tin, magnetite, and lignite.161 These were minerals for industrial output and necessary inputs 
for rearmament programmes after June 1950. Spain’s reserves of pyrites, a source of sulphur and 
copper, were the largest known at the time in the world. In 1950, it produced roughly 14 per 
cent of world's production, ranking second to Japan which accounted for 18 per cent of total 
world production of pyrites. A large part of its production (an annual average during the period 
from 1948 to 1950 of 1,033,000 tons) was exported, principally to the United Kingdom, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Prior to the outbreak of war in Korea, there 
had been some slackening of demand, but after June 1950, the general shortage of United States 
sulphur caused an increase in the demand for Spanish pyrites.162 The following table shows 
how some of Spam’s raw materials were still highly appreciated in Britain.
140. Boyer and Salle, art. cit., p. 204.
1€1. ECE: Economic Survey of Europe in 1953. Including a Study of Economic
Development in Southern Europa, Department of - Economic Affaira, Geneva,
1954, table 82, p. 169.
1W. Ibid., Economic Survey of Europe in 1950, Geneva, 1951, p. 83.
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TABLE 5 . 1 2
BRITISH IMPORTS OF SOME RAW MATERIALS, 1951-1952
YEAR 1951 1952
Pyrites (tons) 233,200 576,700
from Spain 180,400 324,300
from Portugal 17,100 ---
from Cyprus 24,400 152,400
from Greece 15,300 ---
Mercury (lb.) 4,377,600 4,377,600
from Spain 3,040,000 3,040,000
from Italy 1,064,000 1,064,000
from Yugoslavia 228,000 228,000
from Japan 45,600 45,600
Potash (tons) 344,000 372,000
from France 216,000 200,000
from West Germany 44,000 88,000
from Spain 43,000 44,000
from East Germany 41,000 40,000
Source: PRO, B? 11/4722: Notes on estimates of essential requirements.
Next to Italy, Spain was the world's principal source of mercury, producing 30 
per cent of the world’s production, and its reserves were considered extensive and of the 
highest quality. This product, though not listed on the OEEC Council’s list of scarce raw 
materials (December 1950), became one given the rapid price increases.163 Spain's 
reserves of high quality iron ore (i.e., at least 50 percent iron content) were estimated at 
a billion tons, placing it second to Sweden in high quality ore.164 Iron ore deserved a 
special mention when Bevin instructed Sir John Balfour, before the latter departed as new 
ambassador to Spain.163 Spain was also a producer of world importance in zinc 
concentrates and in potash, extracting 3.3 and 4 per cent of the world's total, respectively. 
Potash reserves were estimated to be second only to Germany in western Europe. When 
in May 1950, the British Ministry of Supply had concluded negotiations with all potash 
suppliers (i.e., France and Germany), it believed that British requirements for 1950/51
1M. PRO, FO 371/96195: "Possible Entry of Spain into OEEC", top s«cr«t
report dated 10 March 1951.
144. Onited Nations, Survey of World Iron Ore Resources, Occurrence, 
Appraisal and Ose, 1955, pp. 35 ff.
149• Bevin instructed Balfour to promote commercial exchanges "to the utmost, 
with particular reference to our need for Spanish iron ore.” PRO, FO 
371/96181: "Record of conversation between the Secretary of State and Sir 
John Balfour", 28 February 1951.
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could be satisfied without recourse to high-priced Spanish potash.166 This position 
changed radically after June 1950. Spain had also exportable surpluses of common salt, 
fluorspar, lead and tungsten concentrates, and extensive reserves of antimony ore, cement 
grade rock, clay, and glass sand. Finally, due to the lack of intensive geological surveys, 
additional metallic reserves of great value remained to be discovered.167
The outbreak of war in Korea led to a violent outburst of activity to increase raw 
materials’ stocks and gave impetus to bilateral negotiations to secure raw materials from 
Spain and other suppliers, especially when importers would otherwise have to pay dollars 
for them. Most Western European countries developed increasing debts within EPU, in 
particular with those countries that constituted alternative sources of supply to Spain, like 
Sweden and Portugal, and could not afford to become even more dependent on the United 
States aid for rearmament. They welcomed the possibility to obtain necessary' resources 
from a non-dollar source the raw materials indispensable for their industries.168
The new rush for stockpiling led to spectacular price increases for raw materials 
from which Spain benefited immediately with a favourable impact on its balance of 
payments position. The price of Spanish tungsten went from 90 shillings/unit c.i.f. in 
European ports early in 1950 to 310 shillings at the end of the year. Lead to England 
went from £97 per ton to £136, mercury from £27 to £37 per flask, and zinc from £100 
to £170.w  Tungsten rose from $2300 a short ton delivered in the United States in late
PRO, FO 371/89547 : FO to Madrid, 2 May 1950, and "Minutes on Anglo- 
Spanish Trade Negotiations”, London, 8 May 1950, meeting of officials 
representing the Board of Trade, the Bank of England, the Treasury and the 
Foreign Office.
lf1. Unless otherwise stated, the previous two paragraphs are based on PRO, 
FO 371/113033: U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, 
Secret Intelligence Report no. IR-6634, "Spain's probable role in Western 
Europe", 28 July 1954.
IM. For instance, according to the OEEC Council, France had delayed re­
stocking in the hope of a fall in prices and, consequently, had to buy in 
the worst circumstances with a growth in the French deficit with the EPU 
($300 million); AD, DE-CE, vol. 353: French delegation to the OEEC Secretary 
General, "Suspension de la liberation des échanges", 4 February 1952; and 
AN, AJ/80/2: "Report sur la réalisation du plan de modernisation et de
l'équipement de l'Union française. Année 1951", Paris, 1953. See chapter 
four, footnote 88, for references concerning rearmament programmes in 
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
1€#. "Spain's Economic Relations with the United Kingdom and Ireland", in 
ICE, op. cit., pp. 82-85, p. 83.
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1950 to $4,740 in 1951.170 In response to the change in demand, Spanish production of 
pyrites, copper, lead, and mercury rose immediately.171 A considerable rise in prices 
took place also for those materials with no direct relation to the war industry, such as 
potash salts and superphosphate.172 Therefore, in the case of essential Spanish products, 
European importers had either to pay a higher price for the goods needed or lose the 
goods. In the case of non essentials, importers moved to different suppliers whenever it 
was possible.
Despite increased international demand, output of many branches of mining failed 
to achieve any marked recovery because of the difficulties involved importing mining 
machinery. Rearmament by the Western powers since the Korean War created a larger 
foreign demand for Spanish iron ore at higher prices, but failed to stimulate an increase 
in output since the more basic difficulties of the industry were not removed or mitigated. 
The production of pyrites in 1950 still amounted to only 1.67 million tons as compared 
with about two million tons just before die Civil War, and 4.2 million tons in 1929. In 
order to encourage maximum production, after delivering to priority' industries the 
quantities officially allocated, mines were permitted in the late part of 1950 and early
1951 to dispose of any excess production on the free market at higher prices than the 
official price and to utilize a certain proportion of their foreign exchange earnings for re­
equipment purposes.173 Years of neglect, shortage of mining man-power, frequent 
electric power cuts, transport difficulties, inadequate supply of capital, and shortage of 
foreign exchange for the importation of essential equipment hampered any major recovery. 
Spain’s share of the world trade of raw materials was determined by circumstances of 
demand and supply and not by discriminatory devices.
The international situation which developed after June 1950 causing considerable
1,°. R. Richard Rubottocn and J. Carter Murphy: Spain and the United States 
Since World War II. Mew York [Praeger] 1984, p. 20; and J. Lee Shneidman: 
Spain and Franco, 194 9—1955, New York (facta on File] 1973, p. 62.
111. Carreras: "La industria”, in Estadísticas histéricas, pp. 169-247, table 
5.16, p. 199.
171. "Commercial Post-War Relations between Spain and Germany'', cit, p. 83.
1T*. Pelham, op. cit., pp. 51—52.
419
shortages in raw materials, goods, and services together with rising prices, proved very 
much of a mixed blessing to Spain. Although certain Spanish exports benefited from 
rising international prices, the rise in the prices of raw materials led to a deterioration in 
the terms of trade, that is, with the same volume of exports less imports could be 
purchased. Initially, under the impact of the Korean boom, Spain’s trade balance 
improved. This was due, however, not only to increased European demand for certain raw 
materials produced in Spain, but also to the implementation of a restrictive import policy 
due to the fear that the drastic rise in international prices would greatly aggravate the 
balance of payments problem. There might have been the fear that fresh fruits and 
vegetables, which formed by far the most important group of Spanish exports, could 
become subject to erratic fluctuations in price, affecting powerfully the volume of Spanish 
exports. If heavy rearmament programmes in Spain’s major important countries (i.e., the 
United Kingdom and France) resulted in a lower standard of living, the demand for 
Spanish oranges and other fruits could well decrease.
Source: MAE, Leg. 3238, exp. 5: Despatch no. 105, Gamir to Arguelles, 
"Propuesta alemana de acercamiento de España a la Unión Europea de Pagos", 
Bonn, 18 February 1953. Using official Spanish trade data and converting 
1$-3,061 gold pesetas.
In 1951, a major surplus in commodity trade developed from a further increase 
in sales to foreign countries due to the rise in the prices of raw materials combined with 
a decrease in the volume of imports. This was made possible by an abundant harvest and 
the reduction of coal imports due to an overall shortage after June 1950.174 The sharp
IU. The import bill for agricultural commodities went down from an average 
of $103 million during the period from 1946 to 194 9 to an import bill valued 
at $51 million as an average from 1950 to 1952; Manuel—Jesús González: La 
economía política del franquismo (1940-1970)■ Diriqismo, mercado y 
planificación, Madrid ITecnos] 1979, tables 6-L to 6-N, pp. 580-82. For 
instance the import of wheat, by far the most important item in the 
agricultural import trade went down from an average figure of 417,048 tons 
in 1938/51 (or 374,297 tons in 1948/51) to 87,843 tons in 1951/52; AGA, 
C/37.132: National Wheat Office: "Importaciones de trigo en España
verificadas por el Servicio Nacional del Trigo, durante las campañas que se 
expresan", Madrid, 21 May 1953, provided to the Spanish delegation at the
TABLE 5.13
SPAIN'S TRADE BALANCE WITH EPU, 1950-1952
(in dollars)
1950
1951
+ 300, 000
+ 43,636,000
- 50,614, 000
- 33,001,000
January—October 1952 
November 1951-October 1952
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reduction in coal imports, chiefly from the United Kingdom, and the growing international 
shortages of other raw materials, due directly or indirectly to the rearmament programmes 
in the West, meant further difficulty in maintaining production.
The position worsened the following year and has deteriorated ever since. 
Increased foreign exchange earnings, particularly from mineral exports, were offset by a 
substantial increase in the volume of imports (especially of machinery and vehicles, fuels, 
cotton, and foodstuffs, as poor crops necessitated purchases of grain). The deficit, which 
was believed to be temporarily due to the intense process of industrial equipment and to 
increased imports of raw materials for industry, proved to be structural because the 
Spanish industry was unable to export.
The poor performance of Spanish exports of manufactured goods contrasts with 
the export trends in raw materials and foodstuffs. Did Spain’s exclusion from the 
institutional arrangements for trade and payments in Western Europe place Spanish 
exports of manufactured goods at a higher level of discrimination than EPU members? 
Between 1951 and 1959, according to a comparative study between Spain, Italy, and 
Portugal, the performance of Spanish manufactured goods to the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands was much poorer than those by Italy 
and Portugal. The proportion of manufactured goods in total Spanish exports increased 
only to the Netherlands, although not significantly and subject to constant fluctuations; 
it decreased on the British market, although little, while it decreased importantly on the 
German market. In the case of Italy and Portugal, this same proportion increased 
substantially in exports to the Federal Republic, significantly in the case of the 
Netherlands, and moderately concerning the United Kingdom.173 Narrow bilateralism 
did not promote exports of manufactured goods, particularly after the most intense period 
of import restrictions in different countries.
European Conference on the Organisation of Agricultural Markets. In 1951, 
the IEME registered about $104 million more from exports than in 1950; AHBE, 
I EME, box no. 164: "Balanza General de Pagos del año 1951**.
175. Mil ward: "Una comparación del comercio de exportación español, italiano 
y portugués, 1950-1959**, in Leandro Prados de la Escosura and Vera Zamagni 
(eds.): El desarrollo económico de la Europa del sur. España e Italia en 
perspectiva histórica, Madrid [Alianza] 1992.
Nevertheless, I believe that had Spain been able to benefit from the OEEC free 
lists in the sector, the inadequacy of the Spanish industry to provide those products for 
which west European import demand grew rapidly during the 1950s, apart from 
considerations of quality and price, would have reduced substantially any possible gains. 
The OEEC liberalisation measures would have benefited little the kind of less-essential 
manufactured goods made in Spain. Institutional factors are important in explaining why 
Spain did not benefit more from the rapid growth of intra-European trade in the early 
1950s. More important, however, is the Spanish trade commodity’ composition 
characterised by a low proportion of manufactured goods in total exports and by the 
predominance of textiles, which could not expand according to the panern of demand in 
the industrial countries of Western Europe in favor of engineering, chemicals, and other 
industries and services.176 Spain’s principal export categories appeared highly 
concentrated in a few items that remained almost invariable throughout the period here 
considered: fresh and preserved fruit and vegetables -oranges, dried fruit, bananas, 
tomatoes, onions, grapes-, nuts, wine, and olive oil, iron ore, pyrites, potash, rosin, cork, 
mercury, turpentine, tungsten, chemicals, wood and cork manufactures, and, finally, 
textiles.
In contrast to the stationary situation recorded for Spain, Italy increased 
substantially its proportion of manufactured goods in its total volume of exports due to 
its industrial modernisation and its specialisation in engineering, chemical, and clothing 
sectors (responsible for 63 per cent of the increase in Italian exports between 1950 and 
1960). When world import demands were unleashed, Italian industry was more diversified 
and better equipped to face international competition than the ill-equipped, high-priced, 
over-protected Spanish industry, whose main aim was to supply the domestic market. 
These were facts independent of the institutional arrangements governing international 
trade. The further expansion of this trade continued in a stable trend that was certainly 
favoured by trade liberalisation and the multilateral settlements mechanism of the EPU. 
By the end of the 1950s, Spain acquired a noticeably diversified industrial structure. Until 
the 1960, exports of manufactured goods stagnated. This was in accordance with the long­
17<. A. Maizels: "The Effect* of Industrialization on Exports of Primary- 
Producing Countries’1, Kvklos, vol. 24, 1961, pp. 18-43.
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term logic of an industrial import-subsdtution policy. Time was needed to develop 
domestic industries to replace imports or produce substitutes and reduce the foreign 
exchange needs of the Spanish economy, and still longer for import substituting industries 
to generate new exports of manufactured goods.
A possible explanation for the slow modification of industrial structures and the 
stagnation of exports of manufactured goods was the low level of import trade. This was 
due in turn to the low capacity of foreign currency earnings through export trade or 
tourism and almost non existent foreign assistance to finance balance-of-payments deficits. 
The country’s import capacity depended, basically, on its potential to export basic 
commodities. The initial weakness of the Spanish manufacturing sector required a greater 
contribution from imports than what exports actually financed. The permanent shortage 
of reserves and the consequent need to link imports to the country’s limited foreign 
currency earnings through export trade and tourism retarded reconstruction, limited 
industrialisation, forbade modernisation, and delayed the required industrial transformation 
of the Spanish economy until the late 1960s.177
In the meanwhile, the closed Spanish market deprived industries of the advantages 
of specialisation and economies of scale, owing to the protection afforded. Furthermore, 
the discrimination with respect to the allocation of scarce foreign exchange and capital 
resources, between export industries and import substitution industries, which was first 
declared temporary but then forced endlessly, led to the weak promotion of traditional 
exports. As a result, balance- of-payments difficulties increased in magnitude. If the 
import substitution policy and export promotion appeared to be competitive instead of 
complementary activities in raising Spain's GNP over the long period of time, this was
171. Juergen B. Dong«* provide* the best description of the industrial 
transformation in Spain and the promotion of experts of manufactured goods 
during the 1960s: a) "From an Autarchic Towards a Cautiously Outward-Looking 
Industrialization Policy: The Case of Spain", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv. 
Review of World Economics, vol. 107, 1971, pp. 33-^3; b) "üna nota sobre las 
fuentes de crecimiento industrial en España", Revista de Economía Política, 
no. 59, September-December 1971, pp. 189-98; c) "Spain's Industrial Exports. 
An Analysis of Demand and Supply Factors", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, vol. 
108, 1972, pp. 191-232; d) "Returns to Scale and Factor Substitutability in 
the Spanish Industry", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, vol. 108, 1972, pp. 597- 
607; e) "Shaping Spain's Export Industry", World Development, vol. 1, no. 
9, September 1973, pp. 19-37; and f) La industrialización en Bspafta. 
Políticas, logros, perspectivas, Barcelona (Oikos-Tau] 1976.
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because Spain could devote only a very limited amount of resources to the production of 
export commodities.17* It is important to consider here the structure of the Spanish 
economy and the effects of certain economic policies on the development of the various 
industrial sectors rather than any foreign discriminatory devices. To confirm this, however, 
requires a detailed study of the changes taking place in the country's industrial 
development and in the pattern of western European demand, which is beyond the scope 
of this research.
5.4. Financial Diplomacy
Trade was not restricted exclusively by means of tariff and non-tariff barriers, but 
also by the way payments were arranged. Access to the EPU’s automatic system of short­
term credits and multilateral off-setting of balances further differentiated the OEEC 
member-states from Spain in trading terms. While European currencies became 
transferable against each other, the peseta remained a non-transferable currency for other 
western European economies until 1961.179 While the EPU mechanism allowed deficits 
of one member country with respect to another to be financed with surpluses earned from 
some third member country, the bilateral clearing system that governed trade between the 
Spanish monetary area and each and every currency area meant that Spam's deficits with 
individual countries could not be compensated by surpluses earned elsewhere (except for 
the Sterling Area), because the surpluses were not necessarily earned in transferable 
currencies.
17#. The idea of competition between import substitution and export promotion 
has been borrowed from P.K. Mitra: "Import Substitution and Export Promotion 
as Means to Industrialization", Economia Internazionale, Vol. 27, no. 3-4, 
August-November 1974, pp. 524-37, p. 531.
17>. See Fernando Eguidazu and Daniel Alvárez Pastor: "La convertibilidad de 
la peseta y las cuentas extranjeras de pesetas convertibles", Información 
Comercial Española, no. 573, May 1981, pp. 77—90.
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5.4.1. The EPU versus Spain's Financial Arrangements
Payments difficulties affected Spain's import system more than anything else, 
including the desire to foster and protect an expanding national manufacturing industry. 
The import licencing policy of the Spanish Government was determined mainly by the 
over-riding need to keep imports within export earnings. In the absence of adequate 
reserves of gold and hard currency, Spain was forced to impose rigid selective controls 
on imports. With no other means to pay for imports than export earnings, import licencing 
was based on "essentiality" and on availability of domestic substitutes. This was 
particularly pressing in years when inadequate rainfall, with resultant crop failures and 
restricted industrial output, caused import requirements of basic foodstuffs to increase and 
exportable quantities of agricultural and industrial goods to decline. It was by necessity 
a restrictive licencing system because no feasible substantial improvement in exchange 
holdings could alter it. Imports of capital equipment needed for industrial expansion could 
be increased endlessly. The necessity to conserve exchange might have been a greater 
incentive to direct licencing, control of foreign exchange transactions, and progressive 
devaluation of the peseta through a system of multiple exchange rates (rather than official 
straight devaluation), than any policy of economic self-sufficiency.
The EPU favoured the multilateralisation of payments among OEEC members, 
unlikely the previous intra-European payments arrangements and the straitjacket of 
bilateral clearings in which Spain remained. Within the EPU, a country was concerned 
only with its net position within the Union; it was no longer necessary to attain a strict 
balance in its individual payments with every single country belonging to the Union. 
Countries showing a deficit with the Union received automatic credits in EPU units 
(equivalent to the gold content equal to one United States dollar in 1950) up to a certain 
amount Beyond this amount they received some credits and had to pay a part of the 
deficit in gold. The proportion of gold increased as the cumulated deficit grew; beyond 
a certain limit, no further credits were granted. The fact that debtors did not have to settle 
fully in gold and dollars allowed all prospective debtors to sign the EPU agreement. 
Creditor countries, on the other hand, extended credit to the EPU up to a certain amount 
of their claims upon the Union; then they received an increasing proportion in gold. For 
them, the prospects of future exports compensated the risk of some eventual financial loss.
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According to the EPU agreement, each country had a quota amounting to 15 per 
cent of its total value of merchandise trade and invisible transactions with the members 
of the Union and their dependent territories in 1949 (with few exceptions, i.e. Switzerland 
and Belgium). National quotas expressed in EPU units of account were the basis used to 
calculate the automatic credits and gold payments according to a sliding-scale. The initial 
debt or credit for a value of less than 20 per cent of the size of a given country’s quota 
was covered completely by credit to the debtor country by the Union or to the Union by 
the creditor country. If the debt or credit position reached a value between 20 per cent and 
less than 40 per cent of the original quota, the debtor was to receive 16 per cent as credit 
and be required to settle 4 per in gold or dollars, while the creditor was to provide 10 per 
cent as credit to the Union and receive 10 per cent in gold or dollars from the Union. This 
rate was maintained until the creditor country reached a position in which its credit with 
the Union reached the total amount of its original quota with the Union. On the contrary, 
debtors running up increasing deficits would have to pay their debts in dollars in an 
increasing ratio as the deficit mounted, with a decreasing amount of credit until the initial 
credit/gold-dollars rate was completely reversed. The overall percentages were that debtors 
should receive and creditors extend 60 per cent of the value of quotas in credit, while 
paying or receiving the remaining 40 per cent in gold or dollars. The settlement 
mechanism was an incentive to induce members towards equilibrium at the highest level 
of commodity trade possible.
Researchers agree that setting up the EPU contributed to the expansion of intra- 
European trade. This was true particularly because a very high percentage of the total 
bilateral monthly surpluses and deficits within the EPU were cleared by the automatic 
offsetting mechanism, reducing substantially gold payments.1*0 By the same token, it can 
be affirmed that the exclusion of Spain from the EPU and the transferability of the
1#0. In its first year, of a total of $3,200 million of transactions, $2,100 
were settled multilaterally leaving only $1,100 million to be settled by 
credits and gold payments? MAE, Leg. 344 7, exp. 57: "Nota de la Dirección 
de Organismos Internacionales: La Unión Europea de Pagos", by Román Oyarzún 
Iñarra, Madrid, 14 February 1953. That the EPU's settlements mechanism 
allowed a rapid expansion of commodity trade in Western Europe in the 1950s 
is a common feature in the literature; a last mentioning of it to be found 
in Milward: "Motives for Currency Convertibility: The Pound and the
Deutschmark, 1950-5", in Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich: Interactions in the World 
Economy. Perspectives from International Economic History, New York [New 
York University Press] 1989, pp. 260-84.
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European currencies deprived this country of general trade expansion.111
Had Spain joined the OEEC shortly after its conception, had it initiated the move 
towards progressive trade liberalisation and the consequent reduction of economic 
interventionism in trade and payments, had it joined the EPU in 1950, and had it been 
helped by some American contribution to counter its possible chronic debtor position 
within EPU, Spain might have benefited from EPU membership. However, when the 
matter was considered, Spain could have financed the average percentage of import 
liberalisation with extreme difficulty had Spanish OEEC membership forced the 
fulfillment of this obligation without financial collaboration from the United States or the 
Union itself. To be beneficial to the Spanish economy, access to the Union would have 
meant concessions that might have proved incompatible with the Union's philosophy, 
especially if granted to a later entrant.
5.4.2. Spain within the EPU?
The Spanish economic authorities were aware that the OEEC and EPU constituted 
the hub around which commercial and financial relations took place in Western Europe, 
with the exception of Spain. For this reason, and because Spain’s trade with EPU 
represented 60 per cent of its total trade, the EPU received important attention from them. 
Early in 1951, Spain's access to EPU was presented as "reporting undeniable 
benefits''.1*2 The question of whether Spain’s access to the EPU should be considered 
"an objective of Spanish foreign action” was then presented.1<}
Several general circumstances might have favoured such a consideration. A
1,1. This argument has bean used by Angel Viñas et al.: Política comercial 
exterior en España (1931-1975), 2 vols., Madrid (Banco Exterior de España] 
1979, vol. 2, pp. 831 ff.; and Milward, "Una comparación", cit.
1#a. MAE, Leg. 5915, exp. 1: Despatch no. 11/51 from Jaime Alba, Economic 
Counsellor at the Spanish Embassy in London, to Súñer, MLa Unión Europea de 
Pagos y EspañaN, 17 January 1951, annex 1 to the despatch no. 86 from the 
Spanish Embassy in London of 23 January 1951*
1A>. Ibid., Alba to Suanzes, London, 19 January 1951.
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significant change of attitude in the Spanish Council of Ministers itself occurred in late 
December 19S0, whereby the exclusion of Spain from the OEEC was considered as a 
temporary measure not impossible to overcome.1*4 The reversal of the December 1946 
United Nations’ resolution and the announcement of the appointment of ambassadors by 
most nations were good signs of the changing international attitude concerning Spain. The 
interest shown by the Americans about opening military negotiations with the Spanish 
Government might have prompted the belief that part of the deal could be to support 
Spain’s attempt to gain access to the EPU. However, the decisive factor leading to 
detailed consideration of the matter arose more from the prospects for an increase in 
European trade, credit, and other financial facilities under the EPU, than from the prospect 
of dollar aid.
Unfortunately, at the time of the initial calculations there were no figures available 
on the Spanish balance of payments (as opposed to trade figures). It was not possible, 
therefore, to give a true picture of Spain’s payments position vis-à-vis the OEEC countries 
and its likely position in the EPU. In the absence of full balance of payments figures, 
trade returns were taken as a rough guide, and calculations were hypothetical. It was 
estimated that, in 1949, Spain’s total trade with the EPU monetary' area amounted to 
$484,653,400 (at the official exchange rate of Pts 10.95 to $1, which might have been 
unaccepted by the Union). Increasing it by 20 per cent -the approximate amount for 
invisible transactions stipulated in a great number of the bilateral agreements-, Spain’s 
total volume of visible and invisible transactions with the OEEC area reached the value 
of $581.584,080. This way, a theoretical Spanish quota of approximately $88 million 
came out, which placed Spain right after Denmark and before Austria and Portugal in the 
EPU quota-ranking.1*5
These figures were approximate in the absence of full information on Spanish 
invisible payments and receipts, and were cited only as indication of Spain's likely 
position in the EPU. The balance of payments drafted by the Spanish Institute of Foreign
1W. A report on the OEEC, dated on 22 December 1950 and forwarded to the 
Council of Ministers; MAE, Leg. 3448, exp. 12.
1#9. MAE, Leg. 5915, exp. Is Alba to Süner, London, 17 January 1951.
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Exchange gave a total value of $474 million of visible and invisible transactions with 
OEEC countries and dependent territories in 1949 (excluding dollar trade with Germany 
and Italy). This resulted in a quota of approximately $71 (see table 5.4), which was 
accepted in 1955 by the Spanish delegation to the OEEC.1*6 The volume of the national 
quota was not insignificant Depending on how much of the quota had been used up in 
a cumulative positions from the incorporation of the Union, settlements of surpluses and 
deficits were graduated in a mixture of automatic credits and gold/dollar payments.'*7
With a quota of $88 million, Spain would then be entitled to obtain an automatic 
and unconditional credit from the EPU of 20 per cent of its quota, i.e. $17.5 million This 
was less than the total amount of authorised bilateral deficits that Spain enjoyed at that 
time ($31,781).’** Using the more realistic quota of $71 million, the gap between the 
EPU automatic credits ($14.2 million) and the bilateral swings widen. This proves the real 
effort undertaken by the European nations to favour trade and payments relations with 
Spain to a level which could, at least, partially compensate for the latter's exclusion from 
EPU. This example and the treatment offered to Spanish exports while the OEEC 
liberalisation programme applied, shows how the Europeans implemented their original 
consideration that bilateral means could provide assistance to Spain without uprising 
political dissent with Spanish membership of any of the organisation presented within the 
frame of a United Europe.
The total possible credit available to Spain through EPU arrangements could reach 
60 per cent of the quota, i.e., $53 million, conditioned upon the above-mentioned scale
>M. MAE, Leg. 5332, exp. 1: Spanish delegation to the OEEC, "Informe sobre 
la eventual entrada de España en la Organización Europea de Cooperación 
Económica”, Paria, June 1955.
107. A $88 million quota was maintained in the draft response to the original 
British idea of setting up a working party between Spain and the EPU; MAE, 
Leg* 10077, exp. 42: "Anteproyecto. Apunte relativo a los diferentes
aspectos de una eventual accesión de España a la EPU o para la negociación 
de un posible "working arrangement" entre la EPU y España", n/d, most 
probably 11 April 1951. The British presented the question to the Spanish 
delegates at the trade talks before the renewal of the bilateral agreement 
in April 1951« There is no proof, however, that either Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees, 
the British member of the Managing Board of the EPU, or the British Treasury 
were ever informed of the Spanish position.
1M. AHBE, IEME, box no.3: S/C, 1 December 1950; at the corresponding dollar 
exchange rate used by the United Nations's yearbooks of trade statistics.
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of payments in gold or dollars to the Union to a maximum of $35.2 million or 40 per cent 
of the Spanish quota. This was the maximum financial risk involved in joining the Union, 
because if Spain surpassed the quota it could ask either to benefit from the capital fund 
of S350 million (allotted from the ERP appropriations) that supported the Union, be 
authorised to adopt special restrictive measures and suspend temporarily the fulfillment 
of its obligations as a member, or, finally, withdraw from the Union altogether. In strict 
credit terms, Spain was not necessarily better off within the EPU than carrying on its 
bilateral swings. The benefit of EPU membership came from the automatic credit 
provisions and multilateral settlement mechanism which freed trade from the caprices of 
bilateralism.
The essential question then, was whether the EPU facilities compensated for the 
necessary changes that Spam's EPU membership would have involved in Spain’s 
economic practices. The policy of the Spanish Administration conflicted in large measure 
with the obligations that Spain was expected to assume as a member of the OEEC and 
of the EPU, as regards both domestic economic policy and general trade and payments 
practices. A considerable technical difficulty in the way of Spain’s entry into the 
OEEC/EPU was its complicated system of multiple exchange controls. While the 
manipulation of exchange rates for both imports and exports was an infringement on the 
rules of the International Monetary Fund rather than those of the OEEC itself, it was a 
clear discriminatory device contrary to OEEC practices.119 The abandonment of the 
multiple exchange system would almost certainly entail a fairly drastic devaluation of the 
peseta, to which the Spanish Government was strongly opposed. The fact that Austria held 
two exchange rates made the Spanish officials believe that a multiple exchange rate was 
certainly not at variance with the orthodox practices of member countries.190 
Nevertheless, it was clear to them that an impulse in the simplification of the Spanish
1M. For a brief description of the Spanish multiple exchange rates and other 
exchange distortions, see IMF: Third Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 
1952, Washington D.C., pp. 220-24.
1#0. MAE, Leg. 10077, exp. 42: "Anteproyecto", cit. For Austria exchange
rates see IMF: Second Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions April 1951, 
Washington D.C., pp. 44-4 5.
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system of special rates of exchange was necessary.191 In fact, when the simplification 
of exchange rates was adopted in November 1951 (with the implementation of revised 
regulations concerning the operation of the "free" exchange market established in July 
1950), the Spanish Minister of Commerce, Arbunia, manifested the Spanish 
Administration's interest for the EPU, "the most interesting organisation from the foreign, 
financial, and commercial points of view."192 Simplification of exchange rates was 
welcomed, but the elimination of the system was considered impossible until the Spanish 
economy could export without producing a chain-in-inflationary effect and maintain, by 
other means, raw materials' prices low enough to contain inflation.
Intensive trade controls in Spain were counter to the EPU's commitment to trade 
liberalisation (art 2 of the agreement). The general objective of export controls was to 
channel earnings: import controls were to make the best use of available foreign exchange. 
Given the permanent low level of convertible currency and gold reserves, the Spanish 
licencing system was, by necessity, discriminatory. Le., designed to reduce as far as 
possible the immediate burden on certain reserves. The abolition of quantitative 
restrictions on Spanish imports in the private sector of trade would have involved the 
virtual abandonment of the import licencing system in the form in which it was operated. 
Alba believed that if some countries had access to the Union without having to follow the 
timetable of trade liberalisation; that if those countries that received the strongest 
American assistance (Le., Greece, Austria, and Turkey) and those who received important 
credit lines (i.e., Germany) could not follow the OEEC programme of liberalisation; that 
if the rest could implement the 60 per cent stage of liberalisation only after massive 
injection of American aid, then Spain could not be asked to comply immediately and fully 
with all the OEEC obligations, particularly without financial assistance.193 The question 
was never posed for discussion, and thus is difficult to know what would have been the 
position adopted by the OEEC Council. Doubtless some laxity in relation to escape
in. MAE, Leg. 5919, exp. 1: a) Alba to Súfter, London, 17 January 1951; b) 
"Informe para el Sr. Director. Sobre la Unión Europea y España", Madrid, 22 
February 1951; and Leg. 10077, exp. 42: "Anteproyecto", cit.
1R. Speech before the American Chamber of Commerce in Madrid, 12 November 
1951, in Arburúa: Cinco aftoa. cit., p. 32. For the nature of the November
1951 changes in exchange rates, see IMF, Third Annual Report, cit., p. 224.
lM. MAE, Leg. 5915, exp. 1: Alba to Súñer, London, 17 January 1951.
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clauses and exemptions would have been allowed to Spain as a late entrant, but even a 
minimum compliance with OEEC practices would have involved a radical change in 
Spanish trade practices. There would have been even more of an effect on imports despite 
that 30 per cent of Spanish trade was on government account (see table 5.14).
ZABLE 5 . 1 4
SPAIN'S IMPORT TRADE FROM EPU COUNTRIES AMD THEIR DEPENDENT TERRITORIES 
UNDER PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS, 1946
CLASS
% over the 
group 
private or 
government 
accounts
% in total 
trade on 
imports
% over 
total
Agricultural Commodities 
Private Trade 
Government Trade
4
10
603
229
505, 9 
494,5
31.0
69.0
3.98
20.09
2.76
6.15
Total class I 14 833 000, 4 100
Raw Materials
Private Trade 
Government Trade
44
39
761
732
753,0
309,7
53.0
47.0
38.75
78.03
26.89
23.87
Total class II 84 494 062,7 100
Manufactured Goods
Private Trade 
Government Trade
66 160
957
661,4 
545, 6
98.6
1.4
57.27
1.88
39.75
0.58
Total class III 67 118 207,0 100
PRIVATE TRADE 
GOVERNMENT TRADE*
115
50
525
919
920,3
349,8
100
100
69.41
30.59
TOTAL TRADE 166 445 270,1 100
Source: AHBE, IEME, box no. 54: "Importación española de los países de la
O.E.C.E. Año 1946"; AGA, C/36863: Despatch no. 1956, from Spanish delegation 
to the OEEC, Paris, 30 January 1956; and AGA C/36820: "Importaciones en 194 8 
procedentes de los paises de la UEP y sus zonas monetarias afiliadas". (*) 
Commodities under Government account were, mainly, wheat and other 
foodstuffs purchased by the Supply Commissariat, tobacco tinder State 
monopoly, petroleum products imported by CAMPSA, cotton, coal, and other raw 
materials for public enterprises.
Furthermore, the modest surplus with the OEEC as a whole of approximately $14 
million, within a total commodity trade deficit of $64 million in 1949 (see table S.4), was 
based on a very strict import control system, which would have to be greatly modified, 
if not largely abandoned, were Spain to become a member of OEEC. The year 1950 
ended with an overall trade deficit of approximately $29 million. This was due, however, 
to a large contraction in imports (by $41.4 million) and exports (export earnings decreased
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by $6 million).194 Exports were not performing well. Considering that this might have 
been due to discrimination in terms of OEEC liberalisation, the key element was the 
future prospects for an expansion of exports to European markets. Import liberalisation 
would undoubtedly have increased the total import volume and consequently raised the 
import bill, because it would have allowed Spanish importers to purchase from the 
country offering the best conditions and prices disregarding the state of bilateral balances. 
The answer to the question of whether the Spanish economy, which had been starving for 
imports during the previous fifteen years, could finance even the slightest rate of import 
liberalisation could only come from the benefits that the country expected to obtain on 
the export side.
The extension of import liberalisation to Spanish export commodities, in 
compensation for Spain liberalising its import trade, proved to be only a partial 
improvement over the previous situation. Access to the escudo and sterling areas in 
conditions similar to any OEEC member country was already a reality due to the 
unilateral declarations of Portugal, the United Kingdom and Ireland. Both monetary areas 
accounted for 36.4 per cent of Spain’s total earnings by expons in 1950 (see table 5.4). 
The most obvious improvement would come through an expansion of exports to France 
and the Federal Republic of Germany. Concerning France, it was difficult to increase 
exports beyond the level reached already, because it was a well protected market that 
managed to remain as such despite all the effons made by possible beneficiaries to break 
French tariff and non-tariff protection in the sector. In the German case, any possible 
export expansion was quickly eclipsed by the suspension of the liberalisation measures 
decreed by the Federal Government in February 1951. For Spain’s major markets, the 
extension of an OEEC treatment to its export commodities would have meant little 
improvement in relation to the previous position.
Concerning the rest of the EPU area, the volume of Spanish exports would have 
probably increased less than imports from there. The value of Spanish exports had 
increased owing to the rising world prices of raw materials, and this, while the situation
>M. Sm  tabl* 5.4.
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lasted, would have partially mitigated the effect of import liberalisation on the Spanish 
balance of payments. No one in Madrid forgot, however, that this was a temporary 
situation, independent from OEEC membership, while liberalisation, once adopted, was 
a far-lasting process. The OEEC countries were already taking the major part -in some 
cases the whole- of Spanish exports of industrial raw materials, and had no pressing need 
to absorb a greater amount of Spanish fruits, wine, and textiles, and other future export 
prospects. In sum, supposing that the technical difficulties in the way of Spain’s entry into 
OEEC were overcome, the likely effect on its economic relations with the Union would 
have been to eliminate the surplus situation in Spain’s balance of payments in relation to 
trade with the OEEC area by encouraging Spanish imports from the OEEC countries 
rather than exports to them. The need for diversifying the economy towards a more 
industrialised composition arose from the fact that the scope for increasing traditional 
exports was very limited. The primary products exported by Spain depended on the 
availability of natural resources and weather conditions, and were characterised by low 
price, wide demand elasticity, price oscillations, and resources extinction. It is not 
surprising that the Spanish Administration was unwilling to accept any commitments to 
carry on the programme for imports liberalisation that a joint OEEC/EPU membership 
entailed.”3
The economic "cost" of any Spanish access to EPU was unforeseeable but, 
undoubtedly, larger that the original quota attributed to Spain on the basis of its 1949 
trade values, unless it was agreed to permit Spain to qualify for aid as a special case. 
What aid Spain might have received within the EPU directly from the United States was 
difficult to estimate. In the Spanish minds, if American aid had been necessary to permit 
final agreement on the actual terms of the EPU, some help should also be granted to 
Spain to enlarge its payment capacity (or its deficit position).
With $350 million from congressional ERP appropriations, the United States 
Government contributed to the EPU’s initial working capital (completing the initial
1,s. MAE, Leg. 10077, exp. 42: Alba to Sufter, Madrid, 11 April 1951, after 
meeting the Director-General of Economic Policy and of Foreign Exchange: 
"Anteproyecto", cit.
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deposits of the different countries' own currencies), and provided a further $150 million 
for special aid to the United Kingdom to offset any possible gold and dollar losses 
incurred in allowing the European accumulated sterling balances to be used in multilateral 
settlements. Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, who were likely to be persistent 
creditors, were allocated initial debit balances receiving conditional dollar aid for a total 
amount of $189 million as compensation for the grants they were about to make to the 
other countries. Finally, initial credit balances were allotted by the Government of the 
United States to prospective debtors to counterpan initial debit balances during the period 
from June 1950 (when the EPU came retrospectively into effect) to 30 June 1951, 
according to article 10 of the EPU agreement ($314 million, of which $279 million was 
in the form of grants).
Initial credit balances in the form of grants were allotted to Greece ($115 million), 
Austria ($80 million), Norway ($50 million), the Netherlands ($30 million), and Iceland 
($4 million) and, in the form of long-term loans (through Marshall Aid allocations), to 
Turkey ($25 million) and, again, Norway ($10 million). Initial debit balances oscillated 
between 9 and 255 per cent of the original quotas of the fortunate c o u n t r i e s . I f  
political factors had been important inputs in the determination of the initial credit 
balances, undoubtedly also important was the prospective "cost” of implementing trade 
liberalisation measures. According to this second pattern, it was obvious to Spanish 
officials that Spain should move towards the Greek end of the spectrum, though no exact 
amounts were given.
The British Economic Intelligence Department (henceforth, EID) made an 
assessment of the entry of Spain into the OEEC/EPU. They argued that aid to Spain -both 
direct from the United States and in the way of EPU facilities- would probably be about 
$112.5 million. Since British officials had calculated that, on the basis of 1949 trade 
figures, Spain was to receive a quota of about $55 million, the amount corresponding to
lM, The original quotas for these saiM countries were the following in 
millions of units of account: Iceland 15, Greece 45, Turkey 50, Austria 70, 
Norway 200, and the Netherlands 330; HMSO, Cnd. 8064, p. 11.
direct American aid would have then been about S57.5 m illion 197 The possible amount 
of American aid to back Spain’s EPU membership was similar to the total amount 
attributed by the British to the credits granted to Spain by United States commercial banks 
plus the Export-Import Bank administered loans. The actual loans granted by private 
United States banks were much further reduced (see table 4.1) and the Eximbank's loans 
have not yet started to be effective.19* It is significant to notice this, because, had it been 
otherwise, there would have been support for the hypothesis that by granting loans 
without requesting any degree of political and economic liberalisation, the Americans were 
responsible for Franco’s lack of interest in adopting the necessary degree of liberalisation 
to obtain EPU credits.
There are no grounds to sustain the contention that the Spanish Government 
preferred to obtain dollar aid by means of bilateral negotiations with the United States, 
because the EPU credits would have involved substantial modification of economic 
practices. It was far from obvious that direct American aid, which the Spanish 
Government was still positively hoping for in return for the bases, would necessarily come 
at a cost considered more bearable than the OEEC’s price. By March 1951, the Spanish 
Government’s experience in negotiating the Eximbank loan made it perfectly clear that 
the conditions for American aid to Spain outside the OEEC could involve the same 
unpleasant changes in Spain’s economic practices as those involved in the OEEC rules 
and obligations. Without major changes in political and economic terms, it could expect 
no major direct economic assistance from the United States in the short term.
Initially, it was argued that the granting of American aid through the OEEC 
framework required Spanish membership in the OEEC and EPU; this was opposed by 
most of the OEEC member-states. Any such Spanish participation required unanimous
l” . PRO, FO 371/96195: "Possible entry of Spain into OEEC", a top secret
memorandum drafted by the EID, 10 March 1951, sent to the Mutual Aid and the 
Western Departments for internal discussion. The trade returns used by the 
British were defective for this purpose in that they did not include trade 
between Spanish overseas territories and the rest of the world.
1M. On the one side, the loans granted by the Chase National Bank, the 
National City Bank and the Bank of New York amounted to $31.9 million up to 
the end of 1951. On the other side, it was only in May 1951 that the IEME 
could grant the first authorisations; see chapter four, table 4.1 and p. 
287.
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consent of participating countries; this was unlikely to be achieved in the short term.199 
Nevertheless, had the Spanish Government decided to undergo a change of heart and 
genuinely liberalise in economic terms, there was little economic inducement for the 
United States authorities to extend aid to Spain through the OEEC rather than to increase 
their own bargaining position in order to be granted the desired military facilities and 
granting -c ondi uons. The initial steps in the negotiations for bases had made this clear. The 
truth was that the Spanish Administration had not other alternative except to obtain 
economic assistance on a bilateral basis subject to the unilateral conditions imposed by 
the United States negotiators.
Spain's potential contribution to the OEEC was not great, but in itself was not a 
deterrent to Spain’s admission into OEEC membership. In general, an extension of the 
area of multilateral trade and payments might have been welcomed and, there was no 
doubt that the Spanish adherence to OEEC was a step in the right direction. For individual 
countries, some benefit could accrue from the fact that, insofar as Spain liberalised 
imports, it would no longer be able to discriminate unilaterally against main continental 
competitors. However, it appeared very likely that Spain would be a structural debtor in 
EPU, at least for some time, and be unable to liberalise very far. In that event, Spain’s 
free list would have been unlikely to contain any significant number of the goods that 
then accounted for the greater part of the difficulties that most Western European nations 
were having with the Spanish authorities. The Spanish Government could not be expected 
to trade with OEEC member-countries on a basis significantly different than bilaterally. 
Non-discrimination by means of a system of global quotas for imports from the EPU area 
of goods in the non-liberalised sector might have proved to be impossible to implement.
***. In September 1951, the American Embassy in Spain and the ECA Temporary 
Economic Survey Croup recommended Spanish participation in the EPD as a 
device to accelerate Spanish economic recovery. The State Department 
reminded them that in order to benefit from the EPD arrangement, OEEC 
membership —which appeared to them highly unprovable- was required; FRUS, 
1951, IV, part 1, the Charge in Spain, John Wesley Jones (December 1950- 
February 1951), to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Madrid, 13 September, 
and the Acting Secretary of State, James E. Webb, to the Embassy, 
Washington, 18 September, pp. 651 and 653, respectively. The Europeans 
understood that Spain's OEEC membership would take place once a prior 
economic and political liberalisation had taken place in Spain; PRO, F0 
371/96195: R.M. Saner to R.P. Heppel, 1st Secretary of the British Embassy 
in Madrid after January, 26 May 1951.
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The opening of the Spanish market and the increase in Spanish purchasing from 
Western Europe due to the financial backing of EPU did not present any serious 
advantage given the low purchasing power of the Spanish economy in comparative terms 
with the rest of Western Europe. Spain’s natural tendency to develop a structural deficit 
position revealed that the opening of the Spanish economy would be a long-term process, 
before reaching something similar to the average level of trade liberalisation elsewhere 
in the OEEC markets. It was also clear that, if obliged to abandon the elaborate system 
of import controls and licencing on their present discriminatory basis, Spain, a non-GATT 
member, would have most probably updated its tariff levels for domestic protection, as 
a new recruit to the high tariff camp in which the OEEC was unarmed to act. From the 
trading point of view, therefore, the only effect of the Spaniards joining the OEEC and 
EPU would have been, at best, to subject them to the usual pressure from the OEEC to 
bring their economy into a state in which they could fulfil the obligations of membership. 
This was too small a reward for the distortions that Spain’s closer contacts with 
OEEC/EPU without the sufficiently completed political rapprochement might have 
produced within the OEEC itself and within different governing coalitions in some 
countries.
The EED believed that there was only one benefit and immediate interest likely 
to accrue to the OEEC countries from Spain's accession to the OEEC. This was additional 
pressure for the redirection of the investment plans of the Spanish Government into the 
mining and extractive industries to help overcome the scarcity of raw materials (which 
were at the time largely exported to the OEEC markets) for their new defense 
programmes after the beginning of the Korean War. Any priority of investment given to 
agriculture in order to eliminate the main adverse factor in the balance of trade and to act 
as an incentive to dollar savings, or any long-term social or economic investment 
programmes, i.e., electricity supply, transport, or heavy industry, were of no benefit to 
OEEC countries.“ 0
The possibilities of expanding mineral and metal production in Spain, however.
,##. PRO, FO 371/96195: "Possible Entry of Spain into OEEC", top secret
report dated 10 March 1951.
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were rather limited due to the expenditures involved. Large scale development of Spanish 
mineral potentials required very heavy capital outlays and the employment of foreign 
technicians and engineers. A programme of this son could not be carried out except by 
the joint action of the United States, Spain, the OEEC countries, and international private 
companies. This would require a complete alteration of the Spanish Government’s policy 
to attract foreign investment Government regulations affecting foreign investment were 
not limited to the 25 per cent limit for foreign capital in new firms and the prohibition 
of foreign control of management Labour regulations that forced the maintenance of 
personnel on the pay-roll in periods when production was low because of power shortages 
or other bottlenecks; foreign exchange rates and exchange controls that made production 
for sale on the world markets unprofitable and the procurement of foreign supplies very 
difficult; and the threat of official price controls on expon trade affected powerfully 
foreign investments.
The scope of a general modification of this economic policy was rather limited. 
The first two regulations enumerated above might have been more easily modifiable by 
the Spanish Government than granting foreign firms employment and foreign exchange 
privileges not enjoyed by Spanish firms. Universal liberalisation implied grave economic 
problems. The stabilisation of employment in periods of reduced production was a major 
device for protecting the underpaid wage earners. The only alternative was the expansion 
of unemployment benefits which would have to be met from government funds, thus 
increasing the inflationary deficit A system of realistic flexible foreign exchange rates 
necessary to give market security to exporters could scarcely be established as long as the 
peseta was likely, at any time, to lose its purchasing power rapidly as the result of 
inflation.
Even if one accepted the fact that the Spanish Administration could consent to a 
redirection of investment without major economic assistance, it could not be assumed that 
any future expansion of raw materials* output would necessarily provide a correspondingly 
larger exportable surplus. When foreign demand and international prices rose, impetus was 
also given to sustain a general expansion of Spanish industrial activity. No great increases 
in the output of iron ore in Spain was expected and exports from Spanish Morocco of Riff
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mines, although increasing slightly, were limited after June 1950 by the expanding 
requirements of the Spanish iron and steel industry. Despite Spanish industrialisation 
plans, there was little likehood that Spain’s mineral exports will ever again attain the 
proportion and relatively importance which they held in 1929. Only a larger and more 
efficient production at reasonable costs could have permitted increased exports. 
Furthermore, international distribution of any surpluses would be governed largely by the 
United States production and requirements. A majority of OEEC countries might have 
argued that any expansion of trade in certain Spanish raw materials could well be 
achieved under the current trading arrangements and without the need to incorporate Spain 
in the OEEC.
Early in May 1951, the Spanish Director-General of Economic Policy suspended 
the hypothesis of Spanish EPU membership because of its unpredictable future political 
consequences (e.g., the EPU telling Spain how to behave financially), at least until new 
information could be provided by the IE ME and other financial and commercial 
authorities.201 At the same time, the debate about Spain joining the OEEC and the EPU 
ceased also in the different governments most interested in it. In October 1952, rumours 
from Paris announced that Spanish membership in the EPU was to be discussed; the 
Spanish Ambassador denied it.I0i Portugal had quietly mentioned the convenience of 
Spain taking part in the EPU, but never requested it officially. Germany had played with 
the idea for some time, but it did not go beyond some talks in February 1953.203 The 
Spaniards remained non-committal about the matter until a real possibility for joining the 
OEEC appeared.201
As had been the situation in 1951, by the spring of 1953, the Europeans had
201. Handwritten note dated 8 May 1951 on MAE, Leg- 5915, exp. 1: Under- 
Secretariat of Foreign Economy and Commerce, Directorate General of Economic 
Policy, "Nota para el Señor Director. Incorporación de España a la Unión 
Europea de Pagos", Madrid, 5 May 1951.
202. MAE, Leg. 3446, exp. 57: "Nota de la Dirección de Organismos
Internacionales. La Unión Europea de Pagos", by Román Oyarzún, Madrid, 14 
February 1953.
,0>. See below, p. 387.
204. See chapter seven, section 7.5.2, pp. 593 ff.
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granted to Spain automatic credits at a scale partially to compensate for the Spanish 
exclusion from the most direct benefits of the EPU. A report on Spain and the EPU 
drafted in April 1953, established the Spanish quota at $60 millions on the basis of 1948 
which entitled Spain to receive, after using up its quota, $36 million in credits and pay 
$24 million in gold and/or dollars. According to this report, bargaining the base year for 
Spain, a quota near $100 million could be obtained, which implied a maximum credit of 
$60 million and gold and dollar settlements of $40.2Q5 The $88 million quota used in
1951 on a 1949 basis would have provided credits for a minimum of $52.8. In sum. 
according to all possible combinations of years, the EPU would allow a maximum amount 
of credit to Spain of $52.8 million against the $61.6 million provided by bilateral 
agreements with EPU members (see table 5.15).
TABU 5.X5
SWINGS ALLOWED TO 8PAU) BY WXSTZKH EOROPC, APRIL 1953
(in dollars)
FRG 20,000,000 Netherlands 2,105,000
United Kingdom 11,200,000* Portugal 1,739,000
France 8,000,000 Norway 1,400,000
Denmark 3,623,000 Finland 1,000,000
Belgium 3,000,000 Sweden 967,100
Turkey 3,000,000* Greece 500,000
Italy 2,500,000 Iceland 280,000
Switzerland 2,310,000 TOTAL €1,€24,100
Source: MAE, Leg. €285, exp. 3, carp. 4: "Plafonds de Acuerdos Comerciales 
Vigentes con paises de Europa, America y Oceania", José Antonio Montes, IEME 
Vice-Chairman, to Isaac Garcia del Valle, Director-General of Economic 
Policy at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, 24 April 1953. 
(*) Refers to maximum facilities, though these countries had expressed their 
desire to reduce their individual credit swings: the British authorities 
wanted to reduce from ¿4 million to £3 million, Turkey from $3 million to 
$1.5 million, and Portugal too but no figures were given; MAE, Leg. 5912, 
exp. 2: "Informe sobre la Unión Europea de Pagos (U.E.P.)", Madrid, 25 April 
1953.
In Spanish minds, the conclusion was obvious: there was no immediate advantage 
to joining EPU when the liberalisation of import trade would worsen Spain’s balance of 
payments to an extent higher than all possible credits from EPU or the difference between 
these and the swing credits available at the time from the EPU countries. Although it 
seemed improbable that Spain would be forced to reach the 60 per cent target, when
*•*. MAE, Lag. 5915, exp. 2: "Inform« sobre la Uni6n Europe» da Pagos
(O.E.P.)", 25 April 1953. Although the author of the report explained that 
EPU quotas had 1949 as the basis-year and liberalisation percentages for 
1948 (except for Germany which was 1949), he adopted 1946 to calculate the 
Spanish quota in the EPU.
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Austria was allowed not to liberalise and the United Kingdom reached 46 per cent in 
February 1953, even the Spanish proposal for their own schedule starting with 30 per cent 
in each of the three sectors, would have greatly affected the import bill. Again, as in
1951, the Spanish attitude was much influenced by the belief that Spain's export trade 
would not substantially benefit from liberalisation because it had reached its volume limits 
already (export values would still increase because exporters would not benefit from 
compensation operations and other mechanisms whereby they sold at low cost to 
compensate with high earning on import commodities purchased with those same 
earnings). An additional problem, pointed out in this report, was that Spain would lose 
"the bargaining power that has given some good results before when countries are forced 
to buy Spanish products in order for Spain to buy their goods".206 In other words, as a 
debtor, Spain would lose some of the advantages of import discrimination and bilateral 
bargaining.
The Americans shared the conviction that commercial credits were the alternative 
to Spain's OEEC/EPU membership. When, in April 1954, Minister of Commerce Arburua 
solicited American financial aid to move closer towards the OEEC liberalisation practices, 
the Spanish authorities were informed by the Director of the Foreign Operations 
Administration, Harold E. Stassen, that the United States rejected the offer. However, it 
had decided to enlist the participation of Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
and France in long-term development credits to Spain for the purchase of capital goods 
and the avoidance of excessive short-term owing credits.107 Despite this American 
interest, France and Germany continued to insist on short-term credits. France demanded 
dollar payments for fertiliser purchases from French North Africa and Germany charged 
interest on the swing debit beyond the interest paid to German suppliers of 
machinery.20* Only the United Kingdom increased the amount of the swing from $4.2
,0‘. Ibid.
2C\ FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, part 2, Record of meeting between Arburua and 
certain United States representatives, and "Memorandum of Conversation [with 
Arburua]" by Stassen, Washington, 20 April 1954, pp. 1974—77.
JOi. Ibid., Stassen's memoranda to the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
and of conversation with Arburua [on 28 and 29 October), Washington, 1 
November, and Madrid, 12 November 1954, pp. 1994 and 1998, respectively.
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million in 1953 to $7 million in 1954.20(1
The global amount of credit provided by bilateral agreements with the OEEC 
countries could hardly compensate for Spain’s lack of EPU membership. Spain's 
payments difficulties continued to be the major obstacle for die expansion of trade; 
bilateral trade credits continued to shape the flow of the Spanish trade more intensively 
than any other factor, including price and quality of the products to be purchased (most 
particularly during the period of low agricultural exports). Reciprocal credits were isolated 
actions and altogether a very limited and instable solution. In April 1951, overall swap 
facilities amounted to $31,781 million.210 That year, with a surplus of $35.2 million in 
trade balance, Spain had to make payments in gold for a total value of $13 million to 
settle debts with individual countries.211 From this perspective. EPU credit facilities were 
far from being inconvenient. Two years later, commercial credits and overdraft facilities 
had increased to $61.6 million, but they decreased again in October 1954 to approximately 
$50 million.212
By its exclusion from the EPU, Spain remained in the straitjacket of bilateral 
clearings, which implied that as the bilateral credit lines were exhausted and the creditor 
was not willing to extend further credit, import licence applications were turned down and 
trade stagnated. Very rarely was Spain willing to pay gold in order to continue importing 
from a country whose credit facilities had already been drained. Trade with the specific 
country was put into suspense and purchases were transferred to a different country - 
which did not necessarily offer the same commodities at better prices or at better 
conditions- whose trade credit was still unconsumed. Spanish exporters were forced to 
accept disadvantageous trade terms in order to obtain needed imports, although better
ACA, C/36622: OEEC, HP no. 11 of the Council, "Association of Spain in 
the work of the Organisation. Balance of Payments with Member Countries" 
various years, C/WP11/W(56) 6 and 15, Paris, 23 May and 6 June 1956, on the 
basis of information submitted by the Spanish delegation.
210. See below, p. 429.
*u . ASA, A/6815: National Institute for Agricultural Research: "Aspectos 
económicos de la Conferencia Europea sobre la Organización de Mercados 
Agrícolas", s/f.
*u . MAE, Leg. 10078, exp. 21: Report entitled "Posibilidad de ingreso de 
España en la Onión Europea de Pagos” for Argüelles, Madrid, 11 October 1954.
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terms could have been obtained from third countries. Conversely, when importing, the 
country was forced to accept in payment goods of limited usefulness to its economy in 
order to balance the bilateral account. Due to Spain’s non-EPU membership, the granting 
of import licences to individual countries continued to be influenced largely by the 
availability of a specific currency at any given time.
5.5. Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to show how Spanish bilateralism survived and 
behaved within a context moving progressively towards free trade and multilateral 
payments in increasing economic interdependence. The expected collapse of Spain’s 
bilateral trade was avoided due to the decisive attitude of Spain’s main trading partners 
in Western Europe -France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and, most particularly, the 
United Kingdom- to sustain their trade with Spain.
The role of the British in providing a non-discriminatory treatment to Spain was 
essential because the latter could use its sterling earnings to make payments to a large 
number of countries. The British authorities (both Labour and Conservative, despite the 
former’s ideological aversion to the Franco regime) refused to discriminate against 
Spanish exports. As part of their general commercial policy, the British were determined 
to maintain trade under any circumstances. This was stated right after the war, when the 
international pressure was great; it was maintained despite the great difficulties 
encountered in running the bilateral agreements. It was preserved when the OEEC 
liberalisation applied; confirmed when import restrictions were imposed due to balance-of- 
payments difficulties; and, finally, reaffirmed after 1953, when the Spanish import 
authorities failed to comply with licencing British less essentials at the levels agreed upon. 
The arguments in favour of adopting a strong line with Spain to force the fulfillment of 
formal undertakings under the bilateral agreements were persuasive, but never firm enough 
to impose the adoption of measures such as removing Spain from the transferable 
accounts area or refusing to grant OGL’s to Spanish export products. With one exception 
an A only temporarily, sanctions against Spain raised the objections of the different
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departments of the British administration. In October 1953, when the British authorities 
excluded Spain from OGL’s for grapes and nuts, the bilateral quotas were sufficient to 
allow all feasible trade. The British have extended to Spain complete OEEC treatment 
since June 1954.
The early trade liberalisation measures among OEEC countries had a rather 
limited effect on the pattern of bilateral trade between Spain and its main OEEC trade 
partners. The effects of Spanish exclusion from the general pattern of trade liberalisation 
in the early 1950s were far from homogenous in all three sectors -agricultural products, 
raw materials, and manufactured goods- simply because trade liberalisation had a different 
impact on the different groups of goods. Spain’s main exports faced, generally, a situation 
similar to that of the OEEC countries because the OEEC liberalisation programme 
remained ineffective in agricultural trade or was extended to non-member countries in the 
case of trade of raw materials. The British, French, and German Governments applied to 
Spain article 1 of the Code of Liberalisation of Trade which stated that any member-state 
was free to determine the nature and degree of freedom in its economic and financial 
relations with the outside world in the light of its individual situation and, thus, if it so 
desired, could take measures of liberalisation of trade with respect to a non-member 
country.
That Spain escaped severe discrimination in the process of trade liberalisation, 
particularly in agricultural trade, was significant because the largest consumers of Spain’s 
agricultural produce were the OEEC countries (61 per cent of total agricultural exports 
in the period from 1949 to 1953), providing the Spanish economy with 24 per cent of 
total foreign currency receipts registered in current and capital accounts during the same 
period. This situation represents the necessary background from which to understand the 
Spanish Administration’s reaction when the idea of organising European agricultural 
markets following integrationist schemes was launched and discussed (see chapter seven).
Considering the narrow margins within which the policy was applied, the Franco 
Administration was masterful in adjusting to new and uncertain political and economic 
variables during the first post-World War decade. It was quick to benefit from any
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favourable circumstance created by the clash of particular interests in confrontation within 
and among nations involved in the ocean of economic cooperation in which Spain sailed. 
Basically, Spain benefited from the fact that bilateralism could not be eliminated 
completely because non-discrimination was never fully extended.
This is not so important when considered alone, but it is significant as a rejection 
of the idea that Spanish bilateralism in trade was an undisputable and permanent breach 
with Europe's "free trade system". Spanish literature for the period concentrates on 
placing Spain against a uniformed block fonned by countries propelled by the experiences 
of the 1930s and the disasters of the war to solve their common problems together in a 
continuum between 1945 and 1957. Certain elements such as the predominance of 
bilateral trade in Western Europe up to 1953; the failure of the Americans to push 
Western Europeans from the "shopping list” approach to common standpoints at the time 
of the CEEC; the limits of trade liberalisation among OEEC countries and its set-backs 
due to balance-of-payments difficulties in the early 1950s; the permanence of tariffs as 
effective means for domestic protection once non-tariff protection was removed; the late 
implementation of a multilateral payments mechanism; the various guillotined initiatives 
to move quicker in the removal of all forms of trade discrimination seemed to have 
disappeared from this picture.113
Nevertheless, Spain’s non-participation in the OEEC and EPU schemes had 
serious economic disadvantages. On the one hand, the settlement of inconvertible balances 
remained Spain’s main trade obstacle. Spain's financial resources, apart from export 
earnings, few loans, and reduced American aid, consisted basically in the limits of 
reciprocal swings and overdraft facilities provided by payments agreements with Western 
European countries to finance short-term deficits in bilateral trade. As a debtor, Spain
,1J. A first and timid attempt to perceive Spain's commercial position in a 
less deterministic way for the second half of the 1940s is José Maria 
Serrano Sanz: "On siglo de politice comercial española en perspectiva", in 
Juan Velarde, José Luis Garcia Delgado and A. Pedreño (eds.): El sector 
exterior de la economía española« Doce estudios, Madrid [Economistas] 1988, 
pp. 13-52, in particular pp. 31 ff. The subsequent revision of this article, 
"El proteccionismo y el desarrollo económico en la Restauración. Reflexiones 
para un debate", Revista de Historia Económica, no. 1, 1989, pp. 133—56,
eliminated references to the 1940s and 1950s.
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could accumulate inconvertible debit balances only up to the limits of the agreed swings; 
the remainder of the balance was payable to the creditor in gold and dollars. The inability 
or unwillingness to take more Spanish goods, and thus supply the Spanish authorities with 
additional currency with which to buy more from the given partner, led automatically to 
the contraction of bilateral trade.
On the other hand, the Spanish Ministry of Commerce had to limit the total 
amount of imports from each and every monetary area to the exchange resources available 
at a given time; it had to allocate foreign exchange resources to the satisfaction of those 
needs regarded by it as the most essential. Hie fact that Spain needed to seek a structural 
balance in its individual payments, without the availability of credit facilities of the EPU, 
did not facilitate the relaxation of trade and foreign exchange controls. The extent by 
which licences and quantitative restrictions served to protect national industries was 
related to the distortion of trade practices imposed by the permanent lack of reserves of 
gold and convertible currencies in relation to the import needs of the Spanish economy. 
The obsession with saving foreign exchange made trade regulations more concerned with 
providing import supply to develop subsequent exports than with promoting traditional 
exports. Altogether this tended to reduce the total volume of trade. The Spanish 
Administration created a vicious circle whereby imports were restricted due to the lack 
of foreign currency while the exchange rate handicapped exports, thus diminishing foreign 
currency earnings. In 1947, the Spanish Government pleaded for foreign assistance in 
order to break this vicious circle. By the end of the period covered by this research, the 
circle had grown even more vicious, the basic needs of the Spanish economy had not 
changed, while the set of economic interests around protectionism and isolationism 
became even deeper rooted. Only a gradual expansion of production would have permitted 
the Spanish Government to progress toward the implementation of freer trading practices.
Having access to OEEC markets through an extension of the liberalisation 
measures did not automatically mean an export increase. Spain benefited from these 
circumstances only when domestic production, considerations about prices and quality, 
marketing and payments conditions, as well as bilateral arrangements, allowed. Although 
this chapter has emphasised what could be labelled the foreign constraints on the
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expansion of Spain's trade, by pointing at a somewhat non-discriminatory treatment, it 
cannot be left aside that strong domestic constraints for the promotion of trade existed in 
Spain. Devaluation, followed by a relaxation of export controls, unification of exchange 
rates, and the elimination of the extreme features of state intervention were envisaged as 
long-term strategies. In the short-run, Spain suffered the consequences of its economic and 
commercial practices rather than the discriminatory devices raised by the OEEC partners.
The extension of liberalisation to Spain was neither complete nor automatic, with 
the result that Spain always ran behind the liberalisation schedule. Western European 
countries used the possibility of extending OEEC liberalisation measures to Spain as an 
economic bargaining counter at the time of discussions over bilateral trade deals. When 
the Spanish economic authorities succeeded in obtaining more favourable treatment in 
terms of trade liberalisation from any of the OEEC commercial partners, it was already 
too late, because a new step towards liberalisation had been adopted and not extended to 
Spain. This situation, in which Spain benefited only from non-fulfillments and breaches 
of declared intentions, could provide no stability upon which to build long-term strategies 
of growth. The full extension to Spanish exports of those measures adopted for the OEEC 
programmes was an important bargaining tool that was never relinquished completely by 
the Western European nations.
Bilateral trade worked relatively well as an emergency short-run measure while 
intra-European trade was distoned by controls. At that time, Spain's bilateralism proved 
to be expansive rather than restrictive, like the intra-European bilateral agreements of the 
immediate postwar period. It made possible exchanges of goods that would not otherwise 
have taken place. But, it could not be a long-term solution when intra-European trade was 
liberated from what has been called the "stranglehold of bilateralism”.214 As trade 
liberalisation and multilateral payments extended, Spain's trade was severely affected 
because of the relatively small proportion of essential basic commodities among Spain's 
exportable surpluses and the degree of its dependence upon imports for basic industries. 
Import trade, apart from the years from 1952 to 1954, was in almost permanent
214. Griffiths, "The Stranglehold of Bilateralism"f cit-
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stagnation, whereas exports expanded in 1951 and then decreased (see tables 1, 2 and 
4.1). The year 1950, when the OEEC liberalisation programme and the EPU were 
effectively working before the full effects of the Korean War had major disturbing effects 
on the balance of payments, showed already a bad export performance for Spain. 
However, when protectionism and import restrictions returned, the Spanish authorities 
effectively maintained what was a crisis and emergency device, and did not consider long­
term devices.
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6.1. Introduction
The Schuman Plan has merited the unanimous attention of scholars and constitutes 
a watershed in the literature on European affairs. On 9 May 1950, the French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, made the proposal considered as the first step towards 
the creation of a new Europe: an integrated pool of coal and steel resources under an 
independent "high authority", based on an understanding between France and Germany, 
in an organisation open to other countries in Europe. Making former irreconcilable 
enemies to join efforts in the economic sector directly linked to war capacity was to make 
any future war between the two nations not feasible and placing the joint resources under 
a supranational authority implied an equal surrender of national sovereignty.1
*. The expression «Schumania» refers to the unpredictable (at the time) 
institutional result of the Schuman Plan. It has been borrowed from J. 
Driscoll: "Early days in Schumania" and "Association with Schumania", The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 2, no. 2, April 1954, pp. 89-117, and 
vol. 3, no. 2, April 1955, pp. 79-110, respectively.
1. For the text of Schuman's declaration see Margaret Carlyle (ed.) : 
Documents on International Affairs 1949-1950, London (Oxford University 
Press] 1953, pp. 315-17.
Jean Baptiste Nicolas Robert Schuman (1886-1963) , lawyer, praised by the 
literature on European integration as a father of Europe after having 
proposed the reunification of his fatherland and country of adoption through 
a common use of coal and steel resources. A German citizen before 1919 and 
a French citizen and politician afterwards, he is presented as having a pro- 
European mind apart from nationalism. While he was Prime Minister (November 
1947-July 1948) the Spanish-French common border reopened. Foreign minister 
between July 194 8 and January 1952 and from March 1952 to January 1953. He 
was deeply Catholic with an early admiration for Franco's "rigorous logic" 
regarding the Church. One of Schuman's biographers, Raymond Poidevin, 
explains that Schuman could not hesitate between a republican regime which 
persecuted the Church in Spain and Franco's regime which praised her; Robert 
Schuman homme d'fetat 1886—1963, Paris [Imprimerie nationale) 1986, p. 126. 
He was defined by Ernest Bevin, in the latter's usual frank style, as "a 
devout Roman Catholic, who at times had shown a disposition to defer to the 
Vatican in his attitude towards Spain.” PRO, FO 371/96181: "Record of
conversation between the Secretary of State and Sir John Balfour [appointed 
British Ambassador to Spain], London, 28 February 1951". French Catholics
The works that explain European integration from the deterministic perspective 
of ideals and personalities have made Schuman’s proposal a milestone in the democratic 
march towards a European Union.2 Within this highly political framework, research on 
Spain and the Schuman Plan could have no place: Spain's democratic deficit impeded any 
effective participation.3 Yet, Spam's non membership of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (henceforth, ECSC) does not exhaust historical research about Spain and the 
Schuman Plan.
Ideological strait-jackets have frustrated any assessment of the effects of Spain’s 
non-participation in the Schuman Plan. During the Franco era, the Christian roots of 
western civilisation were presented to prove the artificiality of the exclusion from 
European integration of a country with a clear Christian heritage.4 There was nothing that
had proposed to initiate a canonisation proctss on his behalf.
*. For a critical assessment of the different historical approaches to 
"integration" see Richard T. Griffiths: "A la recherche des débuts de
1 9intégration européenne" and Alan S. Milward: "États—Nations et Communauté2 
le paxadoxe de l'Europe?", both in Revue de synthése, 4th serie», no. 3, 
July-September 1990, pp. 235-52 and 253-70, respectively. The deterministic 
and personality-based lines of interpretation have been exclusively 
cultivated in Spain: Emilio de Figueroa: "Unificación económica de Europa", 
Ana lea de Economía, vol. 11, no. 43, July-September 1951, pp. 383-412; Ramón 
Tamames: Formación y desarrollo del Mercado Común Europeo, Madrid [Iber- 
Amer, S.A.j 1965; Alberto José Lleonart y Amselem: "Veinte años después del 
tratado CECA: del equilibrio político al equilibrio económico**, Revista de 
Política Internacional, no. 117, September-October 1971, pp. 89-112; Antonio 
Truyol Serra: La integración Europea. Idea y Realidad, Madrid [Tecnos] 1972; 
Rafael de Juán y Peñalosa: "La Europa por hacer. Homenaje a Jean Monnet en 
el centenario de su nacimiento", Información Comercial Española, no. 660-61, 
August-September 1988, pp. 209-20; and Manuel Medina Ortega: "El desarrollo 
de la idea europea. De Carlomagno a la Comunidad Europea", Sistema, no. 86- 
87, November 1988, 45-51.
*. i.e, Santiago Torres Bernárdez: "La participación de España en la
organización de Europa. Dificultades, realizaciones y posibilidades", 
Política Internacional, no. 35, February 1958, pp. 9-37, pp. 24-25; Juan 
Ortega Galán: "Proceso de aislamiento e incorporación de España a la
organización internacional (1944-1959). Factores que ejercieron mayor 
influencia. Consideración especifica de la incorporación a la OECE", 
doctoral thesis, Universidad de Malaga, May 1978; and, Angel Viñas et al.: 
Política comercial exterior en España (1931-1975), 2 vola., Madrid (Banco 
Exterior de España] 1979, vol. 1, p. 644.
4. José María Trias de Bes y Girón: "El progreso de la unión europea", and 
José María Yanguas Messia: "Tres aspectos de la Unión Europea", both in Real 
Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas: La Unidad de Europa, Madrid (C. 
Bermejo Impresor] 1949, pp. 7-18 and 21-35; Carlos Vossler: España y Europa, 
Madrid [Instituto de Estudios Políticos] 1951; contributions to Arbor. 
Revista General de Investigación y Cultura, Madrid [CSIC], between 1950 and 
1957; Alberto Martin Artajo: "El Santo de la unidad europea", Punta Europa, 
nos. 23-24, November-December 1957, pp. 76 ff»; and Jesús López Medelr 
"España y Europa", Revista de Estudios Políticos, no. 180, November-December 
1971, pp. 95-112.
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the Spaniards could expect from agreements limited to "physical" (coal and steel) rather 
then spiritual matters.5 For daily bread-and-butter ideology during the Franco era, Spain 
represented the vanguard of the authentic European ideal -that of Christian unity, and the 
past splendour counterbalanced the then decadence and isolation.6
The functional approach to the European initiatives, adopted by some intellectuals 
opposing Franco, accentuated the inefficient framework of the nation-state in an 
interdependent world, and served to differentiate by omission Spain from the core of 
Western Europe.7 The few economic studies undertaken then departured from the 
unrealistic assumption of Spain's participation in the ECSC, and produced the conviction 
that the Spanish Government made no attempt to join either the Paris Conference on the 
Schuman Plan or the ECSC (had it been able to do so!) because of the damage that it 
would have created for the protected and uncompetitive Spanish economy.8 Most
5. Ramón Martin Herrero: "España y la Idea de Europa" y otros trabajos,
Buenos Aires [Talleres Gráficos Sacramento] 1953.
*. Juan Beneyto Pérez: España y el problema de Europa. Historia y politica 
exterior, Buenos Aires [Espasa—Calpe] 1950; Ernesto Giménez Caballero: La 
Europa de Estrasburgo (Visión española del problema europeo), Madrid 
[Instituto de Estudios Politicos/Gráficas González] 1950, p. 122; and Pedro 
Voltes: "Sobre la interpretación dawsoniana de las relaciones entre España 
y Europa", Punta Europa, no. 5—6, Madrid, May-June 1956, pp. 145-47.
\ Enrique Tierno Galván: "Federalismo y funcionalismo europeos", Boletin 
Informativo del Seminario de Derecho Político, Universidad de Salamanca, no. 
13—15, November-December 1956/January-April 1957, pp. 197—202; Raúl Morodo: 
"La integración politica europea: El Consejo de Europa", ibid., no. 20—23, 
November 1957-February 1958, p. 109; Leandro Benavides: "Europa, unidad
politica", Nuestro Tiempo, vol. 4, no. 36, June 1957, pp. 660-86; and Manuel 
Medina Ortega: "Los objetivos politicos de la integración europea", in
Estudios de Ciencia Politica v Sociología. Homenaje al Profesor Carlos 
Ollero, Madrid, 1972, pp. 531-4 5. For the various ideological approaches to 
the "process of European integration" during the Franco era, with scarce or 
nil influence in policy-making, see Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares and 
Antonio Moreno Juste: "La España franquista ante el proceso de construcción 
europea (1945-1970)" (forthcoming in Storia delle relazioni internazionali).
*. Higinio Paris Equilaz (Secretary General of the Council of the National 
Economy): "Problemas de la expansión siderúrgica en España", Anales de
economía, vol. 12. nos. 4 7—48, July-December 1952, pp. 271—384, pp. 383 ff.; 
Antonio Robert: Perspectivas de la economía española, Madrid [Cultural
Hispánica] 1954, p. 186; José Miguel de Azaola: a) España ante la Comunidad 
Económica Europea, San Sebastian [Imprenta de la Diputación de Guipúzcoa] 
1957; b) "Desorientación española en torno a la Comunidad Económica 
Europea", Punta Europa, nos. 18-19, June-July 1957, pp. 64-90; and c) La 
unificación europea y la economía española. Valencia [Instituto Valenciano 
de Economía] 1958; Salvador Millet y Bel: Acercamiento a Europa, Barcelona 
[Instituto de Estudios Europeos] 1960; and José Larraz López: La integración 
europea y España, Madrid [Espasa Calpe] 1961, published separately but it 
constituted vol. 9 of the Estudios sobre la unidad económica de Europa, 
Madrid [Sociedad de Estudios Económicos Españoles y Europeos, S.A.] 1951- 
1961. Larraz's arguments were questioned by Tañantes: "España y la
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recently, Spain's access to the European Community has pushed the debate further into 
the mythological sphere, perhaps in an attempt to stifle complaints about its economic 
effects while reinforcing the historical magnitude of the policy-option adopted by a given 
cabinet.9
New and detailed studies of the origins of the Scbuman proposal, the initial 
intentions of the governments involved, and the negotiation process that finally led to the 
Treaty of Pahs, have shifted the research perspective from the realm of mythology into 
the arena of (perceived) economic national interests. They have revealed the less mythical 
story of an extremely laborious bargaining process by which the participating countries, 
without any real commitment towards a unified political structure for Europe, fought to 
secure their own national interests.10 This new historical approach, less deterministic and
integración europea. Dna critica de la tesi* de Larraz", Información 
Cornercial Española, Aprii 1962, pp. 127—53. Larraz has been commemorated as 
the first Spanish pro—European Union by Truyol: MJosé Larraz, europeista", 
Revista de Instituciones Europeas, vol. 1, no. 3, 1974, pp. 969-84.
Mario Celaya: "Historia de la Europa comunitaria", Información Comercial 
Española, no. 626, October 1985, pp. 19-29; José Félix Tenazos: "España- 
Europa: un encuentro histórico", Juan Marichal: "La europeización de España 
(1698-1936)", and José Luis Abellán: "El significado de la idea de Europa 
en la politica y en la historia de España", all three in Sistema, no. 8 6-87, 
November 1988, pp. 5-7, 53-60, and 31—43, respectively.
1C. The volume edited by Klaus Schwabe: The Origins of the Schuman Plan, 
Brussels [Bruylant] 1988, constitutes the most complete set of works based 
on archival material about the different national reactions towards the 
Schuman Plan. Some interesting contributions about the origins of the 
Schuman Plan can also be found in Poidevin (ed.): Origins of the European 
Integration (March 1948-May 1950), Brussels [Bruylant] 1986, in particular 
Pierre Gerbet's "Les origines du plan Schuman: le choix de la méthode
communautaire par le gouvernement français", pp. 199-222. Still valid are 
Willian Diebold Jr.: The Schuman Plan* A Study in Economic Cooperation, 
1950-1959, New York [Praeger] 1959, and Milward: The Reconstruction of
Western Europe, 194 5-51, London [MethuenJ 1984, chaps. 4 and 12. The most 
detailed country-study concerns Italy; Ruggero Ranieri: a) "L'espansione 
alla prova del negoziato. L'industria italiana e la Communità del Carbone 
e dell'acciaio, 1945-1955", 2 vols., Doctoral thesis, EUI, Florence, 1988; 
b) "The Italian Iron and Steel Industry and European Integration", EUI 
Working Papers, no. 84/109, 1984, Florence, published in Italian as "La
siderurgia italiana e gli inizi dell'integrazione europea", Passato e 
Presente, no. 7, Janu&ry-April 1985, pp. 65-85; c) "Italy and the Schuman 
Plan Negotiations", EUI, Working Papers, no. 86/215, April 1986, Florence, 
published in Italian as "L'Italia e i Negoziati del Piano Schuman", in Ennio 
Di Nolfo, Romain H. Rainero, and Brunello Vigezzi: L'Italia e la politica 
di potenza en Europa, Milano [Marzorati Editore] 1990, pp. 54 7-72. A 
detailed study on the question of coal and steel trade and production in 
Europe, leading to the Schuman proposal is John Gillingham: Coal, steel and 
the rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955. The Germans and French from Ruhr conflict 
to economic community, Cambridge [Cambridge University Press] 1991. The best 
study for the Netherlands is Griffiths: "The Schuman Plan", Griffiths (ed.): 
The Netherlands and the Integration of Europe 1945-1957, Amsterdam [NEHA] 
1990, pp. 113-35.
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more national-interest-minded, offers a possibility to study the Spanish attitude towards 
the Schuman Plan and the ECSC and to its economic impact This case study will show 
how little the milestone in European integration affected Spain’s effort to develop its 
own heavy industry.
6.2. The Spanish Reception of the Schuman Proposals
The Spanish Government, for whom the Schuman Plan was a complete surprise, 
reacted to the initiative by not reacting at all. The controlled press, however, welcomed 
the French initiative. Adenauer's "enthusiastic welcome" was contrasted sharply with the 
reticent British position. The French Chargé d’Affaires in Madrid explained this attitude 
by pointing out the natural pro-German sentiment of the Spanish population and 
government as well as by the idea that general planning in a field on which Spain was so 
dependent on the import side, could have a positive effect11 Spain felt positive about 
what appeared to be the definitive economic recovery of Germany. The low purchasing 
power there had adversely affected Spanish export trade and the lack of the German 
technical collaboration had delayed industrial reconstruction.12 In political terms, the 
resurgence of the German steel industry, even under some control, meant a step toward 
Germany’s political rehabilitation. Spaniards warmly welcomed any step toward ending 
post-war Allied intervention against former enemies that might also lead to a reduction 
in international animosity against Franco’s Spain.
The Spanish diplomatic staff perceived Schuman’s speech as a new manifestation 
of the cold war, linked to the increase of neutralist forces in France.13 It appeared as a
w . AD, DE—CE 1945-1960, vol. 555: Despatch no. 60B/EU from Bernard Hardion, 
"A.*. Projet Schuman et reticences britaniques", Madrid, 6 June 1950.
See chapter three, pp. 154-55.
l*. MAE, Leg. 3368, exp. 15: Despatch no. 750 from the Spanish Charge
d'Affaires in Paris, Manuel Aguirre de Cárcer, Count of Casa Miranda, "Las 
conversaciones Schuman-Acheson", 10 May 1950, a long report on the problem 
of Indo-China, the cold war, and the expansion of communism; and "Los Planes 
Económicos Europeos", by the Director for Europe at the Spanish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Fermin López-Roberts y Muguiro, Marquis de la Torrehermosa, 
Madrid, 31 July 1950.
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new argument to be added to the theory about the weakness of the European partners in 
pursuing an anti-communist policy. Franco himself and various representatives of his 
regime bad expounded on this before the United States’ public opinion more than once. 
Schuman’s proposal had important political implications, of which the Spaniards were 
perfectly aware, but it implied a new economic move still to be put to the test.
The Spanish Government paid more attention to the Stikker Plan of Action for 
European Integration, named after the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dirk U. 
Stikker.14 The softer terminology of the Stikker Plan made it more appealing to the 
Spanish authorities than Schuman’s proposal. The Dutchman proposed (me step further 
in the OEEC liberalisation programme, which at least sounded somewhat familiar to the 
Spanish, instead of integration, and he spoke of majority decisions instead of the 
establishment of any high authority. Equally appealing to a country without access to 
international financial aid was Stikker’s provision for a European fund This was to supply 
financial aid necessary for modernisation and solving possible disequilibria stemming from 
further trade liberalisation. And the Spaniards liked the Stikker proposal for another 
unspoken reason. The Dutch initiative provoked divergence within the block of continental 
powers that indirectly benefited the British Government in their intention to stop any 
further discussions at integration.15
Furthermore it was of interest to the Spaniards that Stikker had clearly stated that 
agriculture was the first step in long-term sectoral integration. Agricultural exports, we 
have seen, constituted a main concern for the Spanish authorities in foreign economic 
policy. The Spanish commercial authorities liked the Stikker Plan because it was closely 
linked to the OEEC. Stikker was Chairman of the OEEC Executive Council, and launched
14. MAE, Leg. 3107, exp. 17: "Full text of the «Stikker Plan»", 15 June 
1950. For t-he Stikker Plan see Wendy Asbeek Brusse: a) "Th* Stikker Plan", 
in Griffiths (ad.): Th* Netherlands and the Integration of Europa, 1945— 
1957, Amsterdam [NEHA] 1990, pp. 69—92; and b) "West European Tariff Plans, 
1947—1957. From Study Group to Common Mark«t", doctoral thasis, EDI, 
Florence, May 1991, pp. 77 ff. Th* direct origin of th* Stikk*r Plan was th* 
Dutch negative perception of the OEEC trade liberalisation programme; see 
chapter five, p. 412.
**. MAE, Leg. 3368, exp. 15: Report entitled "Plan Stikker", presented to 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, 22 June 1950; Leg. 3449, exp. 37: 
"Los Planes Econ6micos Europeos", cit., 31 July 1950.
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his initiative within this institution. Any agricultural integration at the OEEC level seemed 
to represent no major risk. The Spanish had managed largely to avoid the most draconian 
consequences derived from their non-OEEC membership, especially regarding agricultural 
trade. The elimination of barriers such as "calendriers", state trade, minimum prices, 
special levies, and other forms of domestic agricultural protection, which would have 
derived inevitably from Stikker’s plans for increased liberalisation, were also the targets 
of Spanish ire when attempting to expand agricultural exports. The Spanish authorities 
believed that if the Stikker Plan were ever implemented, they had a clearer idea of what 
they might be facing, while « S ch u m an ia» , whatever the Schuman Plan turned out to 
be, could lead to unforeseeable consequences. When the Dutch Minister for Agriculture, 
Sicco L. Mansholt, developed the agricultural aspects of the Stikker proposals, the Spanish 
discovered, to their surprise, how erroneous their perception had been.16
The Spanish experts had not properly assimilated the full scope of the Stikker 
Plan. The gradual removal of all impediments to trade within the OEEC area would have 
implied a discrimination against Spanish exports that would have been more dangerous 
for the entire Spanish economy than the economic effects of the Schuman Plan for the 
isolated Spanish steel sector. In the end, the Stikker Plan was buried in the OEEC 
bureaucracy of a working party and remained completely ineffective after November 1950. 
The reactions to the proposed dismantlement of protective tariff barriers had been 
immediate from all comers, because tariffs were the only effective protection left after the 
commitment to move towards the progressive elimination of quantitative restrictions. The 
steam-locomotive of European integration was to continue along the tracks made of 
Franco-German steel as Schuman had proposed. In reality as well as in fiction, Spain 
continued to stick to a different railway gauge.
_____________________________  V N
1€. See chapter »even, pp. 493 ff.
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6.3. The Spanish Steel Industry
The Spanish Government felt that the solution to the general weakness and 
extended position of the national economy would come from industrial transformation. 
The strong public intervention in the industrial sector was the result of a deep belief that 
private initiative and market forces were insufficient to redress the malaise of the nation, 
which was summarised in a lack of industrial development. The Spanish Government took 
a stand against what it thought was widespread pessimism among the private steel 
producers who did not believe in a sufficient future demand for steel products to justify 
a large increase in steel output.17 Independently of the steel barons’ dejection, steel 
output had decreased for a multiplicity of reasons over which private entrepreneurs had 
little control: price controls limiting benefits and reinvestment, frequent electric cuts, lack 
of domestic supplies due to the physical exhaustion of some minerals, import difficulties 
for coal, scrap, and ferroalloys due to world-wide scarcity as well as to the country's 
foreign exchange difficulties, and, finally, the lack of modernisation due to difficulties to 
impart equipment It was estimated that Spain’s steel industry would be able to increase 
production immediately by 20 per cent if sufficient scrap and coal were available.1* 
However, it was also estimated that even without foreign obstacles, per capita 
consumption would reach 36.5 kgs., still inferior to the 1929 level (43.2 kgs.), due to an 
increase in population.19
Spain’s iron and steel industries confronted the major problem of an inadequate 
supply of iron ore, coke, high quality coal, and scrap.20 The Spanish steel industry was, 
by nature, heavily dependant on imported scrap because it was based on the open-hearth 
(Siemens-Martin) process, which required a high proportion of scrap per ton of steel
l1. P.dro Schwartz and Manual-Jesús González: Dna Historia dal Instituto 
Nacional de Industria (1941-1976), Madrid [Tecnoa] 1978, pp. 69-70.
1#. Temporary Economic Study Group, Economic Cooparation Adminiatration: 
Report on the Spaniah Econotny, 2 vola., Madrid, 1951 (tha ao-callad "Sufrin 
Report"), vol. 2, p. 354.
**• Mariano Rojaa Moralaa: "El problema aiderúrgico •»pañol y la nuava
empresa nacional", Boletín Minero a Industrial, no. 1, January 1951, pp. 7-
13, p. 7.
20. Antonio Almagro: El problema económico español, Madrid [Ed. Delegación 
Nacional del Frente de Juventudea/Jefatura Central de Trabajo] 1956, p. 139.
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produced. The industry expanded in a regime of normal abundance of imported scrap 
during the 1920s. The import level of scrap in 1929, year of the maximum steel output 
of one million tons, was of 220,000 tons (see table 6.1). After World War EL, Spain’s 
imports of scrap remained almost insignificant due to shortage of foreign exchange and 
world-wide scarcity. In 1950, Spain imported 90,000 tons of scrap, that is, only 44 per 
cent of the 1929 level. In addition, the low quality of the rest of the raw materials 
employed resulted in a higher percentage of scrap in the production of steel. The scrap 
requirements for a production of one million tons of steel, which was at die time 
considered the maximum capacity for several years (in fact, until 1954), were of 360.000 
tons, while the domestic market could provide a maximum of 125,000 tons.21 Scrap 
import and crude steel output series moved in parallel after 1929, making imported scrap 
the symbol of imports as overcomers of production bottlenecks.22 The intent of the 
private steel sector was to increase Bessemer-produced steel because it required the lowest 
consumption of scrap per ton of steel produced, and because it produced an excess 
amount of scrap over that required for itself, thereby making it available for the open 
hearth. Time was necessary, however, to adjust the plants.
TABLE 6.1
RAM MATERIALS FOR IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION, 1929-1950
(in tons)
Year Iron Ore Coal Coke Scrap
Production Production Imports Produc. Imports Imports
1929 6,546,648 7,547,267 2,083,717 768,040 291,609 220,363
1935 2,815,150 7,267,878 1,170,360 514,473 80,182 152,785
1940 2,236,102 9,417,283 137,429 845,368 22,183 92,638
1945 1,171,377 12,082,845 54,853 770,714 471 22,834
1947 1,513,911 11,869,089 17,283 815,643 — 19,180
1946 1,630,727 12,026,054 510,711 848,375 32,476 54,286
1949 1,876,295 12,164,666 998,967 967,497 84,474 66,196
1950 2,087,792 12,433,414 726,342 916,939 145,501 89,806
Source: "Estadísticas Minero—Siderúrgica de España, de 1900 a 1950", Boletin 
Minero e Industrial« from Septexnber 1952 to July 1953.
21. Luis Earreiro: HE1 problema de la chatarra", Boletin Minero e
Industrial, no, 6, June 1951, pp. 291-392.
22. Antonio de Torres Espinosa (Under-Secretary of Commerce): La
industrialización del pais y sus interrelaciones con el comercio exterior. 
Problema de un futuro próximo, Madrid [Oficina de Estudios Económicos del 
Ministerio de Comercio] 1954, text of a speech on 23 June, p. 22* Scarcity 
of scrap had forced experiments in sponge iron and/or pellets as scrap 
substitutes; Pablo Martin Aceña and Francisco Comin: INI 50 años de
industrialización en España, Madrid [Espasa Calpe] 1991, p. 177.
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Mining recovered slowly the pre-Civil War levels of output. Spanish mineral 
production in 1949 gave an index figure of only 29 per cent as compared with 100 for 
the base year 1929. This important contraction in mining activities took place, primarily, 
in the years preceding the Civil War, the index figure for 1935 was 38.5. After 1939. 
output in many branches of mining failed to achieve any marked recovery. This was due 
to several causes: the difficulties in attracting and retaining an adequate labour force, the 
low output per worker, the pricing policy that made mineral prices lag in the face of 
mounting costs, frequent electric power cuts, transport difficulties, inadequate investment, 
and shortage of foreign exchange needed for the importation of essential equipment for 
modernisation.
The stationary level of coal mining lagged seriously behind the increasing 
demands of industry. Reconstruction needs, import restrictions, and difficulties in the 
supply of imported scrap and coke, had forced an increase of Spain’s coal production. 
However, the 12.4 million tons of coal mined in 1950 represented an improvement of 
only about 350,000 tons over the level achieved in 1945. Furthermore, the increase in 
output came at the expense of quality. Bituminous coal was generally of low grade and 
low caloric content with a high proportion of impurities; coal which before the Civil War 
would have been unacceptable was now being mined and marketed.13 The immediate 
result was a higher coal requirement for combustion: in 1929, 1.8 tons of coal were 
necessary to produce one steel ton; in 1947 2.4 tons were necessary. In this regard, 
redirecting coal consumption from transport and domestic housing (the destination of 37 
per cent of the coal supply in the Spanish market) to the iron and steel industries was a 
long-term process that depended on the progress made with the ambitious plans for 
electrification of railways.34 Spain’s imported coal requirements varied from 500,000 to 
1,000,000 tons a year, depending on the level of economic activity, the availability of 
other fuels, and the supply of raw materials to industries using imported coal.
22. Guillermo Morales Matos: "Introducción al estudio geográfico de la
siderurgia asturiana", Boletín del Instituto de Estudios Asturianos, nos. 
88—89, 1976, pp. 309-403,
24. For percentages of coal consumption see Sebastián Coll Martin and Carles 
Sudriá Itriay: El Carbón en España# 1770-1961. Dna historia económica, 
Madrid [Turner] 1987, p. 585-86. For electrification of the railways see 
chapter three, pp. 158 ff., and chapter seven, pp. 519 ff.
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Unlike coal, iron ore output had not reached pre-Civil War levels. In 1950, nearly 
three million tons of iron ore were mined in Spain and Spanish Morocco (the high quality 
Riff ore) as compared with a production of approximately six and a half million tons in 
1929. Although constantly increasing, the supply of iron ore was inadequate to meet 
national demand, which moved in inverse proportion to the scarcity’ of scrap. There were 
two additional impediments to the satisfactory fulfillment of domestic requirements. First, 
part of the iron ore production had to be reserved for export, mainly to the United 
Kingdom in exchange for coal. Second, private enterprises were not designed to work the 
pig-iron (especially the Asturian ore of lower quality) directly in the blast furnaces 
because this mineral was difficult to reduce because without the necessary supply of scrap. 
Finally, Spain faced the gradual exhaustion of the more easily worked hematite deposits 
in Vizcaya ("rubios", 50 percent iron content and fairly low in phosphorous), on which 
the steel industry that was centred in Bilbao mainly relied.
As a result of these three main input problems, iron and steel output fell short of 
real needs (see table 6.2).
TABLE 6.2
IRON AMD STEEL PRODUCTION, 1929-1950
(in tons)
Year Pig-Iron Crude
Steel
Rolled
Steel
1929 771,914 1,021,685 753,448
1935 344,202 637,280 440,677
1940 580,376 795,598 592,349
1945 470,694 559,879 356,117
1947 502,140 582,352 359,274
1948 519,226 596,842 340,440
1949 611,976 687,220 411,470
1950 657,337 774,175 531,671
Source: See table 6.1, using «Central Siderurgica, S.A.» data.
By 1949, the production levels of pig-iron, crude steel, and rolled products did not reach 
the record level of 1929. Pig-iron surpassed slightly the 1940 level of output (the peak 
post-Civil War level), while crude steel and rolled products dragged behind due to the 
power shortages during 1949. Per capita consumption ranked the lowest of world steel
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producers.25 While Spain was one of the countries that most increased its crude steel 
output in percentage points in relation to prewar years (1935 for Spain, 1937 for Europe), 
it was, after the Netherlands, the lowest steel producer in Western Europe by 1949.26 The 
low level of steel output became the most important bottleneck for the Spanish economy, 
since it hampered the development of inter-dependent sectors.27
The initial problem was to determine how much more steel Spain required. Steel 
consumption is difficult to calculate a priori since it depends on the industrial level of the 
economy. The levels of consumption in 1929 seemed the logic point of departure. Private 
industry planned to double its production by reaching a total output of one million tons 
of pig iron and 1.5 million tons of cnide steel by the end of 1956 in order to reach the 
1929 per capita consumption.“  The planned expansion required the government’s 
guarantee for the supply of 1.250,000 tons of coal; 2,300,000 tons of coking coal; 
2,500,000 tons of iron ore; the necessary ferroalloys; and, finally, 175,000 tons of 
imported scrap.29 Although still low in comparative terms, the output targets were 
ambitious enough to present many difficulties in realisation. The promotion of a large 
public steel plant aggravated the supply difficulties of the steel sector.
The Spanish Government authorised the establishment of a modern iron and steel 
foundry in Asturias, which was to dwarf most of the existing private plants.30 In June 
1950, the Government commissioned the Institute of National Industry (henceforth, INI)
z:. Emilio Gómez Trueba: "La Comunidad Europea del Carbón y del Acero:
razones para una esperanza", Información Comercial Española, no. 620, April 
1985, table 4, p. 86.
**. MAE, Leg. 5913, exp. 1: Despatch no. 142/50, from the Attach* for
Foreign Economy at the Spanish Embassy in Brussels, Francisco Bozzano, to 
the Onder—Secretary of Foreign Economy and Commerce, Tomás Súñer Ferrer, 
"Producción acero Europa occidental y Plan Schuman", 19 September 1950.
Antonio Robert: Informe sobre la economía española v la integración
europea. 2nd ed., Madrid [Consejo Económico Sindical Nacional) 1958, p. 58.
**. TESG, op. cit., p. 354.
**. Secundino Felgueroso, Vice-President of the Central Siderúrgica, S.A., 
"Propósitos de la siderurgia nacional", Boletín Minero e Industrial, no. 6, 
June 1951, pp. 255—57.
*®. Decree of 15 June 1950, BOE of 18th, approved by the Council of
Ministers on 5 June. A plan for the setting up of a new iron and steel 
industry in Asturias had existed for several years; Martin and Comin, op. 
cit., pp. 173 ff.
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to form a company, with state and private capital, for setting up steel works with a 
capacity for the annual production of 700,000 tons of iron and steel finished products. The 
ambitious plan was to double Spain’s existing steel production capacity by 1960. As an 
integrated works, the new plant was oriented to produce highly specialised semi-processed 
products to feed the activity of non-integrated steel works of private enterprises, in an 
import-substitution effort. The undertaking had hardly emerged from the blueprint stage 
when the Schuman Plan negotiations ended. In July 1950, the «Em presa Nacional 
Siderurgica» (henceforth, ENSIDESA) was established at Avil6s in the coal mining 
region of Asturias; this was to become Spain’s largest steel work ever.
Spain launched its plan to increase steel output based on procedures increasing 
the use of local minerals and fuels (Asturian low-iron content minerals and pyrites from 
southern Spain) by blowing basic iron into the Bessemer and the blown metal used in 
open-hearth, economising in scrap, and lowering coke and ferroalloys consumption per 
steel ton produced. The only scrap consumption stipulated was the scrap produced 
internally in the steel works, with no demand for imports.31 According to the 
Government, INI intervention in a sector which affected directly the national defence and 
public services aimed to complement the private initiative.32 However, it was difficult 
to imagine how an integrated steel plant which was to have a capacity approximately 
equal to all of that of Spain combined could not compete with private industry.33 In fact, 
the public sector received priority in the supply of scarce raw materials, in the allocation 
of foreign exchange, as well as a privileged access to foreign assistance, exactly what
Jose Antonio Cabezas: Del martinete al horno alto. Historia de una
siderurgia, Madrid (ENSIDESA] 1975, p. 91.
12. Paris: Problemas económicos de la industrialización de España, Madrid, 
1952; Suanzes' inaugural speech of Avilés in Hemeroteca Nacional: La
inacmración de la Factoría de Avilés en la Prensa Española, Madrid, October 
1957; and INI, Empresa Nacional Siderúrgica, S.A.: ENSIDESA. La factoría 
siderúrgica de Avilés, Madrid, 1968.
Sindicato Nacional del Metal: "Incremento de la producción de acero en 
España (Nota del Sindicato Nacional del Metal)", Boletin Minero e 
Industrial, no. 4, April 1950, pp. 205-206, gives the high amounts of 
requirements in terms of imported raw materials, to reach the output targets 
established for the new state plant.
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private industry bad feared.34
Regarding the latter, the Spanish Government placed ENSIDESA at the top of the 
list of requests it placed before the Export-Import Bank in 1950. It repeatedly asked the 
Eximbank whether it would consider the steel mill project in Avil6s requiring credits 
worth S50 million; the Eximbank repeatedly discouraged the Spaniards from submitting 
this project. The American argument referred to the large amount of credit required and 
the long time necessary to study and complete iL In reality, the Eximbank, like the 
Economic Cooperation Administration, disliked financing public enterprises against private 
industry.35 At the end of 1951, the "Sufrin Report" recommended granting no assistance 
to ENSIDESA, but to private industry.36 In 1952, private enterprises presented to the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce an urgent plan with a value of $29 million which the 
State disregarded.37 The proposed increase in production of the privately owned steel 
companies required a low dollar investment over a period of five years for the import of 
essential equipment, while the probable dollar cost of the proposed government plant was
14. Felg-ueroso, art. cit., p. 257. To itcur* supplies for private 
entrepreneurs after the establishment of a vertically integrated steel plant 
in Aviles, worried the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations 
particularly; Economic Survey of Europe in 1953, Geneva, 1954, partially 
reproduced in "La situación de la economia española en 1953", Revista de 
Economia Politica, vol. 6, no. 1, January-April 1955, pp. 126-4 9, p. 134.
**. FRÜS, 1951, IV, part 1, Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, to the Embassy in Spain, 
23 April 1951, pp. 844-48. Similar has been the case in Italy with the 
Finsider Steel Plan, also named after his main designer and supporter, Oscar 
Sinigaglia, at the time of the Marshall Plan. The so-called "Piano 
Sinigaglia" was promoted by a company dependent of the state holding
1 st it uto per la Ricostruzione Industriale and was a re a a sumption of the so-
called "Autarchic Plan for Steel". For the initial American hesitation on
the matter see Vera Zamagni: "Una scommessa sul futuro: l'industria italiana
nella ricostruzione (194 6-1952)", and Pier Paolo D'Attorre: "Il Piano
Marshall: Politica, economia, relazioni internazionali nella ricostruzione
italiana", both in Ennio Di Nolfo, Romain H. Rainero, and Brunello Vigezzi:
L'Italia e la politica di potenza tn Europa, Milan [Marzorati Editore] 1990,
pp. 473-95 and pp. 497-545, respectively (pp. 487 and 520). For a summary
of the Plan Sinigaglia's main objectives see Oscar Sinigaglia: "The Future
of the Italian Iron and Steel Industry", Banca Nazionale del Lavoro.
Quarterly Review, vol. I, no. 4, January 1948, pp. 240-45; and Rosario
Romeo: Breve Storia della Grande Industria in Italia, 1861-1961, Bologna
[Cappelli] 1961, pp. 311 ff.; and for the international indications of the
plan see Ruggero Ranieri: "L'Italia e i Negoziati del Piano Schuman", op.
cit.
**• TESG, op. cit., p. 355.
,7. Paris: "Problemas de la expansión siderúrgica en España", Anales de
economia, vol. 12. nos. 47-48, July—December 1952, pp. 271-384, p. 310.
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about $360 million.38
On the other hand, the Schuman Plan was a threat to the supply of coke, coal, and 
scrap.3’ There was no preoccupation with the future of imports of finished iron and steel 
products because of their low amounts (i.e., 3.8 per cent of domestic production, while 
in Italy this percentage was 15.6 per cent).40 The export performance of the Spanish steel 
industry could not be affected because exports of pig-iron, steel, and finished iron and 
steel products were totally insignificant at the time (see table 6.3), and the new steel 
industry had been planned to have no export capacity. In 1950, only 0.5 per cent of 
domestic rolled-products reached the international markets; six years later there were no 
exports of this category. In 1950, Spain exported insignificant quantities of pig-iron; in 
1956 exports of this commodity represented only 1.5 per cent of domestic production. On 
the other hand, exports of coal were almost exclusively to Portugal. It was difficult to 
image how any new organisation of limited membership could be self-sufficient with 
respect to exports of iron ore, which were an important source of supply. The Spanish 
interest was, thus, limited to the effects of Schuman's proposals for the supply of high- 
grade coal from the United Kingdom and scrap from Germany.
Before any political hysteria, it was necessary to evaluate the possible effects of 
the Schuman initiative on Spanish plans for expansion of steel production. This involved 
answers to questions such as was who was ready to join the French plan and on what 
terms, how the original proposal was to be modified by the attitude of new comers, what 
products were to be involved, what kind of organising body the High Authority was to 
be, and whether the member states would be able to maintain national commercial policies 
to third countries. The diplomatic reports received in Madrid pictured a situation that 
corresponded to what the latest research reveals were the different national positions.
,#. TESG, op, cit., p. 354.
,f. MAE, Leg. 5913, exp. 1: Bozzano to Súñer, Brussels, 19 September 1950.
40. Pedro Fraile: •’Crecimiento econòmico y demanda de acero: España, 1900- 
1950", in Pablo Martin Aceña and Leandro Prados de la Escosura (eds.): La 
nueva historia económica en España, Madrid (Tecnos] 1985, table 11, p. 99. 
Spain in^orted 0.16 per cent of the world trade in semi-finished and 
finished steel, a percentage inferior even to Yugoslavia and Turkey; Duncan 
Burn: The Steel Industry 1939-1959, A Study in Competition and Planning, 
Cambridge [Cambridge University Press] 1961, p. 149, table 10.
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TABLE € .3
SPAIN'S TRADÌ OR ECSC PRODUCTS IN 1950§
IMPORTS EXPORTS
ITEMS TONS % TONS %
COAL TOTAL* 725,860 100 COAL TOTAL* 26,852 100France 61,977 6.54 Portugal 26,652 92
Italy 55,743 7.68 French Zone
Belgium—Luxembourg 42,314 5.83 in Morocco 1 , 1 1 0 4
Federal Republic 14,731 2.03 Spanish Protect.
in norocco 7 l J o
ECSC 174,765 24.08 FRG 91 -
u t  m 51
United Kingdom 544,618 75.03 Andorra 32 -
Rest 569 0.08 Netherlands 2 -
NON—ECSC 545,287 75.12 IRON ORE 935,477 100
m r *790 ACfi 78U I\ /¿7,U D oIRON ORE 238,728 100 Netherlands 115,889 12
Spain's Protect. All ECSC 85,515 9
in Morocco 238,728 100 All non—ECSC 5,015 -
PIC IRON AND PYRITES 1,212,685 100
CRUDE STEEL# 109,845 100 Federal Republic 394,112
Federal Republic 57,188 52.06 Netherlands 193,163
France 22,877 20.83 Belgium—Lux. 150,400
Be1gium-Luxembourg 5,595 5.09 France 102,540
Netherlands 1 0 Italy 41,563
ECSC 85,662 77.98 ECSC 878,299 72
French Possessions in United Kingdom 175,892
West Africa 4,392 4.00 Denmark 76,617
United Kingdom 3,072 2.80 Ireland 41,563
Norway 2,890 2.64 Austria 17,599
Tunisia 2,070 1. 86 Switzerland 9,922
French Zone in Finland 4,846
Morocco 1,992 1.61 Algeria 3,194
Libya 1,974 1.80 Tunisia 2,753
Austria 1,670 1.52
Portugal 1,662 1.51 NON—ECSC 334,386 26
United States 1,323 1 . 2 1
Rest 3,653 3.33 PIC IRON AND
646 100U a U V I  &  l U k L
NON—ECSC 24,183 22.02 Portugal 250 39
Spanish Protect.
FINISHED IRON AND in Morocco 239 37
STEEL PRODUCTS 1,450 100 Argentina 105 16
France 358 24.72 Rest 52 6
Be1gium—Luxembourg 298 20.57
Federal Republic 7 0.50 FINISHED IRON AND
Netherlands 1 0 . 1 0 STZEL PROD. 3 100
ECSC 664 45.89
United Kingdom 731 50.48
Sweden 36 2.52
Switzerland-Lich. 6 0.56
Denmark 7 0.50
Austria 1 0.05
Source: Official Spanish trad* statistics, groups number two ("ores, pig- 
iron, and crude steel”) and three ("finished iron and steel products**) of 
Spain's trade categories. ($) Including pyrites. (*) Including anthracite, 
soft coal, and coke. (#) Pig-iron, ferroalloys, crude steel, and scrap.
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Instead of prompt moves to sign a treaty, all governments involved presented their own 
interests and declared themselves ready to fight for them.41 While every nation put 
forward contrasting economic objectives, the Spanish Government maintained a wait-and- 
see attitude. Sharing an Iberian sentiment, Portugal's Premier Ant6nio de Oliveira Salazar 
pictured Schuman’s proposal as "another cobweb which could be blow away by the 
wind.”42
Spain received some initial relief because its main commercial partner, the United 
Kingdom, appeared clearly reluctant to join an initiative that seemed to clash with national 
policy objectives.43 Jean Monnet’s persistence that all governments willing to join the 
Paris conference convened to discuss Schuman’s proposal on 20 June 1950 agreed in 
principle that a supranational authority be established to exercise control over the coal and 
steel industries of the future European market was enough to keep the United Kingdom 
away from the Paris negotiations.44 The absence from the pool of the largest single 
European producer of coal and steel rendered it less powerful.45 This way, at least, 75 
per cent of the Spanish coal supply and 50 per cent of overall Spanish imports of finished 
iron and steel products were not directly affected by the result of the Schuman Plan 
negotiations. Furthermore, coal imports from Belgium were excluded from the Treaty 
provisions as long as the transitional period applied.46
41. See reports in MAE, Leg. 5913, exp. 1, and AGA C/36851.
42. PRO, FO 371/89428: Despatch no. 230 to FO from the British Embassy in 
Lisbon, 14 August 1950.
4i. The first report informing the Spanish Government on Schuman's 
initiative declared explicitly the British reserves to the project; MAE, 
Leg. 3368, exp. 15: Despatch no. 750 from the Spanish Charge in Paris, "Las 
conversaciones Schuman-Acheson", 10 May 1950.
44. For the position of the United Kingdom see Roger Bullen: a) "The British 
Government and the Schuman Plan, May 1950-March 1951", in Schwabe (ed.), op. 
cit., pp. 199-210; and b) preface to Bullen and M.E. Pelly (eds.) : Documents 
on British Policy Overseas. Series II, vol. I. The Schuman Plan, the Council 
of Europe and Western European Integration, May 1950-December 1952, London 
[HMSO] 1986, where important documentation on the response of the British 
Government to the French invitation can be found. For the perception of 
British industry see Ranieri: "Attempting the Unlikely Union: the British 
Steel Industry and the European Coal and Steel Community 1950-1954", in 
Peter M.R. Stirk and David Willis: Shaping Postwar Europe■ European Unity 
and Disunity 1945-1957, London [Pinter Publishers] 1991, pp. 112-23*
45. MAE, Leg. 5913, exp. 1: Bozzano to Súñer, 19 September 1950.
4€. Ibid., "Firma proyecto de acuerdo Plan Schuman sobre pool carbón-acero 
denominado «Comunidad europea del carbón y del acero»", Brussels, 6 April 
1951.
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After June 1950, however, the United Kingdom announced that it was able to 
deliver only very much smaller quantities to Spain, and supplies from other European coal 
producers decreased as a result of shortages. Trade negotiations with the United Kingdom, 
taking place early in March 1951, revealed that the British were unwilling to maintain the 
level of coal exports. The consequence was a reduction in the supply of 500,000 tons. 
This was part of the overall decrease in British coal exports. After 1951, Spain's near total 
dependence on European sources of supply disappeared, supplanted by Spanish imports 
of high-grade coal from the United States on an Eximbank-credit basis.47
On the other hand, pyrites -Spain’s largest export commodity in the field- were 
excluded from the terms of the ECSC Treaty. Therefore an important source of foreign 
exchange and a bargaining element to negotiate the supply of coal from the United 
Kingdom also remained free from the ECSC Treaty terms. The establishment of the 
common market for iron ore presented no major risk since the United Kingdom absorbed 
78 per cent of Spain’s total exports of iron ore, in exchange for coal, and the Community 
as a whole was a net importer.4* Spain’s expons of iron ore to the ECSC increased 
between 1951 and 1958 about 170 per cent, while world iron ore exports to the ECSC 
increased only by 139 per cent.4*
A decline in scrap imports took place after 1950 (see table 6.4), while the private 
investment programme for increasing steel production pointed to the urgent need for 
increased quantities of imported scrap. According to «C entra l Sidenirgica S .A .» , the 
annual requirements of imported scrap to operate at full capacity were 200,000 tons, using 
the most economical ratio of scrap to pig iron. It was impossible for Spain to reach this
47. The firat Eximbank credit «mounted to $3.5 million to finance the 
purchase and shipment of coal from the United States to «Central 
Sidérurgie*, S.A.», which was a private organisation established in 1907 
representing Spanish steel mill and coke companies; "Spain Receives Credits 
for Purchase of Coal and Wheat", released to the press by the Eximbank on
10 July 1951, reproduced in The Department of State bulletin, vol. 25, no. 
€31, 30 July 1951, pp. 170-71. The loan was granted on the basis of an
authorisation of the General Appropriations Act of 1951, see chapter four, 
pp. 278 ff.
4*. HAEC, CM1/1953/9: ECSC, High Authority: Rapport général sur l'activité 
de la Communauté (10 AoOt 1952-12 Avril 1953), pp. 39 and 83.
°. Communauté Européenne du charbon et de l'acier, Haute Autorité: Memento 
de statistiques, 1958, Luxembourg, June 1958.
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import figure with its own foreign exchange resources.
ZABLE 6 .4
8PANXSB IMPORTS OF SCRAP, 1950-1954
(in metric tons)
1950 76,092
1951 39,036
1952 23,756
1953 39,008
1954 77,000*
Source: AGA, C/36951, folder 16: "Request of Spanish Government for Ferrous 
Scrap”, FOA/Washington, TOUSFO A-135, 26 May 1954; and (*) C/36838: Scrap 
Purchasing Agency («Central de Compras de Chatarra» to Director-General 
of Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce, Bilbao, 13 May 1955.
In March 1953, the ECSC Council of Ministers decided to impose restrictions on scrap 
exports to third countries due to a general shortage within the Community.50 In times of 
serious domestic scarcity, the ECSC Treaty had foreseen a system to assure internal 
supply. At this point, several countries suspended their export quotas to non-ECSC 
countries. For instance, in relation to Spain, France suspended export quotas for scrap for 
a total amount of 7,000 tons.51 The difficulties in the supply of raw materials for the 
steel industry could hardly be blamed on the establishment of the ECSC; they resulted 
rather from the position of Spain's foreign exchange resources and the increase in demand 
after June 1950 that led to a world-wide scarcity of supply:
"At present, the country's coal and steel industry does not 
import basic products. This position is not exceptional. It is 
an autarchy forced upon by the traditional restriction in 
imports of coal and co)ce due to the penury of foreign exchange 
and of scrap due to the penury produced by war and 
rearmament. "52
50. HAEC, CM1/1953/11: "Sommaire des délibérations du Conseil", Luxembourg,
17 March 1953; CEAB 4/555: "Lettre adressée le 13 mars 1953 aux
gouvernements des six pays de la Communauté au sujet des exportations de 
ferraille". For the scrap problem in the Community see Diebold, op. cit., 
pp. 287-313.
51. AGA, C/36838: Scrap Purchasing Agency («Central de Compras de
Chatarra» to Director-General of Economic Cooperation, Ministry of 
Commerce, Bilbao, 13 May 1955.
sa. MAE, Leg. 34 49, exp. 38: Report on Spain and ECSC, by the Department of 
International Organisations of the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
Madrid, 20 July 1954.
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As the ECSC as a whole was obliged to import from the United States, so was Spain.33 
In October 1953, May 1954, and January 1955, the Spanish Government requested a total 
amount of $5.6 millions of economic aid funds for the purchase of iron and steel scrap 
from the United States. The Foreign Operations Administration accepted the allocation of 
these funds, enabling Spain to operate its steel industry at the capacity of existing 
equipment, and to meet the need of new plant capacity.54 The scrap imported in 1954, 
mostly financed in dollars, allowed an increase in steel output by 22 per cent. The overall 
shortage of scrap diminished after 1954.55 Despite the fact that the ratio of scrap to iron 
ore remained very high, this permitted the iron and steel output to increase at a constant 
rate.
The Spanish steel industry increasingly imported rolled-products: from 3.9 per 
cent of domestic production in 1950 to 20 per cent in 1956.56 Spain’s imports of semi­
finished and finished steel products from die Six increased, in particular from Belgium, 
Germany, and France, between 1950 and 1955. In addition, Spain imported from the 
United Kingdom, other European non-ECSC countries, Japan, and the United States. Far 
more interesting is the export behaviour of the three major suppliers of semi-finished and 
finished steel products to Western Europe from 1950 to 1955 -the BLEU countries, 
France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The first pair of countries multiplied by 
5.4 their exports to Spain between 1950 and 1955, while France multiplied by 4.9, and 
the Federal Republic by 2.1 (see table 6.5). These increases, however, meant little because 
the point of departure was extremely low.
**. AGA, C/36851: Juan Garcia Lomas, Attaché of Foreign Economy, to Jaime 
Arguellas Armada, Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy and Commerce (after 
July 1952), "El mercado de la chatarra en los paises de la CECA", Brussels,
6 October 1954.
ASA, C/36B38: Ricardo Giménez Arnau, Attaché of Foreign Economy in
Washington D.C., to Arguelles: a) "Solicitud autorización compra de
$1,140,000 chatarra a cargo de la ayuda americana de FOA", 4 December 1953; 
b) "FOA. Solicitud autorización compra chatarra por $2,000,000 con cargo 
Asignación de Fondos No. 1 en favor de España para el año fiscal 1955", 24 
January 1955; and C/36951, folder 16: "Request of Spanish Government for 
Ferrous Scrap", FOA/Washington, TOOSFO A-135, 26 May 1954.
,s. AM, AJ/81/173: ECSC Council, Secretariat, "Autorisation d'exportation de 
ferraille vers les pays tiers", Luxembourg, 3 March 1954.
**. Consejo Económico Sindical Nacional: Situación actual de la industria 
siderúrgica. Madrid, 1962, table no. 9, p. 14.
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TABLE € .5
SPAIN'S IMPORTS OF SEMI—FINISHED AND FINISHED STEEL PRODUCTS, 1950>1955
(in '000 of metric tons)
Export Country 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
Belgium—Luxembour g 10.4 7.2 13.9 16.1 31.8 56.4Germany 2 0 . 1 8.8 1 2 . 2 24.4 29.4 41.4France 1 0 . 6 7.6 12.7 20.2 24.7 51.5
Italy - - - 1 . 6 - 2.3
Netherlands — — — 0.5 1 . 2 2.8
ECSC 41.1 23.6 38.8 62.8 87.1 154.4
Austria 1.4 0.5 1.3 1.4 2.4 7.9
Canada - - - 0 . 1 0. 1 0.3
Japan - - - - - 14.0
Norway - - - - - 0.9
Sweden 1.7 0.9 1.3 2 . 2 1 . 6 3.4
United Kingdom 4.9 3.4 6.6 4.4 7.3 58.0
United States 1 . 8 0.5 18.1 11.9 9.5 27.7
NON—ECSC 9.8 5.3 27.3 20.0 20.9 112.2
Source: Elaborated from Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe: 
Statistics of World Trade in Steel 1913-1959, United Nations, Geneva, 1961. 
Includes the following products: ingots, railway—track material, heavy and 
light sections, wire rods, strip, plates, sheets, tubes, wire, tin-plate, 
wheels, tires, and axles. No official Spanish statistics were used for this 
elaboration, but statistics of the exporting countries.
The establishment of the ECSC did not change the principle of bilateralism 
between Spain and the six individual countries of the ECSC, despite its supranational 
character. In the short-term, trade agreements that had more than one year to run when 
the ECSC Treaty went into effect Three were the bilateral agreements Spain had signed 
with ECSC members either applicable after 25 July 1952 or with a tacit renovation clause: 
a) the bilateral agreement with France, signed on 1 November 1951 with a duration until 
30 September 1952; b) the bilateral agreement signed with Italy on 1 April 1952 with a 
duration until 31 March 1953; and, c) the bilateral agreement with the Federal Republic 
of Germany, signed on 14 October 1951 and tacitly renewed to last until 30 September 
1953. Based on these three agreements Spain imported 49,800 tons of rolled-steel 
products, 712,000 tons of ores, 100,000 tons of coal, 3,000 tons of scrap, 8,000 tons of 
pig iron, and 90,000 tons of coke.57 For the long-run, Spain and the foreign world looked 
with expectation to this new creature, in an attempt to decipher how traditional supplies 
would continue now that five other countries had a prior claim.
*’• Documentation in HAEC, CEAB 3/156, 229 and 258.
470
Initially, it was not clear how the Treaty of Paris and the establishment of the 
ECSC would affect the member states' commercial practices with non-ECSC countries. 
The Schuman Plan negotiations were mainly an inward-looking process -a common 
market involving six countries- which left provisions on external trade deliberately vague. 
It was neither a question of lack of provision nor of interest. It was a matter of priorities. 
The main interest was to build the structure and to get it on its way as soon as possible. 
Given the subsequent difficulties encountered in the early days of the Community in 
combining six different ways of approaching foreign trade, the decision to postpone the 
debate on the question of the Community's relations with the outside world had not been 
unwise.
Foreign commercial policy remained under the national responsibility; the 
administration of import and export licences for trade with third countries was the domain 
of the government in whose territory the place of destination for imports or the place of 
origin for exports was situated. The immediate role of the High Authority was to 
supervise the projects of commercial agreements or similar arrangements that the 
governments of the ECSC member states remained free to conclude, where these related 
to coal and steel, in order to ensure that there was no infringement of the Treaty’. The 
High Authority’s attributions in the field were far from the original dream of a 
supranational power. Even then, some countries bypassed this disposition by making 
available the agreements to the High Authority once they had been already signed, as was 
the case in November 1953 concerning France’s trade agreements with Argentina, Poland. 
Spain, and Portugal.1* The influence that the High Authority exercised over trade outside 
the Community was extremely limited. It was not only that the powers of the High 
Authority in the export field were ill-defined in relation to its powers in the common 
market, but that it constituted the first issue on which her power was challenged.
The question of the commercial external relations of the ECSC arose even before
**. HAEC, CEAB 4/130: Dirk Pi«t*r Spi«r*nburg, iMinb«r of th* High Authority, 
to P. Alby, Secretary General Adjoint of the Interminiaterial Committee, 
Luxembourg, 16 November 1953.
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the establishment of the administrative structure of the community.59 The negotiations 
taking place in London (led by Monnet as President of the High Authority), raised the 
questions of by whom and in what form negotiations with third countries must take place 
in order to conform with the rules of the Treaty. The first to pose the question was the 
Federal Government of Germany at the beginning of September 1952. According to the 
Germans, the external commercial competence remained in the hands of the nation-state 
and, only in specific cases authorised by the Council of Ministers could the High 
Authority replace the national governments. Negotiations with Great Britain represented 
an exception granted by the unanimous vote of the Council, that was not to be taken as 
an example for the future. For them, it would have been a contradiction to transfer to the 
Community decision powers on the subject, for instance, of prices and cartels, but to 
make the opening of negotiations with third countries depend upon a unanimous decision 
of the different States:
"Le principe même du transfert de certains attributs de 
souveraineté à la Communauté, qui constitue pourtant l'essence 
même du Traité instituant la C.E.C.A., s'en trouverait nié de 
manière paradoxale, car le fait de reconnaître la règle de 
l'unanimité du Conseil de Ministres signifie pratiquement que 
chaque Etat, malgré le transfert de certaines attributs de 
souveraineté, continue à prendre librement ses décisions.,,6C
Having instituted a supranational organisation, the nation-states insisted that the High 
Authority not interfere with what they considered their exclusive sphere of action.
Both the High Authority and the Special Council of Ministers, at their respective 
first meetings, suggested the creation of a commission of experts to deal with the question 
of commercial agreements.61 The High Authority attempted to expand its limited 
attributions taking advantage of the negotiations with the General Agreement of Trade and
5f. Until 1955 no division was set up to deal with the foreign relations of 
the ECSC. Before, the ECSC dealt with the external questions by means of ad 
hoc services, either individual members and civil servants of the High 
Authority, or study parties and committees. The first were the ECSC/United 
Kingdom committee established in November 1952, and the Committee for 
Commercial Affairs established by the Special Council of Ministers to 
prepare the negotiations with GATT and OEEC.
•°. HAEC, CM1/1952/16: "Négociations de la CECA avec les pays tiers", Bonn,
1 September 1952.
41. HAEC, CM1/1952/4: "Procès-verbal de la 1ère session 22.9.1952",
Luxembourg, 8 October 1952.
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Tariffs (GATT) and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 
between November 1952 and February 1953.62 The establishment of the common market 
for coal and steel required the repeal of the "most-favoured-nation’’ clause and the 
exemption within the OEEC from fulfilling the non-discriminatory rule necessary to set 
up the common market among the Six.63 Negotiations with the OEEC had shown that 
interference from the High Authority with respect to reallocation at the time of shortage 
and giving priority to assure internal supply weakened die bargaining position of the Six 
with the non-ECSC world when negotiating bilaterally.64
External trade was a sphere which the national delegates fought to maintain at the 
national level against the High Authority's attempt to transfer it to the supranational 
sphere. The High Authority called repeatedly to "l’esprit même du Traité." The problem 
was that the Treaty was interpreted in seven different ways by each State on the one hand, 
and by the High Authority on the other. Among the various aspects that could be brought 
to the reader's attention to show how nation-states succeeded in limiting the action of the 
High Authority in trade relations, the debate about whether promises to deliver coal and 
steel should refer to the country’s obligation under the Treaty at times of shortage, was 
most significant In February 1953, the date of the establishment of the common market 
for coal, iron, and scrap, and making use of the functions attributed to the High Authority 
during the transition period, Monnet proposed that a common clause be inserted in all 
future trade agreements mentioning the eventuality of entry into force of a rt 59
**. These ar* the main aspects of the Community's foreign relations that 
have received particular attention; i.e., Paul Reuter: La Communauté
européenne du charbon et de l'acier. Paris [Librairie générale de Droit et 
de Jurisprudence] 1953, pp. 116 ff.; M.J. de Soto; "Le* relations 
internationales de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier", in 
Academic de Droit International: Recueil des cours. 1956. II. Leyde [A.H. 
Sijthoff] 1957, pp. 29—85; Raymond Prieur: Le a relations internes et
externes de la Cocwunaute du charbon et de l'acier. Paris, 1956; and, 
Diebold, op. cit., pp. 502 ff.
Spain and other non—GATT countries, except Switzerland, received a 
»impie notification concerning their exception from the most—favoured—nation 
clause of the ECSC Treaty; HAEC, CM1/1952/4: "Procès-verbal de la troisième 
session du Conseil tenue A Luxembourg le 23 décembre 1952".
“ . HAEC, CM1/1953/131: "Rapport au Conseil de Ministres par la Commission 
des questions de politique commerciale", Luxembourg, 1-2 December 1952; and 
CM1/1953/160: "Note pour le Conseil de Ministres de la CECA de M.
1'Ambassadeur [Max] Suetens en date du 5.3.1953", Luxembourg, 11 March 1953.
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concerning restrictions on exports that might be imposed in case of internal shortage.65
The German delegation felt strongly -as did the rest of the governments involved- 
that a clause should be included which would render it more difficult to achieve bilateral 
trade agreements. Most delegations suggested that the High Authority should impose no 
restrictions on exports in the six first months of those agreements that had merited her 
previous approval. The French, Belgian, and Luxembourg delegations proposed the 
elimination of any such clause, leaving entirely to the national governments the 
responsibility to make compatible their trade agreements and the dispositions in the ECSC 
Treaty. The High Authority refused to accept any proposal that meant to mortgage, even 
for the shortest period of time, the High Authority's scarce functions (i.e., to secure a 
regular internal supply in case of shortages):
”L'intérêt et les objetifs de la Communauté seraient ainsi 
sacrifiés à 1'avance aux intérêts immédiats des Etats désireux 
de conclure des accords commerciaux favorables à leur économie 
nationale. " <4
The German delegation, supported by the Dutch, maintained that a guarantee (similar to 
that proposed to the High Authority) was absolutely necessary to allow member States to 
conclude trade agreements. It was important psychologically to avoid third countries’ 
uncertainty. As the French delegate stated, it was important to avoid that
"les partenaires d'accords bilatéraux aient 1 'impression que 
le respect des engagements pris dans les accords depend en 
dernier lieu de la decision d'une tierce autorité et non du 
pays membre lui -même.
According to an. 3, the national delegations to the special committee on matters of 
commercial policy argued, the Community was obliged to take account of the needs of
<5. HAEC, CEAB 4/130: Monnet's "Lettre aux Gouvernements concernant
l'application de l'Alinéa 2 de l'Art. 75 du Traité (Projet d'accord ou 
d'arrangement contenant des clauses faissant obstacle à l'application du 
Traité)", 14 February 1953.
M . Ibid., Service Juridique, "Note au suject de l'application éventuelle de 
l'article 59 du Traité aux accords commerciaux conclus par les Etats-Membres 
de la Communauté", Luxembourg, 8 May 1953.
€1. HAEC, 3/131: "Conç>te-rendue de la lOème reunion du Comité des question 
de politique commerciale tenue à Luxembourg le 28 mai 1953", Luxembourg, 3 
June 1953.
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the rest of the world and to promote trade. In their turn, the ECSC legal experts argued 
that, according to the same art. 3, the main objective of the common market consisted in 
guaranteeing the normal supply of the internal market without neglecting the rest of the 
world.68 The ECSC Treaty was malleable enough to be interpreted in opposing ways.
Member-states interpreted die ECSC Treaty to maintain an almost unchallenged 
power in commercial policy with third countries. The commercial policy of the High 
Authority consisted in a set of measures to be adopted in case of shortage, but this 
circumstance had already been dealt with in automatic clauses in most agreements, and 
the Council of Ministers could impose limits to the High Authority action. The debate was 
mainly a struggle between nation-states and the supranational body in a matter of national 
prestige and fundamental economic importance as foreign economic relations. It revealed 
that the ECSC members did not believe that they had been supplanted vis-à-vis the 
foreign world. The states remained the cardinal point of the ECSC's commercial policy 
by dint of the single fact that there was no community policy in the matter. The rest of 
the world should continue to keep up bilateral agreements with the Six. Although the d e  
jure control continued to be disputed for a long time, the d e  iacto control remained 
national.64 The High Authority had suffered a clear defeat in its attempt to create a 
common external commercial policy.
The lack of a community commercial policy might have contributed to the slow 
administrative reaction to the Schuman initiative. The latter phenomenon reveals better 
than anything else the lack of interest of the Spanish authorities for the Schuman Plan. 
It was as late as April 1956 that the Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy and Commerce 
recommended to the Ministry of Commerce to appoint a permanent delegation in
*•. Paragraph baaed on HAEC, CM 1/1953/131: "Compte-rendu* de la 7ème
reunion du Commité dea questiona de politique commerciale tenue à Luxembourg 
le 15 avril 1953”, Luxembourg, 16 April 1953; and CEAB 4/130: "Compte-rendue 
de la 9ème seasion du Comité des questions de politique commerciale du 
Conseil de Ministres tenue a Paris le 9 Mai 1953”, and "Note pour les 
membres de la Haute Autorité” by Spierenburg, 1B May 1953.
°. Driscoll, ”Associâtion with Schumania”, art. cit., p. 108.
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Brussels.70 Previously, the Spanish administration had not been totally inactive: when the 
Treaty of Paris was ready for signature by the ministers of foreign affairs of the Six in 
April 1951, the Minister of Industry and Commerce, Juan Antonio Suanzes, and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alberto Martin Artajo, instructed the attachés of foreign 
economy to report about the consequences for Spain's supply.71 A few days later, 
representatives from the two ministries formed a study party attached to the Cabinet of 
the Under-Secretary for Foreign Economy and Commerce to keep a vigilant eye on the 
development of the Schuman Plan.72 No records for the interdepartmental ECSC 
Commission could be found for this research. Apart from some archival problems, this 
documentary silence could be attributed to the lack of any effective action. In January- 
1953, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Economy and Commerce ordered attachés to 
supply regular information on the developments of the ECSC and of the possible 
repercussions on the Spanish economy.73 However, the long-term delay in adopting a 
definitive attitude towards the ECSC does not relate to bad administrative habits, but to 
the simple fact that the Spanish Government saw no national interest at risk from the 
Schuman Plan or the establishment of the ECSC.
10. AGA, C/36851: "Nota para el Excroo. Sr. Ministro", Madrid, 4 April 1956. 
This same file contains various requests to appoint an observer in Brussels 
due to the increased number of permanent national delegations being 
appointed to the ECSC. For a complete list of countries that established 
diplomatic legations before the High Authority in Luxembourg see Commission 
des Communautés européennes: Archives Générales. Inventaire des Archives 
Historiques. Vol. 1 Dossiers de la Haute Autorité de la CECA 1952. Discours 
1952-1967, Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes, 
Luxembourg, 1985, as well as the funds in HAEC, CEAE 5, "Délégations des 
pays tiers auprès de la Haute Autorité".
11. MAE, Leg. 5913, exp. 1: Coded telegrams to Bonn, Brussels, Rome, Paris, 
and The Hague, 28 March 1951.
12. Ibid., Súñer to the Director-General of Economic Policy, at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, "S/ constitución comisión funcionarios Plan Schuman", 
Madrid, 10 April 1951. This Commission was also known as the "Comité de 
Estudios del Plan Schuman”.
Referred to in AGA, C/36851: Lomas to Arguelles, "Entrada en vigor
Comunidad Europea del Carbón y del Acero", Brussels, 10 March 1953.
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6.5. Concluding Remarks
The Schuman Plan raised little interest for the Spanish steel sector, which was a 
weak and isolated sector before the launching of the Schuman Plan. The establishment of 
the ECSC did not modify the Spanish Government’s plans to increase domestic steel 
production, rather it accentuated them. Spain’s steel sector was so isolated from the rest 
of Europe and so directed to achieve self-sufficiency that the new initiative mattered little 
except in how it affected the supply of raw materials. Since trade with the six country - 
members of the ECSC was maintained bilaterally, Spain lost any interest for the ECSC 
itself. The indirect effects that might occur from the pool's policies concerning production, 
distribution, and pi ices were assumed to be part of the day-to-day problems in commercial 
relations.
The reader should not immediately conclude that the Spanish Government did not 
pay attention to European integration. On the contrary, it did pay attention to European 
integration, but not necessarily with the same intensity for all sectors. When integration 
moved to agricultural exports, the Spanish Administration quickly displayed a strenuous 
effort to reduce the negative implications of any European initiative at cooperation that 
excluded Spain. The following chapter will show that agriculture was a field in which 
Spain engaged in a level of diplomatic activity quite disproportionate to the attention it 
paid to the Schuman Plan or other contemporary economic initiative. The different 
responses offered by the Spanish Administration to the black and green pools were a 
direct reflection of how ’’integration'' was perceived differently according to the degree 
and amount of "national interest" at risk.
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"The French Government believes that a further step forward 
towards the economic unity of Europe should have as its objective 
the joint organisation of the principal agricultural markets."
Note of the French Government, March 19511
"L’intérêt de l’Espagne pour ce projet de si vaste envergure 
s'accroît à la pensée que nous sommes un pays substantiellement 
agricole et que nos exportations de produits de ce genre sont la 
base de notre commerce d’importation."
Spanish Ambassador in Paris, Count of Casa Rojas, March 1953.2
"Several phases mark Spain's path towards her full participation 
within European cooperation. The first one initiated with Spain’s 
participation at the Green Pool conference."
Spain’s Foreign Minister, Fernando Maria Castiella, 1958.3
AN, F/10/5359: "Note du Gouvernement français", Paris, 29 March 1951, 
inviting the governments of the OEEC member—countries to enter into 
negotiations for the purpose of organising a European Agricultural 
Community. English translation from PRO, MAF 83/3388: "Note of the French 
Government".
a. AGA, MAE/11553, folder 40: Opening speech of Ambassador José Rojas y 
Moreno at the 2nd ministerial meeting of the organisation of agricultural 
markets, Paris, 17 March 1953.
*. Declarations recorded by Equipo Mundo: Los 90 ministros de Franco, 2nd 
ed., Barcelona [Dopesa] 1970, p. 267.
7.1. Introduction
This chapter presents documentary evidence of the Spanish reaction to the early 
attempts to set up a European Agricultural Community during the first half of the 1950s.4 
After a consideration of the trade liberalisation programme of the Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the chapter reveals the Spanish 
Administration’s continuous effort to reduce the impact of European cooperation on 
Spanish agricultural trade. This was a field in which Spain displayed diplomatic action 
incomparable with the attention paid to the Schuman Plan or to any other economic 
initiative at the time. The importance of this episode goes well beyond the fact of being 
another step forward towards the international recognition of the Franco regime, as some 
historians have erroneously mentioned.5
4 - In Spain, the early attempts to set up a European Agricultural Community 
deserve short references in Simón Cano Denia: Valencia ante el Mercado Común 
Europeo, Valencia [Instituto Valenciano de Economia] 1956, p. 29; Ramón 
Tamames: Estructura Económica de España, Madrid [Sociedad de Estudios y 
Publicaciones] I960, p. 658; Manuel Fraga Iribame: Horizonte Español,
Madrid [Editora Nacional] 1965, p. 86; Arturo Camilleri Lapeyre et al.: La 
agricultura española ante la CEE, Madrid [Instituto de Estudios Económicos} 
1984, pp. 17—18; and Maria Josefa Requena: España y la Economia del Mercado 
Común, Madrid [Ceura] 1987, p. 87. Spain's intervention in the agricultural 
negotiations has not deserved the attention of historians of Spanish 
political and economic history. It receives a sentence in Joan Clavera et 
al. : Capitalismo español: de la autarcruia a la estabilización (1939—1959) , 
Madrid [Cuadernos para el Diálogo] 2nd ed., 1978, p. 210; and one paragraph 
in Angel Viñas et al.: Política comercial exterior en España, 1931-1975, 
Madrid [Banco Exterior de España] 1979, vol. 2, p. 834. Luis Antonio Buñuel 
Salcedo in an unpublished work, "España y la idea de Europa (Política 
Europea de España 1945-1955)*, 2 vols., Juan March Foundation, Madrid, 1986, 
pp. 129-39, deals shortly with it but without using the same range of 
Spanish archival material (and none of the non-Spanish documentation) which 
appears in this chapter. Totally out-of-context references appear in several 
doctoral dissertations: Santiago Torres Bernárdez: "L'Espagne et les
Organisations Internationales. Le statut internationale de l'Espagne après 
la deuxième guerre mondiale et ses conséquences sur sa participation aux 
activités des organisations internationales (1945-1956)", University of 
Saarbrücken, 1960; Peter H. De Garmo: "Beyond the Pyrenees; Spain and Europe 
Since World War II", Doctoral Diss., University of California, Davis, 1971; 
and Juàn Ortega Galán: "Proceso de aislamiento e incorporación de España a 
la organización internacional (194 4-1959). Factores que ejercieron mayor 
influencia. Consideración especifica de la incorporación a la OECE", 
Doctoral Diss., Universidad de Málaga, Málaga, 1978.
*. Spain's participation in the European agricultural negotiations is 
considered as part of the timetable of Spain's acceptance into various of 
the agencies of the United Mations and other technical organisations: the 
Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations in late 1950; the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation, the World Postal Union, the World 
Health Organisation and the World Meteorological Organisation in 1951; the 
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and 
the International Telecommunications Union in 1952; the International Labour 
Organisation in 1953; the UNICEF in 1954; and the United Nations in 1955.
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It is important to explain why and bow the only country permanently excluded 
from the institutional network of cooperation established after 1945 suddenly attended, 
after March 1953, ministerial conferences whose original aim was the negotiation of the 
second step towards European Unity, a sort of European Agricultural Community. It 
should also be considered that, by participating in these talks, Spain achieved OEEC 
observer status at the beginning of 1955, regarding all agricultural matters. This was three 
years before gaining proper OEEC membership. This chapter aims to provide the 
necessary background to understanding subsequent and better known developments in the 
long and troubled path of Spain’s OEEC and EEC memberships.
Agricultural trade has been considered essential only in explaining Spanish 
attention to European Integration in the post-1957 period. The point of departure of 
this chapter is that even in the early 1950s agricultural trade was of too great importance 
for the Spanish Administration to remain inactive while the largest consumers of Spain's 
agricultural produce were discussing sectorial integration in agriculture and multilateral 
preferential agreements. The percentage of agricultural produce in total Spanish exports 
to the EEC countries was virtually identical in 1960 (57.10 per cent) and in 1950 (57.02 
per cent).4 Any initiative to regulate European agricultural markets had to be taken 
seriously by the Spanish Administration. This was particularly the case when such 
initiatives implied discrimination against countries excluded from the pool and embraced 
all OEEC countries, to which Spain exported 62 per cent of its total agricultural exports 
(in value) in 1950. Dependence on the OEEC markets for agricultural exports forced the 
Spanish Government to keep an open eye on the different proposals for a common 
European agricultural policy.
7.2. The Green Pool: A niscriminatorv Threat for the Spanish Economy
The term Green Pool, coined at the time to draw a connection with Schuman’s
Official Spanish trad* statistics, considering all commodities classified 
under class XII and the statistical territory of Peninsula and Balearic 
Islands; declared values f.o.b.
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black pool for coal and steel, is used throughout this chapter to refer to the evolving 
European Agricultural Community between 1950 and 1955. In 1950, the French and 
Dutch Ministers of Agriculture, independently of each other and with different and 
somewhat opposing interests, conceived initiatives for a common organisation of 
agricultural markets. European discussion on an agricultural community was possible due 
to the confluence of many countries' desires to find outlet markets for their increasing 
agricultural surpluses. Furthermore, there was wide-spread disappointment about the 
capacity of the OEEC to fully tackle the intricacy of the problems which an expansion of 
agricultural trade was facing at a time when agricultural output in Western Europe had 
reached pre-war levels in many commodities and export surpluses of some foodstuffs had 
appeared. These initiatives were discussed at a European scale after 1951 until they were 
finally buried within the administrative complexities of the OEEC in 1955. In essence, this 
episode of European cooperation reflects most governments’ efforts to find adequate 
formulae to expand agricultural trade in those commodities with increasing output under 
the stimulus of government intervention, while ensuring their compatibility with the 
maintenance of highly-protected agricultural sectors.7
1. The most interesting account of the Green Pool episode (until March 1953) 
is Richard 7. Griffiths and Alan S. Milward: "The European Agricultural
Community, 194 5—1954", EU I Working Paper no. 86/254, December 1986. Two 
previous articles by Gilbert Noël: "Les tentatives de communauté agricole 
européenne 1941-1955", Revue d*histoire moderne et contemporaine, vol. 26, 
October-December 1979, pp. 579—611; and "Le Congrès européen d'Agriculture 
de Munich (1949) : échec d'une initiative «européenne»", Revue Historique, 
vol. 266, no. 539, July-September 1981, pp. 95-126, merely describe the 
multiplicity of initiatives for agricultural cooperation. Onfortunately, 
Noel's published doctoral diss., Du pool vert à la politique agricole 
commune> Les tentatives de communauté agricole européenne entre 1945 et 
1955, Paris [Economica] 1988, lacks the necessary documentary references. 
The origins of the Dutch initiative and the subsequent modification of the 
Dutch position are explained in Griffiths: "The Mansholt Plan", in Griffiths 
(ed.): The Netherlands and the Integration of Europe, 1945-1957, Amsterdam 
INEHA) 1989, pp. 93-111. For Belgium's attitude see Leen Van Molle: "Le
milieu agricole belge face à la «concurrence européenne»; 1944-1958", in 
Michel Dumoulin (éd.): La Belgique et les débuts de la construction
européenne. De la guerre aux traités de Rome, Louvain-La-Neuve (Ciaco] 1987, 
pp. 119-43. A detailed study of the Italian position can be found in 
Giuliana Laschi: a) "L'Italie e il processo di integrazione europea: il caso 
dell'agricoltura, 1947-1958", Doctoral Diss., EÜI, Florence, October 1992, 
chapters three to five; and b) "L'Italia e il processo di integrazione 
economica agricola europea", in A. de Bernardi and P.P. d'Attore (eds.): Il 
lungo addio alla modernizzazione e il diclino della société rurale italiana 
(1880—1960) (forthcoming). The widest collection of national cases were the 
papers presented in the Florence colloquium "Agricultural Pressure Groups 
and International Politics: The Green Pool, 1950-1954", November 1990, to 
be published as Griffiths (ed.): The Green Pool (1950-1955) : The First 
Attempt to Create a European Common Agricultural Policy (forthcoming). Some 
of these papers go well beyond pressure groups into national agricultural 
policies and show that the variety of conflicting interests was not limited
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The French initiative for a common organisation of Europe's main agricultural 
markets mainly worried the Spanish authorities.8 After eight months of discussion over 
the form and terms of the initiative, in March 1951 the French Cabinet finally authorised 
the Quai d ’Orsay to request the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Jacques- 
Camille Paris, on behalf of the French Government, to convene all the OEEC countries 
to a conference to examine a proposal for a European Agricultural Community.’ No 
specific date was fixed on the agenda.
The European Agricultural Community emerged as the second step towards the 
economic unity of Europe. The French proposed institutions similar to those provided for 
in the draft treaty of the ECSC, including a shared Court of Justice and Common 
Assembly. The proposal referred to a need to increase agricultural output in Western
to conflicts among nations but also within nations, between the agricultural 
organisations and the rest of the economic sectors and within the farming 
bloc itself.
*. This attitude was certainly due to the fact that the Mansholt Plan for 
a European Agricultural Community never reached the stage of international 
diplomacy as a clear-cut proposal (see note 12). It did, however, play an 
essential part in the discussions linked to the Green Pool. This was also 
the case in Italy, see Laschi's doctoral diss. cit., p. 160. Only once, 
during the course of this research, was a documentary reference concerning 
the Dutch initiative found in which the Mansholt Plan was depicted as having 
no chance given its "extremism with trade liberalisation"; MAE, Leg. 34 45, 
exp. 22: Despatch no. 121/51, "Organización europea de mercados agricolas. 
Plan Mansholt holandés y Plan Verde francés", from the Spanish Attaché of 
Foreign Economy in Brussels to the Ünder-Secretary of Foreign Economy and 
Commerce, Jaime Arguelles Armada, 14 June 1951. Once the French invitation 
for a conference was open to negotiation, the Dutch initiative was ignored 
by the Spanish authorities.
*. The circumstances leading to the Pflimlin Plan and its domestic reception 
are discussed in Griffiths and Fernando Guirao: "The Pflimlin and Mansholt 
Plans", in Griffiths (ed.): The Green Pool (1950-1955), cit.
Pierre Pflimlin (b. 1907), parliamentary member of the Mouvement
Républicain Populaire (MRP), the political formation most favoured by 
farmers' voting support during the early post-war years, served as Minister 
of Agriculture and Food Supply for two years, from November 1947. He 
resigned on 1 December 194 9 due to the lack of modification in official 
French policy towards Germany and European economic cooperation based on 
regional deals and liberalisation proposals to the detriment of farming 
interests. Returning to Government in July 1950, he presented his first 
proposal for the joint organisation of the principal agricultural markets 
in August 1950. Although no longer minister of agriculture after August 
1951, Pflimlin maintained his active involvement in the initiative, acting 
as special ambassador with his old colleagues or being officially consulted 
as Minister of Commerce and Foreign Economic Relations (until January 1952), 
Minister of State for the Council of Europe (until March 1952) and Minister 
of Overseas Territories (until January 1953). Pflimlinrs own account of his 
initiative is to be found in his Mémoires d'un Européen. De la IVé à la Vé 
République, Paris [Fayard] 1991, pp. 30-51, and in Jean—Louis English and 
Daniel Riot: Entretiens avec Pierre Pflimlin. Itinéraires d'un Européent
Strasbourg [La Nuée Bleue] 1989, pp. 97-118.
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Europe and to reduce dependence on extra-European suppliers, especially from the dollar 
area. In exchange far dollar savings and security of supply, assured market outlets would 
provide price stability for the increased output. The consequent equilibrium of supply and 
demand would then render possible a cost-reducing and productivity-raising policy in the 
sector. Urging the benefits of economies of scale, Pflimlin spoke of a large market with 
artificial trade barriers swept away and the disparity of price factors reduced. This process 
would ideally end in the creation of a common market among the participating countries.
The French Government concealed its real interests behind the vagueness of these 
general principles. The method to be adopted would be "gradual and flexible", paying 
heed to the "necessity for transitional stages and guard against any form of automatic 
operation". The negotiations started with wheat, sugar, wine, and dairy produce.10 As a 
result of removing trade barriers, any important change in Western European trade would 
bring France an export gain regarding the first three staples, of which it was a major 
producer, though not a major exporter. The main export advantage in relation to dairy 
products in a single market would have gone to the Netherlands and Denmark, while the 
largest flow of imports would have been into Germany and France. Although France also 
expected to make some gains in the dairy produce sector, the inclusion of the latter was 
more an earnest attempt to make the initiative "something more than a multilateral 
agreement to buy French farm exports."11 Pflimlin could never have expected 
international negotiations on his plan if it was exclusively favourable to French interests. 
At the least, it was necessary to attract Dutch attention with the prospect of future gains. 
The bulk of French agriculture, high-cost and high-tariff protected, would continue to be 
safe from foreign competition, while the French Government would have obtained stable 
markets for its structural surpluses expected to emerge by 19S2-S3. The principle of intra- 
European preference, the quid p ro  quo for increased production and reduced 
dependence on extra-European suppliers, would allow French agriculture to satisfy 
Western Europe’s requirements of primary commodities at high and stable prices until it
10. "Hot* du Gouvernement fran^ais", 29 March 1951, cit, in footnote no. 1
u . William Diebold Jr. s Trade and Payments in Western Europe. A Study in 
Economic Cooperation 1947—51. New York [Harper £ Brothers] 1952, p. 276. 
This book was published before concrete proposals for carrying out the 
principles of the Pflimlin Plan were made public.
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bad accomplished the Monnet Plan’s modernisation targets to mal«» French agriculture 
internationally competitive.12
The French memorandum completely neglected the membership question. 
Although the reference to the ECSC Treaty would have limited the initiative to the 
Schuman Plan countries by involving the OEEC countries through the Council of Europe, 
the French threw into doubt any real commitment towards a restricted community. At the 
same time, by asking Jacques-Camille Paris, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, 
to present the memorandum, the French showed their desire to keep the initiative outside 
the OEEC, where British influence was considered disruptive.13 A sense of pragmatism 
imposed the extension of the initiative to a large number of countries. The Six seemed 
unable to provide outlets for growing output in the aforementioned four staples. The need 
to prevent any country not directly concerned sabotaging the plan, even if it were 
acceptable to a large number of countries, removed the OEEC from the list of possible 
solutions given its rules of procedure at Council level. Whatever the real French intentions 
might have been, the essential point here is that Spain was never considered for 
membership.14 Probably, apart from political factors, the interest that Spain, as a net
11. For the Monnet Plan's agricultural targets and export surpluses see 
Griffiths and Guirao, op. cit.
1J. According to Dirk U. Stikker, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 
French invitation had been sent through the Council of Europe largely 
because Pflimlin was afraid that if the matter were handled in OEEC, the 
French Minister of Finance, Maurice Petsche, would sabotage the plan; PRO, 
FO 371/94347: Telegram no. 2 from Strasbourg to FO, 5 May 1951. In fact, on
12 January 1951, Petsche informed the OEEC Council of Ministers of a French 
plan for the integration of European agriculture as a way of forcing 
presentation of the Pflimlin Plan to the OEEC, which Pflimlin himself mostly 
disliked. Due to disagreement within Cabinet, between October 1950 and March
1951, over whether to present it in the OEEC or as an independent move, the 
Pflimlin Plan remained out of the focus of international discussion. The 
Council of Europe solution was a middle course which attracted the attention 
of the future major of Strasbourg. A similar struggle was taking place in 
the Dutch Cabinet over the so-called Mansholt Plan, named after Sicco L. 
Mansholt, Dutch agricultural minister from 1945 to 1958, after its approval 
by Cabinet in October 1950. The OEEC initiative, opposed by Mansholt, meant 
to link his project to the unpromising fate of the Stikker Plan, which in 
July 1950 was referred to a special OEEC working party.
14. It was believed in Madrid that the French Memorandum of March 1951 was 
not addressed to Spain, despite Pflimlin's interest! (sic), due to the 
opposition of Socialist ministers; MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 22: M. Aguirre de 
Career, Spanish Ambassador in Paris, to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Alberto Martin Artajo, despatch no. 460, "Exclusión de la participación 
española en la Conferencia para la organización de ios mercados agrícolas 
europeos'*, 4 April 1951. The existing records of the various commissions set 
up after August 1950 to sort out the details of Pflimlin's initial proposals
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grain importer possibly willing to purchase in France to reduce dollar imports, could have 
presented to the French economy, was strongly contrarrested by the fact that Spain’s 
agricultural export commodities -i.e., citrus fruit and common wine- entered into strong 
competition with French domestic production and North African exporters.
Any talks on agricultural market organisation, to which Spain had no access, 
represented a direct external constraint on its trade performance, with unexpected 
consequences in both the short and long run. Inertia might lead the historian to think in 
equal terms regarding agriculture and steel, given the early connections between the Green 
and Black Pools. The Spanish Administration had shown no interest in the Schuman Plan 
and its concerns about the ECSC was limited to securing imports of strategic commodities 
fen* its introspective steel industry. They made no official attempt to influence or to enter 
the Schuman Plan affair. This was not the case, however, for agriculture.
Agricultural trade with Western Europe was important enough to excite a quick 
reaction from those who supposedly defended Spain’s foreign agricultural interests. The 
first to report on the initiative, the Agricultural Attaché in Paris, immediately asked the 
Spanish Government "to undertake all necessary steps to avoid [Spain] being arbitrarily 
excluded from an affair which could have an impact on fundamental agricultural 
interests."15 Although the precise meaning of the French proposal was obscure, it was 
clear that any European Green Pool would involve some form of discrimination against 
imports from the outside world, thus affecting Spain’s vital interests. Three circumstances 
provoked Spanish concerns: first, the importance of agricultural produce in Spain’s foreign
provide no grounds to sustain that those involved in the discussions ever 
considered Spanish involvement. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
explained the exclusion in procedural terms : Spain was neither a member of 
the Council of Europe or the OEEC; AM, F/10/5553: "Note verbale" to the 
Spanish Embassy in Paris, 2 July 1951.
15. MAE, Leg. 5910, exp. 6, carp. 1: Report by José Félix de Escoriaza y 
Boix, to the Minister of Agriculture, Carlos Rein Segura, "Conferencia sobre 
organización de mercados agricolas organizada por el Ministerio de 
Agricultura francés**, 10 March 1951. Aware of the importance of the 
situation Escoriaza, in what later on turned out to be a unilateral move, 
suggested to Pflimlin's Chef du Cabinet, Pierre Maestracci, who generally 
represented the French Government on the OEEC's Food and Agriculture 
Committee, that Pflimlin could propose Spanish participation at least "with 
an observer status" if political opposition to Spanish Green Pool membership 
was maintained; ibid.
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trade and as the largest source of foreign currency earnings; second, the fact that Western 
Europe as a whole represented Spain’s main commercial partner in agricultural trade at 
the time; and finally, the fear that organisation of the main agricultural markets could end 
the limited but effective status QUO Spain had attained regarding OEEC trade 
liberalisation as applied to agriculture.
Agricultural produce dominated Spain's trade. On a value basis, foodstuffs 
accounted for an average of 56 per cent of total exports and 19 per cent of total imports 
during the period 1948 to 1953.16 More importantly, agricultural exports generated 
around 40 per cent of foreign currency receipts, the reduction of which would have the 
greatest impact on domestic economic policies.17 The need to maintain and increase this 
source of foreign currency earnings was particularly significant because domestic 
economic policies and the international position of the Franco regime had strictly limited 
other sources of foreign currency. By giving complete protection to an expanding but 
high-cost industrial sector, the Government had limited the contribution of this sector to 
export trade. Manufacturing industry' promoted in Spain during the late 1940’s and 1950’s 
had no capacity to generate exports and thus to contribute to a diversification of Spanish 
foreign commodity trade. While Spain could not hope for international aid without 
substantially modifying the nature of its political regime, export trade, dominated by
1‘. Data from Antonio Tena Jungruito: "Comercio Exterior”, in Albert Carreras 
(ed.): Estadisticas históricas de España. Siglos XIX y XX, Madrid [Fundación 
Banco Exterior] 1989, pp. 356—61, table 8.5, p. 350.
n . The figure refers to foodstuffs exports (fob) as officially recorded for 
194 9 and 1950. Exports corresponding to Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla 
had been added to the export figures for the Peninsula and the Balearic 
Islands, registered separately before 1953. Data on foreign currency 
earnings from Santiago Chamorro et al.: "Las balanzas de pagos de España del 
periodo de la autarquia" Información Comercial Española, no. 502, June 1975, 
pp. 161—87. The gold Peseta given in the trade statistics has been changed 
into US$ by using the exchange rate of 3.060973 gold Pesetas*US$l as 
proposed by Chamorro et al. (p. 8) . The figure in the text is an undervalued 
estimation because official statistics registered exports values as declared 
by exporters whereas the values listed by Chamorro et al. correspond to 
those registered when the exchange took place. Exporters tended to declare 
only part of their earnings to enable them to change the rest at a free rate 
of exchange, distorting official statistics. Considering the possible 
underestimation of the registered trade values and the fact that for a few 
years after 1950 Spain benefited from a temporary increase in the volume of 
raw materials exported due to the boom following the beginning of the Korean 
war, the percentage mentioned in the text is an underestimation of the usual 
contribution of agricultural exports to the OEEC countries in terms of 
foreign currency earnings. Hereinafter, all figures referring to Spain's 
receipts of foreign exchange come from Chamorro et al.'s estimates, unless 
otherwise stated.
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agricultural produce, financed the essential imports to feed the growing population and 
ongoing industrialisation. This was especially the case when accelerated industrial growth 
accompanied import substitution schemes in the early 1950s, aggravated the pressure upon 
foreign currency earnings. Therein lay the essential contribution of agricultural trade to 
the Spanish economy, in spite of its limited volume and its small direct contribution in 
terms of National Income.1'
Trade with Western Europe could not be ignored. The OEEC countries provided 
little over 33 per cent of Spain's total agricultural imports on a value basis (37 per cent 
on a volume basis) and received 61 per cent of the total value of Spanish agricultural 
exports (74 per cent on a volume basis) during the period 1949 to 1953.19 Gross 
agricultural exports to the OEEC countries provided the Spanish economy with almost 24 
per cent of total foreign currency receipts from exports and little under 21 per cent of total 
foreign currency receipts registered in current and capital accounts in 1950. Agricultural 
exports to Western Europe could hardly be neglected. They were crucial to overcoming 
economic bottlenecks.
A closer look at commodity trade composition provides a further insight into 
Spain's great dependence on the OEEC countries.30 Cereals and cereal flours accounted 
for 59 per cent of Spain's total agricultural imports and OEEC countries provided around 
35 per cent of these imports (the rest coming from the dollar area). Second on the list 
came potatoes (19 per cent of Spain’s total imports), of which OEEC countries provided 
53 per cent of the imported tons. Codfish accounted for 7 per cent of total agricultural
ia. The roost influential contemporary claim for the "qualitative** importance 
of the Spanish export trade was Román Perpiñá Grau: a) "Determinantes de la 
estructura del comercio exterior", Boletín de estudios económicos» vol. 15, 
May—August 1960, no. 50, pp. 256-57, and b) De Estructura económica y 
Economía Hispana, Madrid [Rialp] 1952, pp. 364 ff. Perpiñá's most famous 
work was originally published in Germany in 1935. Higinio Paris Eguilaz: La 
expansión de la economía española, Madrid [Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones Científicas] 1944, constituted the exponent of the school 
of economic thought that considered foreign trade unimportant for Spain 
given its limited value in relation to the national income.
xi. Considering all OEEC countries, all commodities classified under class 
XII and the statistical territory of Peninsula and Balearic Islands.
20. The following information is based on official trade accounts for 1950 
and refers to value figures unless otherwise stated.
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imports, coming mostly from Denmark and Norway. On the export side, oranges, wine 
and almonds accounted for 48 per cent of total agricultural exports. The OEEC countries 
took 99.4 per cent of Spain's orange exports, 65.7 per cent of its wine exports and 85.4 
per cent of its exports of almonds. Their importance for other Spanish agricultural export 
commodities, such as canned natural fruit and olive oil, was much smaller. Spain was 
heavily dependent upon the OEEC markets in two of the four staples put forward by the 
Pflimlin Plan: wheat (net import commodity) and wine (net export commodity).21 
Although the French had asked for preferential intra-European commodity agreements for 
only a few commodities, the Spanish Government was well aware that the choice of 
products was still open.22 The possible inclusion of fruit and vegetables could have 
closed down Spain's most important export markets in both categories. The nature of 
Spain's foreign agricultural trade, concentrated on only a few commodities and on a very 
restricted geographical area, meant that the creation of a discriminatory European 
Agricultural Community (whatever that implied!), even when limited to a few 
commodities, constituted a real threat to the entire Spanish economy.
This threat represented an important obstacle to fulfilling the economic 
programme of the new Cabinet appointed by Franco in July 1951. This Cabinet -liberal 
when compared with previous ones- bad the task of increasing production, regularising 
imports, expanding exports and strengthening Spain's gold and foreign currency 
reserves.23 The establishment of a European Agricultural Community without Spain 
would not ease the efforts of the technicians appointed Ministers of Agriculture and
*l. Sugar and dairy products were not significant. Dairy products counted 
for less than 1 per cent of Spanish foreign trade and in relation to sugar 
Spain turned from importing 2.42 per cent of its total sugar imports from 
OEEC countries in 1950 to import only 0.1 per cent in 1953 while exporting 
little snore than $10 million to the same countries in 1953 (24.36 per cent 
as average from total sugar exports).
22. It was known that Italy had expressed its desire to enlarge the list 
with the inclusion of fruit and horticultural commodities and that the 
Netherlands pressed for the initiative to be enlarged to all agricultural 
produce; MAE, Leg. 5910, exp. 6, carp. Is Despatch no. 199/51 from the 
Councillor of Foreign Economy at the Spanish Embassy in Rome to the Under­
secretary of Foreign Economy and Commerce, "«Pool verde» o comun mercado 
europeo de productos agricolas", Rome, 10 April 1951; and Air Post Telegram 
no. 50, from Spain's diplomatic legation in The Hague, 28 May 1951.
2i. Official note of the Council of Ministers of 29 July 1951, published by 
the press the following day.
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Commerce, Caves tany and Arburúa.24
Cavestany opted for modernisation to achieve increases in output and 
productivity.25 The main target of Arbunia, Franco’s first Minister of Commerce after 
the Ministry of Industry and Commerce split, was the expansion of foreign trade.26 Spain 
suffered a chronic deficit in its balance of trade, caused by inadequate agricultural 
production, massive imports of foodstuffs and an industry heavily dependent on imports 
of raw materials. This situation conflicted with official expectations of increasing the level 
of industrial activity, which demanded higher levels of imports, no matter how disturbing 
this was interpreted. By August 1951, the foreign currency' holdings at the Spanish 
Foreign Exchange Institute (IEME) were in the red and the issuing of import licenses 
stopped.27 Therefore, any expansion of imports, when there was no provision of 
immediate international financial aid, implied an immediate expansion of exports to keep
24. Rafael Cavestany and Manuel Arburúa de la Miyar lived parallel political 
lives. Both were born in 1902 and began their political carriers in 1940 as 
President of the National Syndicate of Fruit and Vegetables Producers and 
Dnder-Secretary of Commerce, Tariff and Currency, respectively. Both were 
appointed Ministers in July 1951 and were regarded as technicians apparently 
detached from politics. Both were described as the right men to solve the 
problems of their respective areas through a limited liberalisation of the 
domestic economy. Both were finally dismissed in February 1957.
*5. The French experience was not unknown to Cavestany and those who, like 
him, had a technical training, see Asociación Nacional de Ingenieros 
Agrónomos: I Congreso Nacional de Ingeniería Agronómica, 9 vols., Madrid 
[Talleres Gráficos Altamira] 1950. Cavestany's first measures to raise 
f ixed-^rices to divert produce from the black market, to reduce the 
interventionist apparatus and to increase State's capital investment in the 
sector can be followed concisely in Carlos F. Barciela López: a)
Introduction to the Second Part of «Los costes del franquismo en el sector 
agrario: ruptura del proceso de transformacionet», in Ramón Garrabou,
Barciela and José Ignacio Jiménez Blanco (eds.): Historia agraria de la 
España contemporánea. Vol. 3. El fin de la agricultura tradicional (1900- 
1960) , Barcelona {Critica] 1986, pp. 383-4 54; and b) •’Crecimiento y cambio 
en la agricultura española desde la guerra civil**, in Jordi Nadal, Carreras 
and Caries Sudriá (eds.): La economía española en el Siglo XX. Una
perspectiva histórica, Barcelona [Ariel] 1987, pp. 258-79.
Explicitly stated in the decree-law of July 1951, creating the Ministry 
of Commerce independent from the Ministry of Industry, cit. in HNotas sobre 
el comercio exterior de España", Información Comercial Española, June 1961. 
Early in 1952, a new administrative service for the study of foreign markets 
was set within the Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy and Commerce. Arburúa 
has been unanimously connected with the slow opening of the Spanish economy 
during the 1950s and the promotion of exports. Unfortunately his reputation 
is greater than the actual increase of Spain's export trade.
27. AHBE, IEME, box no. 6 : S/C, 10 August 1951.
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an equilibrium in the balance of payments.2*
Spain’s non-participation in the Green Pool would have made the maintenance of 
the already unsatisfactory levels of the import and export of agricultural commodities even 
more difficult. Both categories were of extreme importance for the nation’s economic 
development and political stability. Agricultural exports were already held up by low 
output, price increases, discriminatory rates of exchange and the State’s commercial 
regulations.29 Devaluation followed by a relaxation of export controls, unification of 
exchange rates and elimination of the extreme features of State intervention, were 
inconceivable in the short-run, despite criticism from all comers. Domestic constraints to 
an expansion of the country’s export trade in agricultural commodities were already too 
damaging to remain inactive when a new foreign constraint appeared.
There has been constant speculation concerning the provision of American 
financial assistance to support the 1951 Government’s liberal programme.30 The previous 
chapter showed clearly that this was not the case. Admiral Sherman visited Spain 
unexpectedly and only two days before the new cabinet took office on 18 July 1951, 
bringing no real commitment for economic aid. Only in September did an American 
mission come to evaluate Spain’s real economic requirements. The United States’ financial 
aid was then linked to the signature of a satisfactory agreement for the use of military
**. As Arburúa put it: "He hope a twofold improvement in balance of
payments: less consumer goods imports, on the one side, and larger exports 
of manufactured goods, minerals and agricultural commodities, on the other 
side." Speech on 31 October 1951, in Arburúa: Cinco años al frente del
Ministerio de Comercio (Discursos y Declaraciones, 1951-1956), Madrid
[Imprenta Nacional] 1956, p. 20.
2*. See public complaints in the editorial of a leading publication in the
field, Agricultura. Revista Agropecuaria, no. 234, october 1951, which
explained the basic conditions for good export performance.
,0. That a firm agreement for financial assistance ought to have been 
granted by the Americans vis-à-vis the Spanish Government to explain the
rather liberal programme of the newly appointed Cabinet, has been most
strongly expressed by Joan Maria Esteban: "The Economic Policy of Francoism: 
An Interpretation", in Paul Preston (ed.): Spain in Crisis. The Evolution 
and Decline of the Franco Regime, Hassocks [The Harvester Press] 1976, pp.
62-100, p. 93; and Joan Clavera, Joan Maria Esteban, Maria Antònia Monès,
Antoni Montserrat and Jacint Ross Hombravella: Capitalismo español: de la 
autarquía a la estabilización (1939-1959), Madrid [Edicusa] 2nd ed., 
February 1976, p. 235. On the other side, some speculation was normal at the 
time, AD, Z/EE, vol. 96: "Note Perspectives éeonomiques en Espagne" by the
General Directorate of Economic and Financial Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, 
Paris, 2 January 1952.
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bases for which no clear economic counter-part appeared in sight. The $62.5 million credit 
administered by the Eximbank could not be considered adequate to provide the basis for 
a change in economic policy. The argument of American aid is only useful for the post- 
1955/56 period. Before that point, the import level was directly dependent on the 
country's expert performance.31 Earnings of foreign exchange via agricultural expons 
were essential and the beginning of talks on the organisation of European agricultural 
markets should have appeared as an unexpected foreign obstacle.
Spain's attitude towards the Green Pool question also stemmed from its previous 
experience of being only marginally affected by the OEEC liberalisation programme as 
applied to agriculture. The Pflimlin Plan was clearly a move away from OEEC 
liberalisation (to which well-organised French agricultural producers and Pflimlin himself 
had declared their hostility) and a step forward towards a system of interlocking 
preferential agreements.32 Any intra-European preferential arrangements for commodities 
in which Spain had an exporting interest would have been more discriminatory than 
OEEC liberalisation, which had basically failed to provide OEEC members better 
treatment in agricultural trade than non-OEEC members. The latter’s ineffectiveness in 
face of the plethora of governmental measures aimed at the control of food supply and 
the protection of domestic production, and the influence of vested interests and political 
pressure, indirectly benefited Spain's agricultural exports. Conversely, preferential 
commodity agreements might not enterily push Spanish exporters out of the OEEC 
markets, but they would certainly damage export sales by placing Spain’s main 
competitors in an extraordinarily advantageous condition.
Any negotiation on agricultural trade involved the risk of putting in motion a 
revision of the OEEC trade liberalisation programme. The general dissatisfaction with the 
results of liberalisation in the agricultural sector could have been transformed into action 
in spheres until then excluded from the OEEC’s concerns (tariffs and commodity trade
11. On this point and for a detailed account of American financial 
assistance to Spain during the early 1950s, see chapter four.
,J. Pflimlin gave assurances (to representatives of the French wine sector) 
that his proposal had nothing to do with liberalisation; AM, F/10/5359: 
"Commission d'organisation du Marché européen du vin", minutes of 
proceedings of its first meeting, 5 September 1950.
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under Government account). Many countries had simply substituted tariffs for quotas to 
protect their domestic production from the effects of quota removal or simply transferred 
commodities from private to Government account to avoid the effects of OEEC 
liberalisation. Any future improvement in both fields would not be extended to Spain if 
it remained outside agricultural arrangements. There was also the pressure for action in 
those matters in which the OEEC had been ineffective such as long-term contracts at 
prices frequently well below world prices, the unilateral fixing of minimum domestic 
prices under which, when domestic prices fell to their level, imports of the relevant 
commodity were automatically blocked, and the reversals of the liberalisation process in 
the face of balance-of-payments difficulties in the largest markets for European main 
export staples. The then system of British long-term contracts for pan of the European 
supplies combined with half attempts at liberalisation in third markets was far from being 
a satisfactory solution, particularly in the exporting countries. Faced with this situation, 
main exporters of agricultural produce were naturally supportive of any greater degree of 
liberalisation in agricultural trade to maintain the principle of reciprocity. This was 
particularly the case of the Netherlands and Denmark, who saw their major export markets 
for agricultural products closed.
The Mansholt Plan favoured a supranational authority with wide powers to limit 
national unilateral actions in the regulation governing imports of the great bulk of 
agricultural products. Bilateralism seemed unable to provide a solution to Dutch 
agricultural problems. The loss of important outlets following the imposition of import 
restrictions in Germany in the early part of 1951, the seasonal restrictions on vegetable 
imports into the United Kingdom, the unsatisfactoiy long-term British contracts for a wide 
range of products, and, particularly, the failure to end the BLEU countries’ discriminatory 
practices in favour of their less efficient fanners within the Benelux agreements, were 
strong arguments in favour of a supranational authority.33 The set-backs to liberalisation 
showed the OEEC’s weakness in regulating trade questions and the Dutch looked for
For the latest research on the functioning of the Benelux agreements and 
the Belgium refusal to provide an open market for the Dutch increasing 
surpluses of agricultural commodities, see Arend Jan Boekestijn: "The
Formulation of Dutch Benelux Policy", pp. £7-48, and Thierry Momens: 
•»Agricultural Integration in Benelux", pp. 4 9-68, both contributions to 
Griffiths (ed.): The Netherlands, op. cit.
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something more effective, particularly on a supranational basis. Mansholt regarded the 
French initiative as a device to secure protected markets for French surpluses at high 
prices based on a European preference. The Dutch plan, on the other hand, was committed 
to setting up a free European market with the progressive suspension of the then existing 
quantitative and tariff restrictions among the six Schuman Plan countries and the creation 
of a common external tariff to regulate common import and export policies. Specialised 
Dutch agriculture had stronger interests than French agriculture in progress in this 
direction, being better equipped fo face increased foreign competition. It is also worth 
observing that the Danes considered both plans unacceptable substitutes to real trade 
liberalisation in agricultural products. They appeared, however, to offer an opportunity of 
promoting real programmes for liberalisation in agricultural trade and tariff reduction.34
The confluence of French and Dutch anxiety over foreign sales certainly started 
a process of unpredictable results, which was especially threatening for a country which 
could not take pan in the negotiation process. Despite their differences, the Pflimlin and 
Mansholt Plans had attracted international attention due to the extent of national 
protectionism for agriculture. Within a wide variety, all countries in Western Europe were 
importers and/or exporters of agricultural commodities and all produced domestically 
foodstuffs at different cost Every OEEC country (except the United Kingdom) wanted 
a wider market for some of its agricultural products and all, including the British, were 
bound to Mic«- some action to protect the livelihood of their farmers. Some wanted to 
postpone trade liberalisation, others wanted to hasten it, but all wanted to protect their 
agriculture production and to assure adequate prices to producers and reasonably
34. AD, DE-CE 1945*60, vol. 58: The Commercial Attach* at the French Embassy 
in Denmark to Petsche, "Reactions danoises devant le Plan Pflimlin", account 
of a meeting with the Danish Secretary of the Council of Agriculture, 15 May
1951. The Danish representative in the Council of the OEEC stated in May
1951 that the reason for the French Government's initiative for a European 
Agricultural Community was that OEEC had produced no result of any 
importance in the field of agriculture; PRO, MAF 83/3388: E.M.H. Lloyd's 
report on the informal meeting of the Council of OEEC, 21 May 1951; and
"Attitude of other Governments to the Pflimlin Plan", Appendix C of the
Brief for UNI SCAN meeting in Stockholm, 13 June 1951. For a wider 
perspective of the main objective of Danish foreign economic policy, see 
Vibeke Sorensen: a) "Danish Economic Policy and the European Cooperation on 
Trade and Currencies", EDI Working Paper, no. 86/251, Florence, 1986; and 
b) "Social Democratic Government in Denmark under the Marshall Plan, 1947— 
1950", Doctoral Dias., EUI, Florence, 1987. UNISCAN refers to the British- 
Scandinavian forum for the discussion of common economic problems taking 
place from December 194 9 onwards.
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permanent outlets. International consideration of the initiatives for a European Agricultural 
Community was possible because some of the Ministers concerned regarded the proposals 
(either as they were originally presented or as Ministers expected to modify them 
according to specific interests) as a relief of the problems posed to domestic agricultural 
policies, the optimal solution of which national governments had become ineffective and, 
consequently, some Government coalitions risked losing fanners’ support.
The concept of an organisation oi agricultural markets thus meant different 
things to different people. Some interpreted it to mean free markets and the removal of 
trade barriers. It could also be interpreted to mean measures for the protection of internal 
markets by the regulation of imports. France, developing large surpluses in some crops, 
required outlets to maintain prices at their desired level. Direct expenditure to underwrite 
the different price suppon schemes necessary for a revolutionary increase in output was 
a burden on government expenditure and a difficult problem in terms of negotiation with 
farmers. However, since the rest of its agricultural economy was rather uncompetitive, 
France would have been reluctant to subscribe to general trade liberalisation. Other 
countries expecting to produce high-cost surpluses hoped to sell them to European 
countries at premium prices and with imports from non-European countries reduced to 
safeguard the outlets for their own produce on the basis of intra-European preference. 
These countries were very reluctant to take their chances as exporters to overseas markets 
in competition with the already established exporters. The low cost and low tariff 
countries, of whom the Netherlands and Denmark were examples, importing a substantial 
amount of intermediate agricultural produce at the lowest price market and exporting at 
world market prices, wanted free access to large markets by the complete removal of all 
impediments to trade, which went beyond the competence of the OEEC’s programme of 
trade liberalisation. Those countries which imported a substantial proportion of their 
agricultural needs (Germany and Belgium) naturally found it difficult to abandon domestic 
protection and guarantee imports at higher than world prices. They rejected an internal 
free trade market rigidly protected against the outside world and accepted, with only very 
little interest, commodity agreements for few staples, falling short of a single European 
market.
495
The official replies to the Council of Europe’s invitation to consider the French 
memorandum revealed no homogeneous interest, making the future of the initiatives for 
a European Agricultural Community unpredictable. All the ECSC countries, except the 
Netherlands, were clearly for the largest membership possible, either to render the 
initiative unworkable or to benefit from specific commodity’ arrangements with the 
inclusion of a larger number of commodities than those the French had presented. Most 
of the OEEC countries adopted the British attitude of showing little interest in any 
initiative which they considered should have been examined by the OEEC and had no 
intention of implementing any proposal which cut across their agricultural policies. 
Agriculture could not be exposed to full competition or become an object of supranational 
planning without serious social and economic effects. Some governments suggested some 
inter-governmental organisation different from the OEEC as an alternative to a full 
supranational community to negotiate a series of inter-linked agreements covering certain 
commodities to guarantee markets to producers whose output was growing under official 
stimulus. It was obvious, however, that no government in Western Europe could afford 
to ignore the proposals for the common organisation of the main agricultural markets. 
Consequently, most of them decided to follow the issue attentively so as to defend their 
domestic interests and ensure that any organisation set up (if one they could join) dealt 
with those agricultural commodities which they exported.33
All the possible scenarios which the agricultural discussions might have led to, 
ranging from an economic union with a common tariff to mutual preferences, from a high 
authority arranging imports from within the pool and restricting imports from outside the 
pool so that European prices could be maintained to an inter-governmental body aiming 
to promote increased European trade in agricultural products, would have been 
discriminatory towards Spanish agricultural exports. This case-study could be well 
considered a classic example of economic interdependence. The possible action of the 
OEEC countries was perceived as imposing costs on a country not a member of the same 
system, which had to respond in the measure of its political capacity in an attempt to
**. The official replies to thè French Memorandum can be found in AN, 
F/10/5694 and a sunmary in AD, DE-CE 1945—60, vol. 58: Nota "Pool agricola. 
Réponses à l'invitation du Gouvernement français", Paris, 25 June 1951.
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avoid having the burdens of adjustment forced upon i t 36
7.3. Spain’s Limited Policy Options
Spain's response to this new foreign constraint on its agricultural exports was a 
boundless effort to secure participation in the agricultural negotiations. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs succeeded after a two year diplomatic struggle. Diplomatic action started 
in May 1951, when the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs ordered the diplomatic 
representatives in the OEEC member-states to find a State willing to promote Spanish 
membership and to avoid the rest of the participating countries opposing i t 37 The main 
argument were the problems which would be caused to the Spanish economy if the 
Spanish Government were the only in Western Europe not involved in Pflimlin’s 
initiative.3* A new diplomatic démarche took place in January 1952, the French 
Government reviewed the whole situation in the light of the replies received and decided, 
on 23 February, to issue invitations to the European countries represented in the OEEC 
to attend a preliminary conference at ministerial level in Paris, in March 1952. The 
conference was to consider the procedure, terms of reference and objective for a further 
conference on the unification of European main agricultural markets.39 Spain's absence 
at that meeting marked the end of the first phase of diplomatic action to promote the 
country’s membership.
7.3.1. Diplomatic Struggle
Spanish diplomats were aware that the position adopted by some governments
M . Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.: "Power and Interdependence
revisited", International Organization, vol. 41, no. 4, Autumn 1987, pp. 
723-53, p. 730.
MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 22: Cifra no. 161 to the Spanish Embassy in Paris,
25 May 1951, similar to the despatch sent to all diplomatic posts in the 
OEEC countrie s.
**. AN, F/10/5553: Spanish Embassy in Paris to Quai d'Orsay, 22 June 1951. 
**. PRO, MAF 83/3388: Telegram no. 621 from FO to Paris, 23 February 1952.
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regarding the Pflimlin Plan made them unable, even if willing, to defend the Spanish 
request for participation in the conference. The British Government was prepared to return 
to their preferred instrument for promoting economic cooperation in Europe, the OEEC.40 
They would certainly not promote new entries in the club and least of all, membership 
of a non-OEEC member country.41 Spanish complaints went unheeded by countries like 
Switzerland and Ireland since their positions mirrored the British attitude, though they had 
been receptive towards the Spanish arguments concerning previous economic cooperation 
issues. The weak position within European affairs of the Federal Government, whose 
relations with Spain were good, ruled out the possibility of any public German support 
for Spanish membership, which would have upset the French and invited left-wing 
criticism. Notwithstanding this, it was believed that, since the Germans had suggested that 
if something were done it should include all Western European partners, the German 
delegation would favour the Spanish request if the latter reached the negotiation table.42 
The Scandinavian Governments were so clearly opposed to the Franco regime in political
4C. The British had declared themselves unwilling to join • supranational 
organisation nor to commit themselves to work towards a unified customs-free 
European market for agricultural products. In their view, the French 
attempted to extend protectionism and higher prices, which was directly 
incompatible with the British low-food price policy. Pflimlin's proposal 
represented a further stimulation of trading malpractice in contradiction 
with Britain's European policy, Commonwealth commitments, and domestic 
agricultural policy. Finally, any British involvement would have implied the 
surrender of an essential tool on balance of payments grounds: the
bargaining position of being the world's biggest food importer; ibid., "The 
French Plan", n/d, probably April 1951, and ER(L) (51)34th meeting, "Pflimlin 
Plan for European Agriculture", Note by the Ministry of Food, 13 April 1951; 
and CAB 134/100: MAC (52) 19th and 20th meetings, 18 and 20 March 1952, points 
3 and 5, respectively.
41 • The FO informed Spanish diplomats that its Government would support 
their claims but that it was highly improbable that a meeting would be 
called on the matter; AGA, C/37132, folder 21: Air cifra no. 150 from the 
Attaché d'Affaires in London, 13 September 1951, and air telegram no. 168 
from the Ambassador in London, 25 October 1951.
42. The group of experts set up to study the French memorandum agreed to 
consider particular commodity agreements with the largest possible 
membership (British participation included), without commitment to any 
specific point of principle; AN, F/10/5695: High Commissary of the French 
Republic in Germany, André François-Poncet to the Director-General of 
Economic and Financial Affairs, 12 June 1951; and AD, DE-CE 1945-60, vol. 
58: François-Poncet to Robert Schuman, Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Plan 
d'organisation européenne des marchés agricoles", 15 June 1951. The position 
adopted by the experts was intermediate between that of Ludwig Erhard and 
Konrad Adenauer. The Federal Minister of the Economy considered that the 
sectoral approach itself had eliminated the element of compensatory 
concessions for industrial commodities and left the Government more 
vulnerable to the pressure of agricultural groups for protectionist 
measures, whilst the Chancellor could not ignore the (though meagre) 
political aspects of the Pflimlin Plan.
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terms that an approach to them was pointless. Other OEEC countries, playing a minor role 
in the entire process, left the decision to those governments which had a more direct 
interest in the Green Pool project. In general, they thought that any initiative concerning 
Spain was to be taken, if at all, by the French Government as host government of the 
conference.
The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs turned to Portugal, the Benelux countries 
and Italy for help to overcome what was considered a new French discrimination towards 
their country. Portuguese diplomats were first thought of to represent Spanish interests. 
Portugal, as an OEEC member, had been invited by the Council of Europe to give an 
opinion on the convenience of a European Agricultural Community. Equally, it was the 
second member of the Iberian Pact since 1942. As such, Spain invited Portugal to defend 
its major interests.43 Contrary to Spanish expectations, however, Portugal did not take 
the French initiative very seriously. It disliked the Council of Europe acting as the 
convener of the meeting and preferred rather, for purely political reasons, to pass the 
initiative to the OEEC.44 The Portuguese Government only decided in March 1952 to 
be represented by an observer, as it did not intend to attend any future meeting. Under 
these conditions it did not appear "either logical or convenient" for Portugal to solicit or 
support Spanish membership for the organisation.45
The Benelux countries were unanimously uncommitted. Spanish diplomats 
believed Belgium might support them. In fact, Spanish membership interested the Belgian 
Government even less than the establishment of a European Agricultural Community. 
Since agricultural negotiations within a broader framework than Benelux would place 
Belgium in a position not so closely linked to the main source of its difficulties, Belgium 
accepted reluctantly, as the lesser of the two evils, to discuss some commodity 
arrangements, particularly if dollar savings. This was the case only after the Belgian 
Government had received assurances for the protection of Belgian farming states and for
°. MAE, Leg. 5910, exp. 6, carp. 1: Letter from the Director-General of 
Foreign Policy, José Núñez Iglesias, to Martin Artajo, 27 July 1951.
44. AD, DE—CE 1945—60, vol. 58: Telegram from Lisbon, 14 June 1951.
MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 22: Despatch no. 181 from Ambassador Nicolás
Franco, Lisbon, 26 March 1952.
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the elimination of any supranational conception. The Belgian Government saw no gain 
in complicating further the matter with the incorporation of Spain.46 Not surprisingly, 
Luxembourg, would support Spanish participation only if its Benelux partners did so first 
and provided that its main agricultural interests were not endangered.47 The Dutch 
Ministry of Agriculture suggested not opposing the Spanish request of membership 
provided another country presented iL They considered Spain more as a potential market 
for Dutch agricultural reproduction material (sowing-seed, seed potatoes, breeding cattle) 
and dairy products than as a competitor in products such as onions and tomatoes.4* This 
position was totally incompatible with Mansholt’s idea of a supranational community' and 
consequently did not lead to positive action.
The Italian Government considered it unnecessary to disappoint the Spaniards on 
an issue for which they forecast a quick death and declared to support the Spanish 
application with the "maximum interest”.49 Without the political importance of the 
Schuman Plan, there was no interest in an initiative which represented the culmination of 
a long-term trend towards a Franco-German special agreement, even before the corpse of 
the Franco-ltalian customs union was buried. Consequently, the Italian Government 
proposed that any discussion, which should involve the largest possible number of 
countries and products and be subordinated to general economic policies, be left in the
4<. For the Spanish perception of the Belgian attitude towards Spain see 
MAE, Leg. 5910, exp. 6, carp. 1: Cifras no. 74 and 80 from Ambassador Count 
of Casa Miranda to Martin Artajo, Brussels, 13 and 23 June 1951, 
respectively; and Leg. 3445, exp. 22: Cifras no. 92 and 13 from Brussels,
11 July 1951 and 22 March 1952, respectively.
47. MAE, Leg. 5910, exp. 6, carp. 1: Cifra no. 44 from Brussels, 29 July
1951. In its reply to the French, Luxembourg had demanded prior recognition 
of its protected status within any agricultural arrangement, as enjoyed 
within both the BLEU and the Benelux; AM, F/10/5694: Luxembourg's commercial 
attaché in Paris to Quai d'Orsay, 17 May 1951. Luxembourg managed to obtain 
an almost complete exemption from all the then existing provisions in 
agriculture within Benelux.
4<. Ministerie van Landbouw, G.S. Arch. 2, Integratie Europese Landbouw, 5: 
The Head of the International Organisations Division at the Dutch Ministry 
of Agriculture to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Note for the 
Minister”, 24 September 1951 (document provided to the author by Richard T. 
Griffiths); and MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 22: Cifra no. 14 from The Hague, 24 
March 1952.
4*. MAE, Leg. 5910, exp. 6, carp. 2: Cifra no. 236 from Rome, 15 September 
1951; and Leg. 3445, exp. 22: Cifra no. 251 from Rome, 28 September 1951. 
The Spanish diplomatic services were generally informed by the Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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bands of the OEEC. Migration and labour problems and more effective trade liberalisation 
in fruit and vegetables, could be more appropriately approached in that forum.*0
Close to the conference date, Spanish (and British) Green Pool membership 
constituted the first Sine (JUG non condition for Italy to accept participation in the Green 
Pool.*1 To present Spanish participation in such terms was a clear-cut political position 
which was difficult to sell to domestic and international public opinion. When the 
question came up for discussion in March 1952, the argument was that if left outside the 
Green Pool, Spain "would benefit from a freedom prejudicial to Italy" since Spain 
competed with Italy in some export commodities such as citrus, some vegetables and 
wine, on Italy’s largest export markets, Germany and the United Kingdom.52 The French 
Minister of Agriculture argued that if the main official concern of the Italian Government 
was labour, Spanish participation would entail twofold competition for Italy. The Italians 
replied that Spain, benefiting from a freer position to export to Great Britain, presented 
a far greater problem, in economic as well as in political terms, than possible competition 
in the field of labour movement. This Italian attitude could be explained by the relative 
experience of Italy and Spain at the time of the OEEC’s liberalisation programme for
50. Official response to the French Government's invitation to open 
international negotiation on the issue of European agricultural integration 
in AN, F/10/5694: Italian Government Memorandum attached to the letter from 
Mr Paris to Schumar*, Strasbourg, 29 May 1951. This came as no surprise since 
Italians had constantly presented labour surpluses as Italy's main domestic 
problem, since they endangered economic options and caused social conflict 
and political instability. Some authors considered the exportation of 
manpower surpluses as the main trend of Italian policy towards European 
cooperation and integration; Federico Romero: "L'integrazione dell'Italia 
in Europa negli anni cinquanta: la questione dell'emigrazione", Passato e 
presente, no. 20—21, May—December 1989, pp. 75—105.
91. AN, F/10/5694: Telegram from Rome, 6 March 1952, and ASMAE, DGAP, b. no. 
167: Telegram from the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Pietro Quaroni, 9 March
1952.
M . AN, F/10/5553: Handwritten note, "Principales questions evoques lors de 
l'entretien entre MM. Laurens et Fanfani [French and Italian Ministers of 
Agriculture]", n/d, March 1952, and "Compte-rendu des conversations entre 
M. Camille Laurens et M. Gui, sous-Secretaire d'Etat italien a 
1'Agriculture", Verona, 14 March 1952. At the elections of mid-June 1951, 
fanners gave their support to republicans, the Peasant Party and to 
independent fanners campaigning in different parties who created the Amicale 
parliamantaire agricole, a multiparty farm bloc; see contributions in 
Jacques Fauvet and Henri Mendras (eds.) : Les paysans et la politiqrue dans 
la France contemporaine, Paris [Librairie Armand Colin) 1958. After 
Pflimlin's dismissal and a short interim by Paul Antier, President of the 
Peasant Party, Camille Laurens (1906-1979), member of the farm bloc close 
to the FNSEA, became minister in November and remained so until and June
1953.
501
agricultural trade and of import restrictions in Germany, the United Kingdom and France. 
Italian persistence drove the French representatives to consider the political implications 
of any Spanish participation.33 Spanish diplomats believed Italy was to present the 
admission of Spain to the conference and that Fanfani earned the proposition in his 
portfolio.54
~v The Spanish question was unimportant for most of the governments involved, at 
least until the exact nature of the proposals for an agricultural community could be 
perceived. The Italian Government’s interest in Spain was a subterfuge to adopt a strong 
position from which to bargain concessions for itself. The intention was to threaten France 
with polluting the debate by throwing in the Spanish question. The disruptive political and 
public opinion effects of the Spanish question would have restricted Laurens’ room for 
manoeuvre, already limited by the pressure exercised by French agricultural 
organisations.95 In order to avoid this, they expected a French commitment to set up the 
necessary measures to defend Italy’s exporters of agricultural commodities against off- 
pool competition, which would cover the Spanish citrus and vegetable sector. Only when 
and if such measures were formulated would the Italian Government withdraw the 
question of Spanish participation.56 The stratagem succeeded as the Italians had expected. 
However, this Italian position was completely unnecessary. On the one hand, intra- 
European preference was a basic principle of any French pro-European initiative and 
France could not have denied it to the Italians simply because they had demanded it for 
themselves, in particular, with respect to wheat On the other hand, since the French 
wanted to save their face on the initiative and needed the Italian presence, they would 
have agreed beforehand to anything the Italians would have put forward without recourse 
to the point on Spain. In fact, apart from the intra-European preference, they agreed, in
**. See previous references to Laurens talks with Italian officials and 
ASMAE, DGAP, b. no. 167: Quaroni to Rome, 14 March 1952, about Pflimlin's.
14. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 2: Cifras no. 10 and 68 from Brussels and Rome, 15 
and 22 March 1952, respectively.
*s. Noël: "Les groupes de pression agricoles français et le projet
d'organisation de l'Europe agricole entre 1950 et 1954", EUX Colloquium
Paper no. 315/90 (Col. 49), Florence, November 1990.
**. ASMAE, DGAP, b. no. 167: Cifra no. 2319 to Quaroni, Rome, 10 March 1952
and telegram from Quaroni, Paris, 13 March 1952.
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principle, to Italy raising the question of the liberalisation of labour movement, the 
enlargement of the list of products and avoiding the term high authority as well as 
imposing preconditions many other countries would have found difficulty in meeting.57 
The historical consideration, however, is that the Italians rated obtaining assurances from 
the French very highly. This was totally insufficient at the future negotiating table. The 
outcome would depend on the multilateral bargaining process similar to the Schuman Plan 
negotiations, where the Italians had actively taken part
The Spanish Administration was facing a new reality, which was difficult to 
handle by means of its traditional statecraft alone. At the time of the Marshall Plan. Spain 
approached the United States assuming that once the Americans had been persuaded to 
extend the scheme to Spain, they would be able to make the Western European nations 
comply. Equally, at the time of the OEEC’s liberalisation programme, Spain initiated a 
bilateral bargaining process with each individual OEEC member state to obtain the 
advantages of liberalisation. In contrast, the question of Spain’s Green Pool membership 
escaped the logic of bilateral bargaining, simply because the position of each of the 
participating states on the question did not depend directly upon its politico-economic 
relations with Spain. Rather, the attitudes of these countries were defmed by their specific 
position towards the Green Pool issue as a whole and their views on the possible reaction 
of the other participating nations. Since the Green Pool was not the place to change policy 
towards Spain, the latter did not take part in the preparatory meeting of the OEEC’s 
member states Ministers of Agriculture, held at Palais de Chaillot, Paris, in March 1952, 
to discuss the suitability of a European organisation for agricultural markets. This was not 
the result of a new leftist conspiracy to further isolate Spain, as Spanish diplomats later 
contended.5'  It was primarily because most nations still had to decide precisely what the 
Green Pool meant before they were ready to adopt any decision regarding new members.
51. Schuman, Pflimlin and Laurens provided guarantees to Italy in relation 
to the different points presented; ibid., Telegrams from Quaroni to Rome on 
13 March 1952 (concerning Schuman's assurances), on the 14th (for 
Pflimlin's) and on the 26th (for Laurens').
5#. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 22: "Informe Pool Verde", Summary Report on the 
entire process of Spanish struggle for Green Pool membership, Madrid, 22 
November 1952.
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The European Agricultural Community was still at a stage of development far 
from any unanimous agreement. The main question on the agenda, due to Mansholt's 
relentless pressure, was whether the pool should be restricted to the Six. For Mansholt 
there was still a chance of a spectacular outcome in which some countries would reject 
the invitation and others be scared away, leaving the Six by themselves to move towards 
a supranational authority. However, none of Mansholt's colleagues from the ECSC 
countries, particularly France, accepted the supranational alternative. Representing the 
rural parry within the French government, Laurens was unwilling to accept a consultative 
body on the lines suggested by the British, although he was certainly not committed at 
all to a supranational solution.39 This broke the only (although feeble) common link 
between the Pflimlin and Mansholt Plans, which differed radically from each other. The 
former was a set of preferential agreements for a few farm products, whereas the latter 
aimed to improve production conditions by eliminating the obstacles to trade for tne great 
bulk of agricultural products. The Pflimlin Plan foresaw a gradual elimination of trade 
barriers by progressively equalising the structural conditions of production. The Mansholt 
Plan aimed at immediately introducing an effective High Authority and a European 
trading price and a repeal of protective measures, as a precondition for the establishment 
of a free exchange of agricultural products within the Six. The only common ground left 
between both was the desire for outlet markets, most particularly in Germany, which made 
them contenders rather than partners.
The questions under debate were of an essential nature. When Laurens met 
Mansholt, on 6 February 1952, the former opposed the Dutch attempt to make the 
conference collapse by placing the High Authority issue high on the agenda.60 The
French agricultural organisation* rejected the supranational authority 
as a threat to the independence of a sector depicted as requiring special 
treatment; i.e., Note by the Council of Administration of the Fédération 
Nationales des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles, dated 30 August 1951, cit. 
in Hélène Delorme and Yves Tavemier: Les paysans français et l'Europe. 
Paris [Librairie Armand Colin] 1969, p. 20; AN, F/10/5553: Confédération 
Générale de l'Agriculture, Press release, 24 January 1952 and AN, F/10/5694: 
"La création de marchés cornnuns de produit* agricoles", Note by the FNSEA,
13 February 1952.
AN, F/10/5553, Handwritten notes "Conversation* du 6 février entre 
Messrs. Pflimlin, Laurens et Mansholt" and "Conversations du 6 février entre 
Messrs. Mansholt Ministre de l'Agriculture de P.B., Pflimlin, Laurens"; 
ASMAE, DGAP, b. no. 167: Telegram from Quaroni to Rome, 26 March 1952.
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"questions prejudicialles” which all Governments had put forward made the French issue 
invitations to a preliminary conference in which nobody had to provide advance 
commitments as was the case in the Schuman Plan negotiations.61 Laurens agreed with 
Fanfani that the European Agricultural Community could not follow the model of the 
ECSC and leave the British outside.62 Even Pflimlin, who in December 1951 had tried 
with Monnet to return to the idea of a conference involving the Six alone, considered that 
the question of a high authority should be left to a latter stage, if at all, and would be 
limited to what was strictly necessary.63 Laurens’ first speech at the Paris conference, 
March 1952, called for a common market synchronised with the progressive 
harmonisation of production. For the sake of reality, he suggested a study of market 
conditions for a few commodities before following up new stages in market integration.64 
In these uncertain circumstances it was difficult to invite the Spanish until a clarification 
of what was to be set up came to light. Any suggestion for Spanish participation would 
have inevitably caused most delicate political issues to arise without any compensating 
practical advantage.
European Ministers of Agriculture meeting in Paris in March 1952 only partially 
clarified the matter. They were not able to determine what the Green Pool meant in 
institutional terms, apart from the obvious fact that their meeting was not part of the
41. PRO, MAF 83/3366: Telegram 621 from FO to Paris, 23 February 1952.
*2. AN, F/10/5553: Handwritten note of the meeting between the technical 
delegations headed by Ugo Pappi and Louis Rabot, which followed the Fanfani- 
Laurens talks in March 1952. The Italian position concerning the matter is 
clearly expressed in AN, F/10/5694: The French Ambassador in Rome to Quai 
d'Orsay, 21 February 1952, reporting on a conversation with Paolo Emilio 
Taviani, Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Both Pappi and Rabot 
were the experts of their respective ministries of agriculture for 
international negotiations. The latter would later be elected overall 
chairman of the future Interim Committee of the conference on the 
organisation of European agricultural markets.
•*. ASMAE, DGAP, b. no. 167: Telegram from Quaroni, Paris, 14 March 1952. 
For the joint Pflimlin-ManshoIt initiative in December 1951, see Griffiths 
and Milward, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
"La plus grande suplesse doit préveloir"; AN, F/10/5359: "Discours de C. 
Laurens, Ministre de l'Agriculture (France). Réunion préparatoire 
Ag/prep/Doc. 3, 1ère séance, Paris, 25 March 1952. For details on the 
conference, in which all the OEEC member-countries, except Portugal, Trieste 
and Iceland participated, see PRO, CAB 134/1012: "Report on the Preparatory 
Conference held in Pari* on 25 March 1952", and MAF 83/3388: "Notes on the 
Pflimlin Conference in Paris 25th-28th March 1952", 4 April 1952. For the 
different national positions see Griffiths and Milward, op. cit., pp. 38-40.
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OEEC or Council of Europe’s activities. They decided to set up an Interim Working Part} 
(hereinafter IWP) to proceed with the technical study of those commodities suitable for 
consideration to be subject to the future organisation of European agricultural markets as 
a preliminary to any decision on the structure and powers of the institutions required. The 
list of commodities would then be examined by a second ministerial meeting scheduled 
for March.
To attend the March meeting was Spain’s new diplomatic target. The Spanish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs reclaimed Spain joining the initiative on a new basis. That 
Spain could not be invited because it did not belong either to the Council of Europe or 
the OEEC, as the French had argued in July 1951, lost weight when the agricultural 
ministers agreed to convene the European conference on agriculture on an ad hoc basis 
and not under the auspices of any of the existing international organisations.63 In 
addition, several countries had declared an interest in Spanish participation.66 Initial 
contacts immediately took place between the Iberian neighbours since Portugal, who had 
not sent experts to the March meeting, joined the initial group at the working parties 
stage. Following the Spanish request, Portugal proposed to invite Spain, which received 
little commitment on the part of the other participating countries.67 A new initiative for 
cooperation in the field of transportation appeared to offer Spain an opportunity to gain 
admitance to the agricultural conference. The Spanish Government linked agricultural and 
transport cooperation questions. How they did this requires a few words about the 
European transport initiative.
(s. For the main decisions taken by ministers of agriculture in March 1952,
see European Yearbook. Vol. 1, The Hague [Martinus Nijhoff) 1955, p. 509.
“ • MAE, Leg. 5910, exp. 6, carp. 2: Cifra to Embassies in London, Rome, 
Lisbon and Dublin, and the Legations in The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo and 
Bern, Madrid, 20 March 1952.
Ibid, Despatch from the Portuguese Embassy in Madrid to the Spanish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Conferencia dos mercados agricolas europeus”,
16 June 1952.
506
7.3.2. Transport Cooperation as a Bargaining Tnnl
Transport cooperation offered the Spanish Government, for the first time after 
World War II, to directly partake in a pro-European debate. The technical nature of the 
field itself removed the different transport proposals from the glare of European public 
opinion, making the political considerations, which had been paramount elsewhere, less 
predominant. Due to its geographical position, the Spanish inland transport system 
intervened between the transport systems of two OEEC countries. Any European transport 
organisation which did not include Spain was unfavourable to the French inland 
connections with North Africa and lacked interest as far as Portugal was concerned. In 
fact, the specific gauge measure of the Iberian railway network placed Portugal's inland 
transport frontier at the Pyrenees. Portugal had to be linked overland to the rest of the 
continent through its neighbour or not at all.68 Finally, the consideration of Spanish 
territory as a possible rear area in the event of an armed conflict in Western Europe, 
might have eased the decision to improve the technical collaboration with the Spanish 
Government in a field with an essential logistic role.
The first proposal for the creation of a high authority for transport, the so-called 
Plan Bonnefous, named after the French deputy £douard Bonnefous, presented to the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in August 1950, posed no objection to
*#. Since the years of the construction of the first train in Spain, around 
the 184 0s, the standard Spanish 1.672 meters railroad gauge was adopted. 
Portugal adopted the same gauge. The USSR's railway gauge is 1.524 meters, 
while the European standard is 1.435 meters. The idea lying behind the 
decision adopted was that the broader gauge would turn out to be money- 
saving in the long terra. Without heavily increasing the costs of route 
establishment it would allow the use of locomotives of larger dimensions to 
produce, at a given time, the necessary steam to carry the same cargo with 
a faster speed. The different attempts to change the railway gauge structure 
can be followed in Rose Albert Dupont: Les transports par chemin de fer dans 
les rapports franco-espaqnols, Paris [Librairie du Recueil Sirey] 1946. The 
argument, which has stood the test of time in politics, is that narrowing 
the Spanish railways network would always be uneconomical, since it would 
only bring about a reduction in costs for international commercial traffic 
across the Franco—Spanish frontier. Some historians like to remain attached 
to the idea that the adoption and running of a different gauge responded to 
the political will of isolationism, Jean-Claude Allain: "Introduction" to 
the special issue on Spain of Relations internationales, no. 50, 1987, pp. 
143-46, p. 144.
507
the participation of Spain.69 The effective opposition of some deputies to the plan itself, 
submitted for study to different committees until November 1951 when the original plan’s 
authority was transformed in a European Transport Office, saved the Assembly the 
embarrassment of facing a vote concerning the inclusion of Spain. The OEECs first 
attempt to improve (what was considered to be) an inadequate inland transport machinery 
came in August 1951 with the idea of calling a conference of experts.70 A technical 
assistance mission was sent to the United States in March 1952 to study the organs, 
powers and functions of the Inter-State Commerce Commission and make the 
corresponding proposals to the OEEC Council.71 There were high Spanish expectations 
that, given the Portuguese representation and the interest of securing unanimity at the 
OEEC Council, Spain would be invited if a conference should be convened, which was 
exactly the case. Finally, on 23 April 1952, the French Cabinet adopted the initiative of 
André Morice, Minister of Transport, to call a transport conference.72 The main features 
of this initiative indicated that, had it materialised instantaneously, the Spanish 
Government would have been invited.
Morice’s proposal was restricted to railways (which covered 75-80 per cent of the
°. Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly: Second Session I 7-26 August 
1950. Reports Part IIy Strasbourg, 1950. I would like to thank Jan Brabers 
for pointxng this element out to me.
10. PRO, FO 371/100273: Document SGD(51)96, note by the Secretary General of 
OEEC on the European inland transport situation, dated August 1951. In the 
note, it was affirmed that the unsatisfactory state of the inland transport 
situation and the inadequate existing international transport machinery 
warranted the calling of a conference of experts by the Council of OEEC to 
study means of improving ths situation.
71. The British attitude was essential to allow the OEEC Council to take 
action. The British Government had replied to Mr Paris's note with the view 
that the then existing international transport machinery was not appropriate 
for a dispassionate study of transport in Western Europe and to the
recommendation that the OEEC Council should sponsor the calling of a special 
conference of transport experts to make recommendations to the Council on 
future work and organisation in the fisld; ibid., "Reply of the United 
Kingdom Government", n/d, September 1951.
73. AN, F/10/5552: Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement: "Communication de 
Monsieur le Ministre des Travaux Publics, des Transports et du Tourisme, sur 
l'opportunité actuelle d'une intervention gouvernementale en faveur de 
l'intégration européenne des Chemins de fer", Paris, 22 April 1952. The 
Spanish Government was informed by MAE, Leg. 3166, exp. 6 : Despatch no. 906 
from the Spanish Embassy in Paris, "Proyecto organización transporte 
europeo", 23 May 1952.
André Morice (1900-1990), a business man in public works and minister of 
public works, transports and tourism, between March 1952 and June 1953. Most 
of the credit for the proposal might be deserved to Antoine Pinay, Morice's 
antecessor from June 1950 to March 1952.
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transport service within the Six) and limited to a technical gathering to increase the 
authority of the International Union of Railways (henceforth, IUR).73 Spain’s IUR 
membership would have made it very difficult to avoid the participation of Spanish 
technicians, especially when there was no mention of any supranational scheme. Morice 
proposed to deal with problems involving little political risk (such as the pooling of 
wagons, the standardisation of railway material and the common electrification of 
networks) because his aim was exclusively to provide the excuse for a pro-European 
conference to the Council of Europe and the OEEC endangering the transport negotiations 
on the discriminatory rates in the transport of coal, steel, scrap and iron ore, scheduled 
after the entry into force of the Treaty of Paris, on 25 July 1952.74
Steel producers in the Ruhr received direct protection against Lorraine industry 
through the application of higher transport rates on coke. The crux of the problem was 
that Lorraine depended more intensively on heavy imports of coke from the Ruhr, than 
the latter depended on Lorraine iron ore. This unequal relation impeded the French from 
retaliating by raising the charges on iron ore and led them to force a general removal of
T>. This was perceived as an attempt to improve the bargaining position of 
the French railways with regard to inland—water ways; AN, F/10/5552: 
François—Poncet to Schuman, "Les problèmes que pose l'institution d'un pool 
européen des transports", Bad-Godesberg, 14 May 1952.
74. According to § 10 of the provisional convention, a special committee 
appointed by the High Authority but composed of nationally chosen experts 
was to study, between July 1952 and December 1954, the conditions of 
applicability of the transport provisions of the ECSC Treaty (arts. 14 and 
70) , which outlawed discrimination in rates and conditions of carriage of 
coal and steel and made the transport of intrastate coal and steel traffic 
at the same rates and conditions as intrastate traffic over the same route 
obligatory. The committee was to propose measures to eliminate 
discriminatory practices, to examine the problem of the harmonisation of 
transport rates, and to draw up degressive international rates. Proposals 
in the first field were to come into effect with the establishment of the 
common market for coal, in February 1953. The effects of the manipulation 
of transport rates for the traffic of goods are similar to those of tariffs, 
that is, they favour local producers and discourage foreign competition 
within national boundaries. This was of a high importance for the ECSC 
because the four commodities mentioned in the text accounted for about one 
half of the total volume of transportation within the Six; William Diebold 
Jr.: The Schuman Plan. A Study in Economic Cooperation 1950-1959, New York 
[Praeger] 1959, pT 161. The aim of degressive international rates was to 
apply the benefits of national degressive charges (rate per kilometre 
diminishing gradually with distance) to goods crossing frontiers so that the 
final cost of transport would be similar to what it would have cost if it 
had taken place in a comparable distance within a single country. This was 
the solution to the so-called rupture de charge, whereby goods passing from 
one member country to another were treated as a'series of separate shipments 
stopping and starting again at each frontier with the consequent charge of 
loading and terminal fees.
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discriminatory transport rates. The French authorities expected that this process, which the 
commission of transport experts was to study in brief, would improve the competitive 
conditions of its steel industry over its German counterpart (as well as an expansion of 
Saar and Lorraine coal and iron ore exports to southern Germany), by guaranteeing on an 
equal footing the supply of raw materials and the distribution of finished goods, for which 
transport costs represented a high share of the final price. It was estimated that the cost 
of transport represented up to 35 per cent of the value of coal and iron one at final 
destination and between 20 to 25 per cent of the price of steel supplied to consumers.75
Morice’s initial call materialised when new initiatives from the OEEC and the 
Council of Europe threatened to disturb the future negotiations of the ECSC's committee 
of transport experts. Both proposed broader-membership organisations to take care of 
transport questions since they considered that any action in the field of transport to be 
adopted by the Six would have important effects on the economies of the other European 
countries. The OEEC's inland Transport Committee, after examining the first pan of the 
report of the OEEC mission of experts to the United States, proposed to set up a working 
party to consider the proposal to convene an international conference of transport experts. 
The British warmly supported this initiative "to avoid the French Government seizing the 
initiative and calling an crd hoc conference”, which would inevitably "reproduce some 
of the less desirable qualities of the current Pflimlin Plan”.76 At the Council of Europe, 
the former director of the SNFC and chairman of the IUR, RPF deputy Maurice Lemaire,
li. AC, MPW, 790.176/13: **Le problem« des transports au sain de la
Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier”, by R. Hutter, Vice Chairman 
of the High Authority'a transport division, 29 May 1953, pp. 9 and 11. For 
examples of the effects of discriminatory transport practices see ECE: 
Economic Bulletin for Europe, Geneva, 1950, vol. 2, no. 2, and Dieboid, The 
Schuman Plan, cit., pp. 154-93. Detailed accounts of the transport situation 
which the community faced in its earlier days are AC, MPW, 780.056/69; 
"Rencontre avec Mr. Charbonnier**, civil servant at the Belgian Ministry of 
Public Works, 30 September 1952; Hutter's report, cit.; Derek Curtis Bok: 
The First Three Years of the Schuman Plan, Princeton [Princeton University] 
1955, pp. 19—27; and the ECSC High Authority's first, second and third 
general reports, dated in April of 1953 to 1955. Brabers: "The Failure of 
European Transport Integration", in Gilbert Trausch (ed.): La construction 
de l'Europe du Plan Schuman aux Traités de Rome, (forthcoming), a first 
advance of his doctoral dissertation, represents a change in the traditional 
pattern of scarce historical attention being devoted to transport 
integration.
PRO, FO 371/100273: FO to United Kingdom Permanent Delegation to OEEC 
(henceforth referred to as OEEC OK Delegation), 1 September 1952.
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proposed a European Transport Council in charge of making proposals to governments. 
Possibly as a means of bringing matters to a head, the Assembly adopted this proposal 
unanimously on 26 September 1952 and sent it to the Committee of Ministers whose 
deputies were to consider it in November 1952. Although purely advisory in character, 
these initiatives threatened to delay the inquiry into all kinds of German exceptional 
transport rates concerning coal and coke, which the ECSC High Authority’s special 
committee of transport experts was to inventory.77
Morice decided to convene a transport conference at m inisterial level, prior to any 
other experts gathering, with an agenda consisting entirely of technical items "too 
complex" for the OEEC. Hus was the main argument presented by the French delegation 
to unilaterally oppose the recommendation of the inland transport committee to convene 
an international conference of experts, which had been received favourably by all 
members when the OEEC Executive Committee considered the question.7* The general 
reaction was that, whatever the questions were, they could always be discussed in the 
ministerial committee or at the special meeting to be convened by the OEEC. Soutou, 
head of the French delegation to the OEEC, confessed to members of the British 
delegation that "the trouble was that M. Morice was determined that in addition to a 
Schuman Plan and a Pflimlin Plan, there should be a Morice Plan".79 In other words,
AD, DE—CE 1944—1960, vol. 561: François—Poncet to Schuman, "Application 
aux transports ferroviaires du Traité instituant la Communauté européenne 
du charbon et de l'acier*1, Bad-Godesberg, 16 September 1952; AC, MPW, 
790.176/13: Comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération
économique européenne: "Relations avec la Communauté du charbon et de
l'acier. Commission d'experts en transports", 29 September 1952. The 
Committee mentioned was created in June 1948 to coordinate the French 
intervention at the Marshall Plan at the OEEC; see Pierre Gerbet: 
"L'élaboration des politiques communautaires au niveau national français", 
in Joël Rideau (éd.): La France et les Communautés européennes, Paris
[Librairie général de droit et jurisprudence] 1975, pp. 379-98.
PRO, FO 371/100273: Telegram no. 640, OEEC ÜK Delegation to FO, 4
October 1952. The day before the Spanish Government was informed that France 
was addressing an invitation to the Spanish Minister of Public Works; MAE, 
Leg. 3166, exp. 8 : Report by Federico Reparaz, technical attaché at the 
Spanish Embassy in Paris, "Proyecto del Gobierno francés de convocatoria de 
una Conferencia de Señores Ministros de Obras Públicas y Transportes de la 
Europa Occidental para el estudio de una Organización Europea de 
Transportes", 3 October 1952.
7>. PRO, FO 371/100273: Telegram no. 642 from Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees to FO, 6 
October 1952.Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees (1900-74) Financial Adviser to The British Embassy 
to Spain (1940-44), Member of the UK Delegation to OEEC with ministerial 
rank in 1948, vice-chairman of the Managing Board of EPÜ (1950-51),
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reasons of personal prestige would have led to a ministerial conference, which had no 
support from any of the ECSC countries’ delegations at the OEEC, nor was it whole­
heartedly backed by French OEEC representatives. This was a simplistic view of Morice’s 
intentions.
The desire for personal fame is diminished strongly by the fact that Morice did 
not consider a supranational scheme. It can also be argued that this lack of 
supranationality did not correspond to the pressure exercised by the Quai d ’Orsay, which 
wanted to leave things as they stood.10 The explanation should be found more naturally 
in the purpose itself of Morice’s proposal. Earlier in that same year, Morice simply 
expected to cut across the proposals put forward by the Council of Europe and the OEEC 
to leave the ECSC’s transport committee undisturbed. Otherwise, it would have been more 
logical (although not simpler!) to suggest to the Schuman Plan countries to develop a 
transport organisation out of the ECSC committee of transport experts." Morice 
considered that any action on the lines proposed by either the Council of Europe or the 
OEEC would have provided French competitors with an excuse to make a gain from the 
imprecision of the transport provisions in the Paris Treaty and curb the activities of the 
ECSC on coal and steel transport and lift the transport discussions from the command of 
the ECSC.*2 This represented a threat, because the establishment of the common market
Permanent Delegate in 1952 with rank of Ambassador (1954-60), Official 
Chairman of OEEC (1952—60), Head of the World Bank Mission to Spain (1961-
62, Chairman of the Anglo-Spanish Society (1967-73), Director of Tharsis 
Sulphur and Copper Co., since 1963. He received the Grand Cross Isabel la 
Católica in 1967.
•°. Brabers (op. cit.) argues, based on the archives of the Dutch Ministerie 
van Buitenlandse Zaken, that the Quai d'Orsay stopped Morice from following 
such a path in order not to distract other preferential diplomatic moves, 
in particular, the European Defence Community.
§1. He dismissed a similar action arguing that it would have divided 
Europe's transport systems and lead to great difficulties. PRO, FO 
371/100273: Brigadier A.E.M. Walter, official at the International Inland 
Transport Branch of the British Ministry of Transport and future leader of 
the British delegation to the OEEC transport conference, to the OEEC UK 
Delegation, 20 September 1952, informing of a meeting held at the French 
Ministry of Public Works on 12 September 1952. According to Walter, senior 
officials at the French Ministry of Transport had favoured the OEEC solution 
as more practical.
•2. François-Poncet felt the same ways **L' attitude de M. Lema ire va fournir 
à nos concurrents un prétexte inesperé pour différer ces réformes. Elle est 
donc extrêmement dangereuse." AC, MPW, 780.056/69: "Note" attached to
despatch no. 3328 from François-Poncet to Schuman, Bad-Godesberg, 25 October
1952. Bok provides interesting comments on how the transport provisions of
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for coal would impose the unconditional opening of the French market to German and 
Belgian competition and the official support enjoyed by Lorraine producers would soon 
be under inquiry by the High Authority. The elimination of the most outstanding 
discriminatory transport rates was perceived as beneficial in reducing costs to French steel 
producers.13
Morice’s reactivated proposal intended that Transport Ministers from all over 
Europe would get together to discuss minor points in a technical framework, in an attempt 
to apply the brake to other disturbing initiatives. The only important modification 
introduced, concerning Morice’s previous call, was that Transport Ministers would deal 
with inland-transport and not exclusively railways. This was the immediate result of 
pressure put forward by interest-groups related to inland-waterways in their particular 
domestic struggle with the French railways, SNCF. It was also a direct consequence of 
art. 2 of the law of 10 April 1952, which authorised the ratification of the ECSC Treaty 
and demanded the initiation of negotiations with the Germans on the question of the 
navigability of the Moselle.*4 This river flows from the Vosges mountains, through the 
heart of the Lorraine and Saar iron and steel industry, into the Rhine at Koblenz. The 
reduction of transport costs for the iron and steel industry in Lorraine (by lowering the 
transport costs of imported Ruhr coke and French and German railway rates) was the 
main force behind the project to make the lower Moselle navigable (approximately 270 
kilometres between Thionville and Koblenz). Furthermore, once completed, this project 
would have improved French steel conditions in overseas markets by the opening of a 
water route, via the Rhine, to Rotterdam and the reduction of shipping charges for
the treaty could be interpreted differently, as well as references to the 
conflicting interests involved and the transport commission's activities 
(op. cit., p. 22 and note 2 2).
#>. AC, MPW, 790.176/13: Comité interministériel pour les questions de
cooperation économique européenne: "Relations avec la Communauté du charbon 
et de l'acier. Commission d'experts en transports", 24 October 1952, and 
General Division for Mining and Steel Industry: "Problèmes des transports 
dans le cadre du pool charbon-acier", 2 November 1952; and AC, MPW,
780.056/59: François-Poncet to Schuman, 25 October 1952.
•4. AC, MPW 770.763/20 and 780.056/69 contains numerous reports on the 
question and shows the continuous pressure from the French Federation of 
Inland Waterways.
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exponed steel.*5
The German authorities had opposed any discussion on the matter.*6 German 
coal and steel industries derived considerable advantage from their location in a well- 
integrated system of rivers and canals, where rates were considerably lower than railways 
rates. The canalisation of the Moselle implied losses for the German railways and directly 
favoured competition against the Ruhr industries by lowering Lorraine industry costs. 
Larger amounts of Lorraine minette were unnecessary. Swedish ores were more 
appropriate to the German plants which were equipped to process high-content ores 
(allowing for economy in the use of coke) and Swedish iron ore prices were sufficiently 
reduced to discourage any investment to convert the Ruhr installations.*7 Morice's 
conference, thus, would have allowed the ECSC committee of experts to continue its 
activities undisturbed, while imposing the fundamental Moselle affair upon the Germans, 
among other strictly bilateral questions.
Morice invited his Spanish colleague, the Count of Vallellano, with a similar 
intention, to attend the ministerial conference on European inland transport to take place 
in Paris in January 1933.** Vallellano greeted the offer warmly. Among the most 
important bilateral problems on the agenda was that of giving international service status 
to the frontier posts of Inin-Hendaya, Canfranc-Port-Bou at the common Pyrenean border. 
Other bilateral questions were the road connections Nice-Barcelona and Paris-Casablanca,
•5. AC, MPW 770*763/20: "Not* pour Monsieur le Ministre", 15 October 1952. 
It was estimated that the canal would enable the steel plants in Lorraine 
to lower the transport costs of Ruhr coke by, at least, 25 to 30 per cent; 
Bok, op. cit., p. 25.
M . Documentation in AC, MPW, 790.176/13.
. See Bok, op. cit., p. 26. In fact, although German ore production 
declined between 1952 and 1954 by 25 per cent, the amounts of ore received 
from Lorraine and Luxembourg declined by 59 per cent between 1952 and 1954;
High Authority: Third General Report, 10 April 1955, p. 80. There was some
French opposition to the project too, specially from the port authorities 
of Strasbourg and Dunkirk, who feared for its traffic share and from the 
SNCF who objected to the consequent reduction of freights. The unified 
electrification of networks was the alternative proposed by the railways 
authorities of Germany and France.
Ci. MAC, Leg. 3166, exp. 8: Letter no. 1031 from the French Embassy in 
Madrid, n/d, to be dated early in December 1952.
Fernando Su£rez de Tangil y Angulo (1886-1964) Law Expert of the Conseil 
d'fitat and convinced Monarchist, appointed minister of public works on 18
July 1951 at seventy-four years of age. He resigned in July 1957.
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some difficulties in the traffic of goods through both countries and the imposition of 
quotas on the number of Spanish trucks allowed into France. They were all matters 
already under bilateral negotiation at the time.*9
The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately considered that the specific 
motivation behind the invitation was to force Spain to give satisfaction to the French on 
several bilateral questions by placing them within a multilateral framework. Bilateral 
problems, diplomats said, should only be discussed bilaterally and not thrown into a 
multilateral framework to put pressure on the weakest partner. In their view, the informal 
discussions on the convenience of a European framework for transportation, announced 
as the main objectives of the Conference, played a cosmetic role behind which French 
interests were hidden. Much to the satisfaction of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
all the reports on the subject coming from Pahs revealed an image of French precipitation 
attempting to conceal maners of exclusive French interest. Besides, Spain was unwilling 
to collaborate in the creation of a new European organisation but was willing to develop 
any other to which Spain belonged, such as the IUR, as the original Morice Plan had 
suggested. The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have preferred the then existing 
circumstantial modus vivendi to any other initiative.
This was naïve, however, since even the OEEC was inviting Spain to its own 
initiative. A ministerial conference had replaced the initial proposal for a conference of 
experts, to supersede both the deliberation within the Council of Europe and Morice’s 
attempt for independent action. The participation of non-OEEC countries had presented 
initial difficulties of a political and technical nature.90 Several OEEC members, Portugal, 
Turkey, Greece, Switzerland, Germany and France, to varying degrees and on strictly
>f. MAE, Leg. 3166, exp. 82 Despatch no. 2443 from the Spanish Embassy in 
Paris, "Invitación de la OECE a España para conferencia preparatoria 
Convenio 'Organización Europea Transportes'", 15 December 1952; and AC, MPW, 
770.763/20: "Conference des Ministres des transports, Chemins de fer.
Echanges ferroviaires entre la peninsule iberique et la France", 29-31 
January 1953.
•°. The British had perceived it as preventing any future body from being 
attached to OEEC in an acceptable manner; PRO, CAB 134/1010: MAC(52)45th 
meeting, "European Inland Transport. A note by the FO and the Ministry of 
Transport, containing a draft brief for the United Kingdom representative 
on the working party set up by OEEC", 14 November 1952.
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technical grounds, were anxious that Spain and Yugoslavia should be invited to attend the 
proposed inland transport conference.*1 The British delegation reserved its position in an 
attempt not to appear as chief obstructionists and left the Portuguese and French delegates 
to rebuff other delegations’ objections.92 The OEEC Council adopted a resolution, at its 
meeting on 9 December, convening a conference u n d e r  the auspices of the OEEC to 
meet on 18 March 1953, in Paris. Under the veto threat of those who felt strongly 
discriminated against by the exclusion of Spain and Yugoslavia, the Council agreed to 
invite the aforementioned two countries to take pan in the drafting of an international 
convention creating a European Inland Transport Organisation.’3
By the end of 1952, Spain was encouraged to leave behind its troubled isolation 
in European multilateral affairs. Furthermore, the Spanish Government was informed of 
the possibility that Spain might also be invited by the French Cabinet to another initiative 
to set up a European Health Authority.*4 The important political dimension involved, 
proof of how Franco’s Spain was overcoming international political ostracism, allowed 
Spanish diplomats some room to manoeuvre for the first time since 1947. The fact that
>1. The French, in particular, asked t o r and received an assurance -that if 
Spain and Yugoslavia were not at the conference this would not exclude their 
participation in any eventual organisation; PRO, FO 371/100273: Telegram no* 
765, Ellis—Rees to FO, 21 November 1952, reporting on the meeting of the 
special working party set up by the OEEC Council to report on the terms of 
reference for a conference to study an organisation of inland transports, 
held on the 19th.
92. Ibid., telegram no. 274, Ellis-Rees to FO, 3 December 1952, informing of 
a meeting of heads of delegation on that same day.
9>. For the terms of reference of the ministerial resolution see European 
Yearbook, vol. 1, cit., p. 4 69. The OEEC convened the conference under the 
auspices of and not within the OEEC, to facilitate the participation of 
Spain and Yugoslavia. The latter would have automatically limited the 
conference to OEEC members. Portugal hurried to communicate the happy event 
to the Spanish authorities; MAE, Leg. 3166, exp. 8: Memorandum from the 
Portuguese Embassy in Madrid, 12 December 1952. The official invitation was 
addressed by OEEC's General Secretary Robert Marjolin; MAE, Leg. 3166, exp. 
8: Despatch SJ/2596, 17 December 1952, remitted enclosed in despatch no. 
2514 from the Spanish Embassy in Paris, "Invitación España Conferencia 
Transportes europeos", 23 December 1952.
94. At the end of September 1952 the French Minister of Public Health and 
Population, Paul Ribeyre, announced his plan for a European Public Health 
Community, later on known, by analogy with the Green and Black Pools, as the 
White Pool, as a new step towards European Union; AN, F/10/5552: 
"Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement, Communication de M. le Ministre de la 
Santé Publique et de la Population sur la création drune Communauté 
européenne de la Santé", Paris, 23 September 1952« A conference was expected 
to be convened for December 1952 and Spain invited to participate; APG, JE, 
Leg. 14, num. 8.1 (443): Cifra no. 384 from the Chargé d'Affaires in Paris 
to Artajo, "Sobre creación Comunidad Europea de Sanidad", 6 October 1952.
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the OEEC-sponsored initiative was most .«similar to Morice’s, strengthened the Spanish 
diplomats' view that the French proposal was unnecessary from a technical viewpoint and 
allowed them to foresee the sacrifice of Morice’s invitation to obtain other targets of a 
higher diplomatic and political importance.
In what then appeared to be a sudden strengthening of bargaining power, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that some reciprocal concession was necessary for 
Spain to cooperate, i.e., Spanish participation at the ministerial meeting on the 
organisation of agricultural markets to be held in Paris, on 16 March 1953. The French 
invitation for transport cooperation and the expected invitation for the health conference, 
strongly contrasted with the situation at the Green Pool:
"It would be totally anomalous for the French Government, on 
the one hand, to Invite Spain to take part in meetings having 
as main objectives to obtain European unification in different 
sectors, such as the foreseen meetings on transport and health 
matters, and, on the other hand, to persist in a negative 
attitude to deny Spanish membership to the Organisation 
affecting essential interests of the national economy. ” *5
Any offer to join any initiative was contingent on Spain taking part in that of maximum 
interest, the Green Pool.96
The logic of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was simple. The French 
initiatives in the field of agriculture, transport and health matters were all manifestations 
of a general plan designed to achieve the integration of the European economy in the 
process toward political unification. A country about to join in the transport and health 
initiatives should participate fully in the general process. The very different treatment
MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 22: "Informe Plan Verde”, by Román Oyarzún Iñarra, 
Secretary of Embassy and official at the General-Direction of International 
Organisations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 November 1952. This 
document received the approval of Minister Artajo and of Pedro Cortina 
Mauri, an international lawyer, whose task was to follow the developments 
in international organisations for the Minister of Foreign Affairs and who 
became the head of the department for International Organisations at the 
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
•4. Undoubtedly, Spain's non participation in the Green Pool talks was 
considered to place it in a very difficult position as regards export of its 
agricultural production; MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 22: Order by Air no. 985 to 
the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, 24 November 1952 and AN, F/10/5553: 
"Memorandum" of the Spanish Embassy to the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Paris, 1 December 1952.
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Spain received and the coincidence of meetings in Pahs, in January 1953, favoured a 
cautious attitude. Cortina suggested that, with regard to the confusing conduct of France,
"due without doubt to political intentions, this Department 
has to respond, maintaining a unity of criteria in all 
preparatory conferences concerning restricted European 
communities. This fact suggests the provisional acceptance of 
participation in the transport preparatory meeting [the 
Morice-inspired conference] on the condition that Spain be 
invited to join the Green Pool.***7
This policy of linking the fate of the transport initiative to the agricultural one 
came in the name of coordination of the Spanish participation in European affairs. What 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs meant was to participate in the Green Pool by any means, 
including the manipulation of the transport initiative as a diplomatic bargaining counter 
against the opinion of the technicians in the field. This attitude is an example of distortion 
of issue-linkage as studied by political scientists. For issue-linkage to be effective in 
international politics the exchange must take place between issues offering somewhat 
equal beneficial goods, which was absolutely not the case here. The Foreign Ministry was, 
in effect, sacrificing the goal of closer economic ties with Western Europe in this field 
without any sure gain.
This policy-strategy was possible because diplomats perceived very limited 
economic interests in the French initiative. Several obstacles hampered deriving substantia] 
benefit from the improvement in transport by road, rail and inland waterways. The low 
importance of inland transport in Spanish commodity trade was a first important 
consideration. Sea traffic accounted for 86 per cent (on a value basis) of overall 
merchandise traffic leaving or entering Spain in 1951-52.”  The Spanish gauge specificity 
reduced the possible benefits of any common railway transport regulation or acquisition 
of railway rolling stock. The reduced number of road vehicles in Spain made it difficult 
to facilitate reciprocity in international transport by road." Geographical conditions
v\  MAE, Leg. 344 5, exp. 16: Report by Cortina, Madrid, 10 December 1952.
M . Instituto de Estudios de Transportes y Comunicaciones: Estadísticas de 
Transportes. Serles cronológicas (1950-1980), Madrid [Ministerio de 
Transportes, Turismo y Comunicaciones] 1963, p. 59.
99. In 1950 Spain recorded 3 automobiles for thousand inhabitants, while the 
United Kingdom recorded 48, France and Sweden 36 units, Ireland, Belgium and 
Denmark 30, the Netherlands 14 and Western Germany 13; ibid.
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prevented Spain from benefiting from the favourable consequences of any unified 
measures in the field of inland waterways navigation. Finally, the economic incentive to 
take part in Morice’s initiative was further reduced by the fact the country’s main 
international problems were already under bilateral negotiations. In sum, from the Spanish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs' viewpoint there was no reason for this conference to take 
place.
This issue-linkage policy was not welcomed by those who dealt with the 
miserable state of Spanish transport and led to intra-govemmental conflict. The civil 
servants from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, dealing directly with the needs 
and penury of the Spanish transport system, adopted an open-minded attitude to any 
international collaboration. Progress in implementing the different investment plans 
designed to reconstruct and modernise the railway and road networks, was extremely 
slow. The investment forecast never reached its targets, due to the increase in prices and 
wages, the limited amount of raw-material supplied and the upward trend in the rates of 
exchange. The Pts 1,500 million investment forecast for the First Five-Year Plan (1946- 
50) for the modernisation of the state-owned and operated railway system, had to be 
increased (by decree of 6 February 1948) to Pts 1,700 million. A subsequent legal 
disposition of 22 May 1949 approved a more ambitious five-year "General Reconstruction 
Plan" which merged the more pressing features of the earlier programmes (including the 
electrification announced in 1947), at a total cost of Pts 5,996 million. Again on 22 
February 1952, an extra expenditure of approximately Pts 12,500 million was devoted to 
implementing the programme of improvements announced in 1949. A new decree, issued 
on 10 April 1953, declared certain of the works and requirements of the previous decree 
as a matter of national urgency, though the total national budget for 1953 was 22,745 
m illions and the public works and transport department’s budget remained at 1.945 
millions.100 The deplorable deficiencies of the Spanish railways were as prevalent in
10C. An overview of the financial difficulties in the sector can be followed 
in Francisco Wais San Martin: Historia de los ferrocarriles españoles,
Madrid [Editora Nacional] 2nd ed., 1974; Tamames, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 357 
ff; and, Carlos de Inza y Tudanca: "Transportes", in Estudios sobre la
Unidad Económica Europea, vol. 7, Madrid [Sociedad de Estudios Económicos 
Españoles y Europeos, S.A.] 1957, pp. 799-812'. The road system followed a 
similar pattern. On 18 December 1950 the approved Modernisation Plan 
estimated a 11,014 kilometers of road renewal in five years. With Pts 2,353
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1952-53 as they had been four years before exhibiting all the shortages and deficiencies 
inherent in the Spanish economy.
As the general economic well-being of Spain increased, the Spanish railroads were 
to find themselves in an impossible situation, unless long overdue maintenance and 
replacement programmes eased the increasingly difficult situation. Steel shortages were 
reflected in the poor condition of tracks, lumber and creosote shortages were apparent in 
the old ties and the lack of preservation of wooden sleepers and coal, machinery, rolling 
stock and signal equipment difficulties reflected deficiencies in basic raw materials and 
foreign exchange. RENFE maintained a pool of 3,400 locomotives, 500 of which were 
in repair shops. Many of these were ancient, 30 per cent dating from before 1915,13 per 
cent delivered after 1936. There were no diesel locomotives and only 3.3 per cent of the 
locomotives were electric. The wagon-pool consisted of 74,000 RENFE-owned wagons 
and 10,000 privately owned wagons. About half of the RENFE wagons in operation were 
in need of minor or extensive repair work. Only 10 per cent of the wagons were equipped 
with automatic breaks and there were no wagons able to cany loads superior to 30 tons. 
Between 1946 and 1950 the total length of normal gauge track increased by 82 kilometres 
and the electrified track by 75 kilometres, while the general electrification plan of January 
1946 forecast the electrification of 4,500 kilometres of rail! Only 10 per cent of the total 
track had double lines and the state of transmissions and signals was primitive. The lines 
were in such a state of deterioration that modern heavy locomotives could not operate at 
anything approaching efficient speeds and loads.101
million of total investment, which was equivalent to only Pts 470 million 
investment a year, only 4,037 kilometres of road wert worked on. In 91 per 
cent of cases the renewal meant either surface irrigation or a slight gravel 
bed reinforcement on the roads. A complementary plan to be accomplished over 
15 years raised the total amount of money to be invested to Pts 15,620 
million, that is Pts 1,400 million a year, which had to be reduced a few 
years later. The basic problem of Spanish roads was related to the lack of 
real resources (asphalt, cement and energy) which led to a progressive 
deterioration of the transport network.
101. Paragraph based upon the economic report drafted by the commercial 
councillor at the British Embassy in Madrid, G. Clinton Pelham: Economic and 
Commercial Conditions in Spain, London fHMSO] 1952; the report by 
Lieutenant-Colonel d'Abovilie, Assistant Military Attaché at the French 
Embassy in Madrid, to the Secretary of State of War, AD, Z/EE vol. 98: 
"Etude sur les transports terrestres en Espagne**, 23 February 1953; and PRO, 
FO 371/107718: **Extract from a pamphlet under the signature of Professor 
Sufrin", n/d. The pamphlet was considered not to be identical to the full 
report. For details about the Sufrin report see chapter four, p. 301.
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With railroads pushed to the limit to meet the demands placed upon them by the 
Spanish economy, the Ministry of Public Works might have seen some relief in the 
perspective of technical cooperation with Europe. Participation in the European fora could 
not hurt such a backward economic sector. Transport technicians did not expect to obtain 
any financial assistance. The only hope of improvement was the future agreement for 
bases with the United States, although the amounts likely to be earmarked for RENFE 
were to be perforce too limited to overcome the existing difficulties. Transport officials 
considered that technical cooperation (i.e., in the standardisation of general rail equipment 
and electrification programming), were worth discussing with their European colleagues.
Bilateral questions such as the speeding up of the technical operations at frontier- 
posts should have been more than welcomed by technical personnel. Spain’s exports 
towards France, particularly citrus fruits, were transported by rail after 1950 (see table
7.1), in contrast to the situation in general trade mentioned before.
TABLE 7.1
SPAIN'S EXPORT TRADE [AND EXPORTS OF CITRUS FRUITS] TO FRANCECLASSIFIED BY MAIN TRANSPORT MEANS, 1948-1953
(percentages calculated over transported tons)
Boat Rail Road
1949 60.7 [35.2] 38.4 [64.2] 0.9 [0.6]
1950 45.2 [25.0] 51.4 [73.0] 2. 8 [2 .0]
1951 45.3 131.6] 49.5 [58.7] 4.9 [9.7]
1952 47.7 [35.5] 50.0 [63.5] 2.3 [3.0]
1953 35.4 [24.9] 62.1 [74.1] 2.4 [1 .0]
Source: Direction générale des douanes et droits indirects: Tableau Général 
de la Navigation Maritime et des Transports, Année 1949, 3è partie Analyse 
du traffic par pays de provenance et de destination, Paris [Imprimerie 
Nationale] 1951. No data is accessible on a value basis concerning 
merchandise traffic classified by means of transport. The nature of Spanish 
export trade towards France, dominated by agricultural products and 
minerals, where there is a direct relationship between volume and value, 
allows the table to be maintained as providing an accurate image. This could 
not be the case for French exports to Spain, since they included commodities 
with high added value.
The direct economic interest in the initiative came from the fact that transportation by rail 
saved the fruit sent to supply the German and Scandinavian markets from damage.102
102. The railway transit between France and Spain took place at four points, 
of which Port Bou/Cerb^re and Irun/Hendaye were the most important. The 
problem of the gauge difference was only partially solved with the use of 
privately-owned interchangeable woogie-wagons at Irun-Hendaye. The service 
started to function in May 1950 at Hendaye and Cerbere in May 1951. By the
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An amelioration of the technical operations at the French frontier would shorten the delay 
from tree to table while shipments, despite all the available chemical treatment, affected 
the quality of the fruit.103 This would have placed Spanish oranges in an improved 
position in relation to their main competitors, the Jaiffa, Navel and Clementine oranges 
from Israel and North Africa, and allowed for an easier modification of the trade flows 
to unsatisfied markets when domestic crops shut down those previously open markets.
In contrast to some private sectors, the official French response to the question 
of Spanish participation in the agricultural ministerial meeting was not encouraging. The 
French National Confederation of Producers decided, when meeting with a delegation of 
Spanish business men, to support Spain Green Pool membership.10* French interest 
groups had no intention whatsoever of stepping out of the heavy- purchasing programme 
of foreign transport material undertaken by Spain in 1952. Negotiations were under way 
with some private French banks for a loan of Ff 15,000 million to assist Spanish industry 
to finance the purchase of French railway and capital equipment in the transport 
modernisation programmes.105 Minister Laurens, more concerned with the views of 
agricultural organisations, declared that only the plenary conference had juridical 
personality to address new invitations once member-countries were consulted at the 
conference table.106 The assurances which the Spanish Ambassador received from 
Laurens that the French Government was not to elude the Spanish request to be invited 
to the Green Pool Conference with subterfuges did not materialise. Finally, despite the 
Spanish expectations, the corresponding Minister was not invited to join the so-called
Spring of 1953 the total pool consisted of 250 Transfeaa wagons and, at its 
maximum efficiency, 64 wagons could be despatched every 6 hours; "Etude sur 
les transports terrestres en Espagne", cit. An enlargement of the pool of 
wagons to 1,000 units was forecast by 1955. Until 1956 this system did not 
deal with at least 50 per cent of the total e::ports crossing the Pyrenean 
border. For more details see Max Liniger: L' or¿.nae d* Espagne sur les marchés 
européens, Geneva [Editions du Temps] 1962, p. 211.
10>. Antonio Dionis Soler: "La exportación de agrios por via terrestre",
Información Comercial Española, no. 259, March 1955.
104, See chapter five, p. 414.
1#s. Ibid., p. 415.
104. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 22: Cifra no. 452 from Paris, 17 December 1952.
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While PooVw At this point, Arajo confirmed to VaUellano that the acceptance of the
a0\  The ministerial conference took place in Paris on 12-13 December 1952. 
A treaty-proposal for a European Health Community, following the ECSC 
Treaty, drafted by the French Ministry of Public Health was presented to the 
conference, which rejected it; AD, DE-CE, vol. 581: The General Directorate 
for Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic Cooperation Office at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the head of Bidault's private bureau, 9 
February 1953. The White Pool initiative did not go very far from the 
original blue-print; see a brief reference in Gerbet: a) La construction de
1*Europe, Paria [Inç>rimerie National] 1983, p. 14 9, and b) La naissance du 
Marché commun, Brussels [Editions Complexe] 1987, p. 69; these titles 
constitute the first scholarly work providing a complete account of what it 
considered to be the process of European integration. Brief references to 
the so-called "projets sans landemain”, the green, white and transport 
pools, are provided by M.-O. Piquet Marchai: Histoire économicrue de lfEurope 
des Dix. De la Seconde Guerre mondiale à aujourd'hui, Paris [Librairies 
Tecniques] 1985, pp. 381-84.
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French invitation to the preparatory meeting of Transport Ministers would only come 
"once the coordination among the several requisitions to Spain to join the European 
Communities” had been obtained.
The decision adopted by the British and Portuguese might have definitively 
reinforced the Spanish diplomatic view. The Portuguese Government learned that, for the 
British Cabinet, Morice’s initiative was incompatible with the OEEC's initiative, which 
they had agreed to and advised Spain to adopt "a similar policy to the benefit of both 
countries”.109 The Portuguese recommendation could hardly be ignored because it was 
Spain who first made use and profited most from a pseudo Iberian solidarity in European 
matters due to Portugal’s OEEC/EPU membership.n0 Under these conditions, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended the Spanish Council of Ministers to answer the 
OEEC invitation positively "therefore showing Spain’s interest on European integration" 
and to avoid assisting at the meeting convened by France since "problems to be dealt with 
are of French interest rather than specifically of a European dimension”.111 The 
diplomatic arguments prevailed at the highest level over those proposed by the Public 
Works Department. On 16 January 1953, the Spanish Council of Ministers emphasised 
the little sense involved in participating in the French transport initiative whilst isolated 
from the rest of the French initiatives, particularly that of greatest interest. The invitation 
addressed to the Spanish Minister of Transports, although it had initially been accepted 
by the corresponding Minister, was rejected and a decision adopted to follow the OEEC 
initiative.112
10*. MAE, Leg. 3166, exp. 8: Despatch no. 666, Artajo to Vallellano, "Sobre 
participación da España an Conferencia de Transportes*4, 27 December 1952.
10f. Ibid., Leaflet from the Portuguese Embassy in Madrid, 9 January 1953.
uo. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 16: Despatch no. 19 to Nicolás Franco,
"Coordinación hispano—portuguesa respecto al movimiento europeo y, 
especialmente, al Pool Verde"# Madrid, 31 January 1953.
111. MAE, Leg. 3166, exp. 6: Information leaflet on the matter drafted by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Council of Ministers, 16 January 1953. 
There is no documentary evidence about any similar attempt made by the 
transport department.
112. A.S.C.M. Tomo II. 1953, no. 5539, Council of Ministers' meeting on 16 
January 1953. Consequently, Vallellano invited his French colleague to 
discuss common interests in the field at the spring OEEC meeting; MAE, Leg. 
3166, exp. 7: Vallellano to Morice, 22 January 1953.
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There was no big difference between the OEEC and the French initiatives. The 
modesty of scale of economic benefits affected both in equal terms, since both were 
limited to inland transport, represented equally limited probabilities of any financial aid 
and contained no commitment towards a high authority.113 Only the Spanish diplomatic 
distrust concerning any French initiative made the acceptance of the invitation to the 
OEEC conference incompatible with being present in Paris in January’. Despite the 
technical nature of the initiatives, the technical experts could not escape from political 
suffocation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who adopted a position of complete 
myopic-self interest,114
7.3.3. Last-Minute Sprint
The Council of Ministers’ decision expressed the desire to continue diplomatic 
action to secure Spain's presence in the second meeting of the Green Pool. The reader 
should recall the importance of agricultural and foodstuffs exports to OEEC countries. 
According to official Spanish statistics for 1952, the total value of the aforementioned 
exports to countries participating at the talks in Paris represented 56 per cent of the 
exports to those same countries and 69.4 per cent of the country’s exports of agricultural 
products and foodstuffs. For the Minister of Foreign Affairs the most advantageous 
outcome was the initiative failing due to a general lack of interest so that "Spain could
113. As we will see in section 7.5.1, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
raised the spectrum of supranationality to increase the political 
implications of the initiative and, consequently, the importance of 
diplomatic considerations.
114. Concept borrowed from Robert 0. Keohane: After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton [Princeton University 
Press] 1984, p. 99. Although the Spanish Council of Ministers had not 
adopted any final decision on the matter, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris 
was informed that: "The Spanish Government [...] has the decisive purpose 
to allow no Spanish representation to take part in any Conference of such 
a nature without maintaining a minimum of coordination in our political 
action in Europe. Therefore the acceptance of the referred transport 
conference [Morice's] can not be complimented without the security that 
Spain will be invited to the second Green Pool conference and that what 
happened with the still awaited invitation to the preparatory meeting of the 
Health Community will never be repeated"; MAE, Leg. 3166, exp. 8: Despatch 
no. 1029 from the General Direction for Foreign Policy at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, to the Spanish Ambassador in.Paris, 5 December 1952. The 
latter had addressed a memorandum to the Quai d'Orsay a few days before 
using the same arguments but without a threat; AN, F/10/5553: Memorandum, 
Paris, 1 December 1952.
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continue the present independent economic system" (sic).m The point of no-retum, 
however, was reached. The hypothetical situation of multilateral agreements closing down 
markets to Spanish exports came closer to reality when it was understood how little 
support the Spanish enjoyed.114 It was also feared that the Spanish Government's 
attitude concerning Morice’s initiative would bring further retaliation from the French.117
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to renew its efforts to obtain support for 
the Spanish position. The Governments of Ireland, Greece, Turkey, Switzerland and Great 
Britain were asked to propose that Spain should be invited to join the conference or, at 
least, to support the proposition if made by another country. In relation to the 
Scandinavian countries there were no expectations given the traditional political opposition 
to Franco's regime. Therefore the action undertaken with them was limited to obtaining 
support for the petition addressed by another country, or, at least, not to vote against it. 
Lisbon, Rome, Brussels and Paris received more expressive messages. Two new 
arguments were used to support the justice of the Spanish demand. They argued that the 
ongoing negotiations with the United States (for an agreement on military bases) could 
have proved the definitive overcoming of the period of international ostracism in addition 
to the OEEC's invitation in the field of transport to back Spain's claims for technical and 
economic collaboration in Western Europe."*
No country could adopt a straight-forward policy concerning Spain while the 
initiative remained ill-defined on the number of agricultural products to be included, the 
countries to take pan in it and the authority to preside over the pool. A definition of the
lls. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 16: Order by Air no. €2 to the Spanish Ambassador 
in Paris, 21 January 1953.
114. The French had semi—officially consulted all the Governments involved
in the initiative for their opinion of possible Spanish participation. The
responses gathered by the Spanish representatives in the different capitals 
had the following profile: most of them abstained from answering or refused 
to comit themselves, Norway showing opposition and only Italy and Portugal 
were favourable; ibid., despatch no. 227 from the Spanish Ambassador in 
Paris, "Pool Verde", 26 January 1953.
117. MAE, Leg. 3166, exp. 7: Despatch no. 282 from the Spanish Embassy in
Paris, "Sobre Conferencias Transportes en Paris", 30 January 1953. »
119. Orders to diplomatic representatives in the different OEEC countries 
with instructions concerning the second ministerial Green Pool meeting to 
be found in MAE, Leg. 3445, exps. 16 and 23, "II Conferencia Plenaria 'Pool 
Verde'", dated 2, 3 and 4 February 1953.
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central problem came when Mansholt tried to rule out the possibility of a vote against a 
High Authority by involving the Agricultural Community in the debate for a European 
Political Community (EPC). Following the so-called Luxembourg resolution. Mansholt 
proposed to Laurens that an agricultural community confined to the Schuman countries 
be the offshoot of political authority."9 Laurens agreed on Mansholt's main points but 
under conditions which rendered them meaningless. The Luxembourg resolution should 
not be presented as a sine qua nan condition for attending the conference and the 
agricultural community should be "sensiblement différent" to the ECSC.120 In a total 
absence of the previous crusading spirit, the French Ministry of Agriculture favoured 
some sort of community of a purely consultative character to promote commodity 
agreements to secure outlet for French agricultural surpluses. This straightforward and 
clear commitment meant the return to the main line of action since Pflunlin’s vote at the 
National Assembly in June 1950.121
Once the accent had definitively gone from the conditions of production to those 
of trade, the simplest step should have been the promotion of general trade liberalisation 
in the sector, including the progressive reduction of tariff barriers. In that case, however.
The Luxembourg resolution was adopted by the six ministers of foreign 
affairs on 10 September 1952 by which the powers of the Assembly ad hoc, set 
up after the signing of the EDC Treaty to work for the creation of a 
European Political Community, should be extended to the economic field. For 
the Dutch initiative for a West European common market as part of the 
proposed EPC envisaged in article 38 of the EDC Treaty of May 1952, the so- 
called Beyen Plan, see Griffiths and Milward: "The Beyen Plan and the
European Political Community", EUI Working Paper no. 85/199, Florence, 
November 1985, and Griffiths: "The Beyen Plan", in Griffiths (ed.): The
Netherlands and the Integration of Europe, cit., pp. 165-82.
12°. AD, DE—CE 1945—60, vol. 58: "Protocol franco—hollandais", Secret Note,
15 November 1952, and ECO, "Compte-rendu du voyage de M. Laurens à La Haye", 
18 November 1952.
121. AD, «Pool Vert»: "Note au sujet de l'Organisation Européenne des
Marchés agricoles" by Maestracci, 4 February 1953. In this note Maestracci 
defined the basis for the French memorandum to be presented to the 
negotiations of the Six ministers of agriculture, previous to the general 
conference, scheduled on 16 March 1953. There was no point in adopting a too 
compromising position when, by 1952, France remained a net importer of 
agricultural commodities since the actual surpluses were far less than what 
the Monnet Plan had envisaged. See French net agricultural exports by 1952 
in Griffiths and Milward: "The European Agricultural Community", cit., table 
2, p. 78. See the gap between actual output and planned targets by 1952 in 
François Houillier: "Les plans de modernisation de l'agriculture", Revue
Economique, no. 5, September 1953, pp. 659—72-, pp. 670—72. By the end of
1952, France's agricultural balance deficit was the largest since 1945, Jean 
Chombart de Lauwe: L'aventure agricole de la France de 194 5 à nos jours, 
Paris [Presses Universitaires de France] 1979, p. 208.
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there was not much to gain for France. The general European deficit in wheat and sugar 
and the desire to reduce the dollar bill worked to the French advantage, even without 
general liberalisation. The latter would have benefited, in particular, the Netherlands and 
Denmark, harmed French agriculture and embarrassed French relations with the French 
Union.
"Malgré l'engagement de principe qui a été pris à Rome 
[February 1953] envisagée par la fusion des intérêts 
essentiels des Etats Membres de commencer de préparer la 
réalisation d'un marché commun européen par une première étape 
d'intégration qui serait limité aux Six, il convient de 
souligner que le Gouvernement française restait libre de 
proposer, en matière agricole, un accord groupant 16 pays de 
l'Europe et dont les dispositions ne conduiront pas 
inmédiatement au marché commun.”122
According to the instructions to the French delegation, the French Government definitively 
abandoned supranationality for product agreements between a large number of 
countries.123
The situation among the rest of the ECSC countries moved along similar lines. 
The BLEU countries continued to be deeply suspicious of Mansholt’s activities.124 The 
Italians realised that there was no possibility of the British joining an agricultural 
community of a supranational kind. They supported the idea of a new organisation which 
they hoped was to be more successful than the OEEC in assisting them to find markets 
for their surpluses of fruit and vegetables.123 Finally, the Germans, without showing any 
clear "pro" high authority sentiment, emphasised the need to expand their exports of 
industrial goods in return for increased agricultural imports and avoid neglecting domestic
AN, F/10/5359: Mot.« of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Agriculture
relative to the European Agricultural Conference, Paris, 10 March 1953. 
Laurens argued to act following a solidarity principle with all the non—ECSC 
countries involved in the agricultural talks.
121. AN, F/10/5694: Mote on the position of the French delegation at the 
Conference of March 1953, n/d.
124. The Belgians told the British that they will try "to steer all further 
action on the Pflimlin Plan into intergovernmental channels." PRO, MAF 
83/3389: FO to Ministry of Agriculture, "Record of Conversation with M. Jean 
de Bassompierre of the Belgian Embassy in London", 20 January 1953.
U5. PRO, MAF 40/549: "Note of a Talk with Mr. Pappi and Mr. Rabot about 
Green Pool Plans", by Edward Lloyd, chiefly concerned with the agricultural 
negotiations in the United Kingdom's Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
5 October 1952. For more detailed information on the different national 
positions see Griffiths and Milward, "The European Agricultural Community", 
cit., pp. 44 ff., and Griffiths, "The Mansholt Plan", cit., pp. 101-104.
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agricultural interests.136 It was not until the preparatory meeting convened among the 
Ministers of Agriculture of the Six two days before the plenary conference (due to 
Mansholt’s insistence and as a reaction to his initial proposal for a meeting of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs to give precision to die Luxembourg resolution) that the Six should 
bring a final clarification to the meaning of the agricultural negotiations.
The balance of Spain’s diplomatic action, two days before the second ministerial 
meeting, shows that only Portugal and Italy seemed prepared to take the initiative to 
propose inviting Spain. Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland and Turkey would support the proposition if made by another 
country. The Netherlands would declare its support only after several other countries had 
done so.127 Sweden replied that it would only send an observer without a voice or vote. 
Norway and Denmark refused to compromise in any sense. Italy happened to be the 
country which could help Spain most efficaciously, since it was to participate at the 
preliminary meeting of the Ministers of the Six.12*
Diplomatic channels reported that Italy was to take the initiative in proposing that 
the Spanish Government should be invited to anend the meeting.129 Carrero Blanco, the 
Minister in charge of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and Franco’s closest man, 
ordered diplomatic representatives to make a last effort to obtain majority support for the 
Italian proposal.130 The respective diplomatic channels informed Carrero that most 
countries would support the Italian initiative. He was informed that even the French 
Council of Ministers unanimously approved granting support to Spanish aspirations and
ia<. AN, F/10/5359: François-Poncet to Laurens, "Position des milieux
viticoles et vinicoles allemands en matière d' organisation européenne des 
marchés agricoles", 29 August 1952.
xrr. Mansholt seemed to have given his conformity to the French intention to 
invite Spain to the Conference already at the beginning of March, maybe as 
part of his strategy to make the entire initiative collapse; ASMAE, DGAP,
b. no. 256: Telegram from The Hague, 5 March 1953.
lia. See the different nations' replies in MAE, Leg. 344 5, exp. 16.
12>. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 23: Cifra no. 41, Paris, 11 March 1953.
190. MAE, Leg. 5910, exp. 6, carp. 2: Cifra no. 7 to all diplomatic posts 
concerned and no. 12 to Lisbon, 11 March 1953.
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sending the Minister of Agriculture to Italy to discuss who was to take the initiative.131 
Finally, the Spanish Government was informed that, since France held the Presidency, it 
was to be Italy who would propose inviting Spain as a preliminary question. This proposal 
would, according to the Spanish Ambassador in Pahs, be approved by unanimity "with 
no doubt at all"!132 On the same day the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made public a 
report in which, given the certainty of entry, proposed the creation of an interdepartmental 
study group in Madrid to gather documentary evidence on the consequences of Spain 
joining the Green Pool, as had already occurred regarding the ECSC. However the fact 
was that
"Even though a fully documentary study could emphasise higher 
costs than benefits from Spanish participation within the 
Green Pool, Spain must not adopt an abstentionist attitude 
regarding the Green Pool, since it must be remembered: First, 
if Spain is kept out of the projected Organisation it could 
never be expected that Spain would continue its present 
foreign trade system based on bilateral agreements with 
Western European countries, since it is to be envisaged that 
this system would be strongly affected by the very fact of 
establishing the pool. Second, since the pool would have as an 
immediate consequence the elimination of closed national 
markets and the creation of a common market, it would always 
be preferable to be part of the Organisation in order to have 
the possibility of handling the instruments at the disposal of 
its Member-States.
Spain was to suffer greatly from its miscalculation in not taking into consideration 
the divergence in aims within nations not only among them. The Italian Minister of 
Agriculture, Fanfani, did not hold the same opinion as Prime Minister and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs at the time, De Gasperi.134 If Italian diplomatic services had given 
grounds for Spanish aspirations, Fanfani, who was preparing his political campaign for 
the autumn elections in which the farmers' vote was not negligible, was to put a quick 
end to the misunderstanding. The day before the plenary conference met, Fanfani 
informed the Spanish Ambassador that Italy would not take the initiative proposing
1,1. Ibid., cifra no. 43 from Pari«, 12 March 1953.
1B. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 16: Cifra no. 45 urgent from Pari», 14 March 1953.
1M. Ibid., "Informe aobre el 'Pool Verde'", 14 March 1953, when the creation 
of a study group in Madrid was announced.
1M. See Laschi's doctoral disa., cit., p. 213.
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Spain’s incorporation due "to the farmers’ fear of Spanish participation".13S Fanfani 
ended the uncertainty about Spain when the ministerial gathering of the representatives 
of the ECSC countries convened two days before the plenary conference, meant the failure 
to form a supranational agricultural community. While the European Agricultural 
Community was a device supposedly for building up Europe’s political union, the 
question of Spain was used to create disagreement so that discussions could be transferred 
to the OEEC. Once the idea was transformed into a round-table to negotiate bilateral trade 
arrangements to sell and purchase certain agricultural commodities, Fanfani was unwilling 
responsible for spoiling Italian agriculture by facilitating the competition between both 
countries’ farming production. Italian and Spanish competition on the British and French 
markets at the time of liberalisation, as well as during the period of import restrictions, 
was certainly at the root of Fanfani’s attitude.
The Italian attitude did not destroy the Spanish expectations because it became 
known on 16 March that die French Council of Ministers had ordered the French 
delegation to adopt the attitude most favourable to Spain.136 Nothing in Franco-Spanish 
relations could explain the French decision and its timing. This section argues that the 
Green Pool had become a full speed race to secure outlets at high prices. At that point, 
Spain could purchase wheat at the same time as the ongoing negotiations favourable to 
French industry (not to mention the French policy in Morocco) could benefit from a 
gesture highly rated in political terms on the other side of the Pyrenees.137 In other 
words, it was the transformation of the Green Pool initiative which led to the modification 
of the French attitude towards Spain on the matter, not a change in bilateral relations. This 
fresh French policy appeared to put the situation back under control, and made it
l>!. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 6: Cifra no. 46 from Paris, 15 March 1953. Same 
attitude explained in ASMAE, DGAP, b. no. 256: "Appunto per S.E. il
Ministro", Roma, 26 March 1953.
lM. AG, MAE/11591, folder 567: Handwritten note dated 16 March 1953, 10.45 
a.m. Information provided by the Director for Europe of the French Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs.
li1. The credit negotiations mentioned before for a credit of Ff 15,000 
million to place command for equipment goods (see chapter five, p. 414) 
finally concluded in a financial protocol signed on 7 April 1953. The 
journal of the Spanish Socialist Party in exile, El Socialista, no. 5661,
26 March 1953, which announced Spain's access to the agricultural 
negotiations at the same time as the credit, drew a clear connection between 
the two.
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unnecessary' for Portugal to present Spanish claims for participation. Laurens gave an 
account to the conference of the existence of (he Spanish candidature and supported it, 
followed by the German delegation. This produced a chain-reaction of a favourable vote 
by many participating delegations. The attitude adopted by the majority helped to 
neutralise the reservations tabled by the Dutch, Scandinavian and British delegations.
For some countries, future possible interference with the resolution of the 
institutional question, was a more important factor to be considered when evaluating 
Spain's involvement in the Green Pool than bilateral patterns of trade and political 
relations. The ministerial meeting of the ECSC countries had shown that a full 
supranational community was unacceptable for five of the Six ECSC countries but the 
institutional debate subsisted upon what to do next. Sir Anthony Nutting, Chief of the 
British delegation to the Green Pool conference, considered Spanish participation as "a 
little premature".13* Little was known regarding Spain’s intentions in the economic field 
but less was known of the Agricultural Community to invite any new country. The 
participation of Spain, a non-OEEC member, would prejudice the possibility that all 
further agricultural discussions would be transferred to the OEEC. Mansholt joined the 
British since it was better to concentrate on strengthening and improving cooperation in 
the existing bodies than to recreate new powerless institutions. In principle, these countries 
were not opposed to Spanish membership but proposed that consideration of the issue be 
deferred until proposals had been made dealing with the central institutional question. 
Switzerland reminded all that the latter presented neither a formal nor a political problem 
since the European Conference of Ministers of Transports acted similarly in spite of
1M. PRO, MAF 40/549: Telegram no. 82, Nutting to FO, Paris, 16 March 1953. 
The British concern about the future of the European Agricultural Community 
predominated over their explicit policy of doing "everything possible to 
encourage" the improvement of relations with Spain, which offered an 
important source of supply and considerable opportunities of economic 
expansion; PRO, FO 371/107682: "Notes prepared for the adjournment debate 
on Anglo-Spanish relations", 13 May 1953.
Sir Anthony Nutting (b. 1920), Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs between November 1951 and October 1954, and Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs between that date and November 1956, when he 
resigned due to the Government's Suez policy.
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Spanish membership.139 A majority decision prevailed and the Spanish Government was 
invited to join on the first day of the plenary ministerial conference on 16 March 1953.
Spain's access to the negotiation tables can be explained by the final and 
definitive transformation of the original Green Pool project. The door opened for Spain 
when the process of reaching the consensus necessary for obtaining some general 
agreement definitively led, after two years of talks, to dropping the idea of a supranational 
institution for crd h o c  product marketing arrangements.140 This was the direct result of 
the competing efforts of governments (and non-governmental actors) to manipulate the 
initiative for their benefit. Once negotiations were concerned primarily with commodity 
trade agreements, Spanish participation entered into the normal circumstances of bilateral 
economic relations. For major importing countries, Spanish exports would favour 
competition. The position of countries with exports competing with some Spanish 
commodities would be reinforced when arguing for special clauses for those specific 
commodities. For some exporting countries, Spain represented an additional market for 
their products, more so if through the multilateral process of negotiation on commodity 
trade. Spain could be forced to relax its import restrictions. In one way or another, almost 
all the countries involved found themselves in one or several of the categories mentioned 
above.
7.4. Green Pool Membership
Spain achieved an important political and economic target after what had appeared 
an almost endless diplomatic struggle. Access to the negotiations for a European
líf. Ministerio van Buitenlandse Zaken, The Hague, Directoraat Generaal Voor 
Economische en Militaire Samenwerking, 630/1384: Report on the European
Agricultural Conference by the Dutch delegate to the OEEC, Paris, 16 March 
1953. Document provided to the author by Richard T. Griffiths.
140. Laurens had defined the negotiation process as "la question de chercher 
le plus petit commun dénominateur aux aspirations des divers pays intéressés 
en matière de communauté agricole européenne"; AN, F/10/5696: "Directives 
données par Monsieur le Ministre sur les divers questions que soulève la 
préparation de la conférence européenne de l'agriculture et de la "pré­
réunion" des six ministres de l'agriculture des pays membres de la 
communauté charbon-acier", n/d.
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agricultural organisation was considered in a triumphal way in Madrid, as a new step 
towards the complete normalisation of Spain’s foreign relations.141 That a Minister of 
Franco’s Cabinet could attend, for the first time since 1945, a European ministerial 
meeting, especially one with a pro-European scope, had great political significance. In 
economic tenns, Spain's direct intervention swept away (although temporary) the threat 
of discriminatory off-pool treatment The economic benefits to be derived were, however, 
still to be seen.
7.4.1. Means and Goals
Prior to Spain’s entry, the European Ministers of Agriculture were unable to take 
any step beyond preparatory work. For the Spanish, the Green Pool was still in a 
formative period and the most important task was yet to be done. The final report of the 
preparatory working party set up by Ministers in March 1952 had evidenced the difficulty 
of quickly reaching some degree of common harmonisation.143 The immense variety and 
complexity of the European agricultural economy (the extreme disparity among national 
production conditions as well as among products within national agriculture) showed 
clearly, in Nutting’s words, that "the task of rationalising European coal and steel 
production [was] a child's play beside that of integrating European agricultural 
markets.”143
141. MAE, Leg. 344 5, exp. 23: "Informe sobre Conferencia 0rganizaci6n Europea 
de los Mercados Agricolas (Paris 16 a 20 de Marzo de 1953) ", 24 March 1953. 
This was equally the opinion expressed by many of the important newspapers 
of that time. See the detailed reports gathered by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs' Information Services in MAE, Leg. 3368, exp. 17.
142. The IWP first met on 15 May 1952 in Paris with representatives from all
the countries attending the Paris preliminary meeting of March 1952, plus 
Portugal. Three sub-groups of experts were subsequently established and 17 
commodities studied. Experts presented their respective reports at the end 
of 1952 and the IWP ended its work in January 1953; Preparatory Working 
Party for the European Conference on the Organisation of Agricultural 
Markets: Report of the Working Party to the European Agricultural
Conference, Restricted, Ag.CT/Ooc.10, 9 January 1953. The interested reader 
could find the commodity reports, the general survey on agricultural and 
food production, consumption and trade, the report on general conditions of 
agricultural production in the different countries and on institutional 
problems, and the IWP's final report, in either AN, F/10/5694-5 or PRO, MAF 
40/549.
14>. PRO, MAF 40/549: "Speech by Mr. Anthony Nutting at the Green Pool
Conference in Paris, 18th March, 1953".
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When the conference, after interminable procedural discussions, got down to 
business, a sharp division of opinion therefore appeared. Mansholt and Nutting took the 
line that a decision on the question of what institution should be selected was necessary 
before any further technical work could be done. The only acceptable alternatives were 
a supranational community or to pursue all further action within the OEEC where, even 
if little had been accomplished in the past in the agricultural sphere, a new attempt could 
be made. Both opposed any suggestion for future action which seemed likely to lead to 
the creation of a new seventeen-power organisation. The French, Germans and Italians 
were clearly unwilling to jump the supranational fence and to accept the OEEC 
alternative. No doubt they would have favoured the creation of a new intergovernmental 
body outside the OEEC, but they argued that the institutional question was dependent on 
a further study of the various commodity markets concerned.1"
The Spanish delegation was naturally interested in setting up a study committee, 
if only to complete, on their side, the reports on products prepared by the previous 
working party (IWP) and to extend the commodity list of those products of particular 
interest for the Spanish economy. Preventing the conference from ending in complete 
failure, Mansholt agreed to set up a new interim committee provided that the institutional 
question was on its agenda.145 On the last day of the meeting. Ministers established a 
new interim committee (henceforth IC) to examine the reports and recommendations of 
the IWP concerning methods of organising and unifying agricultural markets, to study 
new commodities or commodity groups and to suggest what form of organisation was 
practicable for market organisation.
At the IC’s first meeting, 27-30 April 1953, the idea of dealing first with the 
commodity studies and determining the most adequate institutional arrangements at a 
second stage predominated. Seven kinds of commodities were already being studied: 
cereals (bread grains, coarse grains, rice and seeds), tobacco, fruit and vegetables (fresh
144. PRO, FO 371/105894: MAD, "Conference on European Agricultural Markets",
20 March 1953; and MAF 40/549: MAC(53)103, "The Green Pool. Note by the 
Foreign Office", 13 April 1953.
144. Griffith*: "The Manaholt Plan", cit., p. 105.
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and dried), sugar, livestock and meat, dairy produce, and timber. Although in different 
degrees, the list fulfilled the criteria upon which the selection of products was based: 
importance in the agricultural income of the participating countries and in intra-European 
agricultural trade and a high degree of dependence on foreign supply.’46 When the 
question of agreeing on a definitive list arose, all countries adopted the shopping list 
approach, by which the studies were to be initially limited to the few products which 
represented their individual national interest. The Spanish representative, for instance, 
repeatedly requested that wine, natural fruit by-products and cork be included in the list 
submitted.147 The German delegation, with Spanish support, succeeded in getting a 
proposal for cereals, dairy produce, fruit and vegetables, approved. Wheat constituted a 
commodity with extended consumption, organised markets and potentially dollar savings. 
Dairy produce represented 40 per cent of the OEEC area’s agricultural production and 
fruit and vegetables trade was exemplary of die complexity of market and trade. These 
commodities were of interest to all nations since all exported or imported them.’4*
Participation in the work of the new IC and its committees "would allow Spain 
to favour the point of view most convenient to the national interest and to influence the 
final decision adopted to be more in line with it.”149 As the 1C was to put forward 
proposals on the same subjects as the ministerial conference of March 1952, it could not 
be said that the ministerial meeting advanced the proposed Green Pool closer. Problems 
arose when attempting to conceptualise th e  national interest. According to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, which considered itself the direct expression of the national interest.
14f. Preparatory Working Party for the European Conference on the 
Organisation of Agricultural Markets, "Summary of the Discussions of the 
Working Party at its second session (6th-9th January 1953)", Restricted, 
Ag.GT/Doc.11, 14 January 1953.
147. The Turkish representative asked for cotton be included in the list. The 
Greek representative supported this request and also requested that wine be 
included, as did the French delegate. The Italian representative pointed out 
that if cotton were included in the list, he would have to request that hemp 
and silk also be included. The Netherlands representative accepted the list 
as covering a sufficiently wide range of commodities, although it did not 
include eggs.
1M. Paragraph based on the discussions at the IC's first meeting; MAE, Leg. 
3445, exp. 18: Informe E-6201 from the Agrarian Attaché at the Spanish
Embassy in Paris to the Minister of Agriculture, "Primera sesión del Comité 
Interino de Trabajo del 'Pool Verde'", Paris, 2 May 1953.
14>. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 23: Report "Conferencia Organización Europea
Mercados Agricolas (Paris 16 a 20 de Marzo dm 1953)", 24 March 1953.
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the Spanish delegation to the Green Pool had to defend Spain’s economic interests only 
when "they would not be harmful to the political interests" of the Franco regime.150 
'Political interests imposed Spain’s participation on a non-discriminatory basis in any 
future institutional arrangement. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not provided any 
clue as to the economic aspects of the national interest. It had, however, provided a clear- 
cut framework for action: political factors were to have primacy over any other 
considerations and the delegation should oppose any proposal implying supranationalité’. 
Therefore, harmonisation of the foreign economic options with the political demands of 
the Franco regime was the absolute minimnm condition to be fulfilled.151
Spain had been more concerned with the political advantage of obtaining entry 
to the conference than with the economic implications of the pool itself. Before March
1953 there had been no attempt to assess the economic consequences of Spain joining the 
Green Pool. The Spanish authorities assumed that any modification of the structure of 
European agricultural markets would negatively affect Spain.152 The participation of the 
experts from the Ministries of Agriculture and Commerce in the working parties was 
modest but as a whole significant, as it gave shape to the economic aspects of the national 
interest. The technical experts were instructed to favour the most dynamic sector of
ise. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 16: "Informe sobre el 'Pool Verde'”, Madrid, 14 
March 1953, containing the instructions to the delegation.
151. The Minister of Agriculture and head of the Spanish delegation,
expressed this point clearly: "We (must all demonstrate] our desire to
collaborate, and our respect for the political and social institutions which 
each nation has chosen." MAE, Leg. 34 45, exp. 23: Statement by Cavestany, 
on 19 March 1953, attached to despatch no. 7 60 from the Embassy in Paris, 
"Pool Verde", 20 March 1953. Along these same lines were the instructions 
to Spain's delegations to the transport conference of Paris, March 1953, 
which were presented by the Under—Secretary Minister of the Presidency, 
Carrero Blanco, to the Council of Ministers and approved on 13 March; MAE, 
Leg. 3166, exp. 7: "Instrucciones para la Delegación española en la
Conferencia de Transportes interiores europeos convocada bajo la égida de 
la OECE", 12 March 1953,
152. The first meeting of the interdepartmental party set up in Madrid in 
March to assess the implications of the Green Pool talks was convened for 
7 May, with no substantial point on the agenda, while the IC had started 
meetings on 27 April. The party could only very partially undertake the 
necessary studies; see the reports of the «Grupo Español de Estudios 
Preparatorios de la Conferencia Europea sobre la Organización de los 
Mercados Agrícolas» in AGA, MAE/11591, folder 567, and C/36725, folder 13.
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Spain’s agnculture by promoting Spain’s exports of fruit and vegetables.13* The Spanish 
national interest that the delegation was supposed to defend required, on the economic 
side, securing preferential treatment for exports of fruit and vegetables, while avoiding any 
discriminatory institutional arrangement, on the political side.154
Participation in the three commodity groups was directly related to the degree of 
economic interest of the commodities studied. Consequently, the Spanish delegation 
immediately put most emphasis on fruit and vegetables. Their participation in the other 
two commodity groups was far from conflicting. The relevance of wheat on the import 
side and the irrelevance of dairy produce in Spain’s overall trade made the attitude 
adopted in both working groups non-problematic and subordinated to the goals reserved 
for fruit and vegetables.
The expert group on cereals dealt almost exclusively with wheat, with respect to 
which all faced a massive deficit (wheat accounted 40 per cent of the entire OEEC dollar 
deficit in 1950/51).135 For Spain, the import of wheat continued to be an annual 
nightmare for the Spanish Administration after the cut of Argentinian supplies. During the 
years 1950 to 1953, Spain’s average wheat production was still some 1 million tons below 
that of the period 1932-1935, while the population had increased by 4.5 millions. The 
Spanish delegation’s position at the Cereals WP was dictated by the country’s supply 
difficulties and by the fact that grain imports, the most important single item on Spain’s 
agricultural import bill, constituted a drain of foreign exchange resources. The
l” . As the Onder-Secretary of Foreign Economy put it: "Spanish interests in 
agricultural products are fundamentally those of exporters." MAE, Leg. 4612, 
exp. 16: Informative Note to the Minister of Commerce, Madrid, 19 August 
1953. The relevance of this specific commodity group for Spain, comes also 
from the fact that the instructions to the Spanish delegation were 
exclusively instructions to the representatives in the group of experts on 
fruits and vegetables; AGA, C/37132, folder 21: "Nota para el Señor Ministro 
de Comercio. Conferencia Europea sobre la Organización y Unión de Mercados 
Agicolas”, Madrid, 11 June 1953.
154. Although later the number of commodity groups increased, this section 
will be limited to deal with the Spanish position on the original three, 
which initially met during May and June 1953 to prepare reports for the 
following meeting of the IC scheduled for 7-11 July 1953. For more detailed 
information on the product negotiations see Griffiths: "The Green Pool
Negotiations", EUI Colloquium Paper Doc. 313/90 (Col. 47), Florence, 
November 1990.
x#f. AGA, C/37132: "Nota para el Excmo. Sr. Ministro de Comercio", on the 
meetings of the groups of experts, Madrid, 25 June 1953.
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Government had been obliged each year to devote a substantial part of its slender 
resources of foreign exchange to the purchase of foreign wheat, mostly payable in dollars, 
to assure a minimnm of bread ration.136
In 1949/50, Spain imported approximately 528,000 tons of cereals, of which
80,000 tons came urgently from the United States in August/September due to the bad 
harvest and the initial problems with Argentina and were paid with the credit offered by 
the Chase National Bank of New York.157 In the Autumn of 1949, too late to affect the 
sowing of the 1950 crop, a system was announced by which fanners, after delivering their 
compulsory quotas at a fixed price, could sell any excess production, through official 
distribution channels, at prices freely negotiated with consumers.15* This new system had 
not made much head when Argentina, which had supplied 90 per cent of wheat imports 
during the 1940s, announced its official suspension of supplies of wheat in December
1949. This represented a shock to Spanish finances.159
The final suspension of wheat imports from Argentina forced Spain to desperately 
look for a wheat exporter able to offer good conditions to a country with a scarcity of 
strong currencies. The United Stales Government received a credit request of $50 million
***. The estimates consulted confirm that bread ration by the early 1950s was 
inferior to the 1935 level and close to the early 1940s; see Arturo 
Camilleri Lapeyre: "La crisis de la agricultura tradicional”, Anales de
Moral Social v Económica: La crisis de la agricultura tradicional en España 
(La nueva empresa agrícola), Madrid [Centro de Estudios Sociales del Valle 
de los Caldos] 1974, pp. 4 7-71, p. 53; and Manuel de Torres Martinez: Juicio 
de la actual política económica española, Madrid [Aguilar] 1956, p. 195.
l*\ AHBE, 1EME, box no. 2: C/A, 26 July and 11 October 1949. The total 
annual amount of cereals imported by Spain is based hereinafter on the 
documentation that the working party set up in Madrid in April 1953 sent to 
the Spanish delegation in Paris, AGAr C/37132, folder 21: "Importaciones [of 
wheat, rye and maize] verificadas por el Servicio Nacional del Trigo, 
durante las campañas que se expresan", by the National Wheat Office, Madrid,
21 May 1953, sent by the ün de r—Secretary of Foreign Economy to the 
Councillor of Foreign Economy at the Spanish Embassy in Paris, "Datos 
comercio exterior para Comité de Trabajo Plan Verde”, Madrid, 21 May 1953.
1M. Pelham, op. cit., p. 32*
1S*. MAE, Leg. 4220, exp. 1: Artajo to his Argentine colleague, 14 January 
1950. The figure concerning Argentina's supplies from Barciela: "La
agricultura cerealista en la España contemporánea. El mercado triguero y el 
Servicio Nacional del Trigo (1937-1971)", Doctoral Diss., Universidad 
Complutense, Madrid, 1981, pp. 557-58.
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for the import of cereals, which it rejected in mid-December 1949.160 The immediate 
reaction was to increase the Chase National Bank's credit to $30 million and use part of 
it to purchase wheat (see table 4.1). In addition to the impart programme from the dollar 
zone (of about 121,000 tons), the Spanish Minister of Industry and Commerce, José 
Antonio Suan7.es, on 14 January 1950, appealed to "any country whatsoever" to ship
500.000 tons of grain to Spain.161 Portugal, France and Canada offered cereals to relieve 
Spain’s urgent need for immediate wheat supply. By March 1950, Spain had obtained
20.000 tons of wheat from Portugal on loan.162 France sold 10,000 tons of wheat and
10.000 tons of rye and the Spanish pressed them for a further 50.000 tons of bread 
cereals. France opened an export quota of 30,000 tons, half payable in sterling and half 
in exchange for another unspecified product, most probably coal or pyrites.163 In mid- 
January 1950 Canada offered to supply Spain with 500,000 tons of the lowest quality 
wheat to be paid for in dollars, which Spain did not buy.164 Spain had to make recourse 
even to import from the Soviet Union.1“  In 1950/51, despite the fact that wheat 
amounted to 46 per cent of the agricultural import bill, the cereal deficiency was still 
estimated at 300,000 tons.166 The extreme difficulty in food supply was considered to 
be "the only factor which in present conditions could precipitate political change."1*7
140. Vifias: Los pacto» aecretos de Franco con Estados Unidos. Bases, ayuda 
econòmica, recortes de soberania, Barcelona [Grijalbo] 1981, pp. 46—49.
141. J. Lee Shneidman: Spain and Franco, 194 9—59. Quest for International 
Acceptance, New York [Facts on File, Inc.] 1973, p. 49.
142. PRO, FO 371/89547: Pelham's despatch no. 76 to Treasury, Madrid, 15 
March 1950.
1M. AN, F/10/5630: Minutes of the meeting of the mixed Franco-Spanish trade 
and payments commission held in Paris from 15 to 23 March 1950.
1M. AD, Z/EE vol. 41: The French Ambassador in Canada to Schuman, ”L'opinion 
canadienne et le probléme des relations avec l'Espagne", 23 January 1950; 
and AGA, C/37132: "Importaciones de trigo realizadas desde la fundación del 
Servicio en toneladas”, by the Spanish National Wheat Office, Madrid, 21 May 
1953.
l<5. Manuel Espadas Burgos: Franquismo y politica exterior, Madrid JRialp] 
1988, p. 177.
144. PRO, FO 371/101997: "Spain: Annual review for 1951", 16 March 1952.
Considering the import programme from the dollar area, plus Suanzes' 
request, minus actual imports recorded, the total deficiency was 
approximately 273,000 tons.
l4\  PRO, FO 371/89548: The British Embassy in Madrid to FO, 20 December
1950.
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Spain’s membership of the Internationa] Wheat Agreement (IWA) did not ease 
its scarcity of strong foreign currencies. Spain spent less than otherwise since wheat 
supplied to Spain by the United States and Argentina was, on average, 25 percent higher 
priced than the marketing price established by the IWA for the season.1“  It did not buy 
more wheat, however, for twofold reasons. First, when it acceded to the IWA in August
1950, it received a clearly insufficient annual purchase guarantee of 100,000 tons (later 
elevated to 119,000 tons) for the three years left of the agreement.1** This quota 
represented about 30 per cent of the (on average) annual tonnage of imported wheat 
between 1945/46 and 1949/50 crop years. Second, Spain could hardly purchase all its 
quota due to a lack of foreign currency. The problem of wheat supply could not be solved 
with an improved access to dollar markets or international commodity arrangements. The 
Spanish Government continued to find it difficult to spare the dollars required to buy the 
necessary' foreign wheat.
American aid did not help. As members of the Spanish Government were at pains 
to point out, the $62.5 million loan, which the United States Congress had voted on 1 
August 1950 and which the Export-Import Bank of Washington administered, was no 
more than of symbolic value since no agreement was reached as to the purposes for which 
it should be devoted. The Eximbank favoured the purchase of foodstuffs less than the 
European Cooperation Administration Therefore, first on the bank’s priority list came the 
purchase of raw materials and capital goods for industrial reconstruction. Foods niffs were 
only allowed when a lack of their supply could cause social (and thus political) turmoil.
***. FRPS, 1951, IV, Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman of the Eximbank, t© the 
Embassy in Madrid, Washington, 23 April, p. 84 5. The IWA was a commodity 
agreement for wheat stipulating for exporters an obligation to sell within 
given price limits and for importers to purchase a fixed quota at that 
minimum price. The agreement tried to reconciliate beween wheat producers 
who wanted high prices to encourage agricultural production and wheat 
consumers who wanted low prices to protect their wheat consumers, and the 
need to guarantee prices to expand production at the time of world scarcity 
and the need to allow competition and modernisation to offer supply at 
increasingly lower prices.
JO. Spain's IWA membership was approved by the Spanish Government by Decree- 
Law of 23 June 1950, BOE of 12 July, no. 193. The Federal Republic of 
Germany and Japan could join the IWA in 1950 once they had also agreed to 
keep their purchases under certain limits. In June 1951, the Spanish 
delegation to the IWA Executive Committee asked for an increase of 100,000 
tons, which was rejected; cit. in AGA, C/3671, folder 5: Cifra no. 267, the 
Councillor for Foreign Economy to the Onder-Secretary of Foreign Economy and 
Commerce, London, 18 October 1951.
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Furthermore, the actual purchase of commodities financed by the first credits did not take 
place until May/June 1951 and then wheat was considered as an exception not to be 
repeated. The $5 million loan conceded to the import of wheat in March 1951 (the 
contract which was signed on 29 May elevated the loan to $7.35 million) allowed the 
purchasing of 50,000 tons of wheat, which were not sufficient to cover needs before the 
next harvest.170 The Spanish Authorities considered a minimum of between 50,000 tons 
and 70,000 tons more indispensable, of which 25,000 tons should be imported to Spain 
before 30 June and the rest before 15 July.171 Grain could most probably only come 
from the dollar area and be additional to the commitments major exporters had in relation 
to their import partners in the IWA. In 1951, despite of an improved harvest due to the 
increased level of fertiliser imports, the Spanish Institute of Foreign Currency had to 
release $66 millions for the import of wheat. By the end of 1952, Spain remained the only 
country in Western Europe which still retioned bread.
In 1952/53, for the second year in succession, the wheat harvest was abundant. 
The last vestiges of food rationing disappeared and the authorities were partially relieved 
of the necessity to set aside currency for the purchase of imported wheat.173 However, 
at the end of March 1953 the adverse effects of the dry and cold winter began to be 
apparent and, owing to the prolonged drought, the wheat harvest was almost one-third 
below that of the previous year. Dollar payments for these and future imports were to 
aggravate the deterioration in Spain’s trade balance, which showed a deficit largely as a 
result of the decrease in the value of Spanish horticultural and mineral products and, most 
particularly, was due to the rising bill for imported goods. By the time the expert group 
on wheat started to meet, Spain was importing its entire IWA quota from the United
lw. The Spanish Government had applied for imports of cereala valued at 
approximately $10 million; MAE, Lag. 1007, exp. 16: Pat McCarran, Chairman 
of the Unitad States Senate Appropriations Committee, to Gaston, January
1951.
171. Instructions for Leguerica dated 21 April 1951, quoted in Viñas: "La 
primera ayuda económica norteamericana a España", in Lecturas de economía 
española e internacional: 50 Aniversario del Cuerpo de Técnicos Comerciales 
del Estado, Madrid [Secretaria General Técnica del Ministerio de Comercio] 
1981, pp. 49-90, p. 70.
172. By the and of 1951, a prudent estimate for the following year set the
need for imported wheat at 300,000 tons, with a minimum of 200,000 tons; 
AGA, C/36730: The Spanish National Wheat Office to Arguelles, Madrid, 31 
December 1951.
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States.173 A relapse in the foodstuffs supply situation and the subsequent re-imposition 
of rationing was to have a serious effect on public acceptance of the regime and, thus, 
was particularly serious as far as public order was concerned. Would the myth of foreign 
hostility towards the political regime on which the Government blamed Spain's economic 
difficulties continue to be tenable fifteen years after the ending of the civil war or were 
the Spanish to resist any return to post-1945 hardships strenuously? The renewal of the 
IWA, agreed upon on 13 April 1953, in which the Spanish Government signed for an 
import quota of about 200,000 tons, produced some prospect of relief of supply, although 
it continued to represent a drain of dollar reserves. In their determination to avert the 
imposition of bread rationing, the Spanish Government could only welcome immersion 
in an initiative which could involve dollar savings and, more importantly even, a 
guarantee of supply.
This came in the form of a long-term bilateral purchasing contract in which the 
only two net wheat exporters of the future European pool, France and Turkey, were 
willing to provide wheat, at a European price, above the IWA price.174 The French and 
Turkish delegations argued that the wheat-output increases projected in their national plans 
(which expected to increase its wheat surpluses to one and two million tons, respectively) 
responded to the OEEC’s call for the maximum expansion of output to cover Europe’s 
deficit in grains and to reduce the hard currency’ drain.175 Both delegations agreed that
17>. ASA, C/3671, folder 6: IWA, Secretariat, Doc. IWC/WR.4733—4/385, Report 
33, "Cumulative Total* of Sales and Purchases for Crop Year 1952/53", 27
February 1953.
174. France had tried already to use the IWA to force sales abroad by means 
of linking wheat sold off-IWA to the sales agreed at the IWA. That is, a 
country member of the IWA could purchase French wheat under the IWA solely 
in the case it bought French off-IWA wheat many times the quantity to be 
bought under the IWA. This attitude was denounced (by the Dutch Embassy to 
the International Wheat Council) as being totally in contradiction to the 
IWA clauses by which offers to sell wheat were to be done at prices 
consistent with the maximum prices determined under the IWA clauses; AN, 
F/10/5270: "Conseil International du Ble", J. de Sailly, Commercial 
Councillor at the French Embassy in Great Britain to the French Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Affairs, 25 June 1951.
175. Faced with the problems of rearmament and increased dollar expenditures, 
the OEEC Council, in March 1951, called on member countries to increase 
their agricultural production, particulartly those commodities imported from 
overseas. The fear of surpluses and falling prices was counter-effected by 
providing producers assured outlets for their products through organised 
marketing in the form of long-term contracts; PRO, MAF 83/3388: "Notes on 
Food and Agriculture Committee of the OEEC and the Pflimlin Plan", London,
16 April 1951. For a detailed overview of the wheat market situation in
542
this, implied not only assured outlets but prices insulated from world prices that would 
allow, after a (vaguely set) transition period, to stimulate further production, to improve 
productivity and to bring prices down to international levels. Once the gap between 
European and world prices had been reduced, trade would take place within a 
free-trade-barriers area according to the system of minimum import prices exercised by 
importing countries, as the Dutch delegation had proposed as the first stage. A common 
external tariff would continue to provide protection from imports from outside the pool 
and provide funds to subsidise European exporters. The French proposal was backed 
immediately by the other two exporters Turkey and Sweden and by Belgium and 
Germany, who maintained domestic prices well above even the French level.
A second proposal involved the establishment of a multilateral agreement for the 
common absorption of European wheat surpluses on a quota basis at a single equitable 
price. The renewal of the IWA shows to what extent, in this specific case, European 
economic cooperation was in opposite terms to international economic cooperation. France 
signed as an exporter, with a minimum quota of 10,000 metric tons (reduced later to only 
9.215 metric tons). In March 1949 a ten-times larger exporting quota was regarded by the 
French as insufficient! From August 1949, France’s export surpluses in wheat had already 
reached 100,000 tons. The French long-term programme to the OEEC forecast an 
objective of wheat exports between 1.5 to 2 million tons by 1952 and the off-IWA wheat 
import requirements of the European nations were estimated at approximately 4.5 million 
tons for 1950/51 !m  In 1953 in contrast, France did not consider the IWA the best 
means to find outlets for French wheat surpluses. The bulk of French production was 
reserved for the European Agricultural Community at guaranteed high prices.177
Western Europe see AN, F/10/5695: Preparatory Working Party for the European 
Conference on the Organisation of Agricultural Markets, Report No. 1, 
Cereals, 15 September 1952.
ni. AN, 80/AJ/14: "Sommaire des objetifs envisagés pour atteindre
l'équilibre en 1952”, 18 June 1948; AN, F/10/5694: Secret Note on the
European organisation of the wheat market, annex II, 1951.
srr. France maintained the same position concerning wheat since the very 
conception of the Pflimlin Plan. "tS]i sur le marché commun la France 
surproductrice ne pouvait placer sa production qu'au prix de l'accord de 
Washington ou aux prix 'mondial' quel qu'il soit, ce serait la négation même 
de la notion de marché européen commun. " AN, F/10/5694: Under-Commission for 
Cereals, entrusted with the task of studying the French interests in a 
common market for wheat, "Organisation d'un marché européen des cereales.
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Unfortunately for France, the obstacle which led to difficulties over the IWA renewal also 
worked against French intentions for a European price. From the beginning of the 1953/54 
crop-year there was a downward trend in wheat prices which placed international prices 
at a lower rate than the minimum IWA price.17*
The low price importers, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, for which 
imported feed grains were essential for their livestock industries, were unwilling to pay 
high prices to subsidise inefficient production. They recalled that the OEEC. faced with 
the problems of rearmament at home and abroad, did encourage member states to increase 
their agricultural production but at the same time stressed the need for increased efficiency 
and greater productivity.179 The United Kingdom and Switzerland argued that any 
preferential agreement at higher than international prices to promote expansion of yields 
was inconsistent with existing undertakings under the GATT and OEEC. The British and 
Swiss representatives had no intention of committing themselves to long-term purchasing 
contracts for expensive food exports when their policy was geared to the consumption of 
low-cost food imports either from the Sterling Area or, in case of further need, the dollar 
zone.1*0 They had not ratified the IWA’s renewal for the same reason. Their position 
swept away any chances of advancing on the multilateral agreement, which required the 
participation of all nations.
The British had expected that, by making clear that their market would not be part 
of any preferential area for increased agricultural production, the work of the groups of
Rapport de M. Pierre Hallé", n/d, probably October 1950. "Si le succès d'un
débouché européen est possible, aucun intérêt à supporter un «lourde»
sacrifice dans le cadre d'un Accord International. Si au contraire, un 
débouché européen s'avère jjnpossible, aucun intérêt à surproduira II faudra 
renoncer à une politique d'expansion." AN, F/10/5643: "Note sur le
renouvellement de l'accord international sur le blé", Paris, 15 January 
1953.
î7ê. AN, F/10/5643: International Wheat Council: "Annual Report for the Crop- 
Year 1954/55", London, 1955.
11f. Diebold: Trade and Payments, cit., p. 253.
l#0. Monnet's original version of the plan in 1948 envisaged the United
Kingdom as a market able to absorb 800,000 tons of French wheat in 1952; AN, 
80/AJ/14: "Moyens d'exécution du Plan 1952", 15 January 1949.
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experts would have collapsed.111 On the contrary, in the case of cereals, it propelled the 
rest of the countries to consider that high producer and consumer prices could stimulate 
their respective domestic production. Furthermore, the French proposal provided a 
bargaining position from which some degree of preference in return for other suitable 
concessions (such as manufactured goods for Western Germany and the BLEU countries, 
fish products for Norway, fruit and vegetables for Italy) could be allowed. The general 
mood was such that even the Netherlands and Denmark came down to the ring to 
purchase 30,000 tons each in exchange far concessions on dairy produce.112 The 
compensatory market access for other commodities which this attitude seemed to imply, 
meant a synchronisation among commodity groups, which did not in fact take place.
Maintaining State control over grain trading, Spain concluded in principle a long 
term purchasing contract amounting to 100,000 tons of French wheat annually. This quota, 
added to Spain's renewed IWA quota of 145,000 tons for the following three years, would 
have covered the country's total annual import requirements of a little over 200,000 tons. 
Spain also accepted that the European price was higher than the world price (about 10 per 
cent above world market price). A guarantee of supply and the prospect of dollar savings 
made the agreement worthwhile. It should be recalled that France, Spain's largest single 
wheat supplier, had been sending wheat to be paid mostly in hard currencies. 
Nevertheless, Spain suggested that the premium should decrease during an (undetermined) 
transitional period, after which it should be eliminated altogether. Importers would then 
be free to choose their suppliers according to the most favourable price, implementing 
minimum domestic prices to protect their national productions once all tariff and 
quantitative restrictions had been abolished and a minimum import price regime 
established. However, the Spanish delegation proposed making the negotiation of the 
premium and its timing and even any possible compromise over wheat, conditional upon
PRO, CAB 134/1014: MAC(53)21st meeting, "Ministerial Conference on the 
Organisation of Agricultural Markets in Europe-The Green Pool", 14 May 1953.
lt2. AGA, C/37132: Mote for the Minister of Conmerce, Madrid, 25 June 1953; 
MAE, Leg. 4612, exp. 16: Note to the Minister of Commerce from the Under­
secretary of Foreign Economy, "Reunión en Paris del Comité Interino de la 
Conferencia Europea sobre la Organización de Mercados Agrícolas", Madrid,
15 July 1953.
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suitable future concessions on fruit and vegetables, particularly in terms of 
liberalisation.1*3
Regarding the WP on dairy produce, the Spanish delegation did not take too 
restrictive a position, since it might have endangered the arguments to be put forward in 
the WP on fruit and vegetables. Spain’s economic interests were limited, since its total 
import figure of dairy produce was very low. Its only concern was that of increased 
competition in the cheese sector and the pressure that continental butter surpluses might 
exercise in forcing up the reduced level of butter consumption in Spain. Experts 
themselves eliminated any danger of immediate liberalisation. They initially envisaged a 
mere coordination of state intervention and price control systems and. subsequently, a 
progressive elimination of trade restrictions. In this case, protection for domestic cheese 
production could be maintained through health provisions. The group of experts agreed 
to discuss the progressive opening of global quotas and the expansion of trade by the 
progressive elimination of quantitative restrictions, although import duties were to be 
maintained until the complete harmonisation of national policies within a unified market.
The Spanish delegation did not oppose global quotas, which they passionately 
defended for fruit and vegetables. According to this system, imports were free up to the 
limit of the quota fixed unilaterally by the importing country. The quota could be one of 
quantity or value, but it could not distinguish between exporting countries. Having no 
main interest in the debate, the delegation decided to make points of principle which 
could be transposed to fruit and vegetables. It supported the argument of overall import 
quotas set at a higher level than the sum of all the existing bilateral quotas, with automatic 
annual increases, augmented at the expense of third countries (i.e., preferential purchasing) 
and in line with increased consumption (i.e., lowering the levels of protection). Finally, 
there would be no discriminatory practices according to the source of supply. The Spanish 
delegation would never have backed such a set of proposals for the dairy produce sector. 
In real terms, the Spanish delegation considered the gradual expansion of import quotas.
1,3. AGA, A/6814: "Nota para la redacción de instrucciones a la Delegación 
española que asistirá al Comité Interino del 'Pool Verde' de 16 de Diciembre 
de 1953", Madrid, 3 December 1953.
546
checked by a system of minimum domestic prices in the hands of the national authorities, 
as better means to provide the necessary protection for Spain's domestic production in the 
field. The important point is that the Spanish delegation only timidly needed to support 
its real interests. The diametrical distant position maintained among delegations saved the 
Spanish representatives from defending totally opposed positions in the different working 
groups. Though this never caused embarrassment to anyone, in particular the French, the 
Spanish were new to multilateral negotiations and thought it very convenient to show a 
uniform policy-line so as not to compromise their support for liberalisation in fruit and 
vegetables.1*4
The Spanish delegation immediately placed most emphasis on fruit and 
vegetables. Exports of these commodities to the OEEC countries represented 90 per cent 
of the nation’s total fruit and horticultural exports, which were in turn of extraordinary 
importance in overall export trade terms (see table 7.2).
TMLI 7.2
VXLOX or THE SIXTY M&XN PRODUCTS EXPORTED IK 1952
(in percentages)
Fruit and Vegetables ....................  48%
Oils, Wines and Alcoholic Beverages ....  9%
Other Agricultural Products ............. 5%
Canned Fish .............................. 2%
Raw Materials .......... .................  26%
Manufactures ............................  10%
TOTAL .................................... 100%
Source: AGA, A/6815: "Consideraciones económicas acerca de la Conferencia 
Europea sobre Mercados Agrícolas** by the National Institute for Agricultural 
Research, 1 July 1953.
Citrus fruits were particularly important in earning foreign exchange, oranges being the 
largest single export commodity. The main goal to be derived from Spain’s access to the 
negotiation tables was to expand its exports of fruit and vegetables, commodities in which
1M. Both prac.ding paragraphs art basad upon MA£, Lag. 3445, axp. 19: 
"Informe referente a las reuniones celebradas por el grupo de expertos sobre 
productos lácteos de la Conferencia Europea sobre la organización de 
mercados agrícolas", 1 July 1953, and, Report by the Under-Secretary of 
Foreign Economy, "Nota resumen de los problemas a tratar en la próxima 
reunión de los grupos de expertos, que se eleva a la consideración y 
aprobación de los Excmos. Sres. Ministros", 22 August 1953; and, AGA, 
C/37132, folder 21 s "Informe previo del grupo de expertos «productos 
lácteos»”, Paris, 27 June 1953.
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Spanish production was considered competitive. Experts in Madrid calculated that an 
increase of 20 per cent in the export of these commodities would have provided the same 
amount of foreign currency earnings as would have been obtained by doubling Spain's 
exports of manufactured goods.
The delegation's main objective was to replace the network of restrictive bilateral 
agreements by some sort of multilateral mechanism still to be defined. They would most 
probably include multilateral commodity arrangements and the reduction of the restrictive 
trade measures applied to Spanish agricultural exports by some of the OEEC members. 
Furthermore, intra-pool preference would expand Spain's exports to the European markets, 
whose increasing requirements in fruit and vegetables were not satisfied from within the 
OEEC area.m That most extra consumption was coming from outside the OEEC was 
particularly damaging in the case of citrus fruits, where the traditional intra-European 
trade flow from the Mediterranean to North European countries was challenged by non 
European producers (see table 7.3).
TABLE 7 .3
IMPORTS OF CITRUS FRUITS INTO SEVEN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES( • )
WITH AREA OF ORIGIN
(in millions of dollars at 1952 c.i.f. prices - annual averages)
1925-29 1934—36 1946-50 1951-52
Dollar Area 3 11 4 11
Non-Dollar Latin America - 16 5 3 (by UK & France)
Overseas Sterling Area 6 21 24 23 (21 by UK)
Other Affiliated Overs. ,Areas 2 7 41 44 (38 by France)
Other Overseas Countries 9 37 26 17 (14 by UK & F.)
Western Europe 114 100 70 119
TOTAL 134 192 170 387
(*) The Benelux countries, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Source: "Europe's Trade in
Agricultural Products", in United Nations: Economic Bulletin for Europe. 
Forth Quarter, 1953f vol. 6, no. 1, Geneva, May 1954, pp. 22-53, p. 36, 
based on the OEEC statistical bulletins and on national trade statistics for 
non—OEEC member states.
In the late 1920s, 88 per cent of Western European consumption was supplied from within 
the area. In 1951-52 this percentage decreased to 31 per cent. The rest came from the
xu. The OEEC area's imports of fruit and vegetables increased by $267.5 
million from 1950 to 1953, while OEEC exports increased by $4 9 million; Erik 
Mortensen: "Producción y consumo mundiales de frutas y verduras". Revista 
de Economía Política, vol. 6, no. 3, September-December 1955, p. 252.
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Sterling area for the United Kingdom, from North Africa for France and from a 
multiplicity of sources for the whole of Europe. The result was progressive competition 
on the European markets by Morocco (Navel), Tunisia (Clementine) and Israel (Jaffa) 
with Spanish orange exports. Between 1934-38 and 1947-50, Spain's share in the 
European market fell from 55.5 per cent of Europe’s total imports of citrus fruits to 29.8 
per cent, although it continued to be the leading supplier of citrus fruit to Europe. During 
the following five-year period this percentage further increased to 49.1.
Spain's reduced volume of orange exports was entirely due to a decrease in 
exports to three countries, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, its three largest 
traditional export outlets for the Spanish oranges. The decline was most marked in exports 
to Germany, which took insignificant quantities in post-1945 years as compared with the
175.000 tons purchased from Spain in the early 1930s. Exports to the United Kingdom 
market also appeared to have been more or less stationary' in the post-war years. Spanish 
exporters suffered a recession in the British market during 1952, partly for purely 
commercial reasons and partly owing to the effects of British impon restrictions.1*6 
France was the only large traditional market which made an outstanding recovery in 1949 
and 1950 and during the season ended in July 1951 it became the largest buyer of Spain 
citrus fruit, exceeding by ample margin the figure envisaged in the trade agreement. By 
the time Spain reached the negotiation tables on agriculture, at the 1952/53 orange export 
campaign, it had finally recovered the export level attained during the years immediately 
preceding the Civil War due to the recovery of pre-Civil War levels of output and 
traditional markets. Switzerland, the Benelux and the Scandinavian countries had a very 
limited absorption capacity and maintained almost invariable import volumes (see table 
7.4). The recovery of the levels of production and exports did not mean the recovery of 
Spain's past position on the European markets. Exports to the main pre-Civil War 
markets, the United Kingdom and France, seemed to have reached the maximum capacity 
allowed by the competition of North African producers and Commonwealth countries. 
There were few chances for any large export increase on the British market, essentially 
because the British desired a wide variety of sources of supply.
*'*. S*« ch*pt«r fiva, pp. 391 if.
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TABLE 7 .4
SPAIN'S PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS OF ORANGES
(in tons)
PRODUCTION EXPORTS
U.K. FRG France Others
1931/35 1,166,100* 267,000 175,000 213,000 204,000
1949/50 621,500 63,738 34,278 151,816 132,3121950/51 840,930 151,225 69,183 188,741 207,786
1951/52 947,000 147,075 113,654 238,951 204,4 98
1952/53 1,113,000 174,257 311,808 218,446 225,896
Source: 194 9/53, AGA, C/37.132: Statistics provided by the Spanish study 
group to the delegation in Paris, n/d; exports for 1931/35, Fritz Baade: La 
agricultura española v el comercio exterior, Madrid [Instituto de Desarrollo 
Económico] 1967, table 1.1; production for (*) 1927/31, Instituto Valenciano 
de Economía: Economía citricola, Madrid [Sindicato Nacional de Frutos y 
Productos Hortícolas] 1951, p. 43.
On the French market, attention was paid not to endanger the North African orange 
producers’ sheltered position. When Spain exceeded the export figure envisaged in the 
trade agreement for the season ending in July 1952 (despite the 35 per cent ad valorem 
levy between 1 September and 1 January), a restrictive quota for the 1952/53 campaign 
(220.000 tons, allowing for only 50,000 tons before January 8th) was implemented." 7 
The Spanish assumed that the levels reached represented approximately the maximum 
export tonnages which the British and French would allow to Spain under normal 
circumstances. Expectations were mostly placed on the elasticity of the German market. 
The elimination of quantitative restrictions on Spain's citrus fruits in the 1952 bilateral 
agreement (though a 10 per cent levy was maintained), resulted in Spain supplying 78 per 
cent of Germany's total imports of oranges and mandarins in 1953 (versus 10 per cent in 
1950). Italy decreased from 36 to 14 per cent in those same years, Morocco dropped from
1,1. S.. Liniger, op. cit., p. 154. Franch North African producer» had
demanded the French Government to postpone to 15 February the starting point 
of the Spanish export canpaign in France; AGA, C/37132, folder 21: Mosquera 
to the General Director for Commercial Policy and Treaties, Spanish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 25 June 1953. In 1952, 43 per cent of France's 
total imports of oranges came from Spain with a total value of Ff 8,038,750. 
They were in a strong competition with exports from Algeria (Ff 5,340,266) 
and Morocco (Ff 3,228,460). Oranges were by far the most valuable commodity 
exported and together with mandarins and lemons accounted for 4 8.9 per cent 
of Spain's total exports to France, while agricultural products accounted 
for 72 per cent of Spain's exports to France. Direction générale des douanes 
et droits indirects: Tableau Général du Commerce extérieur. Année 1952, 
Commerce de la France avec la France d'outrcr-mer et les pays étrangers,
Paris [Imprimerie Nationale].
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46 per cent to nil and the remaining countries passed from 6 to 3 per cent.1*8
Not surprisingly, the Spanish delegate, Antonio Mosquera y Losada, who was 
Councillor of Foreign Economy at the Embassy in Paris, joined his Dutch colleague in 
opposing any increase in tariff barriers, quantitative restrictions (including those of a 
seasonal character), minimum domestic prices, high levels of health and quality controls. 
In contrast, they proposed the adoption of measures for the progressive (and automatic) 
reduction of all protection measures.1*9 Complete trade liberalisation was naturally to 
be accompanied by European preference, thus ending the competition from non Western 
European countries and especially from the Southern Mediterranean coast. Had the 
original Spanish proposals been accepted, Spain would have been able to export the 
maximum quantity of agricultural produce which Western European demand and 
competition would have allowed, under preferential conditions compared to all non-Green 
Pool members. This was not the case however.
The expert group resisted reaching anything close to full trade liberalisation in 
fresh fruit and vegetables. The widespread use of domestic protection was a constant 
feature, since all countries required it for at least some sectors, except citrus fruits. 
Furthermore, there were special obstacles to trade in a sector in which all countries 
cultivated most crops, within a wide variety of products and vast differences in quality 
and price: the so-called ccdendriers.190
1M. Baade, op. cit., table 1.3, and Liniger, op. cit., p. 141. For a 
contemporary perception of the possibilities on the different European 
markets see "La campaña naranjera”, Agricultura. Revista agropecuaria, no. 
260, December 1953, pp. 675-76. For the characteristics of Spain's position 
in orange trade, see Manuel de Torres Martinez and Higinio Paris Eguilaz: 
La naranja en la economía española, Madrid [Sindicato Nacional de Frutos y 
Productos Hortícolas] 1950, for the 1920s and 1930s, Instituto Valenciano 
de Economía, op. cit., for the post-194 5 difficulties and increased 
international competition; and, Liniger, op. cit., for the 1950s.
19’. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 18: Despatch no. 659 from the Under-Secretary of 
Foreign Economy to the Secretary of the 'Green Pool' National Working Party, 
Madrid, 8 June 1953; AGA, C/37132, folder 21: "Conferencia Europea sobre 
Organización y Unificación de Mercados Agricolas**, Note to the Minister of 
Commerce, Madrid, 11 June 1953; MAE, Leg. 344 5, exp. 19: Instructions to the 
Spanish delegation to the WP on fruit and vegetables, in "Nota para el 
Excmo. Sr. Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores sobre la Conferencia Europea sobre 
Organización de Mercados Agricolas**, by the Under-Secretary of Foreign 
Economy, Madrid, 11 June 1953.
190. See chapter five, pp. 379-80.
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A complete reversal of protection in the sector was not desired by anyone and the 
discussion centred on selecting what could work more efficiently in expanding trade while 
protecting markets.191 The experts agreed that, although the system of calendhers 
should be abolished, another disciplinary mechanism should be implemented to avoid 
domestic prices falling due to massive imports. Experts studied two basic systems to give 
effective protection to home production: bilateral quotas (with or without calendhers) 
and global quotas with the corrective mechanism of the m inimum price system.193 
Bilateral quotas, particularly if accompanied by calendhers, were the most restrictive 
and discriminatory of all the protection systems. Most countries would have preferred to 
keep domestic markets protected through strict recourse to bilateral quotas but the IC’s 
mandate was to work towards the "assouplissement" of existing restrictions.
The Spanish representative supported the system of global quotas without any 
seasonal restriction and accompanied by a clause providing for automatic increase. Global 
quotas offered more room for competition on the part of the exporting countries, to the 
advantage of the importing country. Early Spanish production did not risk finding the 
quota exhausted on reaching the importing markets. The disadvantages of the system 
resided in the unilateral fixing of the quota, the duration of regulations and the fact that 
the restrictive period generally implied the closing of the frontier during the marketing 
period of the home product. Again, the Spanish representative repeated the conditions that 
global quotas should satisfy to allow some trade improvement, which have already been 
mentioned when dealing with the expert group on dairy produce.193
The system of m inimum prices attracted majority support, since it protected 
domestic producers while linking protection directly to the state of the market. Imports
1,1. PRO, FO 371/106036: Ag.CI/FL.7 (Rev.), "Draft Report on the Organisation 
of the fruit and vegetables market submitted to the Interim Committee", 23 
September 1953.
XM. The Swiss delegation presented, in turn, the three-phase import regime 
that characterised the Swiss import regime: a first phase of complete
freedom, followed by a short period of global quotas fixed in the light of 
the home grown harvest and ending in complete import prohibition; ibid, 
annex iv, "Statement made by the Swiss Experts to the Group on Fruit and 
Vegetables**.
1M. AGA, C/37132: "Nota para el Excmo. Sr. Ministro de Comercio", Madrid, 
24 June 1953.
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were free when, for goods of similar quality, both the import price on the one hand and 
the sales price noted on the home market of the importing country on the other attained 
or exceeded the minimum price. Once the sales price fell below the minimum price, the 
imparting country was allowed to suspend imports.194 Spain initially opposed the whole 
idea of minimum prices, no matter which method was used to establish them (unilateral, 
bilateral or multilateral). The Spanish delegation would have agreed on global quotas with 
minimum prices if a guarantee could be given that die price fixing process was "fair", i.e, 
multilaterally fixed on a nan-discriminatory basis, and including a mechanism for its 
automatic reduction. The Spanish delegation, however, considered minimum prices to be 
less restrictive than the then current situation of bilateral quotas and calenchiers, since 
it permitted competitive exports during the entire year, although it did not completely rule 
out the fixed timetable and the closing of frontiers. The delegations from Belgium and 
France, arguing the difficulty in fixing minimum prices on a seventeen-power basis, given 
the wide range of production costs and comparable varieties, the daily price oscillation 
of products and the difference in transport costs, led the group to encounter the same 
problem which had deadlocked the discussion of the experts on dairy produce, by refusing 
to accept any interference in the fixing of domestic prices or any automatism in price 
levels. This meant that domestic prices could be set at levels which would make trade 
beyond a certain limit impossible, which the Dutch delegation opposed.1,5
The division of interest was sufficient to prevent any commodity agreement at the 
IC and its groups of experts during the several rounds of negotiations from April 1953 
to January 1954. In theory, the ultimate aim was professed to be the progressive 
unification of markets with the removal of tariffs as well as quantitative restrictions within 
western Europe. Emphasis was laid on the difference between this objective and the work
1M. Not«» on the minimum price ay»tem implemented within Benelux and 
contained in the German trade agreements with the Netherlands and Italy to 
be found as annexes v-vii to Ag.CX/FL.7 (Rev.), cit. In the case where the 
market price in the exporting country was lower than the minimum price, an 
equalisation fee was levied.
1,s. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 19: Despatches no. 1468 and 1577 from the Spanish 
Ambassador in Paris, "Sobre trabajo realizado hasta ahora por los grupos de 
expertos del 'Pool Verde'**, 11 June 1953, and "s/ marcha de los trabajos del 
'Pool Verde'", 22 June 1953, respectively; and, AGA, C/37132, folder 21: 
Julio Rajal Guinda, the Secretary of the Spanish delegation, to Arguelles, 
Paris, 24 June 1953, and "Informe preliminar elaborado por los expertos del 
grupo «frutas y lugumbres»", Paris, 25 June 1953.
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within the OEEC. As a step towards this distant aim it was proposed to organise markets. 
In simple terms, this meant that countries should coordinate all aspects of their agricultural 
policies and attempt to harmonise the differences in production conditions which prevent 
freer trade. As to trade itself, as a first step, it was proposed that multilateral quotas, with 
possible provisions for m inimum prices, should be adopted. In addition, countries should 
grant trade preferences for European products during the organisation stage in order to 
stimulate production and pave the way for eventual unification. In practice the 
disagreement on the system to be adopted for calculating prices and the absence of 
compensations had led the group on cereals to set preferential agreements at a much lower 
level than the anticipated size of non-OEEC grain imports and exportable European 
wheat.196 The disagreement on how trade restrictions should be « so f te n e d » , what 
instruments for domestic protection should be used until a common market came into 
being and the British refusal to join any European scheme, led the work on dairy produce 
and fruit and vegetables to a halt. Except for some vague generalities about harmonisation 
of production, research, increase in consumption and the desire for coordination of 
national policies, none of the recommendations were unanimous. None of the expert 
groups was able to reach agreement on the crucial questions of trade arrangements and 
the application of trade preference.
The Spanish delegation never gave up the pursuit of progressive reduction of 
seasonal restrictions and tariff levels of protection, and the progressive increase in the 
global quotas for each single product either in volume or value. It also pressed for a strict 
definition of trade preference. But the reports only accepted a formula whereby 
participating countries, without renouncing off-pool purchases, could reserve further 
import increases to pool members. The delegations of the Netherlands, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, Portugal and Greece opposed any strict definition of this principle. The 
desire to avoid the constitution of a high-cost club, to maintain colonial preferential links
1M. Preferential agreements reached the level of 1,160,000 tons, while the 
non-OEEC wheat deficit amounted to an overall figure of 5,290,000 tons and 
France and Turkey anticipated export surpluses of 4.25 million tons by 
1958/59; ECOAM: "Preliminary Report by the Group of Experts on Cereals", Ag. 
Cl/Cer 5, 25 June 1953; and "Second Preliminary Report on the Organisation 
of the Cereal Market submitted by the Group of Experts to the Interim 
Committee", Ag.Cl/Cer 7 (Rev 2), 19 October 1953.
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and to avoid the disruption of the equilibrium of the balance of payments with the EPU 
area which Greece had only most recently reached, were the main reasons behind their 
attitude. The only success which can be attributed to Spain (and Italy) was the agreement 
of special treatment for citrus fruits, namely the need to find crd hoc solutions to the 
intra-European citrus trade, although no specific proposals appeared in the final 
report.197
The question of the real economic benefits of the issue was posed when it was 
argued that Madrid acclaimed access to the negotiations as the achievement of important 
political and economic targets. In the case of wheat, the European Conference on the 
Organisation of Agricultural Markets (henceforth ECOAM) had not solved the problems 
presented to Spain as a result of the drought of the previous year and the consequent 
damage to and shortage in its normal crop. Because of the drought and shortage, the 
Spanish Government found it necessary to import large amounts of wheat. These imports 
required the diversion of foreign exchange on purposes and uses which, early in 1953, 
were not contemplated by the Spanish Government. Although imports sufficient for needs 
were made during 1953, by the time the IC’s final report was being drafted, it was 
estimated that up to 200,000 tons of wheat should be urgently acquired by Spain to tide 
it over until the 1954 harvest came on the market and to afford it some margin of safety 
against contingencies.19*
On the one hand, the slow progress in the experts* discussion did not allow 
commodity agreements to proceed. In the case of wheat, might have proved easier to 
accelerate these at the bilateral level with the French. On the other hand, although it was
ir>. Paragraph basad on AGA, C/37132, folder 21: "Mota resuman sobra las
decision«* tomadas por el grupo de expertos de frutas y legumbres", Paris, 
30 July 1953, and "Nota relativa a los programas de trabajo «laborados por 
los grupos de expertos de cereales y productos lácteos", n/d; and, MAE, Leg. 
3445, exp. 20: Instructions to the Delegation to the 4th Interim Committee 
Meeting (13*16 December), Madrid, 7 December 1953. The IC met on 7-11 July 
1953 and again, after a new round of meetings in working parties, in 
December, January and February 1954, to approve the report to the second 
ministerial conference convened for June 1954•
1M. AGA, C/36625: "Memorandum. Préstamo de trigo sobrante", Madrid, 26
February 1954.
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possible to make use of the Economic Aid Agreement entered into with the Government 
of the United States in September 1953, the Spanish Government had reserved the use of 
counter-fund pesetas for checking the expected inflationary effects of the agreement and 
of an increased military effort. The greatest need for economic aid to counter the 
inflationary impact of the base programme was expected to be in the latter part of FY
1954 and all of FY 1955. The fluctuations of supply on the Spanish market and the 
uncertainty of the European negotiations for French and Turkish wheat, forced Spain to 
adopt the decision to import dollar wheat.
In response to urgent appeals, the Eisenhower Administration offered 300,000 tons 
of wheat for a total value of $20 million specifically allocated through the Commodity 
Credit Corporation and outside the normal assistance programmes.200 Wheat deliveries 
began immediately after the signature of the agreement on 31 March 1954, with payment 
in pesetas at the prevailing world price. The rate of exchange adopted, however, created 
a precedent that the Spanish Minister of Commerce strongly disliked.201 Furthermore, 
the counterpart pesetas were drawn upon by the United States Government to finance its 
expenditures in Spain, in particular the peseta cost of its bases construction programme, 
rather than to support development programmes. The immediate reason for this was that 
American estimates considered certain that the peseta cost of Spanish goods and services 
were to exceed the total amount of counterpart pesetas available from the Spanish defence 
support programme for the U.S. programme of peseta expenditure in Spain during 1954,
,oe. Section 550 of the Mutual Security Act of July 1953, the so-called 
McClellan Amendment., authorised the use of between $100 and $250 million of 
military aid funds for financing the purchase by foreign countries of 
surplus agricultural commodities.
201. The initial American proposal suggested the free Tangier exchange rate, 
which at the time of wheat purchase (Pts 43 to $1) was much higher than the
maximum official rate of exchange applied in Spain (Pts 36.95 to $1).
According to the initial American proposal, if the value of the peseta in 
dollars had depreciated in the Tangier market at the time these pesetas were 
being spent for the U.S. base-building programme, Spain would compensate the 
United States to the extent of this decline by a grant of further pesetas. 
If, on the other hand, the peseta had appreciated in value, the United 
States would reimburse the Spanish Government in a similar manner. The 
Minister of Commerce rejected the proposal on the grounds that during the 
negotiations leading to the Agreement of September 1953 the Americans had 
recognised an exchange rate of Pts 35 to $1. Finally, it was agreed an 
exchange rate of Pts 42.5 to $1, which was slightly inferior to the Tangier 
rate but higher than the maximum Spanish rate. The Spanish Minister of
Commerce considered this operation exceptional, due exclusively to the
extreme supply circumstances. See documentation classified in AGA, C/36625.
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even if Spanish prices were maintained.202
Due to the urgency of the situation, Spain accepted the unfavourable conditions 
demanded by the United States authorities. During the 1953-54 crop year, Spain had to 
purchase 1.4 million tons of grain (including the 300,00 tons purchased in pesetas from 
funds allocated from the Commodity Credit Corporation) representing an exchange drain 
between $90 and $100 million equivalent, a large portion of which was in dollars.203 
Thereinafter, Public Law 480 authorised to sell wheat and other United States surplus 
farm products to Spain against payment in pesetas.204
In general terms, however, the most direct economic benefit stemming from 
participation in the Green Pool had been the support received for the request to treat Spain 
as an OEEC member without holding OEEC membership. The Spanish asked their Green 
Pool partners to extend to the Spanish export goods trade liberalisation measures in terms 
similar to OEEC members and to increase the quotas on products not subject to 
liberalisation. With different degrees of success Spain obtained a d e  facto OEEC 
treatment and immediate increases in quotas from the level set by the trade agreements 
then in force. Obviously, different countries (i.e., Belgium, France and Switzerland) 
maintained a calendher system and quota restrictions for those products competing 
directly with its domestic production, as they did with the OEEC countries. However, 
although, Spain could export those commodities liberalised within the OEEC without
202• PRO, FO 371/113033: U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence 
Research, Secret Intelligence Report no. IR-6634, "Spain's probable role in 
Western Europe", 28 July 1954.
aM. The large programme of wheat imports necessitated, apart front the above 
mentioned $20 million in pesetas, approximately $52 million for imports from 
the dollar area and $14 million in other foreign exchange to purchase from 
other sources; FRUS, 1952-1954, VI, "The Director of the US Operations 
Mission in Spain (Williams) to the FOA", Madrid, 23 March 1954, and "Record 
of meeting between Spanish Minister of Commerce Arburúa and certain United 
States representatives, Washington, April 1954", pp. 1967 and 1974, 
respectively. The Spanish Government expressed the need to allocate $100 
million equivalent for cereal purchases (including the $20 million in 
pesetas); Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Note Verbale to the American 
Embassy in Madrid, sent by Dunn to the Department of State, ibid, Madrid, 
2 April 1954, p. 1971.
204. See Gabriel Fernández de Valderrama: "España-USA, 1953-1964", Economía 
Financiera Española, no. 6, 1964, p. 47 and documentation in MAE, Leg. 7741 
for contracts and shipments under the terms of P.L. 480 between Spain and 
the United States. See chapter four for the different points mentioned in 
this paragraph.
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quantitative limits, this country was rarely treated on an equal footing with the other 
OEEC countries. Import concessions came on a bilateral basis and were subjected to 
unilateral modification.“ 5
7.4.2. The Paradox of the Institutional Question
Spain’s unique situation within pools of OEEC members made the institutional 
question a main point of concern for its delegations to the ministerial meetings on 
agriculture and transport, which took place simultaneously in March 1953. The Spanish 
delegations were instructed to guard the national interest against any discriminatory 
institutional plans.
At the transport conference the Spanish delegation did not play an active part. 
This was so even when the idea of the OEEC taking decisions on behalf of Transport 
Ministers arose in connection with the hypothesis of a complete integration of the new 
body within the OEEC. The majority position in the transport field (in favour of an 
autonomous organisation, placed outside the OEEC, with active Spanish participation) 
made unnecessary for the Spanish delegation to oppose close links with the OEEC.206 
At the agricultural conference, the Spanish delegation supported the setting up of an IC 
to undertake more studies before considering what form of organisation was necessary. 
The Spanish delegate protested against any suggestion that the main issue was institutional
See detailed account, in chapter five, p. 448.
"The advantages for Spain from the solution presented are quite evident 
[runs a report on the subject] Spain would belong to an autonomous 
organisation having close relations with OEEC. Such a position would place 
Spain on the threshold of entry whenever this was considered convenient and 
were fulfilled all conditions to assume obligations and benefits emerging 
from membership. To this specific advantage has to be added the fact that 
Spain would take a cautious step forward in her relation to the European 
integration movement at an equal footing to the other States and without 
making further compromises implying engagements of any political nature". 
MAE, Leg. 3166, exp. 7: "Conferencia Europea de Transportes Interiores",
report drafted by the Department of International Organisations at the 
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, 21 May 1953. All the OEEC 
member countries were present at the transport conference (except Ireland 
and Iceland), together with the United States, Spain and Yugoslavia. The 
conference held three sessions during 1953: the first, 18-27 March, the 
second, 27 April to 9 May, and the third 9-17 June.
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and that there was a need to seek collaboration from the OEEC. Spain appeared anxious 
to avoid any institutional link of the ECOAM to die OEEC, because it considered that a 
path similar to that of Transport Ministers was not feasible for agriculture. The Spanish 
perceived the danger of the IC ’’abandoning" its tasks to other bodies if they did not take 
a strong position.207 Fortunately for the Spanish, other countries' interests made it 
unnecessary to maintain a high profile on the question. The IC declared the matter to be 
outside its ministerial mandate and gave free rein to commodity discussions.
At die time of drafting the commodity reports, many countries found difficulty 
in defining their positions until it was clear which form of organisation would emerge. 
The British. Dutch and Swiss showed increasing unwillingness to continue a discussion 
which was leading nowhere near a genuine freeing of international trade. For them, the 
longer the initiative continued to discuss forms of crystalising protectionism, the more 
difficult it would become to abandon the whole scheme and some son of high-cost club 
would emerge in the long term. On the other side stood those who considered trade 
preferential clauses as basic to the organisation of a European green pool. Since most of 
the proposals worked out by the experts were linked to the kind of institutional framework 
to be adopted, matters had reached the stage that before any further progress could be 
made, a decision was to be taken on the institutional question. The so-called sub­
committee on general problems, set up at the IC's second meeting of July 1953. to study 
questions bearing on the relation of agriculture to the rest of the economy, dived fully into 
the institutional question in October. With the early exclusion of a high authority, the 
debate focussed on choosing between a fresh organisation or some sort of association with 
the OEEC.
The inter-governmental character and unanimity rule made the OEEC the best 
alternative for the Spanish Government. However, only an autonomous body could 
safeguard their specific need for a non-discriminatory arrangement. Therefore, the group 
willing to set up an a d  h o c  organisation recruited the Spanish Government, who had
MAE, Lag. 4612, axp. 16: Mota to tha Ministar of Commerça front tha 
Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy, "Reunión en Paris del Comité Interino 
de la Conferencia Europea sobre la Organización de Mercados Agrícolas", 
Madrid, 15 July 1953.
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never considered which type of body should carry the policy proposals coming out from 
the economic experts. The only point that mattered was that the transfer of the Green Pool 
to any pre-existing organisation would place Spain in an inferior position to the other 
participating countries. Consequently, instructions to the delegation favoured an 
independent body with the maximum inter-governmental character possible, allowing for 
the participation of all member countries.208 That is, an imitation of the OEEC at smaller 
scale.
France headed the group, composed also of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Austria, the BLEU countries and Turkey, which favoured a permanent a d  hoc 
organisation.209 These countries argued that only the latter run by the Ministers of 
Agriculture could provide agricultural problems with the attention that they deserved. The 
French Cabinet found it difficult to go into reverse on an issue of this sort for two 
reasons. It required some-face-saving device to confront its increasing difficulties with 
farmers and to secure outlets for new planned export targets.210 Since the commodity
>M. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 20: Instructions to the Delegation to the 4th IC's 
meeting, January 1954.
20*. The national positions referred to in this section of the chapter 
correspond to the attitudes adopted by the different delegations at the 
committee for general questions and at the IC's third meeting, 16-30 October
1953, as recorded in British documentary records; PRO, MAF 40/550: Telegram 
no. 524 and despatch no. 11714 from the UK Delegation to the OEEC, Paris,
16 July and 31 October, 1953, respectively, and Brief of discussion with Mr. 
Van der Leer and Mr. Bakker", 19 October 1953; CAB 134/1019: MAC(53)247, 
"Interim Committee of European Conference on Agricultural Markets (Relations 
between OEEC and Green Pool) Report by the U.K. Representative", 5 November 
1953; and MAF 40/551: MAC(54)4, "Interim Committee of European Conference 
on Agricultural Markets. Note by Secretaries", 5 January 1954, Annex A "Note 
on work of the Green Pool", 31 December 1953.
21°. On the one hand, after July 1953, the FNSEA rallied against the failure 
to export to European markets and the French Government was progressively 
forced to give price guarantees to wheat producers and also pay reabsorption 
charges to wine and milk producers; see Gordon Wright: Rural Revolution In 
France. The Peasantry in the Twentieth Century, Stanford [Stanford 
University Press] 1964, pp. 122 ff. On the other hand, France needed to 
secure agreements to sell what the second national plan for modernisation 
was elaborating as new agricultural surpluses. The Planning Commissariat had 
proposed to the commissions in charge of drafting the second agricultural 
plan to consider the "working hypothesis" of a 20 percent increase of output 
and approximately Ff 130,000 million increase in the value of agricultural 
exports in 1957 with respect to 1952, of which Western Europe would absorb 
the largest part; AN, 80/AJ/54: Presidency of the Council, Commissariat 
Général du Plan, "Résumé du rapport général des commissions de la production 
agricole et de l'équipement rural", 5 October 1953. The export targets for 
1957 were set at 2 million tons of wheat, 20 million hectolitres of milk, 
250,000 tons of sugar and 200,000 tons of meat, at an estimated total value 
of Ff 230,000 millions; Commissariat au Plan: Deuxième plan de modernisation 
et d'équipement (1954-57). Projet de loi portant approbation, Paris, 1954.
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experts bad shown that the only guarantee of supply could be obtained through 
preferential agreements on a bilateral basis, the door had to be left open to Ministers to 
cany out certain restricted agreements.
An independent organisation allowing for the direct representation of Agricultural 
Ministers appeared necessary to maintain the specific interests of agricultural producers 
in their hands. The French were supported by the Belgians, who saw an excellent 
opportunity to maintain agricultural protection in these activities. The Turks naturally 
supported the idea of a European Whe.’t Agreement and hoped to obtain preferential 
prices for their cotton, tobacco and dried fruit. The Germans were most unlikely to go far 
in the direction of giving a preferential market to agricultural products, unless they got 
some q u id  p ro  quo. The pressure of fanners' organisations, which diminished during 
the period of commodity studies because they formed the technical teams, returned with 
the revival of the institutional question.
The United Kingdom headed those nations willing to transfer the agricultural talks 
into the OEEC. The British, who had maintained an observer status at the commodity 
committees, argued that it was difficult to treat agricultural problems and the marketing 
of particular products, in isolation from questions of commercial, tariff and payments 
policy. It was senseless to set up a new organisation merely to stimulate liberalisation of 
trade, which was properly the OEEC’s duty. The latter was the inter-governmental body 
who could most appropriately and usefully discuss methods of increasing agricultural 
production and trade in Europe, including organised marketing arrangements. The British 
received support from Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands. Mansholt came to admit that a new seventeen-power organisation would 
prejudice the chance of progress being made on a six-power front. Furthermore, the 
Netherlands tried to avoid the creation of a protectionist and high cost club. The formulas 
worked out in the experts groups froze the levels of domestic protection instead of 
promoting free and unregulated trade. The British actively pursued the idea that economic 
cooperation should be gauged through the OEEC. when they realised that the benevolent 
attitude adopted towards Transport Ministers had led to independent action outside the 
ministerial control of the OEEC Council. The institutional question at the Conference of
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Transport Ministers could be seen as a general rehearsal before the question became 
unavoidable in agriculture.
There was considerable discussion at the time about whether the transport 
conference should be convened within the OEEC, or u n d e r  the auspices of the 
OEEC. In the normal course of events, the British would have tended to support the 
calling of the conference within the OEEC, but complications came with the proposal to 
invite Spain and Yugoslavia. The British allowed the ministerial conference to be 
convened outside the OEEC to avoid the political difficulties of calling a meeting within 
the OEEC which included Spain and Yugoslavia. They then rejected the integration of any 
new transport organisation within the OEEC. against the arguments of greater ministerial 
control and general economic considerations, to avoid undesirable reforms of the OEEC 
structures and any image of Yugoslavia and Spain being drawn into the OEEC.211 When 
the British decided to cut across the intentions of Ministers of Transport, the Spanish 
participation in the work of the Conference of Ministers of Transport was a fact that could 
not be reversed and which became a problem when determining the future transport 
organisation’s degree of connection with the OEEC.212 The option of a European 
Conference of Ministers of Transport, with no legal power of decision, received 
overwhelming support at the final stage, over the alternative of meetings of the OEEC 
Council, at the level of Ministers of Transport, to which interested non-member countries 
would be invited. The latter alternative would have suited the British and several others 
best, but was faced by the difficulties raised by the association of Spain and 
Yugoslavia.211
The point of interest is that the final report of the transport conference failed to
*u . PRO, CAB 134/1014: MAC(53)10th meeting, "OEEC Conference on European 
Transport", 17 March 1953«
2U. Ibid., MAC (53) 18th, 19th and 20th meetings, ’'OEEC Conference on European 
(Inland] Transport", 23, 29 and 30 April 1953; FO 371/105900: Telegram no. 
135, Ellis—Rees to FO, 29 April 1953.
21*. PRO, FO 371/105900: Telegram no. 449 from Ellis-Rees to FO, 20 June
1953, and CAB 134/1017: MAC(55)156, "The European Inland Transport
Conference. (Personal Report)", by Brigadier Walters, 25 June 1953.
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provide a strong tie with the OEEC.114 There was no reference to mutual obligation of 
consultation between the ministerial conference and the OEEC. It was up to the m inisterial 
conference to decide to consult the OEEC when transport questions raised general 
economic issues. Conversely, it was only "desirable" for the OEEC to refer transport 
problems to the conference. Ministers ofTransport could meet as the OEEC Council when 
member governments so decided according to arrangements worked out between the 
conference, acting unanimously, and the OEEC.2“ The request for unanimity intended 
to determine the position of countries not members of the OEEC as regards decisions to 
be taken in such circumstances. The Spanish delegation wanted to avoid OEEC members 
of the conference meeting as the Council of the OEEC. The future transport conference 
was to maintain limited links with the OEEC. The pressure was then transferred to the 
national delegations to the OEEC to bring Ministers of Transport into line with the 
general policy of their respective governments.
The clarification of the OEEC’s relations with Spain and Yugoslavia was 
necessary if the terms of reference bringing the conference into being should require 
mutually automatic consultation. The Governments of the aforementioned countries did 
not accept the OEEC discussing matters of their special interest and then sending them 
decisions for their acceptance or otherwise. If the attitude of the OEEC towards these two 
countries was restrictive. Spain and Yugoslavia could do their best in the future to see that 
as little as possible went from the conference to the OEEC. The more liberal the attitude 
adopted the greater the prospect of close association between the projected conference and 
the OEEC.216
314• "Relations could be established" with the OEEC, the report ran vaguely, 
"in view of its competence in the field of European economic co-operation*" 
PRO, FO 371/105900: European Inland Transport Conference, Report to the 
Council of the OEEC and to the Governments represented at the Conference,
17 June 1953. Sub-paragraph 5 of section VI of the proposed rules of 
procedure for the future European Conference of Ministers of Transport.
JU. Sub—paragraph 5 of section VI of the proposed rules of procedure for the 
future European Conference of Ministers of Transport.
21‘. PRO, CAB 134/1014: MAC(53)26, "OEEC Conference on European Inland
Transport", 6 July 1953. According to British records, during July 1953, the 
Council was unable to define the relationship between the new conference and 
the OEEC. The French delegation impeded the OEEC in defining the relations 
between itself and the transport conference and thus, between the OEEC and 
Spain, with the argrument that any action in advance of the constituent 
meeting of the transport conference, to be held in Brussels, 13-17 October
1953, could prejudge the issues involved. See PRO, FO 371/105901: "European
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The British viewed the creation of limited bodies as a centrifugal force depriving 
the OEEC of its executive authority. The transport debate revealed a general malaise with 
the OEEC technical committees and the need to reconsider the structure to forestall 
similar developments in other spheres. The separatist course which Transport Ministers 
adopted, accelerated the consideration of the conditions under which the transfer of the 
ECOAM to the OEEC could be seriously considered by Ministers of Agriculture.217 This 
would also counteract against the progressive detachment of agricultural experts from the 
general policies sustained by member countries in the OEEC.
Almost simultaneously, the British Ministry of Food and the delegation to the 
OEEC argued that for ECOAM, conversely to the transport conference, the OEEC 
solution required some structural reforms with the appearance of granting some special 
status to agriculture. Otherwise, it would imply losing the apparent autonomy Ministers 
had reached after much discussion and did not provide the form of face-saving measure 
needed to confront those farmers who distrusted the OEEC’s practices. They 
recommended considering the following proposals for the OEEC reforms: 1. An annual 
meeting of Ministers of Food and Agriculture under the auspices of the OEEC; 2. a 
committee of deputies for Food and Agriculture taking instructions from and reporting to 
the Ministers’ conference, as well as the Executive Council of the OEEC; 3. an enlarged 
and properly qualified Secretariat under a Director of Agriculture. This revision would
Inland Transport Conference. United Kingdom Record of Discussion in the 
Council on July 19”; telegrams no. 801, FO to UK delegation to OEEC, 20 
July; ER(P)(53)6, UK record of discussion at the OEEC Council of 24 July; 
OEEC Document C (53)218, "Council Recommendation of the Establishment of a 
European Conference of Ministers of Transport adopted by the Conference at 
its 223rd meeting on 24 July, 1953"; Telegram no. 560 from Ellis-Rees to FO,
27 July; and "European Inland Transport Conference", memorandum by Ellis- 
Rees, 31 July.
111 • "The risk we have to guard against is that the Ministers of Agriculture 
may feel that OEEC is not sufficiently interested in their spatial problems 
and are likely to ask why they should not have an organisation of their own, 
like the Ministers of Transport." PRO, CAB 134/1017: MAC(53)174, Ministry 
of Food, "Green Pool and OEEC. Comments by the UK Representative on the 
Interim Committee", 31 July 1953. The Italian delegate incidentally referred 
to the transport conference as a "precedent", when the Spanish delegate 
complaint against abandoning the study of general problems to other 
organisations.
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undermine the case for a special body for agricultural questions.2” This meant 
recognition that the failure to give agriculture more prominence in the OEEC programme 
and the lack of interest shown towards suggestions that Ministers of Agriculture should 
meet in the OEEC, had encouraged the experiment of a separate organisation, which 
persisted even after a supranational authority was no longer acceptable.219
Similar reforms were supported from within the OEEC, even by the Italian and 
German delegations to the OEEC.220 The OEEC should also make efforts to adapt its 
rules to avoid the more important drift of agriculture towards a separate organisation. This 
was not exclusively due to the fact that the combined independent action of Transport and 
Agricultural Ministers was perceived as initiating a process of disintegration of the OEEC. 
There was also long-term anxiety to restore the capacity to discuss European agricultural 
problems of the Food and Agricultural Committee.221 Trade in agricultural products was 
in the limelight because of the efforts to eliminate import restrictions and to increase 
liberalisation involving a direct effect on agricultural produce, since liberalisation of 
agricultural products was far less advanced than others.222
2X#. Ibid., and MAC(53)177, 12 August 1953, despatch no. 2 from Ellis-Rees 
to Marquess of Salisbury, 1 August 1953. Before the March 1952 meeting, MAD 
perceived the reactivation of OEEC in the agricultural field as weakening 
the British position because it would oblige them, as leaders of the 
Organisation, to make concessions which they would not otherwise allow. 
British balance of payments difficulties has made it very difficult to 
contemplate any further liberalisation.
2l>. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries warned that such an action 
could be embarrassing in the long run, since the British could be demanded 
to make high concessions in terms of liberalisation. Otherwise, they could 
appeared "as saboteurs of a «genuine» effort" to find a solution to the 
difficulties of exporting countries; PRO, MAF 40/550: "Note for M.A.C.
Meeting on Green Pool", n/s, n/d. It is important to know that the United 
Kingdom, had recently announced its intention to liberalise up to 75 per 
cent (once it had freedom under GATT to increase horticultural duties), so 
that pressure for increased liberalisation was not an immediate problem; 
PRO, CAB 134/1014: MAC(53)38, "Conference on the Organisation of
Agricultural Markets in Europe - The Green Pool", 8 September 1953.
22e. PRO, MAF 40/550: OEEC UK Delegation to MAD, Paris, 18 August 1953.
221. The Food and Agricultural Committee of the OEEC had been most useful at 
the time of dLrafting the combined import programmes of member countries for 
the allocation of dollar aid and planing for increased production designed 
mainly to save dollars during the ERP period and to reduce dependence of 
Europe on imported foodstuffs from the dollar area.
222. Robert Marjolin, the OEEC Secretary General, had already taken the 
initiative in proposing that the OEEC should work towards 100 per cent 
liberalisation. The progressive disappearance of payments difficulties in 
most countries (with the major exception of France), favoured this move. The 
Council of Ministers, in October 1953, decided to proceed to an examination
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The fact that Spain was a member of the Green Pool and not a member of the 
OEEC slowed down the transfer because of the difficulty of associating Spain with the 
OEEC’s work.223 The report to Transport Ministers had simply stated that some special 
arrangements between the two non-member governments and the OEEC should bring 
them into decisions taken by the members of the OEEC. The OEEC’s legal advice office 
studied the form of liaison arrangement between Spain and the OEEC when consultation 
of the OEEC by the permanent conference on the economic aspects of transport problems 
took place. The three alternatives under consideration involved: 1. attendance of a Spanish 
representative at OEEC committees, including the Council; 2. the creation of a special 
liaison committee composed of representatives of some of the OEEC countries which 
would meet with Spanish representatives as necessary; and. 3. an arrangement between 
Spain and the Secretariat of the OEEC, whereby the latter would keep the Spanish 
informed of the work done in such cases and obtain their comments before the OEEC 
decided on its final reply to the conference.224
The first course was obviously the most efficient means of considering Spanish
of the reasons, other than those of balance of payments, for which countries 
wished to continue to protect certain products with quantitative 
restrictions and State trade, the so-called negative lists. A year later, 
however, rnost OEEC countries failed to reach the minimum of 75 per cent for 
each sector despite the fact that some countries (Germany, the Netherlands, 
Italy, Greece, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland) had either reached or 
surpassed the 90 per cent liberalisation level on intra—European private 
trade expected to be reached by the beginning of 1955 and some (Austria, 
Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom) were somewhere between 75 
and 80 per cent. Agricultural products were at the percentage level of 71.6 
per cent (on average), against 83 per cent on raw materials and 73.6 per 
cent for manufactured goods. France reached 50 per cent its overall 
percentage while Iceland and Turkey suspended all liberalisation; AGA, 
C/36869: **Situaci6n de la liberalizaciôn de los intercambios de los paises 
de la OECE", Madrid, 24 September 1954. State trade represented 20 per cent 
in agriculture against 1 per cent in manufactured goods and 7 per cent in 
raw materials; AGA, C/36625: Manuel Thomas de Carranza to Rajal, Paris, 14 
July 1954.
22J. PRO, MAF 40/550: Despatch no. 11714 from the OEEC UK Delegation to MAD,
18 August 1953.
224. PRO, FO 371/105902: "Rôle de l'O.E.C.E. en matière de transports
intérieurs européens. Position de l'Espagne et de la Yugoslavie", by Pierre 
Huet, OEEC Legal Adviser, Paris 19 August 1953. Despite the numerous 
references to the inportance of taking Spanish and Yugoslav susceptibilities 
fully into account in any arrangement between the transport conference and 
the OEEC, no delegation put forward any concrete proposition as to the best 
way of achieving this. At the end of July, Ellis-Rees reported that he 
"intended to approach” the Spanish and Yugoslav Governments to ascertain 
their views; PRO, FO 371/105901: ER(P) (53)6, OEEC UK Delegation, "European 
Inland Transport Conference. Council: July' 24, 1953. U.K. Record of
Discussion*4, Paris, 28 July 1953.
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views. It implied, however, a degree of association with the OEEC unacceptable to some 
countries, including the British.22* The third was the one most likely to prove generally 
acceptable among member-countries, since it was the easiest to follow. The middle course 
of a special liaison body was most satisfactory to the Spanish Government and proved 
generally acceptable to OEEC members.226 Indeed, if the representatives of Spain were 
to join their French and Dutch colleagues, they might well have succeeded in preventing 
the establishment of a mandatory code of consultation or a defined relationship between 
the conference and the OEEC.
A broad Franco-British agreement on basic matters allowed the Brussels meeting 
to proceed with no surprise. All delegations, including the Spanish, supported the 
consultative relationship with the OEEC.227 The Transport Ministers of Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark., France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Free Territory of Trieste, Turkey and 
the United Kingdom drew up and called for signature of the text of a protocol setting up 
a European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT).22* When the 
conference or a restricted group, by unanimous agreement, transmitted its conclusions to 
any international organisation competent to take decisions, Spain was to notify the 
conference of its intention to act as though it were bound by that decision.229 
Concerning the specific case of the OEEC, Spain worked out a liaison committee with the 
OEEC where those economic problems arising from the ECMT, in fact for all matters
225. PRO, FO 371/105902: Intel no. 161, "European Inland Transport", 14
September 1953.
22é. Ibid., OEEC UK Delegation to MAD, Paris, 29 August 1953; CAB 134/1017: 
MAC(53)191, 4 September 1953; and CAB 134/1018: MAC(53)211(Rev.), "European 
Inland Transport. Note by FO", 10 October 1953.
22\ PRO, FO 371/105905: UK Delegation to the OEEC, "Note on Negotiations in 
Paris on the Transport Conference", Paris, 13 October 1953; and "Report on 
the European Conference of Ministers of Transport held at Brussels from 12th 
to 17th October, 1953".
22#. Conférence Européenne des Ministres des Transports: Acte final.
Protocole. Règlement intérieur. Résolutions, Brussels, 17 October 1953. 
Yugoslavia was not represented, although it had been represented at the 
European Inland Transport Conference in Paris during the Summer. Neither 
Austria nor Greece signed the Protocol. The Protocol was signed on behalf 
of the Spanish Government by Vallellano and was finally ratified on 1
January 1954 by a decision of the Council of Ministers.
22#. Sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) of article 9 of the ECMT Protocol.
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interesting Spain from the transpon viewpoint, were discussed.
Once the special role of the OEEC in the transport field was preserved, the 
British, from the Chair of the Organisation, tried to fmd a workable arrangement for the 
transfer of the Green Pool to the OEEC. The British offer to reactivate the agricultural 
discussions within the OEEC intended to break the reticence of some countries, most 
particularly, Denmark and Italy. Denmark’s idea was of a fresh organisation within which 
Governments would try to negotiate schemes for increased liberalisation and. perhaps, a 
gradual reduction of tariff barriers. Despite the fact that the British did not consider the 
latter aspect, Denmark joined the club. The commodity groups showed that it was not 
necessarily true that only a European Agricultural Community (of an inter-governmental 
character) outside the OEEC provided a real prospect of making progress towards 
liberalising trade and that paying more for imported wheat did not imply disposing of 
wider markets in Germany and France for their livestock products.230 The Italian 
position favoured the idea of a fresh seventeen-power organisation which they hoped 
would be more successful than the OEEC in assisting them in finding markets for their 
surplus fruit and vegetables. Once Fanfani. a strong supporter of the Green Pool, was out 
of office, the Italian delegation deserted the Franco-German bloc which made a decisive 
change in the 1C, but continued to be reluctant to become active members of the OEEC 
club. Only a revised OEEC appeared to promise better possibilities for fruit and 
vegetables exports.
The two groups remained in confrontation at the IC’s 4th meeting, 13-16 January 
1954. It is interesting to notice that those promoting an association with the OEEC had 
not yet presented how they intended to do so. The French Ministry of Agriculture 
proposed a fresh organisation of a classic intergovernmental character with power to adopt 
decisions by unanim ity "si elles sont de nature it engager la politique agricole des pays 
participants”.231 Italy suggested an autonomous organism within the OEEC with a
21C. AD, DE-CE, vol. 370: The French Ambassador to George Bidault, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, 6 November 1953.
2,1. "Définition de la position de la délégation française à la prochaine 
session du Comité intérimaire", quoted in AD, «Pool Vert»: DG of Economic 
and Financial Affairs, "Note pour le Cabinet du Ministre", 11 January 1954.
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ministerial council with a unanimity rule, in which Spain should be represented with 
"absolute equality". The Swiss delegation suggested following a path similar to the one 
already established for transport, though with better defined linics to the OEEC than 
ECMT, which worked a similar arrangement for Spain. Most of the participating countries 
leaned towards transfer to the OEEC, but those reticent delegations still pressed for an 
independent organisation. The division of opinions on the institutional matter was so 
significant that the agreement was left to Ministers.232
The United Kingdom intended to reach a definitive agreement within the OEEC, 
so the Governments of those countries particularly opposed to the OEEC solution could 
bring their Agricultural Ministers back in line.233 The provisions for restricted 
agreements and for the Spanish association paved the way with difficulties. The OEEC's 
rules of procedure allowed any country to cripple any restricted agreement, even if it were 
acceptable to the majority.234 Therefore, the French demanded an extensive use of 
"special cases" from the unanimity rule.235 The constitution of some multilateral 
agreement (i.e., the European Wheat Agreement) did not seem very problematic if the 
French could interest other countries.23* The problem resided in applying preference
212. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 20: "Nota informativa sobre la reunión de la cuarta 
sesión del Comité Interino de la Conferencia Europea sobre la Organización 
de Mercados Agrícolas**, the head of the Spanish Delegation to the IC to 
Argüelles, Paris, 21 January 1954.
2M. At the meeting of the IC on 26-30 October 1953, it was decided to
approach the OEEC with a view to agreeing to a method of collaboration on
problems which were beyond the competence of agricultural experts. This was 
the first real opportunity to influence the Green Pool talks directly and 
officially from within OEEC; PRO, MAF 40/550: "Green Pool", the OEEC UK
Delegation to MAD, Paris, 31 October 1953; and CAB 134/1019: MAC(53)247, 
"Interim Committee of European Conference on Agricultural Markets (Relations 
between OEEC and Green Pool) Report by the U.K. Representative”, 5 November,
2M. Article 14 of the Convention setting up the OEEC reads: "Unless the
Organisation otherwise agrees for special cases, decisions shall be taken
by mutual agreement of all Members. The abstention of any Members declaring 
themselves not to be interested in the subject under discussion shall not 
invalidate decisions, which shall be binding for the other Members."
215. PRO, FO 371/111239: "Note on Regional or Restricted Groups and Article 
14 of the Convention for the Organisation of European Economic Cooperation", 
attached to despatch from the OEEC UK Delegation to FO, Paris, 1 January 
1954; and AD, <<Pool Vert»: Note for the minister, cit., 11 January 1954.
2,<. The group of experts on cereals, chaired by Pierre Hallé, who
represented French wheat producers on the FNSEA, had obtained a basic
agreement to sell at least 400,000 tons of wheat to the Germans. The German 
representation to the conference, presided over by Andreas Hermes, the head
of the German Union of Farmers, agreed because European wheat would help to 
keep wheat prices above the world market level to assure high incomes for
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over a wide range of products. We saw bow the increasing schizophrenia reached at the 
working parties led most of the delegations to accept special European prices and some 
degree of preference in return for suitable concessions in the products they were interested 
on. In these circumstances, the emphasis was laid on the importance of compensatory 
transactions in order to provide a cpjid pro CJUO for those countries importing 
agricultural products at preferential prices. This also required, in the form of 
compensation, to provide preferential treatment for industrial exports of importing 
countries. How could these plans be expected to be brought into effect by the OEEC in 
consideration of a "special case", without encountering the range of Ministers of Finance 
and Economic Affairs?237 In principle, a preferential market system for agricultural 
products was not consistent with the policy of the OEEC, which aimed to encourage 
economic growth on a competitive basis leading towards dollar convertibility and non­
discrimination towards imports from the outside world. "The result of this might be a 
return to bilateralism."231
farmers. The German delegation also accepted some price preference in 
exchange for compensation in other fields (i.e., industrial products). This 
ran against the position of the Federal Minister of the Economy, who 
insisted in bringing wheat prices down by purchasing on the cheapest markets 
available (including the dollar area) and selective expansion of production, 
without preferences or compensation, in the context of progress towards 
world-wide multilateral trade and convertibility.
221. The negotiations in the transport field showed the difficulty to 
dispense with restricted agreements, as the French had suggested; PRO, CAB 
134/1014: MAC(53)19th, 20th & 22th meetings, "OEEC Conference on European 
[Inland] Transport", 29-30 April and 22 May 1953, respectively. The 
conference's final report implied that the future organisation would have 
no power to take decisions binding on all member governments but could 
exclusively make recommendation; PRO, FO 371/105900: European Inland
Transport Conference, Report to the Council of the OEEC and to the 
Governments represented at the Conference, 17 June 1953. In cases requiring 
an international agreement, "such an agreement could not be concluded within 
the Conference of Ministers, in the event of opposition by one or more 
Member countries." Sub—paragraph b.2 of section V of the proposed rules of 
procedure of the future European Conference of Ministers of Transport.
As Lloyd explained to Rabot and Malecot, the French Chairman of the IC 
and the Head of the French Delegation to the Green Pool, respectively; PRO, 
MAF 40/551: "Note on discussion with Messrs. Malecot and Rabot on Friday, 
February 19 concerning the Green Pool", by the British Delegation to the 
OEEC, Paris, 22 February 1954. British strong opposition to "special 
agreements" might also have been due to the likelihood that any preference 
for European produce given by Western Germany (the only other substantial 
importing country in Western Europe) was likely to be compensated by 
preference of some kind for industrial goods to the detriment of United 
Kingdom goods. The action programme proposed by Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees 
disregarded restricted agreements; PRO, MAF 40/551: "Draft Paper by the
Chairman of the Council on the work of the OEEC on Agriculture", attached 
to despatch no. 11708/54, OEEC UK Delegation to FO, Paris, 5 April 1954. The 
question was left to the goodwill of countries whose vital interests were 
not concerned, who would abstain if a group of countries wished to operate
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The second problem far the transfer of the activities of ECO AM to the OEEC was 
the association of Spain with the agricultural work of the OEEC. It was necessary to find 
a solution not involving an inferior position in deliberations at the "political level” of the 
OEEC Council, otherwise unacceptable to the Spanish, before anyone could regard it as 
an impediment to following the British path.2”  Fortunately for Spain, the British 
accepted paying the price for the sake of securing a proper and clearly-defined link with 
the OEEC. The British recognised that the reactivation of the OEEC's agricultural 
activities and discussions on agricultural matters at ministerial meetings did not 
necessarily "entail the exclusion of Spain."340 The establishment of a liaison committee, 
as was the case for inland transport, was immediately rejected by the British as falling 
short of what was required for agricultural matters.241 By March 1954, the most viable 
solution appeared to be observer status to the OEEC as a whole.242 This was a 
misunderstanding of the Spanish position and was caused by the fear that Spanish 
discontent could lead them to veto the transfer. The Spanish, convinced of the inevitability 
of the OEEC solution, were thinking along liaison lines, to allow Spain to participate in 
the agricultural discussions but without committing them to any obligation.243
Having reached this point, it seems necessary to explain that the question of 
Spanish membership of the OEEC was also considered. The question arose to the British 
with the first indications of the Spanish Government’s apparent interest in becoming a full 
member of the OEEC.244 This was an anticipated move to the possibility that a correct
an agreement among themselves.
2,#. PRO, MAT 83/3391: "Record of Conversation", by the UK Delegation to
OEEC, Paris, 18 January 1954,
240. PRO, MAT 40/550: 9th meeting of UNISCAN, "Brief for discussion of the
Green Pool", October 1953.
741. PRO, FO 371/111308: FO to British Embassy in Madrid, 12 February 1954.
743. PRO, CAB 134/1021: MAC(54)42, draft of a despatch to Ellis-Rees, setting 
out the official British attitude to the granting of observer status to 
Spain in the OEEC.
2°. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 24: "Pool Verde. Consideraciones sobre los trabajos 
realizados hasta el momento presente y sobre la posición española en la 
próxima reunión de Ministros de Agricultura", 15 February 1954.
244. Arguelles indicated to Ellis-Rees that at any rate the Spanish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs wanted to pursue the idea of securing Spain's entry into 
OEEC; PRO, FO 371/106047: Note of an interview with Arguelles, by Ellis-
Rees, Paris, 11 September 1953. During the course of the ECMT constituent
session, the leader of the Spanish delegation at the deputy level, Cortina,
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solution of the transport or agricultural conferences required Spanish OEEC membership. 
The point of departure was the stated policy not to take the lead in promoting any relation 
between Spain and the OEEC.245 A first consideration could be limited to the domestic 
level. The direct cost of Spanish membership of the OEEC was very reduced for the 
United Kingdom (as for Germany), who extended their own liberalisation measures to 
Spain automatically.246 The Economic Relations and Western and Southern Departments 
concluded that "there might be positive economic advantage in such membership" 
(provided that Spain undertook to carry out fully the obligations of membership).247 The 
Board of Trade and the Treasury affirmed that Spain's OEEC membership would do little, 
however, to solve part of the then existing trade problems with Spain, i.e., the make the 
latter respect its bilateral obligations, which caused hardship and distress to British 
industry. It was likely that Spain would have been unable to liberalise very far in the 
minimum 75 percent liberalisation for a long time. In that event, Spain's free lists would 
have contained an insignificant number of those goods which accounted for the greater 
pan of everyone’s difficulties with the Spanish authorities. In this case, apart from 
whatever liberalisation measures the Spanish authorities might have taken, they would 
have continued to trade with the other OEEC member countries on a bilateral basis and 
not necessarily have adopted a system of global quotas for imports from the EPU area of 
goods in the non-liberalised sector.24*
With regard to the effect of Spanish membership on the OEEC as a whole, serious 
disadvantages were perceived to come from the structural character of Spanish foreign 
trade. Spain was likely to prove a structural debtor in the European Payments Union 
(henceforth, EPU) and, therefore, retard the liberalisation programme and be an incentive
Director General of International Organisations at the Spanish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, told the British representative that the Spanish Government 
wished to join OEEC; indication confirmed by the Portuguese Minister of 
Transport; PRO, FO 371/105905: "Report on the European Conference of
Ministers of Transport held at Brussels from 12th to 17th October, 1953".
a45. PRO, FO 371/105902: Intel no. 161, "European Inland Transport", 14
September 1953.
244. As we have seen in chapter five, very rarely did the British exclude 
Spanish export commodities from Open General Licence and the Germans 
extended an ample OEEC treatment to Spain.
*47. PRO, FO 371/106047: "Spain and the OEEC",. 28 October 1953.
,4*# Ibid., BT and T to FO, 16 November and 11 December 1953, respectively.
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to everybody else to maintain resistance to further liberalisation.249 Spain's EPU 
membership, which would necessarily follow from membership of the OEEC, was only 
possible if in the sort of position of Iceland, Greece and Turkey of complete suspension 
of all liberalisation measures (by October 1953).230 The change brought about in the 
Spanish balance of payments with the EPU area, moving from a deficit of $25.7 million 
in 1952 to a surplus of $14.7 million in 1953, was not due to an improvement in the 
export performance at all, but to a policy of restricting imports and other foreign 
expenditure (see table 7.5). Thus to avoid running into debt in EPU, Spain would have 
to maintain its trading policies unchanged, particularly bilateral bargaining. Membership 
of EPU would have deprived the Spanish authorities of their argument for discrimination, 
namely, the lack of a given country's currency.
Little possible mitigation was provided by the provision of special American 
assistance in meeting future Spanish deficits, since all economic aid was generally coming 
to an end as a technique of providing dollars in the non-dollar world.231 The addition
30. In October 1953, the OEEC Council had endorsed the objective of a 100 
percent liberalisation of private trade on the 194 8 basis in the near
future. When at the end of October 1953, the OEEC Council asked the member
countries to provide information in order to draft a "negative list” of the
products that, although presenting no problems from balance-of-payments 
point of view, countries were not willing to liberalise. The French 
authorities refused to consign it, but they announced that from April 1954, 
France would re-liberalise imports. A proposal by Marjolin to implement the 
100 percent liberalisation on private trade on 1 April 1954, was blocked by 
the Onited Kingdom and France. The latter was only willing to liberalise 
then 52 per cent of 1948 private imports; AD, DE-CE, vol. 353: French
delegation to OEEC Secretary General, Robert Marjolin, Paris, 15 April 1954. 
Only measures to control de-liberalisation were agreed. A country which de- 
liberalise had to increase its liberalisation percentage after one year to 
60 per cent and after eighteen months to 75 per cent; Boyer and Salle, art. 
cit., p. 209. The EPU and the Steering Board of Trade, however, could 
invalidate this new measures if the position of a given country made it 
necessary. In November 1954, after imposing new customs duties on 
liberalised commodities, the French liberalisation percentage reached the 
65 percent. It was not until January 1955 that the French authorities felt 
sufficiently confident to bring the percentage of liberalisation back to the 
level of February 1952.
**°. By October 1953, Austria maintained a total percentage of 35.8 and the 
United Kingdom 58.5. France had not re-liberalised at all yet. The total 
OEEC liberalisation percentage was 70.4 (61.1 corresponding to agricultural 
commodities, 73.9 to raw materials, and 71.3 to manufactured goods); J.M.J. 
Clerx: Nederland en de liberalisatie van het handels- en betalingsverkeer 
(1945—1958), Groningen [Wolters Noordhoff] 1987, table on p. 152. 1 would 
like to thank to Arendjan Boekeslyn for bringing to my attention this table.
351. This was a general European pattern. Conversely to the Marshall Plan 
period, economic aid was no longer a priority. Already during 1953, United 
States military aid surpassed economic aid to Europe. In 1954 the 1951 ratio 
economic/military aid was completely reversed, total economic aid to Europe
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of a further structural debtor would complicate still more the problems connected with 
providing credit in Europe to the inconvertible countries in the event of the stronger 
members becoming convertible. In these circumstances, the effect of the Spanish joining 
the OEEC and the EPU would have been reduced, at best, to subject them to the usual 
(ineffective) pressure from the OEEC to bring their economy into a state in which they 
could fulfil the obligations of membership. At this point, it was difficult for the OEEC 
to exercise guardianship over a country, whose authorities were considered incapable of 
managing any liberalisation, while other forms of observer status could accomplish the 
same objective and yet avoid the debate.252
TABL£ 7.5
SPAIN'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WITH THE OEEC COUNTRIES, 1952-1953
(in dollars)
IMPORTS c.i.f. 
OTHER EXPENSES
1952 
313,375,651 
(338.5 m.) 
54,917,489
1953 
290,811,630 
(377.6 m.) 
51,787,255
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 368,293,140 342,598,885
EXPORTS f.o.b.
OTHER RETURNS 
TRADE CREDITS
275,871,362 
(289.0 m.) 
55,767,441 
8,600,000
268,839,795 
(307.3 m.) 
79,629,085 
8,800,000
TOTAL RECEIPTS 340,238,803 357,268,880
BALANCE - 28,054,337 + 14,669,995
Source : AGA, C/36622: OEEC, C/WP11/W(56)15, "Working Party No. 11 of the 
Council. Association of Spain in the work of the Organisation. Balance of 
Payments with Member Countries in 1952, 1953 and 1955", Paris, € June 1956. 
Spain refers to metropolitan Spain, the Balearic and Canary Islands, Ceuta 
and Melilla. The value of imports and exports of this table differs from the 
official Spanish foreign trade statistics: imports suffered from an average 
23 percent overvaluation while it was 28 per cent for exports; by years, the 
overvaluation was 33 per cent in 1952 and 18.5 per cent in 1953. Figures in 
parenthesis correspond to imports and exports to the EPU area (OEEC 
countries + their monetary areas) according to the statistical yearbooks of 
Spanish foreign trade.
Whether the balance of advantage on economic grounds was in favour of Spanish
dropped by half in relation to 1953, and economic assistance to Austria, 
Ireland, Portugal, the BLEU and the Scandinavian countries, had disappeared. 
During 1955, total economic aid to Western Europe, including Yugoslavia, had 
been reduced to a mere $466.4 million (compared to the $6,276 million of
194 9); U.S. Foreign Assistance, cit., pp. 8-25.
lM. The FO had reached the conclusion that "if sufficient members of OEEC 
were to support an application by Spain for membership of OEEC", it should 
not be opposed on political grounds; PRO, CAB 134/1019: MAC(53)271, "Spain 
and the OEEC. Note by the FO", 22 December 1953.
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membership and whether there was strong opposition within the OEEC, were less 
important factors than whether the Spanish Government was ready and prepared to carry 
out the obligations of OEEC membership. Despite the Spanish representatives’ indications 
mentioned before, Spanish OEEC membership was not officially considered by the 
Spanish Government, who made no formal move. The latter referred exclusively to liaison 
arrangements in transport and agricultural matters to move closely into the OEEC's orbit, 
without necessarily going as far as membership. A month after the constitution of the 
ECMT, Cortina asked the OEEC Deputy Secretary General, Colonna, whether the time 
had come for Spain to send an observer to the OEEC (not forecast in the transport 
protocol), though he did not mention the possibility of Spain joining the organisation.253 
Observer status had more political and propaganda value to the Spanish regime than 
economic significance and did not presage any intention of full membership. There was 
little doubt that the Spanish Government would have found it difficult to comply with the 
discipline involved in full membership (entailing a radical modification of their basic 
trading policy, a comer stone of which was the multiple exchange rate).
In terms of trade liberalisation, no move would have been undertaken until 
sufficient financial backing had been effectively provided by the United States authorities. 
Concerning the exchange rate practices, John Balfour, the British Ambassador in Madrid, 
reported that Arburua, the Spanish Minister for Commerce, stated repeatedly that it was 
premature to talk about a unified exchange rate.234 Indeed, an indication that the system 
remained dear to the heart of the Spanish authorities was its extension in order to assist 
Spanish dollar-earning capacity. In these circumstances, the question of Spanish OEEC 
membership did not reappear until the Green Pool was definitively transferred to the 
OEEC.
The second ministerial conference, 6-10 July 1954, provided a solution to the 
institutional question. The Spanish delegation was instructed not to strongly oppose the
1S>. ASMAE, DGAP, b. no. 256: Cortina to Colonna, Madrid, 21 November 1953.
,M. PRO, CAB 34/1021: MAC(54)29, Daapatch no. 30 to Anthony Edan, Foraign 
Secretary, on Spain's attitude towards OEEC, 4 February 1954.
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OEEC option, in case this solution was imposed.235 In fact, this was the compromise 
reached after some struggle among delegations. Countries could bind themselves within 
the framework of the OEEC by special agreements "insofar as they are not in 
contradiction with existing international commitments".256 Spain accepted the transfer 
conditions once it obtained assurances that it could take part fully on an equal 
footing with OEEC countries in the agricultural bodies.257 A satisfactory solution to 
both questions, restricted agreements and the Spanish request for a special non- 
discriminatory arrangement, had been necessary to reach the required unanimity
A ministerial resolution articulated the conditions that the OEEC should meet for 
the transfer of agricultural talks. The OEEC Council should meet twice a year with the 
Ministers of Agriculture holding the national chair. A Ministerial Committee for 
Agriculture and Food should directly report to the Council of Ministers, helped to carry 
out its tasks by a permanent Committee of Deputies, taking instructions from and 
reporting to the Ministers, and an enlarged and properly qualified Secretariat under a 
Director of Agriculture, who would, of course, be subordinated in status to the Secretary 
General of the OEEC. The final point of the resolution mentioned that Spain should
,5!. MA£, Leg. 3445, exp. 24: "Reunión Pool Verde € Julio 1954. Proyecto de 
Instrucciones sobre el aspecto institucional”, Madrid, 22 June 1954. 
Position made perfectly clear by Cavestany; PRO, MAF 40/552: Ag.Conf./45, 
"Déclaration de M. Cavestany, Ministre de l'Agriculture, Chef de la 
Délégation de l'Espagne”, 6 July 1954. On the other hand, preliminary 
conversations were offered by Portugal back in June for a joint defence of 
agricultural bodies within OEEC based upon unanimity; ibid, Despatch no. 486 
from Spanish Embassy in Lisbon, "Próxima conferencia 'Pool Verde'", 2 June,
1954.
25i. For a detailed account of the immense difficulty to reach this 
compromise between French and British see PRO, MAF 83/3392: MAC(54)146, 
"Report on the last European Conference on the organisation of agricultural 
markets", 19 July 1954. The British, Dutch and Danish delegations said that 
they interpreted this last sentence to mean that if the Ministerial 
Committee on Food and Agriculture could not reach unanimity when considering 
agreements of the kind under discussion the matter would be referred to the 
Council where any country was free to use its veto. The compromise could be 
reached because before the ministerial conference the Quai d'Orsay had 
decided to "liquider [♦..] une entreprise qui n'a pas réussi"; AD, «Pool 
Vert»: DG of Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic Cooperation Office, 
"Note: Transfer du pool vert à l'OECE", 24 June 1954.
251. "Spain should take a full part in the work of the organs concerned with 
agriculture envisaged in the preceding paragraphs." AGA, A/6814: OEEC
C (54)326, Annex II, "Projet d'Accord entre l'OECE et le Gouvernement 
Espagnol relatif à la participation de .l'Espagne aux travaux de 
l'Organisation intéressant l'agriculture et l'alimentation", Paris, 10 July
1954.
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participate fully in these bodies and also participate (but not fully) in the work of other 
OEEC committees when these were dealing with questions which might affect food and 
agriculture.231 The resolution was a unit which the OEEC should accept or reject totally. 
The establishment of a direct link between the creation of a d  h o c  bodies allowing for 
the Green Pool transfer to the OEEC and the Spanish question proved useful for Spain. 
It meant that a possible veto (probably from Belgium or the Scandinavian countries) 
would imply the French Minister of Agriculture calling a new meeting. This would have 
been opposed particularly by those willing to close the affair and leave the ECOAM tied 
up within the OEEC.
The question of Spanish participation in the new agricultural bodies was a matter 
of negotiation between Spain and the OEEC and a general agreement concerning the 
complete resolution should be reached between an ECOAM Commission and the OEEC's 
Committee of Eight299 It was up to the OEEC to solve the Spanish question, which 
would only come to the ECOAM Commission when a formula had been agreed upon. The 
ministerial resolution implied the need to design a new participating system to fit the 
specificity of the Spanish case, i.e., making the granting of full rights compatible with 
Spain’s status of dod-OEEC member. Before the actual negotiations, scheduled for 
September, started between Spain the Group of Eight, the Spanish rushed to make up their 
minds. They thought the resolution meant that when a matter, due to its general economic 
nature, was passed for decision to the OEEC Council of Ministers, that Spain should take 
part at the deliberating process at the Council of Ministers of the OEEC although without 
vote and veto. According to this position, any resolution so adopted was to be studied at 
the Council of Ministers in Madrid who unilaterally would decide whether to accept it, 
defer its application or reject it altogether, that is, the "Spanish right to veto”.240
!M. PRO, MAF, 63/3392: "Resolution of the Conference", 12 July 1954.
***. The Commission was composed of representatives from Italy, France, the
Netherlands and Spain. The OEEC Committee was a working party instructed to 
keep under review the relations of the OEEC with other organisations
concerned with European economic cooperation and composed of delegates from 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Turkey and Sweden.
This position was known as the Cortina formula, named after its
proponent; see summary in MAE, Leg. 10078, exp. 21: Antonio Mosquera y
Losada, Commercial Counselor at the Spanish Embassy in Paris, to Arguelles, 
Paris, 6 August 1954; and Arguelles to Mosquera, Madrid, 10 August 1954.
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Arglielles did not like the idea of Spain having neither a vote nor a veto, which difficulty 
placed it on an equal footing. For him, the right position was that of full membership, 
including a voice and veto at the Council, while discussing agricultural matters.261 The 
Under-Secretary mistook the target of promoting a full-scale discussion about the 
advantages of Spanish OEEC membership, because the OEEC was able to fulfill his 
Government’s political exigencies without requiring any economic counterpart.
The Spanish question was pan of the ministerial resolution and thus constituted 
a condition for the transfer of the work of the Green Pool to the OEEC. A majority of the 
OEEC delegations argued strongly in favour of the closest possible association of Spain 
with the agricultural work of the OEEC. From the initial debate, it was clear that any 
formula envisaged would, in practice, mean that the Spanish representatives would have 
M l rights in the agricultural committees and extensive facilities to attend meetings as 
observers in other parts of the organisation when agriculture had some bearing on the 
discussion. No clear indication of how to articulate this was provided, because their major 
effort was directed to placate the Belgian representative’s claim that no decision should 
be taken regarding Spain until the transfer of the Green Pool had been compleied and that 
no change in the relationship between Spain and the OEEC should take placed Since 
a formal commitment existed to grant Spain full membership to the Ministerial Committee 
and the Committee of Deputies, the discussion centred on whether the Spanish should 
enjoy any automatic rights as to participation in the non-agricultural bodies of the 
Organisation when agricultural questions are involved. In the case of the Council, 
everybody agreed, including the Spanish, that Spain should participate in the discussions 
on agricultural questions at the Council level but the Spanish delegate would not, of
This was the formula finally accepted.
Ibid, "Notas relativas a la posición española en relación con la 
propuesta de integración en la OECE de los trabajos de la Conferencia 
Europea de Organización de los Mercados Agricolas (Pool Verde)", by 
Arguelles, Madrid, 3 September 1954.
PRO, MAF 83/3392: ER(P) (54)17, UK Delegation to OEEC, "Green Pool", 17 
September 1954. The Belgian position came as a surprise. As far as I know, 
no major economic problems existed between the two governments. The only 
difficulties concerned the Barcelona Traction Company in which Belgium had 
a substantial interest and to which the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Paul Henri Spaak, had been a legal adviser, but this hardly justifies the 
Belgian attitude.
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course, be able either to veto Council decisions or to participate in them.263 A procedure 
could easily be worked out under which Spain could, if it so desired, accede to a Council 
decision. The main problem was thus, how to associate Spain with the work of other 
bodies of the OEEC. It emerged that Spanish participation in the agricultural work of the 
OEEC became the principal remaining difficulty.
It was essential to resolve the Belgian difficulty and the Spanish exigency on the 
procedure for association to non-agricultural committees. Both countries, from their 
respective positions in the OEEC Council and ECO AM Commission, could easily abort 
the transfer to the OEEC if the agreement fell short of their expectations. The Swiss 
representative suggested drawing up a list of specific subjects with the idea that the 
Spanish would only be invited to attend meetings of non-agricultural committees when 
items on this list were under discussion. Colonna put forward the possibility of a group 
of three (Chairmen of the Council and the Executive Committee and the Secretary 
General) looking at the agendas of various committees with a view to inviting Spain to 
attend when agricultural items were being discussed.264 The Scandinavians proposed 
some form of liaison committee, which was open to a number of practical objections by 
a majority of delegations. The British worked out an observer status vis-à-vis the OEEC 
as a whole, which the Portuguese delegate was charged to defend, by which Spain could 
send observers to any meetings of the committees concerned without specification.263
***. Arguelles agreed that full action at the Council level (when 
agricultural questions were discussed) was impossible for non-full members; 
PRO, MAF 40/558: Ellis—Rees to Coulson, "Spain and the OEEC**, Paris, 20 
October 1954* The existing contradiction between this attitude and the one 
he adopted in September might be due to the fact that in Spain, as section 
7.5.2 will show, Arguelles intended to force the debate about Spanish 
membership of OEEC. At its meetings on 14 September, the Group of Eight had 
agreed to all the institutional requirements which appeared on the 
resolution of 10 July of the European Conference on the Organisation of 
Agricultural Markets. In fact, it had agreed practically to all the measures 
put forward to give effect to the Green Pool transfer to OEEC. The fact that 
the French Assembly rejected the EDC Treaty, on 30 August 1954, might have 
helped to speed up the general agreement to end this already irritating 
negotiation.
244. Ibid., "Record of conversation", 20 September 1954.
. Ibid., despatches from the OEEC UK Delegation to MAD, dated 21 and 22 
September and 5 and 6 October; and FO to UK Delegation to OEEC, 2 October
1954. The despatch of 5 October to be found in FO 371/111308. The only 
restriction referred to those committees already restricted in membership, 
such as the Executive Committee, the Managing Board of the EPU, the Steering 
Board for Trade and the Overseas Territories Committee, which were not open 
to some full members of the OEEC.
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Conferring a broad right of entry- as observers to any OEEC Committee went beyond what 
was necessary to comply with the ministerial resolution. The Belgians reacted with what 
they called "an agricultural approach” formula, whereby Spain would be permined to send 
observers to meetings of the Council and of a specified list of committees when they were 
dealing with "agricultural or connected questions". Spanish attendance at other technical 
committees was not overruled but was subject to specific invitation and was considered 
an exception to the rule that Spain should have no access to the restricted bodies.266 
Although the Belgian formula was not as satisfactory as the one advocated by the British, 
it was acceptable for the Spanish authorities, because oral word was given that there 
would not be a rigid interpretation so that the Spanish were left to decide in what cases 
(including general discussions and not exclusively discussions on specifically agricultural 
questions) they would attend meetings.267
Once Heads of Delegations reached an informal agreement, the arrangements for 
the participation of Spain in the work of the OEEC were examined with Arglielles and 
Escoriaza (on 29 November).26® The OEEC negotiating team was composed of Ellis- 
Rees, Cattani and Colonna. The Spanish representatives raised three formal points, which 
could have been interpreted as giving Spain a position of inferiority. The OEEC team, 
which was not anxious to take the proposal back to the Council for a new discussion, 
clarified these points to the satisfaction of the Spanish or merely agTeed to their 
modification. There were no major points involved.269 Spanish membership of the 
agricultural committees was announced and the Spanish Government was granted the right 
to send observers to any other meeting in which they had an interest. This legal formula 
placed Spain on an equal footing in all administrative bodies dealing with agriculture to
*‘4. PRO, MAF 40/558: "Association of Spain with the OEEC. Record of (a
restricted) Meeting Ion 23 October 1954]”, n/s, n/d. The Belgian formula was 
set by the OEEC Secretariat as SJ/3231, "Note. Participation of Spain in the 
work of the Organisation", Paris, 27 October 1954.
,f7. PRO, MAF 40/558: OEEC UK Delegation to MAD, Paris, 29 October and 18 
November, 1954.
,i#. With minor changes, the compromised Secretariat proposal was approved 
as a basis for discussion with the Spanish Government; PRO, FO 371/111308: 
OEEC Secretariat CES/335, "Note. Participation of Spain in the work of the 
Organisation", Paris, 17 November 1954.
a<#. Ibid., Ellis—Rees to Coulson, Paris, 29 November 1954, and AGA, 
C/36.625: Arguelles to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and
Agriculture, Madrid, 7 December 1954.
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be developed within the OEEC, without contracting the compromises of OEEC 
membership. The position designed for Spain in agricultural matters implied that Spain 
was allowed to send observers to the Council and to many technical committees when 
treating matters directly affecting agriculture, which in fact would be interpreted very 
broadly in the future. It was also a good solution for those OEEC members willing to 
draw Spain closer to Western Europe. On the other hand, the solution found for the 
Spanish question was not unsatisfactory to those Governments which strongly disagreed 
with Franco in political terms, because Spanish association with the work of the new 
agricultural committees, side-stepped the membership question. The question of full 
participation by Spain would have come closer on the horizon only if the Spanish showed 
themselves anxious for closer economic cooperation with the rest of Western Europe and 
willing to comply with the corresponding obligations.
The meeting which took place between the representatives of the OEEC and 
ECOAM, on 30 November, agreed the terms for the transfer of the Green Pool to the 
OEEC following minor discussion. The Group of Eight's proposals were almost identical 
to the ministerial resolution. With regard to the conclusion, within the OEEC framework, 
of special agreements on agricultural and food products, the Group of Eight considered 
that the provisions of the Resolution "should be purely and simply endorsed by the 
Council."270 With regard to Spain, ArgiieUes affirmed that the previous negotiation with 
OEEC representatives gave him every reason to believe that satisfactory arrangements 
could be devised to give effect to the transfer provisions regarding the participation of 
Spain in the work of the OEEC concerning agriculture.271 After the Liaison Committee 
of the Green Pool agreed to the paper as a whole, it was up to the OEEC Council to 
approve the formal resolutions.
,w. PRO, MAF 83/3392: OEEC Secretariat SC/L01(54)12 (3rd rev.) Annex A, 
"Working Party instructed to keep under review the relations of the 
Organisation with other organisations concerned with European economic co­
operation. Measures to be taken for the implementation of the resolution of 
10th July 1954 of the European Conference on the Organisation of 
Agricultural Markets. Report by the Working Party to the Council”, 12 
October 1954.
271. Ibid., ER(P) (54)20, "OEEC United Kingdom Delegation. Green Pool", 2 
December 1954.
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The OEEC Council meeting in mid-January was ready to officially sanction the 
two sets of agreements (the draft decision and the draft agreement with Spain). Suddenly, 
when the invitation had already been extended to Ministers of Agriculture for the final act, 
a new bilateral confrontation between Spain and Belgium threatened the entire transfer of 
the Green Pool to the OEEC. The Head of the Belgian Delegation to the OEEC called to 
Sir Ellis-Rees, on January 7, to announce that the Belgian Government had decided the 
day before that they would not be able to agree to the resolution reached, in so far as it 
authorised Spanish observer status in certain committees.272 The cause this time was the 
public revelation that Leon Degrelle, the ex-chief of the Belgian fascist party founded in 
1935 -rex- and condemned to death after World War II accused of collaboration with the 
Nazis, lived in Spain in a semi-official protected status despite the Spanish Government's 
promise to extradite him.273 The Belgian Government’s reaction, very much supported 
by all the country’s parties and public opinion, was to veto anything which could appear 
to give Spain a new mark of favour. The Belgian delegation tried to separate the approval 
of the general question of transferring Green Pool works to the OEEC from that of 
Spanish participation, with respect to which Belgium would impose a veto.274
Fortunately for the Spanish Government, the Belgian request was against the 
precise instructions approved by the Ministers of Agriculture. The best British diplomacy 
and the firm attitude of most delegations persuaded the Belgians that a point of no return 
had been reached, which could not be endangered by unrelated particular problems. The 
reputation of the OEEC, the urgency of bringing the long drawn out negotiation to a 
satisfactory conclusion, the unpredictable consequences of throwing the whole 
arrangement back into the melting pot and whether the OEEC's work should be governed 
by political considerations of this kind, were put forward to persuade the Belgians. As in 
the early period, the Green Pool was not the place to formulate policy towards Franco
,1J. PRO, MAF 40/558: Ellis-Rees to FC, Paris, 7 January 1955.
2” . The Belgian Government had demanded hia extradition since August 1945 
and the Spanish authorities continuously denied Degrelle's presence in 
Spain; see Florentino Portero: Franco aislado. La cuesti6n espaftola (1945- 
1950), Madrid (Aguilar] 1989, pp. 169-90. Unfortunately, Degrelle appeared 
publicly with members of the Spanish Government, early in December 1954, in 
the official homage to the Blue Division that fought in the Russian front.
MAE, Leg. 7384, exp. 8: Cifra 6 from Paris, 12 January 1955.
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Spain.273 After approval by the Conference and by the Spanish Government of the 
proposals, on 14 January 1955, the OEEC Council of Ministers adopted the final decision 
to return agriculture to the general framework of the OEEC.276 After years of discussion 
the ECOAM could be safely kidnapped within the OEEC.277
7.5. Domestic Dynamics Stemming from Green Pool Membership
Spanish participation in the European agricultural negotiations reveals more 
clearly than ever before two distinct circumstances. First, the implementation of the 
principle of unity in ioieign action (designed in the mid-1940s to grant a monopoly 
of power to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and, second, the beginning of an open debate 
within the Spanish Administration about adopting progressive steps towards trade 
liberalisation. The success of the latter phenomenon was directly proportional to the 
ability to break the conservative rule imposed by diplomats in foreign action.
7.5.1. implementing the Principle of Unity in Foreign Action
The importance of the progressive association to West European economic 
cooperation precipitated the implementation of the principle of unity in foreign action.
215. The bitter Belgian opposition was channelled through the vote at the
United Nations Assembly in December 1955 when Spain gained membership, 
together with Austria, Finland, Italy, Japan and Switzerland. When asked 
whether he considered Belgium's opposition to Spain's entry into the
different international organisations (OEEC and UN) to be a consequence of 
the affair Degrelle, Franco answered: "I do not think so. What happens is 
that the Belgian Government obeys Mason and Socialist instructions"; 
Francisco Franco—Salgado-Araujo: Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco, 
Barcelona (Planeta] 1976, pp. 73-74 and 153.
*’*. PRO, MAF 40/556: OEEC, C (54)326(Final)Scale 1, "Decision of the Council 
concerning the continuance of the work of the Organisation in regard to 
agriculture and food. Adopted by the Council at its 270th Meeting on 14th 
January, 1955" and its annex, "Agreement between the Organisation for 
European Economic Co—operation and the Spanish Government concerning the 
participation of Spain in the work of the Organisation on questions relating 
to agriculture and food", Paris, 14 January 1955.
*T1. For a concise account of the initial steps of the new agricultural units 
within the OEEC see Laschi's doctoral diss., cit., pp. 289 ff.
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The different Ministries concerned acted accordingly. Because the French Government had 
not originally invited its Spanish counterpart to attend European agricultural negotiations, 
the latter considered the Green Pool another manifestation of international dislike of the 
Franco regime. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose task was to overcome post-war 
international political ostracism, was thus responsible for action.
The Ministers of Agriculture and Industry' and Commerce did not oppose the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopting the necessary measures. This concerned, most 
clearly, the Minister of Agriculture, Carlos Rein, who immediately passed responsibility 
to his colleague at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.27* Rein’s personal attitude was one 
of total non-attendance (not even as an observer) if the Spanish Government was not 
properly invited "even if it can be pernicious to our interests". The only question to decide 
was the "political convenience of raising a protest".27* The pride of Franco’s regime was 
above the nation’s interest. Three months later, however. Rein’s attitude was in favour of 
taking some action.2*0 The ministerial reshuffle of July 1951 did not modify this state 
of affairs. On the contrary, the need for an export promotion to sustain the new Cabinet’s 
economic programme reinforced the need for diplomatic priority action.
The ill-defined structure of the foreign economic administration also favoured 
diplomatic predominance. The newly created Ministry of Commerce (divorced from the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce in July 1951) tried to increase its influence in foreign 
economic policy by linking the Under-Secretariat of Foreign Economy and Commerce to 
itself. After February 1947, the latter supposedly coordinated the different administrative 
units involved in foreign economic relations. In February 1952, the split of the Under- 
Secretariat allowed diplomats to maintain control over the foreign economic policy- 
machinery. The Ministry of Commerce’s influence through the Under-Secretariat of
Carlos Rein Segura (b. 1897), Agronomist, Lawyer and convinced
Phalangist. As Minister of Agriculture (18 July 1945 to IB July 1951). Rein 
was on# of the Cabinet's most favourable members of interventionism, which 
led to the disastrous state in which Spain's agriculture was placed by 1951. 
The situation came close to starvation and was only partially solved via 
in^orts of basic foodstuffs.
a7>. MAE, Leg. 5910, exp. 6, carp. 1: Rein to Artajo, Madrid, 26 March 1951. 
,#0. Ibid, Rein to Artajo, 20 June 1951.
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Commerce was reduced to internal trade. The competence of its main section, the 
Directorate General (DG) of Commerce and Tariff Policy, was directly seized by the 
powerful DG of Economic Policy («D irección General de Política Económ ica»), the 
newly created DG’s of Commercial Policy («D irección General de Política Com ercial») 
and of Foreign Markets («D irección General de Mercados Extranjeros»). The last three 
DGs were within the administrative structure of the Under-Secretariat of Foreign 
Economy, which was technically dependent upon both Ministries.211 The clear 
overlapping of functions rendered the whole structure as ill defined as previously (see 
chapter one). The different Ministers involved, due either to the administrative structure 
or to Spain’s isolation concerning the new integradonist proposals, had no option but to 
leave the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to act first
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued to be defending Spain's interests against 
France's obscure designs for political preponderance behind a united Europe. The ECSC 
and the EDC were the tools to control German heavy industry and armament. Other 
initiatives far restrictive communities intended to cut other countries’ foreign policy 
aspirations to carry out their preponderance plan more easily. Faced with any restricted 
organisation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that Spain should adopt an attitude 
based, above all, on considerations of a political nature. The confusing conduct of France 
towards Spain in the preparatory conferences dealt with in this chapter, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs argued, made it necessary to impose a unity of criteria dominated by 
diplomats.2*2 The central considerations which should guide the Spanish official reaction
2,1. Whilst the DG of Commerce and Tariff Policy had the main task of dealing 
with inports and exports, apart from tariff matters, the DG of Commercial 
Policy (Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy) had the task of preparing 
studies when negotiating trade agreements and treaties, surveying their 
execution, as well as "the defense of Spain's general economic interests 
abroad", article 12 of the Decree-Law of 6 February 1952, BOE 15 February. 
The DG of Foreign Markets (set up by order of 11 January 1952, BOE of 24th) 
for an expansion of trade was dealing with tasks closely related to the 
above-mentioned ones. At the same time, the DG of Economic Policy had the 
task of actually negotiating the treaties, being quite involved in all other 
aspects of foreign economic relations. The Under-Secretariat of Foreign 
Economy also incorporated the consultative commission, created in October 
1951 with a wide administrative membership, regarding all matters related 
to the Eximbank credits and other financial agreements.
2t2. MAE, Leg. 3166, exp. 8: General Direction for Foreign Policy, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, "Informe sobre la Comunidad Europea de Transportes", 30 
October 1952.
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to any integrationist proposals were twofold. First, any attempt at integration would 
have inevitable repercussions upon Spain’s economic structure and foreign policy. 
Second, those countries who "have repeatedly distinguished themselves by their deep 
hostility towards Spain” dominated European integration.2*3 This made the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs the direct means of expression of the national interest. The rest of the 
ministries involved, unaware of the whole complexity of foreign policy and Spam’s role 
in world affairs, exclusively represented partial interests.
"Only the Foreign Office is in possession of the general
information required to judge properly the convenience of
Spain joining the attempts of European integration”.2,4
The disagreement between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Public Works 
showed how political considerations had reached their peak. The principle of cautious 
action represented a safeguard against the Ministry of Public Works’ narrow vision. This 
principle initially reflected (and always according to diplomatic sources) the need to avoid 
making mistakes. Morice had ignored the official diplomatic channels and sent the 
invitation directly to his Spanish colleague, with the excuse of the technical character of 
the subjects to be discussed. For Spanish diplomats, zealous for formalities, this 
represented clear evidence of France’s attempt to by-pass important bilateral political 
problems. An unconscious Spanish promising attitude would facilitate French political 
predominance over Spain without the French Government making the corresponding 
political concessions. Vallellano’s independent action, without properly considering the 
"existing interdependence among the different restricted communities", represented an 
extreme danger to "the efficiency of Spanish foreign policy regarding Europe".2*5 The 
different perception of the interests involved created debate and conflict within the 
Spanish Administration. Arguing that no real economic gain was involved, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs turned Morice’s invitation into a bargaining tool. That is, diplomats
*'*. Ibid., despatch no. 575 from the General Direction for Foreign Policy 
to the Onder-Secretary of the Ministry of Public Works, "S/ la participacifcn 
España en trabajos preparatorios Comunidad Europea de Transportes", 30 
October 1952.
,M. Ibid., "Informe sobre la Comunidad Europea de Transportes", 30 October
1952.
,,s. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 16: Report by Cortina on the transport and
agricultural pools, Madrid, 10 December 1952.
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determined the policy's relative costs and benefits in isolation from the department 
directly involved. The unity of criteria meant that transportation became part of a larger 
design affected by foreign policy considerations. In view of departmental struggles, the 
Council of Ministers expressed the need to maintain the diplomatic monopoly regarding 
Spain's participation in several restricted communities.2*6
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered it obvious that Spain should maintain 
a unified front, coordinated (and monopolised) by itself, given the uncertainty of the 
political implications of the initiative. The Council of Ministers had appointed Cavestany 
as President of the delegation to the plenary conference of March 1953. Despite this, the 
Foreign Affairs department placed the responsibility of representation to the IC upon 
diplomats. The potential discussion of the institutional question, which was above the 
competence of any other department in the name of the principle of unity of action, was 
the supportive argument.2*7 The general orientation of the Green Pool corresponded to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its civil servants because the institutional question 
represented a problem of high international policy.2** The delegation did not include the 
Under-Secretariat of Foreign Economy and Commerce, which theoretically held a primary 
role in foreign economic policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acted similarly 
concerning the Spanish delegation to the transport conference, since diplomats had 
presented the OEEC's transport initiative as presenting a potential threat towards
,M. A.S.C.M. Tomo II. 1953, no. 5539, Council of Ministers' meeting on 16 
January 1953.
*a\  The composition of the Spanish delegation in the IC was approved by 
Foreign Affairs and commun ica ted to the Minister of Agriculture, MAE, Leg. 
3445, exp. 18: Despatch no. 169 to Cavestany, "Comisión española en
reuniones Comité Interino Pool Verde**, 22 April 1953. Emilio de Navasqüés 
y Ruiz de Velasco, Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was appointed 
Chairman of the Spanish delegation and assisted by Cortina, head of the 
division of International Organisations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The rest of the delegation was composed of Mosquera, Councillor of Foreign 
Economy, and Escoriaza, Agricultural Attaché, both of whom were at the 
Spanish Embassy in Paris. Only the latter represented the views of the 
Spanish agricultural ministry.
2M. AGA, MAE/11591, folder 567; Order no. 397, Artajo to Rojas, "Próxima 
reunión Coc&ité Interino de la Conferencia «Pool Verde»", Madrid, 17 April 
1953; and MAE, Leg. 4612, exp. 16: Arta jo to Arburúa, Madrid, 20 May 1953.
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supranationaliry.2W
The argument that the transport and agricultural initiatives implied concessions 
of sovereignty was a mere excuse to expand diplomat’s influence in foreign action and 
to end the ministerial confrontation over the leading role played by diplomats. To assure 
an undisturbed action, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs constantly threatened the danger 
of supranationalité’. The political interest was so evident that it required the strict 
harmonisation of economics with the political design of the Franco regime.2,0 The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was thus the best equipped to survey the matter. Political 
factors had taken over from any other consideration.
In comparative terms, the Spanish case was not unique among those nations which 
overrated the political implications of the Green Pool initiative. In the Swedish case, the 
Ministry of Agriculture developed a very similar subordinated position.291 The British 
Foreign Office was as clear-cut as its Spanish counter part. When the question came to 
be decided about British representation to the ministerial meeting in March 1953, Nutting 
expressed the problem to his colleagues at the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and 
Fisheries in terms which Artajo could have written for him 292
Diplomats presided through the General Director for Foreign Policy, 
Mariano Iturralde Obregoso, assisted by Cortina. The Minister of Public 
Works had suggested that the main chair be occupied by the General Director 
of Railway, Trams and Road Transport, in order to follow the example set by 
other delegations, Vallellano was 1 convinced of the great advantage to be 
derived from the fact that our representation, with a similar composition, 
would move among acquaintances used to gathering in similar international 
technical meetings since many years ago.” MAE, Leg. 3166, exp. 7: Vallellano 
to Artajo, Madrid, 12 February 1953.
2t0. "The political interest this represents to Spain is so evident that it 
does not need to be recommended"; ibid., report on transport cooperation, 
28 February 1953.
2fl. See the expressive comments of Martin Peterson: "Sweden and the Green 
Pool: 1950-1955", EUI Colloquium Paper Doc 310/90 (Col 44), November 1990, 
pp. 16-17.
292 • "Although this meeting purports to deal with a technical subject, I am 
sure you will agree that our interest are at this stage primarily political. 
This is, after all, part of the whole European federalist plan, and, to 
judge from a talk I had with Mansholt [on 30 January 1953] the meeting will 
turn solely on the question whether or not to set up another supranational 
federal authority." PRO, MAF 40/54 9: Nutting to Sir Thomas Dugdale, Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries, 11 February 1953. A similar letter was 
addressed to the Minister of Food. Nutting decided to attend the ministerial 
meeting accompanied by only one official from the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries and another from the Ministry of Food.
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acted independently from the mechanism for 
coordinated action established in March 1953, namely the Study Group composed of 
representatives from the three ministries involved. The lack of consensus within the party 
rendered it totally ineffective. With this excuse, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially 
appointed and briefed the delegations to the transport and agricultural meetings and the 
different working parties. Furthermore, it channelled all instructions to delegates, 
irrespective of the ministries to which they belonged. The absence of well-defined 
instructions from the special party set up to follow the conference’s events led to 
inconsistencies among the delegates to the different groups of experts and to inaction on 
many questions.293 The technical experts enjoyed some degree of freedom of action, 
while the 1C shelved the institutional question for the study of market organisation. Even 
during this so-called functionalist p h a s e  of the negotiation, in diplomatic terms, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not renounce its role of coordination.” 4 The Ministers 
of Agriculture and Commerce were unhappy with the attitude adopted by their colleague. 
They wanted their personnel to preside over the delegation at the IC and not be restricted 
by the working groups of experts.295 These departments managed, although temporarily, 
to seize the state of affairs. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and Commerce, 
who met on 30 May, ratified Cavestany as Chairman of the Spanish delegation to the 
conference, restated that civil servants from different ministries were to form part of the 
working groups and confirmed the Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy as the official 
channel of communication between Paris and Madrid.296 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was ready to intervene when the institutional question appeared on the IC's agenda and 
brought the political element to the forefront The Ministry of Foreign Affairs profited
2M. A complete collection of complaints on this line in MAE, Leg. 3445r 
exps. 18 and 19; and Leg. 5910, exp. 6, carp. 4. This same argument has been 
extended in general to all Spanish multilateral diplomacy by Benny Pollack: 
The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy. Spain's International Relations from 
Franco tc Democracy, London [Pinter Publisher] 1987, p. 116.
2M. MAE, Leg. 4612, exp. 16: Artajo to Arburúa, 13 May 1953.
2M. AGA, C/37132, folder 21: "Mota para el Sr. Ministro", n/d, and MAE, Leg.
4 612, exp. 16: Note for the Minister of Agriculture, Madrid, 20 May 1953.
2M. MAE, Leg. 344 5, exp. 18: "Nota sobre la reunión de los Señores Ministros 
de Asuntos Exteriores, Agricultura y Comercio que tuvo lugar en el 
Ministerio de Comercio el dia 30 de Mayo de 1953", 2 June 1953. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs had imposed its Directorate-General for International 
Organisations as the official channel between the Spanish Study Group and 
the delegation in Paris, against Cabinet instructions; MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 
21: Despatch no. 170 to Cavestany, 21 April 1953.
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from the opportunity to recover preeminence with the excuse of defending a position of 
non-discrimination.297
Regarding the Green Pool as another international attempt to isolate and 
discriminate against the Spanish political regime, this Ministry over-rated the political 
implications of the agricultural discussions. Initially, as had happened in many other 
countries, Spanish diplomats had rather naturally assumed a supranational development 
in the move towards a separate organisation. This attitude was maintained even after it 
became clear from the discussions that the idea of a supra-national agricultural community 
in any way comparable to the ECSC was tacitly dropped. Still in December 1953, Spanish 
diplomats argued that any proposal for a separate organisation with proper decisional 
powers was "equivalent” to supranational institutions and "to a certain extent, a federal 
configuration", implying the surrender of sovereignty.29® It is hard to believe that 
Spanish diplomats were so unaware of the different national positions. They did not 
perceive that the need for a separate organisation did not derive from the specific desire 
for supranationality, but was a means to avoid the Ministers of Economy and Finance 
dismissing the heretic proposals discussed within the commodity groups, which moved 
away from the generally accepted policies of free trade that the OEEC countries were 
supposed to follow. The benefit of initial and genuine perplexity could be granted to the 
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the beginning it was somehow natural to think 
that any organisation independent from the OEEC would necessarily imply an 
"integrationist" solution. There seemed to be no other sense in setting up a separate 
organisation for agriculture reproducing the OEEC's practices and rules (apart from 
allowing Spain to participate on an equal footing). After the Summer of 1953, however, 
this argument was no longer valid. The Ministers of Transport had shown that an 
autonomous organisation was not necessarily paired with supranationality. It is more 
appropriate to think that the supranational threat was addressed for domestic consumption. 
The supranational spectrum helped diplomats in their particular struggle with other sectors 
in the administrative distribution of power.
,r>. MAE, Lag. 7384, exp. 8; Artajo to Arburua, 15 October 1953.
MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 20: "Pool Verde", Cortina's report, 10 December
1953.
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The principle of unity in foreign action, as described in the first chapter of 
this dissertation, implied the abandonment of economic criteria when dealing with foreign 
economic relations and its replacement by the political guide-lines of foreign policy. The 
technical ministries challenged this model. For them, Spain should approach Western 
European affairs through technical cooperation in economic matters, rather than bluntly 
in diplomatic negotiations. Any diplomatic move would immediately bring international 
public attention, whilst economic cooperation could be presented as necessary for the 
genera] welfare. For in s ta n t, it was difficult to argue against the need to include Spain 
in any transport cooperation and the enrichment of Western European diet through imports 
of oranges from Spain. Railways and agricultural exports represented tools of realpolitik 
and the best channels for rapprochement Once political foreign ostracism vanished, as 
came to be progressively the case during 1953, the post-1945 model of unity lost its 
urgency and domestic circumstances and technical factors reappeared as the predominant 
factors.299 From the diplomatic stand-point, however, the problem was how to benefit 
from international economic and technical cooperation while maintaining as much power 
as possible within the domestic distribution of power. Diplomats had been forced to share 
the administration of foreign policy with other bureaucracies dealing with important 
issues. The negotiation with the United States for the establishment of military bases was 
primordially handled by the military authorities. In the negotiations with the Vatican 
leading to the signature of a Concordat, the Catholic hierarchy side-stepped diplomats. 
This might have generated a mentality of siege among diplomats and defence of their 
prerogatives versus other administrative bodies.
The predominance of political considerations explained why no organised 
agricultural group influenced Spain's policy options about the Green Pool.100 The 
corporate system for the economic reorganisation of the country imposed after 1939 had 
placed agricultural organisations under the political control of the State. The Sindicato
2M. In the domestic sphere this same argument was put forward to favour 
central planning and coordination by technical bodies and not exclusively 
by the Council of Ministers, i.e. Manuel de Torres Martinez: La coordinación 
de la Política Económica en Espafla, Madrid [Instituto Social León XII] 1953, 
pp. 17-19.
*°°. Something that was quite significant in other countries, see 
contributions to Griffiths (ed.): The Green Pool, op. cit.
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bad the specific function of informing the Government of the aspirations and requirements 
of each branch of production and executing the State’s general directives.101 These 
artificially created bureaucratic organs could play no significant role in the country’s 
international economic policy.302 These circumstances predominated in our specific case, 
because the Green Pool affected vital interests of the State. It was the responsibility of the 
highest levels of the Administration.305
It has been argued that agricultural groups did not participate in the policy-making 
process concerning the Green Pool because they rated the Pfiimlin and Mansholt Plans’ 
possibilities of success very low.304 This argument is based on a false perception. Most 
agricultural producers and exporters in Western Europe held a similar opinion about both 
plans. This opinion, however, did not stop them from participating in the initiative either 
to render it ineffective altogether or to ensure that the results to be booked in Paris were 
perfectly in line with their respective interests. Disinterest from the Spanish side would 
have been unwise, because the situation contained elements of potential danger for 
Spanish agricultural interests. It would be very surprising to find that Spanish agricultural 
interest groups were not willing to eliminate pan of the many restrictions influencing their 
performance, which participation in the Green Pool offered. In compensation, any level
101. Principles stated by the earlier Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom (Fuero 
del Trabajo, March 1936, and Fuero de los Españoles, July 1945) , whose 
principles were defined as permanent and immutable; Leves políticas 
españolas fundamentales (1808-1978), Compilation by Enrique Tierno Galván, 
2nd éd., [TecnosJ, Madrid, [1968] 1979, pp. 216-24.
203. The only example of the agricultural Sindicatos' direct intervention in 
foreign economic policy is their sporadic involvement in bilateral trade 
talks. Even in these cases, however, they simply formed part of the 
negotiating team and had the limited function of carrying out the 
instructions issued by the appropriate ministry.
103. This research did not find any evidence of dialogue between Sindicatos 
and Administration. The appointment of the Vice-President of the Sindicato 
vertical de frutos y productos hortícolas, as a member of the delegation to 
Paris in March 1953 and the proposal for his appointment as a member of the 
Study Group set up in Madrid to follow the events of the Green Pool, led 
only to the acquisition of statistical information. The Sindicato mentioned, 
was set up in August 1941 and, given its specialisation, dominated Spain's 
agricultural exports. It received the returns of a special levy on orange 
exports, which allowed it to set up commercial offices in the most important 
markets. Other powerful Sindicato was for olive oil, but it did not 
participate in export trade.
,w. Mr Félix Pareja MuAoz's comments to my "Spain and the Green Pool:
Challenge and Response, 1950-1955", EDI Colloquium Paper no. 312/90 (Col.
46), November 1990. Mr Pareja's activities as a civil servant were related
since 1951 to the field of agricultural exports.
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of increased imports would be necessarily very low, given the Spanish Administration's 
inability to accept immediate liberalisation. Spanish producers might have even welcomed 
some level of import liberalisation and commodity agreements to help end the price 
support schemes which often maintained domestic prices at artificially low levels. Another 
element, which Spanish exporters might have considered, was the aim of Pilimlin and 
Mansholt plans to reactivate the OEEC's objectives, which could not be extended to Spain 
if the latter abstained from participation.
7.5.2. Initial Steps Towards Trade Liberalisation
The diplomatic personnel interpreted the Green Pool as a step towards the 
complete normalisation of foreign relations. The Spanish ambassadors in Western 
European nations were instructed to maximise the possibilities of the economic bargaining 
for other issues, such as the United Nations, NATO, OEEC and the Council of Europe. 
Conversely, for the technical divisions, any international economic forum was an 
opportunity to trigger off the question of whether an open or a closed economy was more 
beneficial for Spain. Without an effective coordination mechanism, they could not fight 
their private battles at home and go to meetings with a single mind and clear instructions. 
The Spanish delegation suffered from constant inter-departmental differences made public 
even at the negotiating table itself. Already at the first meeting of the IC, 27-30 April
1953, the Spanish representatives confronted each other when they attempted to establish 
< the balance between the economic interest of the State, as presented by the agricultural 
attaché, Escoriaza, and the political requirements of its foreign policy, as presented by the 
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the Director of the division of Intemadonal 
Organisations, Navasqtiés and Cortina.309 Both sides viewed the other as trying to 
eliminate the opponent's influence in future agricultural developments.106
105. MAE, Leg. 3445, txp. 16: Report by Escoriaza, 2 May 1953; and AGA, 
C/37132, folder 21: Informativa Nota, Madrid, 8 May 1953, and Cortina to 
Artajo, n/d.
104. AGA, MAE/11.553, folder 40: Escoriaza to Cavestany, "Designación ám la
delegación española al Comité Interino de Trabajo del "Pool Verde" y misión
encomendada a éste", Paris, 24 April 1953; and AGA, A/6814: Escoriaza to 
Cavestany, Paris, 6 May 1953«
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Those responsible to the Ministry of Agriculture saw the Green Pool as a means 
of enhancing their Ministry's efforts to modernise Spain’s agriculture. Obtaining better 
trading possibilities and stabilising foreign markets would lead them inevitably to confront 
the excess and complexities of intervention in the countryside to reach increases in output 
and improvements of productivity.*07 For those responsible to the Ministry' of 
Commerce, the Green Pool would accelerate the trend towards liberalisation of trade. This 
was the position of the delegate at the WP of fruits and vegetables, Mosquera, Councillor 
of Foreign Economy at the Embassy in Paris, who mainly represented the views of the 
Under-Secretariat of Foreign Economy. One cannot ignore the surprising fact that 
representatives of the Franco Regime, which had imposed and maintained the most 
interventionist, protectionist and restrictive trade system in Western Europe at the time, 
preached to their European colleagues (although exclusively for fruit and vegetables) 
about the virtues of free trade without restrictions.
The technical experts were conscious that liberalisation implied a movement in 
both directions and could not exclusively be used to promote export trade without also 
contracting a commitment to liberalise import trade.30® Their support for liberalisation 
of agricultural exports could have had a knock-on effect on other economic sectors and 
lead, by contagion, to the progressive opening of the Spanish economy. It is essential to 
underline that the personnel of the Ministries of Agriculture and Commerce and of the 
Under-Secretariat of Foreign Economy were perfectly conscious that the opening of the 
Spanish economy was a progressive long-term process, but not a revolutionary step. The 
state of the Spanish balance of payments could not afford (and some important sectors 
within the Spanish Administration would not allow) any broad and immediate 
liberalisation of agricultural produce. The bulk of Spain’s agricultural production was not 
competitive in foreign markets and the dismantling of State purchasing agencies (for a 
system of licences and quotas plus tariffs) could not be done overnight. The element of
,0’. The first and most sensible report on the economic consequences of the 
Green Pool stressed this point, ASA, A/6815: "Consideraciones económicas
acerca de la Conferencia Europea sobre Mercados Agricolas” by the National 
Institute for Agricultural Research, Madrid, 1 July 1953. See also AGA, 
A/6614, folder 1953: "Breve informe sobre los trabajos desarrollados por el 
grupo de expertos 'frutos y legumbres'”, by Escoriaza, 22 June 1953.
,0*. AGA, C/37132, folder 21: "Nota resumen sobre las decisiones tomadas por 
•1 grupo de expertos de frutas y verduras", by Mosquera, 30 July 1953.
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progressiveness was permanently present in all the proposals of the Spanish delegation to 
the OEEC. In the first official proposal in that respect, in August 1953, Argiielles 
suggested the imposition of import global quotas for each product as an intermediate stage 
between the then existing situation and a general liberalisation.109 His intention, 
however, was to pursue the idea of securing Spain’s entry into the OEEC.310 The 
Ministry of Agriculture agreed to undertake "steps in the direction of liberalisation" to 
allow Spain to profit fully from improved access to European markets.311
Concerning the question of what sort of institution should bouse agricultural 
negotiations, the Ministries of Agriculture and Commerce considered a majority rule 
desirable to allow the Green Pool to go further in liberalising agricultural trade. On the 
contrary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed adopting the principle of unanimity, 
initially approved by the Council of Ministers cm 4 December 1953, since it was ’’the only 
principle compatible now with [Spain’s] institutional system."312 The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs tried to warn the Council of Ministers of the need to adopt a cautious 
policy. There were still commodities being studied and thus, it was hard to decide upon 
the effects of general liberalisation on the Spanish agriculture and economy. The benefits 
that Spain would have obtained from liberalised agricultural exports would have to be 
compensated by the import liberalisation of industrial goods and invisibles, with respect 
to which the Spanish economy needed protection by all possible means. The technical 
ministries did not have the opportunity to reply to this. It was argued flatly that the
*°*. MAE, Leg. 4612, exp. 16: Informative Not« to the Minister of Commerce,
19 August 1953.
J1°. PRO, FO 371/106047: "Note of an interview with Señor Don Jaime
Arguelles, Under-Secretary for External Economic Affairs in Madrid”, by 
Ellis—Rees, Paris, 11 September 1953.
,n. A&A, A/6614, folder 1953: "Instrucciones a la Delegación española que 
asistirá al Comité Interino del 'Green Verde' de 16 de Diciembre de 1953" 
by the Ministry of Agriculture's General Technical Secretariat, Madrid, 3 
December 1953.
>u. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 24: Report by Cortina, "Pool Verde. Consideraciones 
sobre los trabajos realizados hasta el momento presente y sobre la posición 
española en la próxima Conferencia de Ministros de Agricultura", 25 February 
1954; and AGA, C/36625: Juan Schwartz y Diaz-Flores, General Director for 
Commercial Policy and Treaties at the Spanish Ministry of Commerce, to 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Agriculture, "Reunión del Comité 
Interino de la Conferencia Europea sobre Organización de los Mercados 
Agrícolas para aprobar el Proyecto de Informe al Consejo de Ministros de 
Agricultura", Madrid, 27 February 1954.
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majority option was "unacceptable” in political terms anyway. The technicians attending 
the expert groups had progressively isolated themselves from (and almost conspired 
against) the general policies approved by the Spanish Government. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs considered that it was time to bring the technical personnel back into line 
when matters had reached the policy level. Liberalisation was fine when limited to the 
export of fruit and vegetables, but it raised problems going beyond agricultural exports.
A further example of inter-departmental struggle reveals the underground debate 
on essential policy options for the Spanish economy. At the time of the transfer of the 
Green Pool to the OEEC, the Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy endorsed the OEEC 
option (in contrast to the official position). The advantages of Spanish membership were 
an increase in export trade, the reduction of restrictions on trade with Western Europe, the 
possibility of maintaining an overall deficit with the EPU area higher than the sum of all 
the bilateral commercial credits offered by OEEC countries, and the intra-European 
currency transferability which allowed for a better selection of suppliers.313
The Spanish authorities were aware that the strong benefits deriving to debtors 
from the EPU arrangements had progressively decreased ("hardened" in EPU terminology) 
from those that members benefitted originally. Initially, debtors were entitled, according 
to a sliding-scale, to lines of automatic credit from the Union which amounted, in the last 
tranche of their quotas, to 60 per cent of the value of the respective quota, while paying 
the remaining 40 per cent in gold or dollars. In 1952, when the EPU was renegotiated for 
the first time, a revised scale of payments by debtors was approved. More gold was to be 
paid in the early tranches of the quota, though the overall proportion of gold to credit was 
maintained at 40 to 60. In June 1954, after lengthy negotiations, the EPU was renewed 
again, but the proportion of gold to credit in settlements was 50 to 50.3'4 Despite the 
hardening of the initial EPU settlement rules in relation to debtors, it remained invariable
m . MA£, Leg. 10078, exp. 21: "Notas relativas a la posición española en 
relación con la propuesta de integración en la OECE de los trabajos de la 
conferencia europea de organización de los mercados agricolas (Pool Verde)**, 
by the DG of Comercial Policy of the Under-Secretariat of Foreign Economy, 
Madrid, 3 September 1954.
,X4. See chapter five, pp. 336 and 426, for a short explanation of the 
settlements system of the EPU and for bibliographical references.
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the fact that Spain, up to the limit specified by its quota, did not need to settle its total 
debt in gold or dollars.
Spain's EPU membership could also be presented as totally disadvantageous by 
means of reducing the Spanish quota and thus credit facilities in relation to the then 
Spanish swap facilities; approximately SSO million. Proposing 1953 as the year-basis for 
calculation and using the rate of exchange of the free stock market in Madrid (Pts 38.95 
to $1) the Spanish quota resulted in $29,113,961, with the possibility of obtaining credits 
for $14.556,981.315 In this case, the maximum possible amount of credit was inferior to 
the overall swap facilities available for the Spanish on the basis on bilateral trade 
arrangements. Furthermore, the maximum amount of credits available was even inferior 
to those calculated in January 1951. when the matter was first discussed in Madrid. At 
that time, the Spanish quota (on a 1949 basis) entitled Spain to $53 million credit in the 
60 to 40 ratio credit/gold.316 If in 1951 the fact that EPU credits were higher than the 
sum of all bilateral swap facilities was favourably considered, it was not a surprise that 
the opposite situation played against Spanish EPU membership.317
There were many unknown variables to make any consideration definitive. Both, 
a positive and a negative attitude could be given depending upon the year and exchange 
rate used for calculation. For instance, adopting a Spanish quota of $88 million (calculated 
in January 1951, when the matter was first discussed, at the official rate of exchange) on 
the basis of Spain's total visible and invisible transactions with the EPU area in 1949, the 
new EPU ratio of 50/50 credit/gold settlement meant that Spain would have received - 
once it had reached the maximum debtor position allowed by the size of its quota- $44 
million as credits. Obviously the hardening of the settlements rules within EPU was
119. A Spanish unidentified top official made a wrong calculation of 
percentages and mentioned $14,051, 981 as the maximum amount of credits that 
Spain would have received from the Onion as well as the maximum amount in 
gold and dollars that it would have paid to the Union once Spain had 
exhausted its quota; MAE, Leg. 10076, exp. 21: Report for Arguelles entitled 
"Posibilidad de ingreso de España en la Uni6n Europea de Pagos", drafted by 
a unidentified official, Madrid, 11 October 1954.
,1‘. See chapter five, pp. 429-30.
A unidentified Spanish official so informed Arguelles; MAE, Leg. 10076, 
exp. 21: "Posibilidad de ingreso de España en la Unión Europea de Pagos", 
Madrid, 11 October 1954.
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detrimental for Spain as for any other debtor, because the previous ratio of 60 to 40 gave 
as a result $52.8 million as overall credits. Notwithstanding this, the total amount of 
credits available threefold the initial $14.6 million previously mentioned, although they 
were still below the total amount of swap facilities. Adopting 1953 as the year basis with 
the official exchange rate of Pts 10.95 to $1, instead of Madrid free market’s rate, would 
have resulted in a quota of approximately $104 million, with the possibility to obtain 
credits up to approximately $52 million, i.e., higher than the total amount of bilateral 
swap facilities then available. An opposite image could be given by adopting 1949 as the 
basis year for calculation and using the rate of exchange of the free market. In this case, 
the Spanish quota would have been approximately $24.5 million, which gave Spain access 
to credits amounting to approximately $12.3 million.
Similar operation could be done if the observer was more concerned about the 
possibility of a drain in gold and dollar resources. In 1951, it was officially estimated that 
the full use of the Spanish quota would have resulted on $35.2 million in gold and dollar 
payments (at the settlements ratio 60 to 40 of credits against gold and dollar payments, 
with 1949 as the basis-year and using the official exchange rate of the peseta to the 
dollar). The new 50 to 50 ratio would have increased gold payments -in the same 
circumstances- to $44 million. The hardening of the EPU’s settlements rules could have 
acted immediately against Spanish membership. However, again, the possibility of a drain 
of resources could be accentuated or diminished according to the conditions adopted for 
making the estimates, as in the case of credits. On the one hand, adopting the year 1953 
and the at the official exchange rate, payments in gold increased to $52 million. The same 
basis-year but at the free stock market exchange rate would reduce gold payments to 
$14,556,981. Finally, adopting the year 1949 and the free rate of exchange would reduce 
even more the possible gold and dollar drains to a maximum amount of $12.3 million! 
The real intenogant was the capacity of Spanish exporters to expand business on 
European markets in order to offset any gold and dollar drain once a more stable cross- 
the-line liberalisation measures were extended to them and bilateral financial constraints 
and special exchange rates eliminated.
Calculation* made at the time were worthless and data could be easily
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manipulated in order to provide the result that the observer had previously in mind. In 
June 195S, the Spanish Delegation to the OEEC, which was drafting a favourable 
proposing for Spanish OEEC membership to be presented to the Spanish Council of 
Ministers, came out -mysteriously- with a Spanish quota of SI20 million, which entitled 
Spain to credits up to $60 million, plus an initial credit position of $80 million granted 
by the United States Government!311 No final quota was possible until Spanish 
negotiators could reach an agreement with their OEEC/EPU partners in terms of the 
Spanish quota, the rate of exchange for current transactions, initial credits as a possible 
structural debtor, special transitional clauses and the maximum degree of flexibility that 
Spain would have been allowed in import liberalisation. Import trade liberalisation was 
the strongest disadvantage and the real element to fear in terms of drain of dollar and gold 
resources. At that time, the OEEC had established a liberalisation target of 75 per cent of 
total private imports from the OEEC area in 1948, with a minimum requirement of 60 per 
cent in the three categories of goods into which the OEEC trade nomenclature was 
divided, i.e., raw materials, agricultural products and foodstuffs. The Spanish economic 
authorities were perfectly aware, however, that the disadvantages of import liberalisation 
could be reduced strongly. The Spanish Government could easily exclude many 
commodities from liberalisation calculations by purchasing them under State agencies and 
bodies. The reasons that a country could argue for not implementing liberalisation 
obligations or for de-liberalising were numerous and the capacity of the OEEC to change 
countries' attitudes was limit**! by the rule of unanimity of its decision-making 
procedure.31* France, Turkey and Iceland were clear proofs. For several years, the 
Spanish economic authorities had been watching trade liberalisation efforts in Western 
Europe very carefully. Finally, it seemed that they could use the knowledge of the OEEC 
member countries' experiences with trade liberalisation to their own advantage.
The fact that the Spanish looked carefully at scape-clauses should not be 
perceived negatively. Rather on the contrary, this attitude implies that they intended so 
seriously to move closer towards OEEC practices that some softening measures seemed
,l>. See supra, p. €03.
ax#. MAE, Leg. 10078, exp. 21: Despatch from the Spanish Embassy in Paris to 
Director-General of Cocnercial Policy Schwartz, 7 October 1954.
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necessary for the weak and long-time protected Spanish economy. Argüelles had made 
clear to Ellis-Rees that the agricultural problem was not of vital importance and that he 
was thinking a stage ahead, i.e., whether Spain would, at some stage or another, be able 
to join the OEEC.320 The Government was to decide whether OEEC membership made 
the necessary modification of most of its then existing practices worthwhile. The latter 
were almost entirely at variance with the rules of the OEEC and EPU.
The reply from the diplomatic comer was immediate. The division of International 
Organisations, the Under-Secretary’s most direct rival, argued that generalised 
international competition would be a disaster for the Spanish economy. Conversely, an 
association formula provided a good opportunity for first-hand acquaintance with the 
OEEC and the nature of economic cooperation, without the commitment to modify 
economic and commercial practices. This was particularly relevant when, by the end of
1954, Spain maintained a critical foreign exchange shortage in the case of virtually all 
currencies. The Spanish Government should not accept the possibility of OEEC 
membership without detailed consideration of how a higher tariff level could provide the 
necessary protection.311 The Council of Ministers agreed. To make sure that the dealings 
with the OEEC remained within the limits imposed by foreign policy considerations, the 
Director of International Organisations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was appointed 
to replace the Under-Secretary at the Spanish delegation dealing with the OEEC's 
Committee of Eight.322 For an obscure reason, this never completely happened. At the
3,°. "They had been thinking about this for a long time, but the Green Pool 
incident had brought them to face realities and to regard the possibility 
of their association with OEEC as something of practical importance." PRO, 
MAF 40/558: Ellis-Rees to Coulson, "Spain and the OEEC", Paris, 20 October
1954.
121. AGA, A/6815: "Observaciones a la Nota de la Dirección General de
Política Comercial sobre la posible posición española en las negociaciones 
para incorporar el 'Pool' Verde a la OECE", Madrid, 5 October 1954, sent to 
the Ministers of Agriculture and Commerce before the debate at the Council 
of Ministers. The import licensing system and exchange controls had until 
then overshadowed the effects of a high and protective tariff. Any future 
commitment to eliminate licences and bilateral quotas meant preparing 
tariffs as a main instrument for domestic protection and trade bargaining. 
For a similar and earlier experience in Western Europe see Wendy Asbeek 
Brusse: "West European Tariff Plans, 194 7-1957. From Study Group to Common 
Market", Doctoral Diss., European University Institute, Florence, May 1991.
122. Before the decision was adopted by the Council of Ministers the Spanish
Ambassador in Paris, Rojas, gave an account to Mosquera of the contents of
the subsequently-issued ministerial order no. 1286; AGA, C/36773, folder 4:
Despatch no. 54 6, 10 October 1954.
600
end of November, Argiielles negotiated the conditions of the Spanish participation in the 
organisation for agricultural matters with the OEEC and Cortina checked that the 
limitations imposed did not appear to be inspired by political motives.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Under-Secretariat differed on their 
interpretations of foreign economic policy. The former attempted to remove the essential 
part of the latter's field of action, i.e., relations with the OEEC. In October 1954, a 
proposal came to set up a Secretariat of International Organisations («Secretaría 
Permanente de Organismos Internacionales») within the Ministry, with the purpose of 
coordinating action regarding the new forms of formalised European interdependence 
which the Spanish Government was finally contemplating. The new service was to 
reconcile the different viewpoints with the criteria which guided and inspired the country’s 
foreign policy. It was, in sum, to guarantee the exact continuity in the execution of the 
principle of unity in foreign action, reinforcing the Ministry as the ''unifying centre of the 
Government’s foreign policy."323 Lacking competence regarding Spain’s OEEC 
membership, the Under-Secretariat would be rendered useless in political terms.324 The 
establishment of the DG for International Organisations (decree-law of 8 February 1955. 
BOE of 15th) was an explicit attempt to deprive the Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy 
of its previous political importance and to replace it with another body closer to 
diplomatic considerations. In fact, after March, Arguelles’ economic proposals came as 
head of the Spanish Permanent Delegation to the OEEC and in September he decided to 
leave his post of Under-Secretary to become Spain’s delegate to the OEEC.
Departmental confrontation received a fresh impulse with the transfer of ECO AM 
to the OEEC. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs merely pointed out that the delegation’s 
presence at the OEEC would serve to reinforce the Government’s efforts for political 
respectability. Its targets were to counterbalance the influence of the Council of Europe,
. MAE, Leg. 4616, exp. 2: "Proyecto de Decreto—Ley por el que se crea en 
•1 Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores le Secretaria Permanente de Organismos 
Internacionales", n/d, probably December 1954. In France, the Quai d'Orsay 
always directed the delegation to OEEC, despite the Ministry of Finance's 
efforts to the contrary; Pierre Gerbet et al.: The relèvement 1944-194 9, 
Paris [Imprimerie Nationale] 1991, p. 241.
M4. MAE, Leg. 4616, exp. 2: Argüe lies to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Agriculture and Commerce, Madrid, 7 December 1954 and 19 January 1955.
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whose Assembly under the Guy Mollet Presidency had renewed its hostile actions against 
Franco Spain, and ease future access to European institutions.325 By contrast. Argtielles 
considered Spain’s participation in the OEEC and in the EPU as a means of forcing Spain 
progressively into the international economy.326 Fortunately, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was unsuccessful in removing Argtielles, who was a major opponent of the 
diplomatic role and guide-lines in foreign economic policy, from front-line relations with 
the the OEEC. This was fortunate since Argtielles was well-received in Paris, while 
Cortina was either hardly known to any of the OEEC delegations or considered a difficult 
type.
The Spanish Government agreed to consider membership of the OEEC and EPU. 
It agreed to study ways of achieving some degree of effective liberalisation and the reform 
of exchange practices. The anxious Spanish delegation to the OEEC. headed by the 
Under-Secretary Argtielles, placed the drafting of a report explaining to the Government 
the convenience of Spanish OEEC membership as the first item on its agenda.327 Early 
in June 1955, the M inistries of Commerce and Industry set up the so-called working party 
on International Trade Liberalisation. The latter was "to adopt all necessary measures 
towards a progressive liberalisation to prepare Spain for its entry into the [OEEC]."32* 
The main preoccupation dealt with the rhythm of acceptance of the OEEC exigencies to 
allow the Spanish economy to progressively accommodate to foreign competition. This 
was to be done from scratch and there was clearly a long road to be covered to conform 
with the so-called Code of Liberalisation. The delegation to the OEEC proposed the 
negotiation of a timetable for trade liberalisation. Accordingly, Spain would commence 
with a percentage equal to 30 per cent of its private trade in 1948 in all three categories
,25. MAE, Leg. 3448, exp. 13: "Consideraciones de orden politico sobre el 
eventual ingreso de Espafia en la OEEC”, Paris, 22 June 1955.
M*. AGA, A/6815: Argruelles to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and 
Commerce, Madrid, 3 and 7 December 1954.
w. AGA, A/6814: Escoriza to Cavestany, 2 March 1955. Officially the Spanish 
delegation to OEEC was appointed by the Council of Ministers on March 4th.
m . AGA, C/36869: Record of the interdepartmental meeting, 1 June 1955.
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and would have freed 60 to 65 per cent two years after its admission to the OEEC.329 
The percentage figures mentioned by the delegation were not very significant in absolute 
terms: 30 per cent of Spain’s private trade with OEEC countries as it stood in 1948 meant 
the liberalisation of imports equivalent to $34.7 million. However, they represented 20 per 
cent of total imports, given the importance of State trade (26 per cent of total imports in 
1955).330 The possible Spanish EPU quota was estimated at about $200 million, 
counting upon support from the United States similar to the cases of Austria, Turkey, 
Greece and Norway. According to the Delegation, considering 1953 as base year 
(something which had to be agreed upon in accordance with the OEEC partners), the 
Spanish quota amounted to $120 million. The rest was to come in terms of American 
support. This was a complete misinterpretation of the OEEC and American attitudes which 
the Spanish would have suffered had they officially requested the opening of negotiations.
The OEEC was perfectly aware of the American unwillingness to back the 
immediate effects of Spain’s assumption of the OEEC obligations. Besides, membership 
of EPU was no longer a possible source of short-term credit (might have been perceived 
by the Spanish). After June 1955, the renewal of the EPU provided for settlements of the 
deficits and surpluses of FY 1956 on a 75 percent gold or dollars and 25 percent credit 
basis, instead of the previous 50-50 ratio. In other words, if Spain received a quota, credit 
would have been available as to 25 per cent of any deficit Spain might have incurred with
Ul. MAE, Leg. 5332, exp. 1: Spanish Delegation to the OEEC, "Informe sobre 
la eventual entrada de España en la Organización Europea de Cooperación 
Económica", Paria, June 1955, addressed to the ministers of foreign affairs 
and commerce.
AD, DE-CE 1945-1960, vol. 371: OEEC, C (56) 201, Conseil "Association de 
l'Espagne aux travaux de l'Organisation. Rapport du Groupe de Travail 
Spécial du Conseil", Annex A, "La situation économique de l'Espagne", Paris
26 July 1956. Petroleum products and tobacco were imported by State 
monopolies, while different State offices imported several minerals, cotton 
and coal. For certain agricultural commodities, such as oil, potatoes, 
coffee, meat, eggs, wheat and maize, imports were occasionally undertaken 
by the Supply Commissariat•
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the Union as a whole, the reminder being payable in gold.334 The new EPU mechanism 
forced its members more than ever before to maintain the equilibrium or at least not to 
undergo a persistent and grave disequilibrium in trade balances with the EPU member- 
countries. Furthermore, some OEEC members were convinced of the difficulties to replace 
the multiple rates of exchange overnight without serious inflationary consequences and 
to abandon the licensing system without accentuating the trade deficit with Western 
Europe. In the latter case, Spanish OEEC membership would have no effect at all, since 
the EPU quota would have to be suspended and Spain’s dollar and gold reserves would 
have to be necessarily used to settle monthly intra-EPU payments. The OEEC had no 
capacity to force members to comply with their obligations if they resisted to do so. 
Without American assistance and with EPU credits granted under strict conditions, the 
Spanish economic and financial situation would have made it necessary for the Spanish 
Government either to invoke many safeguard clauses or, with the clear precedents of 
Greece, Iceland and Turkey, to suspend liberalisation and impose discriminatory treatment. 
The most recent target of 90 per cent of intra-European trade liberalisation, set by the 
OEEC Council of Ministers in January 1955, was not even considered by the Spanish.335 
The weak partners in the OEEC were numerous and the OEEC was unwilling to create 
more circumstances in which the number of exceptions in the application of the OEEC 
practices could be multiplied.33* In these circumstances, the fact that an eventual 
membership of the OEEC involved the adoption by the Spanish
1.4. Another probability was the Union making available short-term credits
repayable in gold within two years, or at the termination of the Union, 
whichever came first. These were considerations initially applicable to 
Yugoslavia; PRO, CAB 134/1030: MAC(52)210 (Rev.), "Closer association of
Yugoslavia with OEEC", section 6, "OEEC Considerations".
1.5. This might have been due to the Spanish belief that after the initial 
experimental period, ending in September 1956, the 90 percent liberalisation 
target would have been dropped. Contrarily, in July 1956, the experimental 
period was extended until 31 December 1957; AD, DE—CE 194 5—1960, vol. 371: 
OEEC, C (56)201, Conseil "Association de l'Espagne aux travaux de 
l'Organisation. Rapport du Groupe de Travail Spécial du Conseil", Annex B, 
members' obligations, p. 58.
1,1. ASMAE, records corresponding to the Italian Delegation to the OEEC, b. 
5: "Participazione della Finlandia, Jugoslavia e Spagna all'Unione Europea 
dei Pagamenti", 30 December 1955. Document provided to the author by 
Dott.ssa Giuliana Laschi. Only the Federal Republic, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal and Sweden had reached a 90 percent liberalisation stage, including 
75 per cent in each category; AGA, C/36.819, folder 12: OEEC, C(55)312, 
Council, "Extension de la libéralisation des échanges en application de la 
décision C (54)291 (final), Rapport du Comité de Direction des échanges", 17 
December 1955.
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Government of more liberal policies, which would have in the long term strengthen its 
economic position to the economic advantage of the OEEC as a whole, was not 
considered. Any advantage in extending the multilateral area to Spain would have been 
largely offset by the weakening of the OEEC. Therefore, the possible application for 
membership of the OEEC was simply considered not to be technically credible until the 
Spanish Government’s capacity to observe the conditions, duties and responsibility of 
membership was sufficiently proven.” 7
The emphasis on what Spain should do, hid some countries’ mixed opinions about 
their particular benefits when obliged to extend to Spain their own OEEC measures and 
the modification of their relations with Spain. To the extent that the import liberalisation 
lists included goods for which Spain had to negotiate for import facilities, the OEEC 
countries would be deprived of some of their previous bargaining power. The general 
expansion of export trade toward Spain, with the backing of the EPU multilateral 
payments mechanism, would be detrimental to those countries with no strong competitive 
position.33* This perception was supported when another consideration was assumed: the 
initial percentage of import liberalisation that the Spanish economy could afford was to 
be very low covering exclusively raw materials and manufactured goods not competing 
with domestic industries, leaving aside the range of intermediate manufactured goods in 
which many of the small Western European economies could compete efficaciously with 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom on the Spanish market.339
Some countries could find important domestic opposition in extending the benefits 
of import liberalisation in the agricultural sector to Spain, i.e., French North African
This was, at least, the British position; PRO, CAB 134/1029: MAC (55) 162, 
"Admission of Spain to OEEC", 27 August 1955; and CAB 134/1026: MAC(55)44, 
"Admission of Spain into OEEC”, 26 October 1955.
,M. ASMAE, Italian Delegation to the OEEC, b. 5: "Participazione della
Finlandia, Jugoslavia e Spagna all'Unione Europea dei Pagamenti", 30 
December 1955.
ASMAE, records corresponding to the Italian Delegation to the OEEC, b. 
5: "Eventuale participazione della Spagna all'O.E.C.E. e all'Unione Europea 
dei Pagamenti", 30 December 1955. Document provided to the author by 
Dott.ssa Giuliana Laschi.
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exports to metropolitan France.*40 In general terms, Spain’s closer association with the 
OEEC could help to transfer public opinion concerns to Spain’s NATO membership, a 
highly conflictual field. Finally, maintaining the incertitude about OEEC could be used 
as an important bargaining counter in bilateral relations with Spain. We have seen how 
Belgium tried to solve old financial and diplomatic controversies through its vote at the 
OEEC. France could offer Spain the opportunity of opting between the possible 
international prestige provided by its Arab policy, which was very disturbing in French 
Morocco, and the economic advantages of a progressive rapprochement to the western 
community of nations.341 The United Kingdom could always make its attitude implicitly 
conditional to Spain putting aside, not its claim to Gibraltar, but at least its active pursuit 
of such.342 Support for Spanish participation in Western European regional arrangements 
and some economic concessions could serve to obtain some alleviation on both issues on 
a quid pro quo basis.343
The OEEC officials and some delegates (i.e., the American delegate) suggested 
that the Spanish delegation unofficially work towards membership with the progressive 
liberalisation and simplification of the multiple exchange-rate system in order to reach, 
at least, the level of the Austrian system (which the OEEC had admitted in totally
,<c. AD, DE-CE 1945-1960, vol. 371: DG of Economic and Financial Affairs, 
Economic Cooperation Office at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Note 
a.s. aspects économiques de l'admission éventuelle de l'Espagne À l'OECE", 
Paris, 25 August 1956.
m . AD, DE-CE 1945-1960, vol. 371: DG of European Policy, Under-Direction 
of Southern Europe, v*Note pour le Secrétaire General a. s. admission de 
l'Espagne à l'OECE", Paris, 28 July 1956.
*4Î. PRO, CAB 134/1019: MAC(53)271(Addendum): "Spain and the OEEC. Note by 
the Secretaries", 4 January 1954; PRO, FO 371/130343: INTEL no. 214, 5
December 1955.
*41. The Spanish Government was involved in a series of diplomatic skirmishes 
with France and the United Kingdom. France's difficulties in Morocco served 
Spain to negotiate all outstanding differences between the two countries, 
in particular, the opposition refugees in France. The campaign for the 
return of Gibraltar, which became a strong internal propaganda weapon, 
inevitably casted its shadow on the improvement in Hispano-British relations 
since Winston Churchill again became Prime Minister in November 1951. On the 
question of Gibraltar see references provided by Juan Carlos Pereira 
Castañares: "Las relaciones entre España y Gran Bretaña en la época
contenporánea", and Maria Elena del Pozo Manzano: "Gibraltar en el marco de 
la firma de los acuerdos hispano—norteamericanos de Septiembre 1953", both 
in Bulletin d'histoire contemporaine de l'Espagne, no. 8-9, June 1989, pp. 
15-28 (in particular pp. 19 ff.) and pp. 52-55, respectively. The most 
recent work on the matter is D.S. Morris and R.H. Haigh: Britain, Spain and 
Gibraltar, 1945-1990: The Eternal Triangle, London [Routledge] 1992.
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different circumstances).344 Lists of commodities for liberalisation were immediately 
drafted, proposals to simplify the multiple exchange rate system and to apply a unified 
exchange rate to liberalise imports were analysed and studies to update tariff protection 
were initiated*45 The few items "liberalised” during 1955 (5 to 10 per cent of Spain's 
import trade in 1955) did not comply with the OEEC requirements. Although licences for 
these commodities were issued more quickly than for the "noo-liberalised" goods, 
considerable difficulties and delays existed in making foreign exchange available.346 
Despite all this, there seemed to be a real Spanish commitment to move in the right 
direction, which changed the debate concerning possible Spanish membership of the 
OEEC.
The British Cabinet decided to support Spain's admission to the OEEC, "provided 
Spain is able to satisfy the organisation of her willingness and ability to comply with 
OEEC practices."347 Strengthened by the British blessings, the Spanish Government 
made public its official desire to be more closely associated with the OEEC.34* The 
Belgian and Scandinavian delegations opposed the modification of the Spanish 
relationship with the OEEC, while Italy, Portugal, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Switzerland recommended, at least, its discussion.344 Argiielles recalled the need for 
progressiveness in the elimination of all Spanish controls involving trade and payments, 
which had been installed, he said, for the sake of economic reconstruction in a country
AGA, C/36669: Francisco Javier Elorza y Echaniz, Marquis of Nerva, Vice- 
President of the OEEC Spanish delegation, to Argiielles, Paris, 21 July 1955.
145. Ibid., "Relación de mercancías consideradas en la reunión de ayer 
presidida por el limo. Sr. Subsecretario de Comercio”, 27 September 1955. 
The liberalisation list included spices, tea, rubber, watches, gomme laque, 
noir de fumé« and grains de semence.
,4‘. PRO, CAB 134/1026: MAC (55) 44, •’Admission of Spain into OEEC", 26 October
1955. The import licence itself was not contrary to the OEEC practices 
provided it was granted automatically and followed by the automatic 
attribution of the foreign currency needed.
141. PRO, CAB 134/1030: MAC(55>205, "Admission of Spain to the OEEC. Note by 
the FO”, 20 October 1955, which the British Ambassador in Madrid was to 
communicate to the Spanish Government at the end of the month.
*4i. Elorza to Ellis Rees, cit. in AD, DE—CE 1945-1960, vol. 371: Despatch 
by F. Valéry, General Director of Economic Affairs and Finances at the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Head of the French delegation to 
the OEEC, 3 November 1955.
Ibid., "Note pour le President. L'Espagne et l'OECE", 3 December 1955, 
and Telegram from René Massigli, on a meeting of heads of delegations on 6 
December, Paris, 15 December.
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without foreign assistance and which could not be eliminated overnight. In other words, 
the OEEC should not request the Spanish Government a percentage of import 
liberalisation which could endanger Spain’s balance of payments position, though the 
Spanish Government was willing to increase it as the economic conditions in the countrv 
improved. The initial import liberalisation percentage that the Spanish Government was 
willing to accept was estimated at 25 percent.350
In January 1956, after the British insistence had overcome over-riding objections 
of a general character, the OEEC Council approved the proposal for an agreement in 
principle to examine the Spanish economic situation to enable the OEEC to form an 
opinion on whether Spain was able and willing to fulfil the obligations which membership 
entailed.351 In March, the OEEC Council agreed to the establishment of a working party 
for a detailed inquiry into Spain’s economic situation and into the regulations governing 
trade and payments. Its report was to enable the OEEC to judge to what extent Spain 
could comply with the OEEC practices and was npe for closer association. Much care was 
taken to make no political point in either direction. The study of Spain’s economic 
conditions did not commit the OEEC to any specific form of "closer association", but 
equally, on the Spanish side, there were no prior political conditions to be fulfilled.352 
The OEEC had discovered its clear economic vocation.
Unfortunately for the Spanish perspective, the reports revealed that Spain was in
,50. Argüelles to the Italian Commercial Counsellor recorded in ASMAE, 
Italian Delegation to the OEEC, b. 5: "Eventuale participezione della Spagna 
all'O.E.C.E. e all'Unione Europea dei Pagamenti", 30 December 1955.
,51. AD, DE-CE 1945-1960, vol. 371: "Draft Minute on the Association of
Spain's in the work of the Organisation", 6 January 1956. The British 
originally proposed giving Spain a full observer status on all plenary 
committees and Belgium was the only one to oppose it. A chronology of events 
leading to Spain's association to the OEEC can be found din Pedro Temboury: 
"Espafta asociada a la OECE", Revista de Polltica Internacional, February
1958, pp. 79-88.
AGA, C/36955: OEEC C/WP 11/W(56)2 1st Rev., "Association of Spain in the 
work of the Organisation. Main obligations of membership and questions to 
be put to the Spanish Delegation", Paris, 4 May 1956. The French and the 
Belgians had agreed that, in case the result of the inquest was disastrous, 
the observer status be used as a consolation premium; AD, DE-CE 194 5-1960, 
vol. 371: "Note urgente pour le Conseil des Ministres de mercredi. L'Espagne 
et l'OECE", 13 February 1956, "Note pour le Ministre. Discussions 
officieuses du problème espagnol à l'OECE lors de la sésion ministérielle",
25 February 1956.
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no position to implement suitable trade and payments policies, i.e., the establishment of 
a unified exchange rate and the implementation of an effective liberalisation of imports. 
The original Spanish plans had been to continue with a cautious import trade liberalisation 
during 1956, but further liberalisation was postponed. As regards multiple exchange rates, 
despite the fact that the Spanish authorities had informed the OEEC that they aimed 
ultimately at unification of rates, progress was limited to the reduction of the number of 
exchange rates in force. The introduction of a single rate was not contemplated. As we 
shall see. the Spanish Government’s combined reserves of gold and foreign exchange did 
not allow them to make any progress towards complying with the OEEC trade and 
payments practices.353
The cold weather during the early months of the year, which damaged several 
crops (particularly citrus fruit) and decreased foreign currency earnings, was the 
immediate cause put forward by the Spanish authorities and to an extent accepted by 
foreign observers.354 The Spanish authorities estimated a loss of foreign currency 
earnings of about $100-120 million and the Minister of Commerce asked for immediate 
import restrictions and the implementation of the necessary mechanisms to force other 
exports.355 Modest liberalisation seemed only possible as long as weather conditions 
remained favourable, since the volume of both imports and exports of agricultural goods 
played a decisive role in determining the volume of earnings available to support new 
schemes.
ACA, C/36622, folder 2: OECE, C/WP11/W(56)5, "Statement* by the Spanish 
Delegation on Conznodity Trade Policies", June 1956; AD, DE—CE 1945—1960, 
vol. 371: OEEC, C (56) 201, "Association of Spain in the work of the
Organisation. Report of the Special Working Party of the Council", Annex A, 
"The Economic Situation of Spain", Paris, 25 July 1956, and the Economic 
Cooperation Office of the DS of Economic and Financial Affairs at the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Mote a.s. Aspects économiques de l'admission 
éventuelle de l'Espagne à l'OECE", Paris, 25 August 1956; and, PRO, FO 
371/130322: "Annual Review of Spain for 1956", Ivo Mallet, British Embassy 
in Madrid, to Selwyng Lloyd, 16 January 1957. The initial proposals to 
update the tariff level of protection were suspended until July 1957; 
Antonio Alonso: "El sector exterior", in José Luis Garcia Delgado (dir.) : 
España. Economía, Madrid [Espasa-Calpe] 1988, pp. 273-365, p. 275.
*M . i.e., PRO, F0 371/124124: "Spain: Annual Review for 1955", Mallet to 
Selwyng Lloyd, Madrid, 14 February 1956, and OEEC Working Party on the 
association of Spain in the work of the OEEC, document OEEC Council (56)201, 
cit., 25 July 1956.
*ss. Viftas et al., Politice Comercial en España, cit., vol. 2, pp. .
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The source of real difficulties did not come from the export side, as the Spanish 
authorities contended. Spain’s balance-of-payments difficulties came from the increased 
import demand and the impossibility of financing the consequent deficit (see table 7.6). 
Spain’s balance of payments vis-à-vis the OEEC countries maintained its credit position 
in 1953 and (slightly increased) 1954. The deficit appeared in 1955 and increased 
substantially in 1956. In the latter year, Spain’s overall balance-of-payments deficit 
consisted of $4.3 and $73 million with the dollar and the EPU areas, respectively (only 
partially compensated by a $11.3 million surplus with the rest of the world). The deficit 
with the EPU area was not the result of a disastrous export performance as had been 
forecast early in the year. Commodity exports maintained the level of earnings and total 
receipts increased by $16.5 millions. Tourist earnings continuously increased but did not 
enable Spain to maintain the equilibrium. The responsibility' for the deficit corresponded 
to an import bill increased by $63.8 millions (timed most unfortunately with an 
approximately $35 million drop in the export of citrus fruits).
TABU 7 .6
SPAIN'S BAIANCZ OF PAYMENTS WITH THE OEEC COUNTRIES, 1954-1956
(in dollars)
IMPORTS c.i.f. 
OTHER EXPENSES
1954
288,520,807
56,063,223
1955
311,551,479
55,212,756
1956 
364,509,029 
66,027,813
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 344,584,030 366,764,235 430,536,842
EXPORTS f.o.b. 
OTHER RETURNS
271,751,245
88,723,745*
240,230,631 
100,781,331
241,024,405
116,458,511
TOTAL RECEIPTS 360,474, 990 341,011,962 357,482,916
BALANCE +15,890,960 -25,752,273 -73,053,926
Source: AGA, C/36622: OEEC, C/WP11/W(56)15, "Working Party No. 11 of the 
Council. Association of Spain in the work of the Organisation. Balance of 
Payments with Member Countries in 1949 and 1954", Paris 23 May 1956; ibid. 
for 1955, 6 June 1956; and AHBE, IEME, box no. 54: "Balanza General de Pagos 
del aho 1956". Spain refers to metropolitan Spain, the Balearic and Canary 
Islands, Ceuta and Melilla. (*) It includes French and British credits for 
a total amount of $11,614,286.
Again, the considerable import potential of the country brought to light the main 
difficulty of the Spanish economy: the impossibility of financing the necessary imports 
which would help Spanish manufactured goods to meet foreign competition and make the 
support provided by exchange-rate manipulations unnecessary. The different controls 
maintained imports (during 1951 to 1955) at between 1/6 of the OEEC per capita average
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import level, 1/3 of that of Italy and half of those of Greece and Portugal.3*6 The 
permanent deficit with EPU was due to the lack of any real change in Spain’s foreign 
trade composition. Imports consisted mainly of machinery, vehicles and raw materials, 
while exports involved foodstuffs and some mineral ores.
The reserves of convertible exchange and gold that the Spanish had been carefully 
building up in the previous years drained in few months. Levels dropped from $225 
million to $155 million between December of 1955 and 1956, with a drop of $70 million 
in reserves of dollars and free Swiss Francs.357 While reserves amounted to the 
equivalent of 43.5 per cent of the total value of imports during 1955, they amounted to 
27 per cent a year later. Spain's gold reserves and foreign exchange holdings were 
negligible when compared with the country’s foreign debt By April 1956, the reserves 
(gold and convertible exchange lessened by deficits in other currencies) amounted to 
$220.8 million, while the foreign debt amounted to $163.2 million.35* Under these 
financial circumstances and facing a large and continuing deficit, especially if the country 
continued to liberalise imports from OEEC countries, Spain continued with its rigid 
selective controls on imports to improve its balance-of-payments position concerning the 
EPU area.
AD, DE-CE 1945-1960, vol. 371: OEEC, C(56)201, Con»«il "Association d« 
1'Espagne aux travaux de l'Organisation. Rapport du Groupe de Travail 
Spécial du Conseil”, Annex A, 25 July 1956, p. 11.
>s\ Data on Spain's reserves of gold and foreign currency is amazingly 
contradictory. The mutual appreciation done by the IEME and the Bank of 
Spain of their respective reserves of gold differed strongly. For instance, 
while the IEME reported that the Bank held gold reserves for the equivalent 
of $46.8 million at the end of 1955, the Bank itself announced $56 million. 
Equally, while the latter announced that the IEME's gold reserves amounted 
to the equivalent of $76 million by the end of 1955, the IEME itself 
estimated its gold reserves at $66 million. Consequently, the total amount 
of gold reserves differed: the equivalent of $118 million for the IEME and 
$132 million for the Bank. Fortunately, both sources agreed concerning 
reserves of dollars and free Swiss francs the equivalent of $93 by December 
1955« The reserves in other non—convertible currencies amounted to a deficit 
of $15 million. The figure of $225 million, as Spain's reserves of gold and 
convertible exchange, corresponds to Banco de EspaAa: Informe sobre la
evoluciôn de la économie espafiola en 1957, Madrid, 1959. This source was 
preferred over the figure of $210.5, drafted by the IEME, as presented by 
the OEEC Spanish delegation to the OEEC working party (C(56)201, annexe A, 
p. 31) because the IEME had a clear interest in undervaluing the level of 
the country's reserves in order to stress its financial difficulties.
AD, DE-CE 1945-1960, vol. 371: OEEC, C(56)201, Conseil "Association de 
l'Espagne aux travaux de l'Organisation. Rapport du Groupe de Travail 
Spécial du Conseil", Annex A, 25 July 1956, pp. 31-32. Excluding some debts 
with Argentina.
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The Spanish Government demanded help from OEEC members and the United 
States. OEEC members were asked to grant {before EPU membership) currency 
transferability of a certain percentage of Spain’s bilateral deficits with EPU members. In 
compensation, without the provision of membership, the Spanish Government would agree 
to an annual economic inspection by OEEC experts and to receiving 
recommendations.359 This meant a half-way house to multilateralism, which the Spanish 
authorities believed was necessary to adopt less discriminatory practices (global quotas 
and higher liberalisation percentage) and to grant a multilateral character to its import 
policy. By means of a bilateral agreement with its OEEC trading partners (but without 
holding an EPU quota), Spain would be allowed to use pan of its earnings from these 
countries multilaterally, eliminating the need to maintain a continuous balance with each 
of the monetary areas involved, since transactions between the Spanish monetary area and 
most OEEC member countries were settled through clearing accounts.360
On the American side, in June 19S6, Spanish Foreign Minister Martin Artajo 
reclaimed in Washington a re-distribution of counterpart funds in favour of the Spanish 
economy and an increase of raw materials and capital goods in the commodity 
composition of purchasing authorisations. On the one side, as it has been explained 
already, not only the proportion of counterpart funds at the disposal of the Spanish 
Government was reduced (30 per cent), but it was also committed to investment in 
bilaterally agreed projects with direct benefit to the military programme (transport, 
munitions and military material industries).361 On the other side, according to Artajo, 63.5 
per cent of the economic aid authorised by the Congress of the United States after the 
signature of the Agreements of September 1953 (including funds under P.L. 480) was 
assigned to agricultural surpluses, a proportion which appeared as "excessive by any
AD, DE-CE 1945-1960, vol. 371: OEEC C(56)192, Elorza to Ellis-Rees, 
Paris, 11 July 1956.
**°. This position was adopted by the special working party studying possible 
measures for the closer association of Spain with the OEEC, who considered 
Spain's direct access to the EPU as a source of innumerable problems; AD, 
DE-CE 1945-1960, vol. 371: OEEC, C(56)201, Conseil "Association de l'Espagne 
aux travaux de l'Organisation. Rapport du Groupe de Travail Spécial du 
Conseil", Annex A, 25 July 1956.
1,1. See chapter four, pp. 304—305 and 323 ff.
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yardstick”. ^  In August 1956, Aitajo went even further and asked directly for 
approximately $325 million of financial assistance: $200 million destined to finance the 
immediate impact of an average level of import liberalisation according to the OEEC 
pattern, $50 million worth of American agricultural surpluses to be sold in different 
markets by the Spanish Government, which would refund the United States Government 
in pesetas and finally, undetermined amounts in different currencies to pay off some of 
the then existing deficits in the clearing accounts with OEEC members.363
The Spanish Government argued to have initiated import liberalisation and the 
elimination of other financial restrictions, but that their financial resources alone were 
insufficient, particularly after the frosts had decreased the expected earnings of foreign 
exchange and reduced the amount of reserves. The assistance was requested explicitly to 
reduce economic intervention in order to move towards trade and payments 
multilateralisation and, for the United States Government, to comply with some of the 
principles inscribed in the Economic Aid Agreement of September 1953.364
According to Carrero Blanco, the $60 million authorised for FY 1956 represented 
barely 50 per cent of the estimated loss of foreign currency earnings due to the damage 
caused to the crops by frosts.363 Carrero explained to Lodge that frosts had reduced the
,c. MAE, Leg. 7741, exp. 3: Artejo to John D. Lodge (U.S. Ambassador to 
Spain from March 1955), Madrid, 21 June 1956; English translation in FRUS, 
1955-1957, XXVII, p. 575.
***. MAE, Leg. 5883, exp. 4: Arta jo to John Lodge, the United States
Ambassador to Spain, Saint Sebastian, 31 August 1956. Observing that the 
Spanish Government mobilised $74 million to pay off part of its bilateral 
deficits with some of the OEEC members (Viñas et al., op. cit., vol. 2, p. 
858), this is the amount used to calculate the initial total figure of 
financial assistance of $325 million. With respect to the United States 
economic aid programme for Spain, the reader should consider that of the 
$320 million worth of funds authorised for fiscal years 1954, 1955 and 1956 
(including Public Law 480 programme of approximately $100 million), a total 
of approximately $146 million had been disbursed by April 1956, leaving a 
total of $174 million worth of goods yet to be delivered; FRUS, 1955-1957, 
vol. 27, Memorandum of Conversation between the United States Secretary of 
State and Ambassador to Spain and the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Ambassador to the United States, with their respective teams, Department 
of State, Washington, 10 April 1956, p. 566.
,M. According to a subsequent report, the Americans answered negatively in 
2 October; MAE, Leg. 4618, exp. 16: Report on USA—Spain relations, Madrid,
26 April 1957.
m . MAE, Leg. 10078, exp. 24: Luis Carrero Blanco to Ambassador Lodge, 
Madrid, 13 November 1956.
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financial resources normally available for imports, with a direct effect on the clearing 
balances with Western Europe and on Spain’s future relation with the OEEC. Hiis, in 
turn, had diminished the possibilities to purchase capital goods during the following two 
years, unless the Spanish authorities could pay in gold or dollar. Therefore, Carrero asked 
for an aid programme of $30 million additional to the funds granted to Spain by the U.S. 
Congress under the terms of the Mutual Security A cl This additional aid would have been 
programmed to purchase raw materials (coal, scrap, copper, aluminium, and steel 
products) in order to sustain demand, break bottlenecks and black markets prices.366
The different Governments disregarded the Spanish request for financial assistance 
to consolidate the initial steps in the direction which these same Governments had been 
indicating to the Spanish Government since 1947. The American response was particularly 
disappointing. The authorities in Washington exclusively agreed to increase to 70 per cent 
the portion of the proceeds from Public Law 480 sales of agricultural surpluses loaned to 
Spain under the programme of FY 1957.367 This assistance would have eased little the 
situation of the Spanish balance of payments to solve the immediate consequences of any 
degree of import liberalisation. The fact itself that Spain had initiated collaboration with 
the OEEC, whose rules were totally incompatible with the Spanish practices in trade and 
payments, should have persuaded the United States and other countries’ Governments that 
Spain finally intended to adopt more liberal practices.
The response from the executive branch of the American Government was to 
increase by $20 million the $50 million of Congressional authorisations for economic, 
technical and military assistance for Spain through FY 1957. There is no secret to 
decipher the United States Government attitude. As it has been explained previously, the
,4i. MAE, Leg. 10078, exp. 24: Arta jo to Lodge, 1 December 1956. The intended 
allocation of Carrero's $30 million was as following (in millions): copper 
$6, scrap $5, coal $4, aluminium $2.5, steel products $3, miscellaneous $9.5 
(for the basis of this programme see Viñas et al., op. cit., p. 794). 
Between June 1953 and June 1958 the following amounts were purchased with 
American funds (in millions): copper $4.14, scrap $3.02, coal $5.21,
aluminium $1.91. Cotton represented the lion's part in the commodity 
composition of dollar-aid purchasing programme ($19.94); MAE, Leg. 5519: 
"Ayuda o asistencia a España", cit.
**7. FRPS, 1955-1957, vol. 27, Letter from Ambassador Lodge to Arta jo, 
Madrid, 5 October 1956, p. 576.
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latter’s objectives in Spain, in terms of economic aid, were limited to insure interna] 
stability so that the use of the military facilities in Spain would not be jeopardized by civil 
disorders. This programme required the granting of minimnm amounts of economic aid 
to assist the Spanish authorities in achieving stability and growth while the United States 
maintained necessary military forces. It was only in October 1957 that the prospect of 
using aid programmes for Spain to obtain positive action by the Spanish Government 
toward stabilising the economy reappeared as a goal to be actively pursued in the United 
States’ policy toward Spain.3*8
On the European side, the OEEC working parties* reports recognised the existence 
of a real change of direction in the Spanish economy, limited by the situation in the 
Spanish balance of payments. Notwithstanding this, instead of providing for limited 
transferability of their deficits with Spain, the different OEEC members reduced their 
commercial credits to Spain. The clearing agreements concluded by Spain with the OEEC 
countries provided for credit lines corresponding to the equivalent of about $27.5 million 
in all, during 1956, whereas they had been approximately $66 million a year before.3** 
This attitude might have corresponded to a general desire to avoid negotiating outstanding 
surpluses of the clearing accounts in case Spain acceded to the EPU or any new monetary 
agreement. The reserves of convertible exchange bad seriously dropped to $23 million at 
the end of 1956, leading to renewed efforts to contend the import level as well as to draw 
on IEME gold reserves. Previously, the National Foreign Exchange Institute had been able 
to m aintain a precarious balance without drawing on the Bank of Spain for its support due 
to strict import controls.
The option of Spanish OEEC membership disappeared at the OEEC Council level 
after October 1956, even for those who had previously supported it, i.e., Austria, Ireland, 
Portugal, Turkey and the United Kingdom. A special agreement for closer collaboration 
received more attention and Spain was invited to continue implementing a non- 
discriminatory import policy, to submit a development plan and to suggest the means to
,M. See chapter four, pp. 337 ff.
***. C/WP11/W(56)2, Annex A, cit., p. 37
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multilateralise its deficit with the OEEC.370 New working parties were set up to work 
at the decisions in more detail and to present a proposition on the subject of Spanish 
association to the OEEC, which was to be the object of further negotiations with the 
Spanish Government.371 In December 1957, after considering the new report, the OEEC 
Council proposed to grant an associate-membership to Spain and to progressively replace 
the network of bilateral agreements with OEEC members by a single multilateral 
agreement. The Spanish Government finally signed an association agreement with the 
OEEC on 10 January 1958.372 The OEEC member states and Spain agreed to 
progressively take measures to eliminate restrictions on their trade and invisible 
transactions as much as their economic and financial position permitted and considering 
similar efforts made by the other party. Spain was committed to proposing a first 
programme of trade and payments liberalisation. Finally, in 1959, with the reorganisation 
of that body into the OECD, Spain became a full member and presented a Stabilisation 
Programme in July, drafted with the help of an OEEC mission, which travelled to Spain 
in December 1959.373
The last section of this chapter has dealt exclusively with the first steps of a long 
and costly process of liberalisation. The sharp perception of the new post-February 1957 
ministerial personnel of the international setting and of the situation of the Spanish 
economy were not, at least exclusively, the factors which led to the rapid response of the 
international community to the official request for financial aid to stabilise the economy 
in 1959.374 There were sectors within the Spanish Administration which had supported
,10. AD, DE-CE 194 5—1960, vol. 371: OEEC C(56)201, "Association d® l'Espagne 
aux travaux de l'Organisation. Rapport du Groupe de Travail Spécial du 
Conseil", Annex A, "La situation économique de l'Espagne", 26 July 1956; and 
Quai d'Orsay to French Embassy in Madrid, 10 October 1956.
171. Ibid, Quai d'Orsay to French Embassy in Madrid, 25 October 1956.
*72. Text reproduced in Temboury, art. cit., pp. 83-86.
,1*. For an account of Spain's entry into the OEEC see Elorza: "La O.E.C.E 
y España", Cuadernos de la Escuela Diplomática, vol. 1, 1960, pp. 9-58.
,14. i.e., Mariano Navarro Rubio: "La batalla de la estabilización", Anales 
de la Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, no. 53, Madrid, 1976; 
Joan Sarda Dexeus: "Prólogo a la primera edición", in Joan Clavera et al.: 
Capitalismo español: de la autarquía a la estabilización (1939-1959), 2nd 
ed., (Cuadernos para el Diálogo], Madrid, 1978, pp. 13-21; Enrique Fuentes 
Quintana: a) "El Plan de Estabilización económica de 1959, veinticinco años 
después", Información Comercial Española, nos. 612-13, 1984, pp. 25—40; and 
b) "Tres decenios de economía española en perspectiva", in José Luis García
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for years the economic options implemented at the end of the decade. Due to participation 
in the OEEC agricultural structure, the Spanish delegation to the OEEC could hold 
discussions with OEEC officials as well as bilaterally with most national delegations since 
the beginning of 19SS. By the time the new Cabinet reached office, the official Spanish 
position was clearly favourable to the progressive dismantling of controls and the then 
existing bilateral system of trade and payments.373
Spain’s association with the OEEC produced growing awareness of the dangers 
of economic isolation. The long process of bringing Spain back into the realm of 
European economic cooperation formed the basis that determined the economic policy 
adopted at the end of the 1950’s. The OEEC, the EPU, the ECSC, the Green Pool and 
cooperation in transport represented a learning process in which the Spanish 
Administration became aware of its entanglement in a situation of strategic 
interdependence.” 6
It is my understanding that what the Green Pool experience revealed should also 
be estimated in a long-term perspective. The Spanish Government officially requested the 
opening of negotiations with the EEC to examine the possibilities of association and 
future membership, when the EEC Council of Ministers was discussing the first package 
of measures on a common market organisation.377 The Spanish had learned their lesson 
and rapidly recognised the discriminatory nature against imports from third countries of 
any system of minimum prices of reference and any attempt to impose regulation of
Delgado (dir.): España. Economía, Madrid [Espasa Calpe] 1988, pp. 1-75.
*n . Contrary to my arguments, some authors draw Ha causal relationship” 
between the signature of the military agreements between Spain and the 
United States for the use of bases and the acceleration of the country's 
economic transformation and Spain's economic liberalisation measures of
1959. Most clearly and recently expressed by R. Richard Rubottom and J. 
Carter Murphy: Spain and the United States Since World War II, New York
[Praeger] 1984, pp. 1 and 64.
,,f. The idea of a learning process has been borrowed from Ernst B. Haas, 
"Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes", World Politics, 
no. 32, April 1980, p. 390.
171 • Which became Council Regulations (EEC) no. 23/62 on the progressive 
establishment of a common market organisation in cereals, pig-meat, eggs, 
fruit and vegetables, and wine, and on the financing of the common 
agricultural policy, Official Journal of the European Communities no. 965/62 
of 20 April 1962.
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qualities and markets. The official motivation supporting the request, as it was in the early 
1950s, was the essential agricultural character of Spanish exports to the Six, which 
financed the economic development of the country.37* The lessons the Spanish 
Administration learned from the difficulties and results of the Green Pool negotiations 
constituí a key element to understanding the very nature of the Stabilisation Plan starting 
in 1959 and the reasons behind the 1962 EEC membership request. The legacy of Spanish 
Green Pool membership is by no means negligible!
7.6. Conclusions
The term Green Pool and the idea of a European Agricultural Community 
covered possibilities ranging from a fully supranational organisation to a set of interlocked 
preferential agreements covering several commodities. The lack of unanimous consensus 
reflected a point of special interest to explain Spanish participation. The negotiations 
naturally excluded the Spanish Government until the struggle to reach a common 
denominator among and within participating countries had dragged the initiative not only 
away from supranationality but to the lowest imaginable level of consensus.
Subsequent events historically shadowed the Green Pool issue. The Concordat 
with the Vatican was presented as the existing confidence of Spain’s rulers in the 
messianic mission of Spain as the outstanding champion of Christendom in with standing 
the Communist menace. The bilateral agreement with the United States Government, 
providing them with bases in exchange for economic aid, represented the alignment with 
the West in the defence of the non-Communist world. Moreover, it happened that any 
advantageous statement made by a foreign statesman and quoted by the press and radio 
was very often worth more to the Spanish Government than a technical achievement 
which could not be translated into propaganda terms. However, this case-study provides 
grounds for two further important considerations.
171. "Carta del Ministro español de Asuntos Exteriores al Presidente del 
Consejo de Ministros de la Comunidad Económica Europea (Maurice Couve de 
Murville), 9 de Febrero de 1962", reproduced in Antonio Truyol y Serra: La 
integración europea. Idea y realidad, Madrid [Tecnos] 1972, pp. 157-58.
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On the political side, this chapter strongly denies the idea that in foreign policy 
the Spanish Government opted for the European alternative only after 1957.374 It also 
contradicts the idea that the post-1957 period represents the only conscious attempt to 
articulate a foreign policy to forge external circumstances in line with the country’s 
interests.3*0 This research has given a detailed account which confirms that both 
premises can be applied at an earlier stage. Furthermore, the Green Pool experience 
contradicts the traditional view that Spain paid no attention, or felt absolutely unable to 
formalise responses, to the integrating initiatives taking place in Western Europe during 
the 1950s. In that case, Spain did react, obtained favourable results and, what is more, was 
able to participate and promote its own economic and political interests.
The Green Pool issue also shows the limits of Spain's traditional foreign action 
mechanisms. The instruments of foreign policy, dominated exclusively by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (the only policy-option available), were totally unable to deal with 
economic multilateralism. The impressive diplomatic effort displayed by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had no influence on the outcome of the negotiations. Spain’s diplomatic 
effort deserves recognition only for the continuous persistence on Spain’s request for 
membership. The Green Pool issue could not be dealt with simply as a diplomatic 
objective. Nor could commercial policy, limited to the administrative aspects of foreign 
economic relations, properly handle the complexities of the Green Pool. Multilateral 
negotiations were far more complex than the bilateral bargaining negotiations the Spanish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was used to dealing with.
The Spanish Administration was, as elsewhere, far from being a monolithic entity. 
Administrative unity implies a unified national interest Spain's involvement in 
European economic cooperation brought about relevant differences within its 
administration when defining the national interest When the several departments 
involved in foreign economic matters presented a different interpretation of the national
An oppoait* visión i» pr.a.nt.d by, among othara, Williare T. Salisbury: 
"Spain and Europe: the economic realities", in Salisbury and James D.
Theberge (eds.): Spain in the 1970s, New York [Praeger] 1976, pp. 33-47.
100 • An opposite visión is expressed by, among others, Roberto Mesa: 
Democracia y política exterior en Espafli, Madrid [Eudema] 1988, p. 27.
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interest, unity disappeared and a disparity of aims appeared on essential foreign economic 
policy measures among ministers and corps of civil servants. The so-called technical 
departments tried to obtain as much as they could by attracting matters into their limited 
spheres of responsibility, that is, the technical aspects of foreign economic policy. By 
acting in this way they attempted to reduce the political element involved in foreign 
economic policy and thus to eliminate the most obvious obstacle to Spam’s international 
economic cooperation.
The Green Pool issue highlighted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ fears of losing 
ground in the administrative distribution of power. A split between technical and political 
matters involved the risk of losing power and competence in foreign policy. When foreign 
economic policy increasingly became the dominant aspect of the nation’s foreign policy, 
the technical ministries argued for better-prepared professionals to deal with foreign 
economic matters. Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarded increasing European 
economic interdependence as a direct threat:
"The federalist trend [that France] pushes forward has the 
tendency to reduce the Ministries of Foreign Affairs' 
prerogatives by increasing dirept contacts among the technical 
administrations in each field."1*1
A fresh outline of future economic options only appeared when economic experts had 
freedom in the WP’s. This meant breaking out the strait-jacket imposed by the guide-lines 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reflecting the international political situation of the 
Franco regime.
The main result of unilateral action by diplomats, even beyond the limits imposed 
by the Council of Ministers, was the imposition of political considerations. This chapter 
shows how diplomats, using the prerogatives of its privileged position in foreign matters 
to extremes abandoned economic criteria and replaced them with the political guide-lines 
of foreign policy. When calling for "maximal prudence" concerning European economic 
integration "not to compromise the higher interests of Spain’s foreign policy", the 
Minimy of Foreign Affairs was not talking about the national interest but exclusively
“l. MAE, Leg. 3445, exp. 24: "Pool Verde", n/d.
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about personal survival.312 The lour de iarce maintained with the Under-Secretariat 
of Foreign Economy should be considered in the framework of the struggle to dominate 
foreign economic policy. With the establishment of the DG for Internationa] 
Organisations, the Under-Secretary initiated a harmful body, which only ended with its 
dissolution in October 1957.3,3 In other words, after a decade, the design of the foreign 
economic machinery went back to the pre-1947 situation. Clearly departmental 
confrontation rendered the machinery designed to conduct the State’s foreign economic 
relations inefficient. The first Spanish experience in multilateral affairs revealed the need 
for a proper State foreign economic policy. Collaboration between the department 
competent in foreign affairs and those directly interested in foreign economy became 
essential, although it could never be achieved in the 1950s due to administrative 
confrontation. The so-called technocrats, who came to power in 1957 and initiated 
drastic economic stabilisation would have taken good notice of it.
On the economic side, agriculture constitutes a relevant case-study of the Franco 
Regime’s foreign economic policy and its effectiveness in reducing external constraints 
on the country’s agricultural trade as part of a comprehensive strategy for economic 
development Spanish-Green Pool experience shows the interaction between the domestic 
strategy for economic development and the State’s foreign action.314 Official aspirations 
to increase domestic production were in complete dependency on the foreign performance 
of the economy for its financial resources. Export trade carried out the extremely 
important task of providing the economy with the required financial means to purchase 
essentials to sustain economic growth. Thus, when a vital source of expons and foreign
lc. MAE, Leg. 2334, exp. 16: Despatch no. 169 to the Minister of
Agriculture, "Comisión españole en reuniones Comité Interino Pool Verde", 
22 April 1953.
Mí. As were the corps of councillors and attachés for foreign economy, 
Decree of the Presidency of the Government, 3 October 1957, BOE of 16th. 
After that, the economic attachés were appointed by the minister of foreign 
affairs both from the diplomatic as well as the commercial technical 
services. Once the Onder-Secretariat was dissolved, its attributions were 
transferred to both ministries (Foreign Affairs and Commerce) according to 
the principle of direct responsibility and economic efficiency.
***. An interesting coincidence is that the first minister of foreign affairs 
in Mr González Cabinet, Fernando Morán, initiated his diplomatic career with 
a study on the Green Pool; "El proyecto de una comunidad agricola europea 
y España9*, to be consulted at the Diplomatic School, Madrid, academic year 
1953-54.
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exchange was threatened and a real bottleneck for economic development appeared, Spain 
adopted a desperate, but ultimately successful, response. Even more, the attempts to open 
up the Spanish economy during the second half of the 1950s are linked to the relation 
(allowed by the Green Pool developments) of the most European-minded sectors of the 
Spanish Administration with the OEEC.
Undoubtedly, the Spanish Administration succeeded in limiting the impact of 
European integration in the field of agriculture. Spain managed to neutralise the OEEC's 
trade liberalisation scheme concerning agriculture (partly due to the failure of the scheme 
itself) and intervene in the debates to create a European Agricultural Community (or 
whatever was left of the idea). Green Pool membership had reinforced Spain’s bargaining 
position on its particular bilateral trading in agricultural produce. Bilateralism meant that 
Spain's agricultural exports to Western Europe increased more rapidly from 1948 to 1955 
(261 per cent) than those same exports to the world markets (167 per cent).3,5 
Furthermore, the percentage of agricultural exports in the value of total exports increased 
and Spain accentuated its dependence on Western European agricultural demand. On a 
world basis, this figure rose ftom 49 per cent in 1949 to 55 per cent in 1955, while that 
for the OEEC (excluding Greece. Turkey and Portugal) increased from 51 per cent to 65 
per cent In the case of orange exports, while Spanish exports represented 72.3 per cent 
of the total volume of European orange and tangerine exports during 1948-52, this 
percentage increased to 83.8 per cent of Europe’s total.3*6
The Spanish authorities had reached a position similar to the quadrature of the 
circle. On the one hand, even before they could celebrate their diplomatic success, the 
liberalisation debate involved the Administration in a long-term process of confrontation 
on basic economic options, which could not be solved for many years. It is not surprising 
that the Green Pool precipitated this debate. Agricultural export trade was the only sector 
of the Spanish economy in which there could be general agreement on some degree of
,#s. Following official Spanish statistics on a weight basis. This is also 
valid for the following percentage figure on the text.
,#€. FAO: Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, Trade, Rome, 1957, 
vol. 11, part 2, p. 108.
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greater liberalisation. For the rest, there were great difficulties as regards protectionism. 
On the other hand, the difficulties in harmonising national policies with a reasonable 
degree of freedom of trade remained as contentious and intractable as before the 
installation of the new agricultural bodies in the OEEC. While the latter continued to set 
up new working groups, the relaunching of agricultural integration was taking place 
within the Six. The original success of Spain’s reaction towards integration in European 
agriculture could provide no guarantee for its equal treatment as regards future measures. 
In fact, the progressive establishment of a common market for agricultural products 
reproduced the Green Pool threat. The adoption of greater degrees of liberalisation, while 
Spain’s major markets negotiated the formation of a common market, produced a new 
insoluble problem in the short run, as the Green Pool had done a decade earlier. The 
legacy of the Green Pool immediately warned the Spanish Administration of the potential 
danger of integration in agriculture. Spain's dependence on the EEC as its primary export 
market for agricultural goods and its impact on Spain’s economic development provided 
compelling reasons for Spain to seek some arrangements with the Six a few years later. 
That is a long story and for me, a different story!
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CONCLUSIONS
There is a unanimous belief that the post-1945 decade of Francoism was a period 
of intended isolation from democratic Europe. Therefore, the Spanish Administration 
would have disregarded efforts for European economic cooperation before 1957. It is only 
after the creation of the Common Market that a definitive clash between supporters of 
self-sufficiency and those espousing liberalisation would have taken place. As a result, 
those coming into power in 1957 -the so-called technocrats- would have been approved 
close economic ties with Western Europe. The immediate effect of the European 
Economic Community’s success in affecting Spanish foreign trade would have impelled 
the Foreign Affairs Minister to present officially Spain’s request for EEC admission in 
1962. Stabilisation, liberalisation and economic integration with Western Europe are 
considered the stages of a new strategy for economic growth.
This thesis proves that the Spanish Administration watched closely as the Western 
European countries edged towards economic interdependence between 1945 and 1955, and 
then reacted accordingly. It also shows that trade relations between Spain and Western 
Europe provided the means for the international recognition of the Franco regime. But this 
thesis also shows that foreign policy and foreign economic relations aimed at the 
promotion of domestic economic policies in Spain and not exclusively for the political 
survival of Francoism. Finally, this study demonstrates that, well before 1957, some 
sectors of the Spanish Administration considered stabilisation, liberalisation, and economic 
cooperation with Western Europe to be the correct strategy for economic growth. In sum, 
this thesis contributes to a better understanding of Francoism.
The predicament of the European economies in the aftermath of World War II 
favoured the permanence of the Franco regime. Despite the nature of the Spanish political 
system. Western Europe needed Spanish resources for relief and reconstruction. The 
Spanish economic position, as net exporter of goods in short supply at the time, eclipsed 
the political antipathy towards the Franco regime. As far as possible, most governments 
in Western Europe tried to keep the issues of politics and trade separate, and attempted 
to conduct trade purely on business principles. The Allies deemed that Franco’s 
disappearance from Spanish politics would have caused internal turmoil in Spain; in turn,
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it would have disturbed the then important trade relations. Trade intensification replaced 
political retaliation.
Spain’s position concerning the relief and reconstruction efforts of Western 
Europe provides an understanding of the Spanish response to subsequent events in the 
field of European economic cooperation. In the absence of major foreign obstacles to trade 
from 1945 to 1947, the Spanish Administration believed that political relations with 
Western European countries could be as correct as economically advantageous. The 
ideological content of the Marshall Plan disrupted this scheme.
The Spanish Government expected that Marshall Aid would stimulate economic 
recovery by providing for the modernisation of industrial structures. The Spanish offered 
to undertake a long-term process of economic stabilisation and trade liberalisation. This 
was conditional upon assistance to finance the supply of raw materials and machinery' 
needed to break bottlenecks and to initiate a long-term economic adjustment. Spain’s 
exclusion from the European Recovery Program eliminated the possibility of any radical 
change in foreign economic policy. The inclusion of Spain among the list of ERP 
countries or other concession of assistance outside the Marshall Plan arrangements (a 
viable possibility) would most certainly have helped to end the country’s economic 
isolation a decade earlier.
Spain’s poor economic performance during the late 1940s was not exclusively the ~l 
result of domestic policy measures adopted in pursuit of economic isolation. This has been 
the main argument of post-1975 research on the period, in direct contradiction to the 
views of the regime’s propagandists who exclusively stressed external constraints to 
economic recovery. This thesis reveals that the severity that characterised trade controls 
and currency intervention in Spain was due to the lack of financial resources and not to 
an ideological commitment to autarchy. The Spanish willingness to join the Marshall Plan 
implied, to a certain degree, a commitment to the American goal of a world-wide system 
of multilateral trade and payments. Foreign financial assistance would have allowed 
progressive economic liberalisation as early as 1947. However, the Western powers’ 
insistence on linking inexorably the granting of financial assistance to political
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démocratisation, frustrated an earlier evolution of the Spanish economy towards any 
greater degree of liberalisation.
In historical perspective, the Allies’ attitude was a total failure in practical terms. 
Excluding Spain from the Marshall Plan produced neither democratic evolution nor 
economic growth. On the contrary, it strengthened the authoritarian lines of the Francoist 
political system, and led to economic stagnation. Furthermore, the unsatisfied need for 
substantial financial assistance led the Spanish Government to enter into negotiations with 
the United States Government to trade the right to use military bases in exchange for 
dollar aid.
The use of military bases on Spanish territory was the only policy opdon left to 
the Spanish Administration to obtain quickly substantial foreign economic assistance 
independently from political liberalisation. However, in spite of Spain’s expectations for 
a general rehabilitation of the Spanish economy, the amounts earmarked for Spain were 
much reduced and allocated mainly for the construction of the bases. Spain’s relations 
with the United States explain neither Spanish economic performance before 1955 nor the 
survival of the Franco regime. Furthermore, the belief that the United States played a role 
in promoting economic liberalisation and stabilisation in Spain (a common belief in 
Spanish historiography) is irreparably damaged by this research. Since 1947, the United 
States refused to accept the Spanish Government’s argument that liberal economic 
practices had nothing to do with politics; when it finally accepted the Spanish reasoning, 
a decade later than when it was first formulated, it made a weak effort to support the 
Spanish stabilisation programme. The Spanish case during the 1940s and 1950s might be 
enlightening for political scientists studying the American reaction to similar processes ^
Surprisingly, the significance of relations with the United States comes from the 
frustration which they produced. The Spanish economic authorities were forced to divert 
their aaention from foreign financial assistance to exports and from short-term to long­
term transformation of their economy. Eventually, trade relations with Western Europe 
provided necessary inputs for a long-term process of economic transformation. Spanish
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industry was unable to substitute domestic production for imports and could not do 
without certain commodities which, at times, paralysed economic activity. The Spanish 
thus perceived progressive economic interdependence in Western Europe as a serious 
obstacle, although not an insurmountable one, to improving their trade performance. This 
was particularly true for agricultural exports which, as the country's principal source of 
foreign currency, were essential to the import substitution policy and for the favourable 
development of the economy as a whole.
The trade liberalisation programme of the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation had less of a negative impact on Spanish trade than might have been 
expected. Balance-of-payments difficulties in various Western European economies 
restricted the overall efficiency of trade liberalisation in the early 1950s. The programme 
failed especially in agricultural trade, while trade liberalisation in raw materials was 
extended to non-OEEC members. Traditional Spanish exports, dominated by raw materials 
and agricultural produce, were thus scarcely affected by the trade liberalisation programme 
promoted by the OEEC. Furthermore, some OEEC countries extended trade liberalisation 
measures to Spain.
The Schuman Plan did not further isolate Spain. Central European coal and steel 
were of scant interest to Spain given the inward-looking nature of Spanish coal and steel 
industries. Furthermore, the lack of a commercial policy by the European Coal and Steel 
Community diminished the immediate distortions of the very limited, but essential, trade 
flows between Spain and each of the six ECSC countries. This situation changed when 
integration expanded to high priority areas such as agriculture.
Inasmuch as Spain managed successfully to cohabit in the loose framework of 
early European cooperation, later initiatives based on supranationality appeared as threats 
to Spam’s relations with Western European countries. In the end, attempts to set up 
European communities following the line of the Schuman Plan did not have negative 
effects on the Spanish economy. These initiatives did not fulfill their initial goals and 
Spain could participate in defence of its own interests. The Spanish Administration was 
able to overcome the potential negative implications of European cooperation in the
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agricultural field, and continued to export agricultural products to Western Europe. In 
summary, the OEEC countries kept open for Spain the possibility to earn foreign 
currency. This reduced -via imports- some of the supply bottlenecks that had previously 
limited domestic production; prevented the collapse of the Spanish economy; and 
permitted modest sectorial growth and, thus, political stability. Spain’s trade performance 
was not directly attributable to external discriminatory measures. On the contrary, exports 
depended upon output and domestic price levels, and imports relied upon payment 
facilities and the availability of foreign exchange.
The policy-making process concerned with European economic cooperation had 
significant implications. The various European economic initiatives involved several 
departments, and provided the grounds for disagreement on essential foreign economic 
policy measures. This confrontation impeded the implementation of a uniform policy 
which would have placed diplomats in a dominant role in foreign economic action. 
Conversely, competing ministerial bureaucracies determined the policies pursued by the 
Spanish Government to cope with the broad political and economic implications of 
European economic cooperation between 1947 and 1955. The technical ministries had a 
sufficient grasp of the situation to realise that a non-political attitude towards Europe 
would ease the transition to European economic practices, if the country was to benefit 
from the European economic expansion.
The Spanish Administration was effective in dealing with the challenge of 
European economic cooperation. The degree of success in establishing a basic measure 
of compatibility between domestic and international policy objectives, however, remains 
an open debate. This research can only assure that Spain's association with the OEEC 
produced a growing awareness of the dangers of economic isolation. The long process of 
bringing Spain back into the realm of European economic cooperation formed the base 
that determined the economic policy adopted at the end of the 1950s. The OEEC, the 
EPU, the ECSC, the Green Pool, and cooperation in transport represented a learning 
process in which the Spanish Administration became aware of its entanglement in a 
situation of strategic interdependence. After 1955, the idea that the Spanish economy 
should adapt itself to the European economy was a matter of public policy.
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ARCHFVALIA
The need to reconstruct a basic network of bilateral relations between Spain and 
its main partners required the consultation of French and British archives. France’s main 
documentary source concerning Spain is the historical archive of its Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Quai d’Orsay. One qualification needs to be immediately made with respect 
to the latter. French diplomatic records come from an administrative division within the 
Quai d’Orsay, which dealt, at the time, mainly with diplomatic and political matters, the 
Under-Direction of Southern Europe. This fact has provoked an inflationary tendency 
towards the political element involved in bilateral relations. Historians have over stressed 
factors such as exile and the Spanish Republican pressure on French government and 
public opinion. This is especially the case if the French diplomatic records have been only 
compensated by records from the National Assembly. The five files disclosed at the Quai 
d’Orsay on Spain’s economic affairs for the period 1945 to 1955 give a misleading 
impression of the importance of economics in Franco-Spanish relations. There has been 
no declassification of records concerning Spain from the General Directorate of Economic, 
Financial and Technical Affairs. Scholars on European economic cooperation have 
benefitted recently from these records but any early release concerning Spain seems 
unlikely.
The latter circumstance imposed to enlarge the range of records in order to 
explain Spain’s intervention in the green pool episode and in European transport 
cooperation, which the French Cabinet initiated after the Schuman's proposal for a coal 
and steel community. Records from the Ministries of Agriculture and Public Works were 
necessary to understand the origins and nature of both initiatives. Records from the 
Archives Nationales, where the documentation concerning the Ministry of Agriculture is 
kepi, and the Contemporary Archives, which houses the records from the Ministry of 
Public Works, enriched the diplomatic documentation. The consultation of these records 
was as intensive as was allowed. Despite a nominal thirty-year-rule, many valuable French 
documents, dating back to 1945, remain unreleased.
The research at the British Public Records Office benefitted from a lack of
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geographical dispersion of and easier administrative access to records. The Foreign Office 
files are more informative in many respects than French diplomatic records. British policy­
making machinery, with the system of Cabinet Committees, combined with the good 
organisation of Cabinet papers, easily reveals the spheres of policy-making going beyond 
diplomacy. Since the Board of Trade’s views on Spain were essential in shaping British 
policy, its records were also considered. The files of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries were consulted in an attempt to obtain a historical contemporary perception of 
the French green pool initiative. The Treasury’s views on policy towards Spain and the 
British perception of the French proposal for transport coordination were followed through 
Cabinet Papers, which completed the inquiry at the PRO. The documentation collected at 
the PRO was complemented by the HMSO printing material from the EU1 microfilm 
collection.
The most important source in Italy would have been the Ministry of Agriculture’s 
records, since some Spanish and Italian agricultural export commodities competed on 
Western European markets. Unfortunately, these records are not open to research due to 
some legal problems with the country's Central Archive. The alternative was to consult 
the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' archive on an ad hoc basis: the Marshall Plan, the 
OEEC liberalisation in agriculture and the green pool initiative. Another documentary 
source consulted in Italy was the European Community Archive, the main non-national 
archive concerning the European Coal and Steel Community. The interest was centered 
on the High Authority’s foreign relations for the years 1952-1956.
The Spanish archives deserve here a more detailed consideration because they 
have constituted the main documentary sources for this Dissertation.1 Access to public 
records in Spain is a recent phenomenon from which only the present generation has 
benefitted. Until the beginning of the 1980s, Contemporary History ended with the 
Spanish Civil War. Current History, which is the most recent contemporary heritage.
*. For precise accounts of tha natura, whereabouts and accessibility of some 
of the most important Spanish archives and other documentary sources, see 
Commission of Historians of International Relations: Newsletter, no. 4, July 
1990, pp. 45—47, Spain's Ministry of Culture's data-base "Censo-Guia de los 
Archivos españoles", and the special issue of Studia Histórica* Historia 
Contemporánea, vol. VI—VII, 1988—1989.
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therefore, did not exist. The Franco period remained outside the scope of historical 
enquiry and was dealt with by other branches of the Social Sciences, such as Political 
Science, Sociology and Economy. The manipulation of History imposed by the Franco 
regime to favour its legitimacy discouraged scholars from studying contemporary history. 
It compelled them to do research in other historical periods with fewer political 
implications and less personal risk.2
The logic of the Spanish Archives is the complete distortion of their original 
design, which dates from 1969. All administrative units were to send their records to the 
central archive of the corresponding ministry, which in turn was to transfer them to the 
Administration’s General Archive (AGA). The latter would have then selected the 
valuable documentation to be kept permanently at the National Historical Archive. This 
three-stage structure was never implemented. The National Historical Archive lacks any 
post-1945 documentation, many ministries still conserve historical records and the AGA 
became a permanent deposit forced to act as a historical archive, inferior in quality to 
other countries’ national archives.
The general administrative reorganisation of the mid-1970s provoked a massive 
transfer of documentation to the AGA causing its immediate saturation.3 Documentation 
was originally filed without any clear indication of contents and remains as such today. 
Valuable sources might be completely inaccessible due to cataloguing problems. Typed 
inventories are not clearly informative and some of the references are ambiguous enough 
to render research ineffective. Despite the state of AGA records, they are the main 
existing records regarding the different technical ministries within the Spanish 
Administration, except for the diplomatic archive and the Bank of Spain. The 
administrative archives at the ministries of Agriculture and Public Works -the latter 
sheltered the Transport Department in the period referred to in this thesis- are in a 
calamitous state. The Spanish Ministry of Agriculture transferred some records to the
J. A phenomenon qualified as "a long lasting kidnapping" by Jordi Nadal, 
Albert Carreras and Carles Sudrià: La economía española en el siglo XX. Ona 
perspectiva histórica. Barcelona [Ariel] 1987, p. 7.
*. Maria Luisa Conde Villaverde: "Fuentes documentales de la Administración 
Central: el Archivo General de la Administración", Studia Histórica, cit., 
pp. 157—67.
632
Central Archive but did not conserve the rest (if indexing is accurate). The visit to the 
archive of the Ministry of Transport was completely useless. On the other hand, the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce was particularly disastrous at keeping records after
1951 and the fish shop cellar which kept some of this Ministry’s records in 1951 was 
demolished to build a modem shopping centre.4 The present state of the archive of the 
National Institute of Industry, visited in an attempt to compensate for the lack of records 
from the Ministry of Industry, impedes any research about Spain’s public industrial policy. 
Although less rewarding than expected, my research at the AGA dealt with records 
belonging to the ministries of Commerce. Agriculture, and Foreign Affairs (sources from 
embassies and diplomatic delegations).
The only fully effective Spanish ministerial archive is at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.5 Since this Ministry reached a semi-monopoly position regarding the State’s 
foreign economic policy, diplomatic papers in part compensate for some lacunae in other 
archives. The Spanish diplomatic archive contains information regarding the different 
viewpoints held by the rest of the ministries involved in the different issues concerned. 
The cataloguing system based on key words makes research depend upon a factor of 
chance.6 For instance, documents referring to die green pool could adopt eighteen
*. Conversation with Mr M&nuel Varela Parache, Florence, 6 July 1989.
5. This archive follows a twenty-year rule for public access, the most 
liberal in Western £urope, where normally a thirty-year-rule is applied; 
ministerial Order of 16 January 1984, BOE of 10 March, regulating 
provisional access, confirmed by the MO of 2 April 1991, BOE of 11th, except 
for the so-called classified matters. The previous administrative circulars 
of 26 October 1970, 3 February 1977 and 11 May 1983, fixed the dates of 
record disclosing as 1900, 1931 and 1935 respectively. Angel Viñas is the 
scholar who had most stressed the importance of opening the archives to 
historical inquiry, i.e. a) "Los archivos como fuente para la historia del 
franquismo", in Ministerio de Cultura: Los archivos para la historia del 
siglo XX, Madrid, 1980, pp. 75-97; b) "Por una historiografía del franquismo 
desde dentro", in Estudios sobre historia de Espafta. Obra homenaje a Manuel 
Tuñón de Lara, vol. 2, Madrid (Universidad Internacional Menéndez y Pelayo] 
1981; and, c) "La historia de la contemporaneidad española y el acceso a los 
archivos del franquismo", Sistema, no. 78, May 1987, pp. 17-36. On the other 
hand, this same author benefitted from personal access to public records 
before 1984.
*. This cataloguing-system is contended to preserve State security, Maria 
Josefa Lozano Rincón and Enrique Romera Iruela: Guia del Archivo del
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid [Servicio de Publicaciones del 
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores] 1981, the only guide to this Archive. 
Researchers of Spanish contemporary international relations lack a 
collection of diplomatic documents and a basic description of the diplomatic 
machinery. There is only a list of international treaties signed by Spain, 
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Secretaria General Técnica, Servicio de
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different (detected) entries, apart from country Hies. Important documents were also found 
by chance: the 1947 Import Programme upon which Chapter three was based belongs to 
a file labelled "Foreign Trade: State of Legislation” (sic). The problem is that, at times, 
the logic of the civil servant writing the labels on the jackets is difficult to comprehend. 
When documentation concerning a specific issue was not found, was it because the 
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs paid no attention to the topic or the researcher was 
unable to find the proper key-word?
The Archive of the Presidency of the Government (APG) at the Ministry of 
Relations with Cortes, was of little use due to the non-existence of important documentary 
records which a researcher might have expected to find there: the Chief of State, 
Presidency of the Government and Secretary of Cabinet.7 Records regarding the Chief of 
State consist of seventy files, which supposedly contain the documents despatched by 
Franco acting as Chief of State. These files only include documents received from the 
different ministries which can also be found in the archive of the original ministry. Only 
few specific documents drafted for the Chief of State and none produced by this office, 
are among the papers which the author of these lines has seen. The El Pardo Archive, 
which initially kept Franco’s papers, was split between the Royal Archive in the Palacio 
de Oriente and the Archive of the Presidency. Since the Royal Archive exclusively 
contains records concerning the internal administration of the palace, the only public 
documentation of the Head of State is limited to the records in the Presidency Archive.
The publication of eight volumes on Franco statecraft and one on Franco’s policy 
towards the USSR, based on Franco’s private papers (sic), proves the existence of non­
public records concerning Franco.' Both publications are evidence that an important part 
of public records escaped public control. They also show the persistent lack in Spain of
Información: Canso de Tratados Internacionales suscritos por España desde 
16 de Septiembre de 1125 a 21 de Octubre de 1975, Vol. I Bilaterales, Madrid 
(Imprenta de la Oficina de Información Diplomática] 1976, of little use.
7. For a short summary of the specific nature of this archive, Maria 
Concepción Contel Barea: "El Archivo de la Presidencia del Gobierno", Studia 
Histórica, Historia Contemporánea, Vol. VI—VII, 1988-89, pp. 169-77.
§. Luis Suárez Fernández: Francisco Franco y su tiempo, Madrid [Fundación 
Nacional Francisco Franco] 1984, 4 vola., and Franco y la ÜRSSy Madrid
[FNFFJ 1987.
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a clear-cut line between public and private documentation. Franco supposedly kept copies 
of important documents, which his wife conserved and, it seems, are now guarded at the 
Francisco Franco National Foundation. The puzzle is that, while public records concerning 
the Chief of State are very much reduced, no access is granted to Franco’s persona] 
papers*
Another relevant aspect of the APG refers to the records of Admiral Carrero 
Blanco. The material conserved regarding Carrero’s continuous government for more than 
30 years (1940-1973) amount to thirty-three dossiers, whilst there is no notice of any of 
Carrero’s personal papers. This lack of primary sources produces a paradox. While some 
scholars consider CaiTero the black beast of the Franco regime, others see him as "one of 
the more persistently liberal members of the Cabinet".10
Cabinet, in turn, never minuted its meetings. The poor substitute is a register-book 
of the subjects reaching Cabinet and the decision adopted in their respect; all written in 
a few lines. This lack of records concerning the highest level of policy-making makes 
extremely difficult to be precise about many aspects of policy-making at some crucial 
points.
A more gratifying archive is the Historical Archive of the Bank of Spain.11 The 
archive houses the records of the Spanish Foreign Exchange Institute (IEME), which
*. The fact also that many minister» or top civil servants left office 
talcing their respective papers with them, should force the Spanish State to 
capture some private papers, following the French model of Ptpiora d*Agents. 
Important titles are based on individual access to important private 
archives, i.e. Javier Tuse11: Franco y los católicos. La política interior 
española entre 1945 y 1957, Madrid [Alianza] 1984, based upon the records 
of Alberto Martin Arta jo, Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1945 to 
1957. The most recent publications on foreign policy by Tusell's 
collaborators made full use of it, Florentino Portero: Francc aislado. La 
cuestión española (1945-1950), Madrid [Aguilar] 1989.
10. Viñas: •'Carrero BLanco y la autarquía**, in Guerra. Dinero, Dictadura. 
Ayuda fascista y autarquía en la España de Franco, Barcelona [Critica] 1984, 
pp. 323-328, versus Charles W. Anderson: The Political Economy of Modern 
Spain. Policy—Making in an Authoritarian Regime, Madison [The University of 
Wisconsin Press] 1970, p. 112.
11. A concise guide to this Archive is Teresa Tortella: "El Archivo del
Banco de España: Cuatro años después**, in Banco de España: Actas del Segundo 
Congreso sobre Archivos Económicos de Entidades Privadas: Fuentes para la 
historia de la Banca y del Comercio en España 26-27 de junio de 1986, Madrid
[Archivo Histórico del Banco de España] 1988, pp. 193-200
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constitutes the main source of information available nowadays regarding Spain's 
commercial policy. The IE ME, set up in August 1939 and subsequently placed within the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce, held a monopoly over the State foreign exchange 
reserves. All commercial and financial operations involving the use of foreign currency 
required its previous authorisation. It also decided upon the exchange rate mechanism, 
following instructions from the Council of Ministers. The IE ME constituted an important 
body of administrative coordination regarding foreign economic policy due to its 
interdepartmental structure. Its highest executive body, the Council of Administration, was 
presided over by the Minister of Industry and was composed of the general directors of 
EEME, Agriculture, Industry, Commerce, Stamp Duty and Monopolies, and Banking. The 
Council’s Steering Committee, set up by a ministerial order of 29 March 1947, which first 
met on 14 April, replaced the Council as the IEME’s executive body from July 1947 to 
January 1949. The consultation of their minutes partially compensates for the lack of 
records from the Ministry of Commerce. Furthermore, the IEME's annual reports are an 
important source of information on foreign economic policy.12 However, this archive 
follows a very disappointing forty-year rule, which presently bars research after December 
1950. Some scholars during the second half of the 1970s used these records fully for the 
post-1950 period. No revision of the historical views expressed in the late 1970s for the 
1950s will be fully undertaken until the end of this Century!13
This research has tried to avoid what can be considered a serious problem in 
approaching Spain’s international relations and foreign policy: the exclusive use of 
diplomatic records. The latter limits the historian’s vision of Spain’s international relations 
to the perception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that is the perceived interests of the 
Ministry and its civilian corps. To limit research exclusively to diplomatic records implies 
the assumption that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs benefitted from an exclusive
l}. The annual reports from 1948 to 1956 and 1957 were never drafted, 
although some documentation concerning them appears in the archive.
11. Viñas et al., op. cit.f and Joaquin Muns: Historia de las relaciones 
entre España y el Fondo Monetario Internacional, 1958-1982. Veinticinco años 
de economia española, Madrid [Alianza Editorial/Banco de España] 1986. The 
author received authorisation to consult the IEME records up to December 
1955 only recently, while writing the final draft of this dissertation. A 
more logical attitude would be for the Board of Governors to adopt the 
Spanish standard 25-year rule for the Bank's archive.
636
monopoly of the country's foreign relations. It did so in the very limited area of 
diplomatic relations but it encountered competition from the rest of the administrative 
departments in other fields of foreign action, especially with respect to economic relations.
There is a generally admitted twenty-five-year rule for access to public archives. 
Every-day reality, however, is frustrating. As a result of administrative apathy, rooms to 
consult records are inadequate and opening hours cruelly short. Research suffers from the 
dispersion of sources, the mislaying of documentation and the traditional chaotic habits 
of the Spanish Administration when dealing with documentation. It is frequent to see files 
kept incomplete and many reports without their technical or statistical appendixes. It 
appears, thus, very difficult to establish the technical basis of many decisions. Even more 
disappointing is to find documentation classified in such an unpredictable and illogical 
way to render its consultation very time-consuming or even impossible. Notwithstanding 
this, innovative historical research can take place. Huge amounts of documentation are 
still waiting to be brought to light and the positive disposition of personnel, the best 
feature of the entire Spanish archives’ structure, is a guarantee that new research will be 
welcome.
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DRAMATIS PERSONAE
Personages are identified exclusively by the position(s) they occupied when they are 
mentioned in this thesis.
Lieutenant-Colonel d’ABOVTLLE, Assistant Military Attaché at the French Embassy in 
Madrid
Dean G. ACHESON, U.S. Under-Secretarv of State 1947-49 and Secretary of State 1949- 
53
Theodore C. ACHILLES, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs at the U.S. 
Department of State
Konrad ADENAUER, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Manuel AGUIRRE DE CARCER. Count of Casa Miranda. Spanish Chargé d’Affaires in 
Paris and Ambassador from December 1950 to July 1952
Duke of ALBA, Spanish Ambassador in London
Jaime ALBA DELIBES, Economic Counsellor at the Spanish Embassy in London in 
1950, Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy and Commerce after July 1951
Luciano ALBO CANDINA, Spain’s Director-General of Commerce and Tariff Policy and 
member of the IEME’s Steering Committee in 1947; Director-General of Foreign Policy 
at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, February 1947-June 1948
Manuel ARBURUA DE LA MIYAR, Spanish Minister of Commerce, July 1951 to 
February 1957; President of the Interministerial Coordinating Committee for the 
distribution of funds available from the economic aid agreement concluded in September 
1953
José Maria de ARE il ZA y MARTIN DE RODAS, Count of Motrico, Spanish 
Ambassador in Buenos Aires 1947-50 and Washington 1954-60
Jaime ARGÜELLES ARMADA, Spanish Under-Secretary of Economic Affairs and, after 
July 1952, Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy and Commerce; Vice President of the 
Interministerial Coordinating Committee for the distribution of funds available from the 
economic aid agreement concluded in September 1953; head of the Spanish Permanent 
Delegation to the OEEC, after March 1955; in September 1955, Argiielles leaves his post 
of Under-Secretary to be Spain's delegate to the OEEC
Norman ARMOUR, U.S. Ambassador to Spain from March 1945 to December 1945, then 
Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs
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Clement R. ATTLEE, Lord President of the Council and Deputy Prime Minister during 
WWIL, British Prime Minister 1945-51
Vincent AURIOL, President of the French Republic, January 1947-January 1954
Sir John BALFOUR, British Ambassador to Spain after March 1951
Germán BARA1BAR y USANDIZAGA, Spanish Chargé d'Affaires in Washington
Juan BARCENAS Y DE LA HUERTA, Head of the American Section of the Spanish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Robert W. BARNETT, Office of Western European Affairs at the U.S. Department of 
State
Joseph BECH, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg
Colonel Juan BEIGBEDER Y ATEENZA, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs August 
1939/October 1940
Edgar J. BEIGEL, Office of Western European Affairs of the U.S. Department of State 
R. de BERCEGAL, French Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Madrid in 1947 
Alejandro BERMUDEZ GONZALEZ. Secretary of IE ME 
Ernest BEVIN, British Foreign Secretary 1945-51
Georges BIDAULT, France’s Minister of Foreign Affairs 1944-48 and 1953-54, President 
of the Provisional Government June to November 1946 and Prime Minister October 1949 
to June 1950
René BLONDELLE, Secretary General of the Fédération National des Syndicats des 
Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA)
Léon BLUM, France's Premier for a little more than a month in 1946-47
James CJL BONBRIGHT, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs at 
the U.S. Department of State 1950-54
Édouard BONNEFOUS, Draftee of the so-called Plan Bonnefous
Philip W. BONSAL, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Madrid between March 1946 
and June 1947
Don Juan de BORBON Y BATTENBERG, third son of Anfonso XU and Pretender of the 
Spanish throne
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Francisco BOZZANO, Attaché for Foreign Economy at the Spanish Embassy in Brussels 
A.R. BRUCE, Official at the Export Department of the Board of Trade 
James F. BYRNES, U.S. Secretary of State 1945-47
Antonio CACHO ZABALZA, official at the Diplomatic Information Bureau. Spanish 
Embassy in Washington
Demetrio CARCELLER, Spain’s Minister of Industry, October 1940-July 1945
Fernando CARDERERA, Attaché for Foreign Economy in Madrid
Admiral Luis CARRERO BLANCO, Minister Under-Secretary in charge of the Presidency 
of the Council of Ministers (i.e.. Secretary to the Franco Cabinet Office), after May 1940.
Femando María CASTELLA MAIZ, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, from February 
1957 to October 1969
Attilio CATTANL Head of the Italian Delegation to the OEEC and Chairman of the 
OEEC’s Executive Committee
Rafael CAVESTANY y ANDUAGA, Spanish Minister of Agriculture, July 1951 to 
February 1957
William L. CLAYTON, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 1944-46 
and Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 1946-47
E.A. COHEN, British civil servant
Guido COLONNA, Deputy Secretary General of OEEC
Tom CONNALLY, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the U.S. Senate
Pedro CORTINA MAURI, Head of the International Organisations Department of the 
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He will be appointed Spanish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in January 1974
J.R. COTTON, Commercial Counsellor at the British Embassy in Madrid
J.E. COULSON, Head of Mutual Aid Department of the British Foreign Office
Paul T. CULBERTSON, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs at the U.S. 
Department of State in March 1945, Head of the Spanish Desk in January 1946 and 
Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Madrid, June 1947 to December 1950
Ernest DAVIES, British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs March 
1950-0ctober 1951
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Leon DEGRELLE, Chief of the Belgian fascist party
John Foster DULLES, U.S. Secretary of State 1953*59 
Jacques DUMAINE, French Ambassador to Portugal
William B. DUNHAM, Country Specialist in the Office of Western European Affairs of 
the U.S. Department of Sute after October 1951, Chairman of the Mutual Assistance 
Advisory Committee Working Group on Spain after December 1951, and Head of the 
Division of Western European Affairs after December 1954
James Clement DUNN, U.S. Ambassador to Italy, France and Spain April 1953 to 
February 1955
Anthony EDEN, Earl of Avon. British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs October 1951 
to April 1955
H.H. EGGERS, Official of the British Treasury
Dwight D. EISENHOWER, General of the U.S. Army, Chief of Staff 1945-48, Supreme 
Allied Commander in Europe 1951-52, 34th President of the United States 1953-61
C. Burke ELBRICK, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary’ of State
Sir Hugh El-I.IS-REES. Financial Adviser to the British Embassy in Spain 1940-44; 
member of the British Delegation to the OEEC with rank of minister in 1948; vice- 
chairman of the Managing Board of the European Payments Union 1950-51; Permanent 
Delegate to the OEEC in 1952 with rank of Ambassador after 1954; Chairman of the 
OEEC 1952-60
Francisco Javier ELORZA Y ECHANIZ, Marquis of Nerva, Commercial Attaché at the 
Spanish Embassy in Washington and then Vice-President of the Spanish Delegation to the 
OEEC
Ludwig ERHARD, West German Minister for Economics
José Sebastián de ERICE y O'SHEA, Director-General of Commerce and Tariff Policy 
at the Under-Secretariat for Commerce, Tariff Policy and Currency at the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce. June 1945/June 1946, then Director-General of Foreign Policy 
at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and first Spanish Permanent Observer to the 
United Nations
José Félix de ESCORIAZA Y BOIX, Agricultural Attaché at the Spanish Embassy in 
Paris
Am in tore F ANFANI, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Juan FERNANDEZ CASAS, Director-General of Banking and Exchange Stock, member
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James FORRESTAL, U.S. Secretary of National Defense September 1947-March 1949
General Francisco FRANCO BAHAMONDE, Spanish Head of State
Nicolás FRANCO BAHAMONDE, the former's brother and Spanish Ambassador to 
Portugal
Francisco FRANCO SALGADO-ARAUJO, Francisco Franco’s military secretary for 1956 
to 1975 and author of an interesting collection of conversations with his cousin General 
Franco
André FRANÇOIS-PONCET, French High Commissary of the French Republic in 
Germany
Sir Oliver S. FRANKS, British Ambassador to the United States June 1948 to February 
1953
Tommasso GALLARTI SCOTTI, first Italian Ambassador to Spain after World War II
Carlos G  AMIR, Counselor of Foreign Economy, Spanish Embassy in Bonn
Juan GARCIA LOMAS, Attaché of Foreign Economy in Brussels
Issac GARCIA DEL VALLE. Director-General of Economic Policy at the Spanish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Herbert E. GASTON, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of 
Washington
Charles de GAULLE, President of the French Committee of National Liberation at 
Algiers, President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic in November 
1945 to January 1946
Ricardo GIMENEZ ARNAU, Attaché of Foreign Economy in Washington D.C.
Francisco GOMEZ-JORDANA Y SOUSA, Count of Jordana, Spanish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, February 1938/August 1939 and September 1942/August 1944
Lincoln GORDON, Chairman of the Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee
Manuel de GOYTIA y ANGULO, Spain's Director-General of Agriculture and 
representative of the Ministry of Agriculture at the IEME Administrative Council
Stanton GRIFFIS, U.S. Ambassador to Spain, March 1951 to January 1952
Sir Edmund HALL-PATCH, Permanent British Representative to the OEEC and Chairman
of the IEME's Steering Committee
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of the OEEC Executive Committee, April 1948-September 1952
Bernard HARDION, Chargé d ’Affaires at the Delegation of the Provisional Government 
of the French Republic in Spain after May 1945, Ambassador after November 1950
Carlton JÜ . HAYES, U.S. Ambassador to Spain, June 1942 to January 1944
R J \  HEPPEL, 1st Secretary of the British Embassy in Madrid after January 1951
John D. HICKERSON, Director of the Office of European Affairs at the U.S. Department 
of State
Paul G. HOFFMANN, U.S. Administrator of the European Cooperation Administration 
1948-50
Outerbridge HORSEY, Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs at the 
U.S. Department of State
Douglas F. HOWARD, British Chargé d’Affaires in Madrid after December 1946 when 
the British Ambassador Sir Victor Mallet left Spain
Pierre HUET, Legal Adviser at the OEEC
Bias HUfclfc CARRASO, Chairman of the Spanish Institute of Foreign Exchange
Jean HUGUES, Commercial Counsellor, Chief of the Economic Division at the French 
Delegation in Spain
R. HUTTER, Vice-Chairman of the ECSC High Authority’s transport division
Lord INVER CHAPEL. British Ambassador to the United States
John Wesley JONES, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Spain between December 1950 and 
February 1951, thereinafter Counselor of the Embasy in Madrid
Eduardo JUNCO Y MARTINEZ-AZCOITiA, Director-General of Commerce and Tariff 
Policy at the Under-Secretariat for Commerce, Tariff Policy and Currency at the Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce, until June 1945
George F. KENNAN, Head of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Staff
Charles P. KINDLEBERGER, Chief of the Division of German and Austrian Economic 
Affairs at (he U.S. Department of State
Major General August W. KISSNER, USAF, leader of the Joint United States Military 
Group negotiating, after April 1952, the granting of military bases by the Spanish 
Government
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Dr Oscar LANGE, Polish Delegate at the United Nations
José LARRAZ LOPEZ, Minister of the Treasury in Franco’s second government, August 
1939 to may 1941 and promoter of a research project, during the 1950s. about the impact 
of a European economic union on the Spanish economy
Harold LASKI, Chairman of the Labour Part)' National Executive
Camille LAURENS, France’s Minister of Agriculture after August 1951
Maurice LE MAIRE, former Director-General of SNCF and initiator of a proposition for 
a European Transport Council
José Félix de LEQUERICA y ERQUIZA, Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs August 
1944/July 1945; inspector of embassies and unofficial Ambassador in Washington after 
1947; official Spanish Ambassador to the United States after January 1951
Edward LLOYD, official at the British Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
John Davis LODGE, U.S. Ambassador to Spain, March 1955 to April 1961
José Maria LOJENDIO, head of the Diplomatic Information Bureau at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Madrid
Fermin LOPEZ-ROBERTS Y MUGUIRO, Marquis de la Torrehermosa, Director for 
Europe at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jean-Marie LOUVEL, French Minister of Industry and Energy August 1951-March 1952
Robert A. LOVETT, Under-Secretary in the U.S. Department of State and Secretary of 
Defense September 1951 to December 1956
Lincoln MacVEAGH, U.S. Ambassador to Spain, March 1952 to March 1953
Pierre MAESTRACCI, Chief de Cabinet of the French Mnister of Agriculture
Roy MAKINS, British Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until 
December 1952
MALECOT, Head of the French Delegation to the European Conference on the 
Organisation of Agricultural Markets (henceforth, ECOAM)
Sir Victor MAT !.FT, British Ambassador to Spain, presented credentials in July 1945 and 
was recalled in mid-December 1946 as result of the resolution of the United Nations’ 
General Assembly
von MALTZAN, German Director-General of Foreign Trade
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Hans Karl von MANGOLDT, President of the European Payments Union 
Skxo L. MANSHOLT, Dutch Minister for Agriculture 
Robert MARJOLIN, Secretary General of the OEEC
General George C. MARSHALL, U.S. Secretary of State 1947-49 and Secretary of 
Defense 1950-51
Alberto MARTIN ARTAJO, Spam’s Minister of Foreign Affairs
René MASSIGLI, French Ambasador to London
Caeiro da MATA, Portugal’s Minister of Foreign Affairs
H. Freeman MATHEWS, U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of State
Patrick A. McCARRAN, Chairman of the Special Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Mutual Security of the United States Senate
Hector Me NEIL, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs between October 1946 and 
February 1950
Pierre MENDES-FRANCE, French Minister of National Economy and executive director 
of the International Bank
Antonio de MIGUEL, Counsellor of National Economy
Jean MONNET, France's High Commissioner for the Plan for Modernisation and 
Rééquipement 1946-52, inspirator of the Schuman declaration of 9 May 1950 and 
President of the High Authority of the ECSC 1952-55
José Antonio MONTES, Vice-Chairman of the Spanish Institute of Foreign Cun-ency
Ben T. MOORE, Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs at the U.S. 
Department of State
Andrés MORENO, Chairman of the Banco Hispano-Americano and special emissary of 
the Spanish Government to Washington for matters related to Eximbank credits
André MORICE, French Minister of Public Works, Transpon and Tourism, after March
1952
Antonio MOSQUERA Y LOSADA, Spanish Commercial Counselor at the Spanish 
Embassy in Paris
Agustín MUÑOZ GRANDES, Spanish Army Minister after July 1951
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Emilio NAVASQUES Y RUIZ DE VELASCO, Director-General of Economic Policy at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until February 1947; Under-Secretary of Foreign Economy 
and Commerce (as such representative at the IEME executive bodies) until the end of 
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